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This thesis investigates the form and function of the Jewish representative organisations of western 
Europe during the Nazi occupation from a comparative perspective: the Dutch Joodsche Raad voor 
Amsterdam (JR), the Belgian Association des Juifs en Belgique (AJB) and the French Union 
Générale des Israélites de France (UGIF). It is the first study in which the three organisations are 
fully compared and contrasted. The aim in doing so is to move away from the inherently moral 
approach that has been taken towards their study. Methodologically, this thesis extends beyond 
individual national contexts within which these organisations have been scrutinised as isolated 
examples. Instead, it highlights their transnational nature, and shows that it is impossible to assess 
these Jewish organisations without understanding the broader western European context in which 
they were forced to operate.  
Three themes are investigated: the organisations’ socio-historical foundations, their organisational 
structures and their connection to illegal networks. First, the thesis looks at those men who went on 
to become chairmen of the JR, the AJB and the UGIF between 1941 and 1943/1944. It examines 
how their status in the prewar Jewish communities affected their wartime position and the nature of 
their leadership. This, in turn, had an impact on the extent to which they were accepted by Jewish 
communities. Second, the thesis shows that the history of how the Jewish organisations’ were 
established as well as ways in which they functioned, means that the Germans did not have a clear 
plan about what the remit of these organisations was supposed to be. As a result, the organisations’ 
leaders relied strongly upon ad hoc decisions. Third, the thesis reflects upon the various ways in 
which the organisations were used as cloaks for clandestine activities and also highlights the 
participation of some of the central board members in these activities. It argues that the Jewish 
organisations facilitated clandestine activities and that these would not have been possible without 
their existence. The assessment of these themes contributes to a more inclusive perspective, in 
which the function of the JR, the AJB and the UGIF is considered within the broader themes of 
Jewish representation and the nature of the National-Socialist regime.  
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Introduction 
On 21 September 1939, Reinhard Heydrich, head of the Sicherheitspolizei und Sicherheitsdienst 
(SiPo-SD), communicated the first decree establishing the Jüdische Ältestenrat (Jewish Councils of 
Elders) in the occupied Polish territories. He did so in the form of an urgent circular letter 
(Schnellbrief), which he sent to the chiefs of all special task forces (Einsatzgruppen) operating in 
the region. The letter set out the design of the Councils’ structure and indicated that the leading 
officials and Rabbis who were to head the organisations were primarily held responsible for the 
maintenance of order and the prevention of acts of sabotage for assistance in the process of 
concentration of Jews.  Even though the Schnellbrief at this point only related to Poland, it became 1
the foundation of the numerous Jewish Councils, representative bodies forced upon the 
communities by the Nazis, that were later established in the occupied eastern European lands. In the 
context of western Europe, no order of this nature has ever been found. Nevertheless, Jewish 
representative organisations were established in western Europe in 1941 as well. An examination of 
their form and function shows that in some respects they differed significantly from one other, even 
more so than the Judenräte in eastern Europe. This thesis is centred on the notion that while the 
histories of the western European Jewish organisations are intertwined, they also differ in crucial 
respects. Even though all organisations were so-called representative bodies, each was distinctive in 
terms of its origin, construction and personnel and the way its leadership decisions were taken. 
Hitherto, no fully comparative analysis of the subject has been sufficiently conducted. This research 
comprises the first comprehensive comparative study of the Jewish representative organisations of 
the Netherlands (De Joodsche Raad voor Amsterdam, JR), Belgium (Association des Juifs en 
Belgique, AJB, or Vereeniging der Joden in België, VJB) and France (Union Générale des Israélites 
de France, UGIF). 
 Existing literature has primarily examined the role of these western European Jewish 
organisations in the context of the nation-state.  However, their establishment and function largely 2
 Isaiah Trunk, Judenrat: The Jewish Councils in Eastern Europe under Nazi Occupation (Lincoln: University of 1
Nebraska Press, 1996; first ed. 1972), 1-2. 
 See, for example, Rudi van Doorslaer and Jean-Philippe Schreiber, De curatoren van het getto: de vereniging van de 2
joden in België tijdens de nazi-bezetting (Tielt: Lanoo, 2004); Michel Laffitte, Un engrenage fatal: l’UGIF face aux 
réalités de la shoah, 1941-1944 (Paris: Liana Levi, 2003); Willy Lindwer, Het fatale dilemma: De Joodsche Raad voor 
Amsterdam, 1941-1943 (Den Haag: SDU Uitgeverij Koninginnegracht, 1995). 
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depended upon circumstances and decisions that were made outside the confines of national 
borders. The essentially transnational nature of these organisations is exemplified by the recurring 
meetings in Berlin between Judenreferenten Wilhelm Zöpf, Kurt Asche and Theodor Dannecker, 
Nazi experts on Jewish affairs who were responsible for the Jewish organisations in the 
Netherlands, Belgium and France respectively.  During these meetings, they discussed progress 3
towards the solution of the so-called ‘Jewish problem’, the implementation of anti-Jewish 
legislations and other ways that might unify anti-Jewish policies in western Europe.  Often held in 4
the presence of SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann, these meetings symbolise the 
transnational nature of the implementation of the ‘Final Solution’ in Europe more broadly and in 
western Europe in particular. A more detailed analysis of the level and timing of anti-Jewish 
directives points to some form of cooperation between those Nazis who were responsible for the 
supervision of the Jewish organisations.  
 The implementation of the yellow star is an example of this. After the Wannsee Conference 
in Berlin on 20 January 1942, during which the so-called ‘Final solution to the Jewish question’ and 
the deportation all European Jews to forced labour and extermination camps in Poland was 
discussed, Dannecker wanted to facilitate deportation by introducing the yellow star in France.  In 5
order to overcome the objections of the Military Administration, which was sensitive to Admiral 
François Darlan’s prediction of a negative response from the French non-Jewish population, he 
encouraged his counterparts in Belgium and the Netherlands to introduce this distinctive sign 
simultaneously. In a telegram sent to the German authorities in Brussels in February 1942, 
Dannecker proposed to negotiate with the Military Befehlshaber of Belgium and the occupied 
French zone on this matter.  In response, the head of the Security Police in France, Helmut 6
Knochen, proposed a meeting between the Judenreferenten of the Netherlands, Belgium and France 
 See, for example, the report on the meeting between Eichmann, Zöpf, Asche and Dannecker in Berlin on 4 March 3
1942, XXVI-18, Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (CDJC), Mémorial de la Shoah; Telegram of senior 
commander of the SiPo-SD in Paris Helmut Knochen to SiPo-SD commander in Brussels Ernst Ehlers concerning the 
yellow star, 10 March, 1942, XLIX1-49, CDJC, Mémorial de la Shoah; Dannecker’s report on a meeting between Zöpf, 
Asche and Dannecker in Berlin, 15 June 1942, Eichmann Trial documents TR.3-585, Yad Vashem; Yaacov Lozowick, 
Hitler’s Bureaucrats. The Nazi Security Police and the Banality of Evil (London/New York: Continuum, 2002), 88–92, 
100–105, 190-193. 
 Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton, “The Nazis and the Jews in Occupied Western Europe, 1940-1944” in: The 4
Journal of Modern History, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1982), 700-701. 
 Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (New York: Basic Books, 1981), 234-240. 5
 Telegram of Dannecker to the German authorities in Brussels concerning the introduction of the yellow star in 6
occupied France, 26 February 1942, XLIXa-45, CDJC, Mémorial de la Shoah; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and 
the Jews, 235-236.
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on 14 March to discuss the implementation of the measure.  Even though, as we will see, the idea of 7
a simultaneous implementation of the star failed, this shows that the timing of its introduction in 
Belgium and the Netherlands depended upon the initiative of the French Judenreferent. The 
structures in which the Jewish organisations were forced to operate were in large part defined by 
processes that were not limited by their country’s borders. This idea is reinforced by postwar 
statements from leading Nazi officials such as Willy Lages, the German chief of the 
Sicherheitsdienst (SD) in Amsterdam. As head of the Zentralstelle für Jüdische Auswanderung 
(Central Bureau for the Jewish Emigration), he was responsible for the deportation of Dutch Jews. 
After the war, Lages referred to visits from his colleagues in Belgium and France, describing how 
the men kept one another informed about the progress of the organisations in ‘their’ countries.  The 8
underlying rationale was that uniform anti-Jewish laws had to be implemented at a similar pace in 
the three countries. This transnational aspect has barely been addressed in existing historiography 
because of the prevailing analyses of these Jewish bodies in their national contexts. 
 Restricting historical examination of the Jewish organisations to the nation-state makes it 
difficult to contextualise the choices made by these organisations’ leaderships, and this in turn risks 
fostering moral judgements.  The behaviour of leaders is often analysed on an individual basis and 9
proper attention is not paid to the larger situational circumstances from which leaders emerged. 
With the exception of some monographs, including those of Vicki Caron and Michel Laffitte on 
France, little overall attention is given to the position of the leaders in the prewar Jewish 
communities in western Europe, or to how the nature of particular Jewish communities affected 
 Meeting of the Judenreferenten at the RSHA - IVB4, 4 March 1942, Berlin, XXVI-18, CDJC, Mémorial de la Shoah; 7
Telegram of Knochen to Ehlers concerning the distinctive sign for Jews, 10 March 1942, XLIXa-49, CDJC, Mémorial 
de la Shoah; Meeting report of Asche and Dannecker concerning the identification of Jews, 15 March 1942, as printed 
in: Klarsfeld, Recueil des documents, 1er Janvier  1942 au 31 Mai 1942. 
 Statement of Willy Lages, Nationaal Archief (NA), Centraal Archief voor de Bijzondere Rechtspleging (CABR), 8
nummer toegang 2.09.09 inventarisnummer 107491 I (PF Amsterdam T70982). 
 The term ‘leadership’ will be used to address those who stood at the helm of the Jewish organisations in Western 9
Europe. Dan Michman proposed the term ‘headship’ as an alternative in the context of the Jewish organisations. 
However, despite the objections raised by Michman to the use of the term ‘leadership’, the council board members did 
fulfil a leadership function. The tasks they took on and the decisions they were forced to make can in my opinion best 
be understood through this term. See: Dan Michman, “Jewish Leadership in Extremis” in: Dan Stone, The 
Historiography of the Holocaust (New York: Palgrave: Macmillan, 2004), 319-340; Dan Michman, “‘Judenräte’ und 
‘Judenvereinigungen’ unter nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft: Aufbau und Anwendung eines verwaltungsmäßigen 
Kozepts” in: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft Vol. 46, No. 4 (1998), 293-304. 
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their leadership.  Indeed, the decision-making processes of the Jewish organisations and their 10
general operations depended upon the decisions and actions of central board members. At the same 
time, these decisions relied strongly on larger (socio-)historical developments where these leaders 
generally had little influence. A comparative analysis of the varying external conditions in which 
the organisations were forced to operate highlights the importance of these factors.  
 Furthermore, little research has been done on the workings of the Jewish organisations 
within the broader context of German persecution of the Jews in western Europe. As a result, the 
depiction of German attitudes towards the organisations has been oversimplified. The institutions 
have traditionally been seen as instruments of Nazi oppression, effectively aiding the process of 
identifying, registering, isolating and deporting the Jews they were ostensibly representing. 
Accordingly, they have been assessed as part of debates about the mortality rates of the Jews in 
individual countries (25%, 40% and 75% in France, Belgium and the Netherlands respectively).  11
As a result, the Dutch Jewish Council, which functioned more effectively, is considered to have 
played a more pivotal role than other similar organisations.  The problem with this approach is that 12
it is based on the highly contested intentionalist perspective which considers that the ‘road to 
Auschwitz’ was carefully planned and premeditated. If we accept this viewpoint, then we also have 
to accept that Jewish organisations were established in order to carry out the orchestrated process of 
removing Jews from occupied countries. However, this approach has long been challenged, first and 
most notably in the early 1960s by Raul Hilberg, who suggested that an order for the so-called 
‘Final Solution’ might not have existed. Instead, he proposed that the genocide of the Jews resulted 
from a sequence of decisions. To him, the annihilation of European Jewry was above all 
‘functionalist’, a bureaucratic process of destruction.  Rather than trying to pinpoint the precise 13
course of events that would explain Nazi policies in terms of continuity, some historians became 
 For France, see: Vicki Caron, Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish refugee crisis, 1933-1942 (Stanford: University 10
Press, 1999). Caron provides a thorough overview of the impact of the prewar refugee stream on the leadership of the 
Jewish community. However, she does not examine how the prewar structures affected the nature of the UGIF’s 
leadership; Michel Laffitte, “Between Memory and Lapse of Memory: The First UGIF Board of Directors” in: John K. 
Roth and Elisabeth Maxwell (eds.), Remembering  for the Future: The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001), 674-687. For the Netherlands and Belgium, such analyses are conspicuously absent. 
 For an overview of the mortality rates, see: Hans Blom, “De vervolging van de Joden in Nederland in internationaal 11
vergelijkend perspectief” in: Gids, Vol. 150, No. 6/7 (1987), 494. 
 See, for example, Griffioen and Zeller, “Jodenvervolging in Nederland en België tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog: 12
Een Vergelijkende Analyse” in: Oorlogsdocumentatie ’40-’45, Vol. 8 (1997), 38-49; Hans Blom, “The Persecution of 
the Jews in the Netherlands: A Comparative Western European Perspective” in: European History Quarterly, Vol. 19 
(1989), 347-349. 
 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (London: Allen, 1961), 177. 13
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increasingly convinced of the Holocaust’s unplanned nature and of the reduced role of Hitler in the 
decision-making process.   14
 Decades of debate ensued between ‘functionalists’ and ‘intentionalists’, and those who 
positioned themselves somewhere inbetween. The functionalists focussed on the structure of the 
Nazi regime while the intentionalists focussed on Hitler’s ideology and intentions to explain the 
course of events. In 1998, Longerich proposed a model in which both views were combined, noting 
that vaguely-worded orders required the personal initiative of those in authority locally, who 
possessed considerable latitude.  This more balanced view focussed on the interactions between 15
central and local authorities. Kershaw shared this view in his biography of Hitler, where he argued 
that the Nazi leader approved the initiatives of those ‘working towards the Führer’, ultimately 
turning into what we now know as the ‘Final Solution’, without any clear or decisive turning 
points.  It is clear that historiography has evolved during recent decades so that we can no longer 16
understand the nature of these Jewish organisations in the context of the intentionalist perspective. 
 By focussing on the broader transnational context of the Jewish organisations and of the 
National-Socialist regime, this thesis builds upon current trends in historiography that explain Nazi 
rule in Europe as unplanned and irrational, represented by the work of historians including Mark 
Mazower and Dan Michman. Mazower has focussed primarily on eastern Europe, arguing that the 
incredible speed of military expansion there outpaced the administrative and intellectual readiness 
of those Nazis responsible for the implementation of genocidal measures. This, according to 
Mazower, explains improvisation on a local level.  Michman centred his research around the 17
eastern European ghettos, claiming that the Nazis ‘never had a clear and unequivocal definition of 
what the ghetto was or should be’.  This thesis situates such findings in western Europe, and 18
reveals that the same characteristics can be identified in the context of the western European Jewish 
representative organisations. It shows that the German position vis-à-vis these organisations was not 
 See, for example, Uwe Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1972), and Karl Schleunes’ The 14
Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy Toward German Jews (Illinois: University Press, 1970). 
 Peter Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung: Eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung 15
(München: Piper, 1998). 
 Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris (London: Allan Lane, 1998); Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis (London: Allen 16
Lane, 2000). 
 Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How The Nazis Ruled Europe (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008).17
 Dan Michman, The Emergence of Jewish Ghettos During the Holocaust (New York / Cambridge: University Press, 18
2011), 3.
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decided in a political or geographical vacuum. It also reveals that the German administration was 
never completely unified, nor had the sole overriding aim to deceive Jewish leaders into assisting 
with the process of destruction throughout the war. Rather, the history of the organisations’ 
establishment is characterised by improvisation and rivalry between the various institutions 
involved in overseeing Jewish affairs.  
 These institutional rivalries materialised differently in the Netherlands, Belgium and France 
and contributed to the establishment of diverse Jewish representative organisations, despite attempts 
to unify anti-Jewish policies in western Europe. Other factors also contributed to their differing 
forms and functions. In order to understand the origins of the organisations’ functional differences, 
this thesis analyses: 1) their socio-historical foundations and the ways that they represented the 
Jewish communities, 2) the histories of their establishment and the variations in their structures and, 
3) their possible roles as covers for clandestine activities. This comparative approach allows us to 
better understand the western European Jewish organisations in their respective countries. It also 
enables us to distance ourselves from the moral approach of apportioning blame for the 
deportations. Contrasting the three case studies leads to a fuller review of those factors which 
contributed to variations in form and function. This, in turn, allows for a better understanding of the 
period of Nazi occupation at large. Other key themes in the historiography of the Jewish 
organisations can be better understood when positioned in a comparative context. These include 
questions about how representative these organisations were and about when and how their leaders 
decided to take up responsibility or resign it. 
 In contrast to the recent comparative study on the Netherlands, Belgium and France 
conducted by Griffioen and Zeller, this thesis does not assume that the function of the organisations 
and the decisions of their leaders were a contributing factor to the different mortality rates of the 
Jews in the three countries.  Many factors have already been investigated to attempt to explain 19
these differences. In 1961, Raul Hilberg argued that the discrepancies might be explained by a 
combination of circumstances including, but not limited to, geographical location, different 
occupational structures and the overwhelming number of Jews who were concentrated in 
Amsterdam.  Other scholars have emphasised additional aspects including the fact that the 20
 Pim Griffioen and Ron Zeller, Jodenvervolging in Nederland, Frankrijk en België 1940-1945: overeenkomsten, 19
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Netherlands had had no experience of the First World War, which meant that there was no existing 
model for the organisation of resistance groups, and the fact that Jews living in the Netherlands 
were well integrated in Dutch society and therefore had a false sense of security.  The almost 21
unlimited power of the German SS and police in the organisation and execution of deportations 
from the Netherlands, compared to Belgium and France, has also been highlighted.  Assessing the 22
role of the Jewish organisations and, more specifically, their leaders in relation to deportation rates 
is problematic for two reasons: 1) it includes an inherent value judgement; and 2) the organisations 
had little influence over their operational efficiency as their room for manoeuvre was predominantly 
decided by the contexts in which they operated. Therefore, this thesis primarily examines the 
complexity of the situation in which the Dutch, Belgian and French Jewish organisations operated, 
providing a nuanced, differentiated and multi-causal understanding of the varied responses of their 
leaders and members in the context of the harsh daily realities with which they were confronted. 
 
‘Jewish Councils’ in Europe: a historiographical overview 
In both western and eastern Europe, historiography on the ‘Jewish Councils’ began in the 
immediate postwar period with an understandably emotional and strongly moralistic response. 
Later, historians attempted to reach a more objective (though still morally weighted) account of 
their function and the choices made by their leaders. Most of the literature remains marginal, hidden 
in more general works on the histories of these countries during the Nazi occupation. In the last two 
decades, attempts to bridge this gap have produced monographs on the Jewish organisations of 
Belgium and France. Rudi van Doorslaer, Jean-Philippe Schreiber and Michel Laffitte have 
published studies focussing on the AJB and the UGIF respectively. Their work has expanded our 
understanding of the structure and function of these organisations. Yet their analyses remains 
limited by national borders. In the Netherlands, the Joodsche Raad is still contentious and no 
monograph on the Council has yet been written apart from Knoop’s critical assessment, which dates 
back to 1983. An overarching study of these organisations in western Europe does not yet exist.  
 In this respect, western European historiography has lagged behind its eastern European 
counterpart. In 1972, Trunk published what is still considered to be the key comparative work on 
  See, for example: Blom, “De vervolging van de joden in Nederland in internationaal vergelijkend perspectief”,  501. 21
 Dan Michman “The Uniqueness of the Joodse Raad in the Western European Context” in: Dutch Jewish History, Vol. 22
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Jewish Councils in eastern Europe. Despite the limited availability of primary sources, Trunk was 
able to give a very detailed and valuable insight into their nature. In his work, the divergent 
characteristics of the Judenräte in various German occupied countries, such as the Councils’ 
relationship with German authorities, were highlighted. Moreover, Trunk assessed the various 
stages of the organisations’ activities over the course of occupation and the relationship between the 
Judenräte and clandestine groups. One of his central conclusions is that Jewish participation or non-
participation in the deportations had no substantial influence on the final outcome of the Holocaust 
in eastern Europe.  As a result, Trunk’s work became the foundation of a new approach towards 23
Jewish representative organisations that was less emotional and more focussed on the specific 
historical context in which they operated. 
  
 In the period that followed, prominent Holocaust historians such as Yehuda Bauer, Yitzak 
Arad, Israel Gutman, Aharon Weiss and Dan Michman entered the debate.  This, in turn, fostered 24
new insights into the broader theme of Jewish leadership during the Nazi occupation. In the edited 
volume Patterns of Jewish Leadership in Nazi Europe 1933-1945 (1977), some of these historians 
reflected upon the function of local Jewish representative organisations. By underlining the 
particular circumstances of the ghettos in which the Judenräte were forced to operate, their analyses 
resulted in the gradual loosening of the more generalised, stigmatising approach to the study of 
Jewish organisations.  Increasingly, Judenräte came to be regarded as an ‘expression of the Jewish 25
community’s desire to conduct its affairs within the framework of a hostile regime whose exact 
intentions were unknown’.   26
 Nevertheless, there has not been a conceptual breakthrough in the study of eastern European 
Judenräte since the publication of Trunk’s comparative work. This is the direct result of a lack of 
comparative works that have built upon his analysis. By providing a comparative perspective on the 
Jewish organisations of western Europe, this thesis contributes not only to the development of 
western European historiography, but also to that of eastern Europe, so that the conclusions of this 
 Trunk, Judenrat, xxxv. 23
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research can be applied to Jewish leadership in Europe under Nazi occupation more broadly. The 
themes discussed in this study – including Jewish leadership, the social foundation of the Jewish 
organisations and their involvement in resistance activities – are common to both eastern and 
western Europe, and also apply to the southern and south-eastern regions of the continent. 
Therefore, this research fosters new insights into the broader theme of Jewish representation during 
Nazi occupation.  
The development of historiography on the JR: the Netherlands 
The historiography on the Joodsche Raad in the Netherlands was personal and emotional in the 
initial postwar years. This is a tendency that can be identified more broadly in both eastern and 
western Europe. The ways in which the activities of the JR were perceived both by scholars and 
others who publicly disseminated their views on the Council seemed, at times, to depend upon the 
aid they themselves had received from the organisation. The first monograph on the Joodsche Raad 
was published in 1945 by the non-Jewish lawyer Koert Berkley, son-in-law of the chairman of the 
Council’s finance committee. Berkley focussed chiefly on its establishment history and activities. In 
his conclusion, which serves as an overall assessment of role of the JR, Berkley underlined that the 
organisation had attempted to serve the interests of the Jewish community. In addition, he 
emphasised that the JR was established by German order and that its leadership had tried to buy 
time by hampering anti-Jewish regulations.  In the years that followed, a more critical evaluation 27
of the JR followed, in the public as well as in academic domains. 
 After 1945, emotional responses to the JR were reinforced by the so-called ‘honour trial’, 
which was instituted at the beginning of 1946. In this, leading members of the Council were tried by 
their own Jewish community members who had organised themselves in the Contact-Commissie 
van de Joodse Coördinatie-Commissies (Contact Commission of the Jewish Coordinating 
Committees).  In December 1947, the honour court ruled that leading Council members had 28
behaved reprehensibly according to various accounts and that they ought to be excluded from all 
 Koert P.L. Berkley, Overzicht van het ontstaan, de werkzaamheden en het streven van den Joodsche Raad voor 27
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leading positions in the Jewish community for life.  Not only were the JR chairmen Abraham 29
Asscher and David Cohen indicted by the honour court, but they were also officially indicted by the 
Dutch public prosecutor at the end of 1947 while the honour court was reaching its verdict – a 
circumstance unique to the Netherlands. The arrest of Asscher and Cohen in November 1947 led to 
much controversy within the community. Newspaper articles show that the trial was substantially 
covered both in the Jewish and non-Jewish press. The illegal newspaper Het Parool published an 
article titled ‘Was dat nodig?’ (Was that necessary?) as a response to the arrest of both men in 
November, after which they were interned ‘like the Dutch collaborators (NSB-ers) and SS-ers’ 
were.  In early 1950, the public prosecutor formulated an indictment in which Asscher and Cohen 30
were accused of helping the enemy by facilitating the deportation of Jews and refusing to accept the 
advice of those who warned against collaboration with the Germans. Shortly thereafter, however, 
the charges were dropped. Asscher died in May 1950 and there was a change of sentiment as people 
longed for a return to normality. Most cases against ‘collaborators’ were dropped and those who 
were convicted received parole.  Nevertheless, the indictments by both the honour court and the 31
public prosecutor are indicative of the unfavourable sentiment vis-à-vis the JR in the immediate 
postwar period.  
 This sentiment is also visible in the academic works published in this period. In 1947, the 
German Jewish journalist Heinz Wielek, who had managed to obtain a position at the Expositur, a 
department of the Jewish Council where the registration of so-called Sperren (exemptions from 
deportation) were processed, argued that the Joodsche Raad had been ‘submissive’ and ‘naive’. At 
the same time, he was convinced that its leaders should not be considered traitors.  In his personal 32
account of the deportations, Deportaties: Westerbork, Thersiënstadt, Auschwitz, Gleiwitz (1945), 
Siegfried Van den Bergh took a more radical position, vilifying the ‘Jewish leaders’ because they 
had not shared their supposed knowledge about what awaited the Dutch Jews upon their arrival in 
eastern Europe.  33
 De Haan, “The Jewish Honor Court in the Netherlands”, 125. 29
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 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the first detailed overviews of the history of the 
Netherlands during the Second World War appeared, with varying analyses and assessments of the 
role of the Joodsche Raad. A few years after the initial emotional responses, the first attempt was 
made to write a detailed overview of the history of the Netherlands during the Second World War by 
Abel Herzberg. Herzberg survived Bergen-Belsen concentration camp and had defended the joint-
chairmen of the JR when they were censured by the Jewish honour court in 1947. His book, Kroniek 
der Jodenvervolging (1950), was the outcome of the research he had conducted for their defence.  34
It has been argued that Herzberg’s personal involvement with both Asscher and Cohen undoubtedly 
helps explain his more conciliatory depiction of their behaviour.  He underlined that Asscher and 35
Cohen were forced to function in isolation and were unable to find a sounding board for their ideas 
within the Jewish community.  He also concluded that they had tried their best to support their 36
fellow Jews, emphasising that they had worked hard, acted cordially and had been very dedicated. 
Despite the fact that things worked out in an unforeseen, terrible way, he concluded that their 
motivations had been honest.  His analysis had a major impact as it was published while the 37
previously mentioned criminal case court was being filed against the Council leaders.  Partly as a 38
result of Herzberg’s claims, the charges against Asscher and Cohen were dropped, as we have 
seen.  Herzberg’s work also became a central text for later authors and ‘opened the debate on the 39
role of the Jewish Council in earnest by defending aspects of its conduct’ as historian Bob Moore 
has indicated.  In subsequent historical analyses, however, the organisation would be regarded less 40
favourably.  
 In 1965, a radical stance was taken by Jacques Presser, who had unsuccessfully tried to flee 
to England after the German invasion of the Netherlands. During the first year of the German 
occupation, due to German anti-Jewish regulations, he was first suspended from his job and 
subsequently fired on 1 March 1941. In 1943, his wife Dé Appel was deported to Sobibór where she 
was killed. Presser went into hiding in May 1943 and, after the war, he became a Professor at the 
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University of Amsterdam (UvA). In 1950, the Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie (RIOD) 
asked him to write the history of the Jews in the Netherlands between 1940 and 1945, which 
resulted in his momentous work Ondergang: de vervolging en verdelging van het Nederlandse 
Jodendom 1940-1945 (1965). Presser blamed the Council chairmen for being submissive and for 
failing to initiate any form of resistance against the German regulations. Furthermore, he 
condemned them for their active role in fostering illusions among the Jews who were deported.  In 41
what he later considered to be the most central section of his book, Presser wrote on the JR: ‘You 
have been the tool of our enemies. You have contributed to our removal’.  While thousands of 42
copies were sold within days and reprints soon appeared, scholars considered the work to be too 
emotional, and Presser was criticised for the double standards he seemed to adopt: he had requested 
and received help from the Jewish Council himself during the war.  Nevertheless, Presser’s work, 43
published two years after Hannah Arendt’s provocative statements about the detrimental role of 
Jewish leaders in the deportation of their coreligionists, set the agenda for future discussions in the 
Netherlands.   44
 Presser’s work also influenced Louis (Loe) de Jong, shaping his perspective on the Joodsche 
Raad. After Germany occupied the Netherlands, De Jong had fled to London where he became a 
popular political commentator for the Dutch radio broadcast Radio Oranje. After the war, De Jong 
was asked to write the entire history of the Netherlands during the Second World War.  His 45
 Jacques Presser, Ondergang: de vervolging en verdelging van het Nederlandse Jodendom, 1940-1945, Vol. 1 (Den 41
Haag: Staatsuitgeverij Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 507-509. 
 Presser, Ondergang, Vol. 1, 514; Conny Kristel, Geschiedenis als opdracht: Abel Herzberg, Jacques Presser en Loe 42
de Jong over de jodenvervolging (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1998), 147. Cohen was very disappointed by Presser’s 
analysis of the JR, see: Letter of David Cohen to Line van Gelder-Cohen, 20 June 1965, as cited in Piet Schrijvers, 
Rome, Athene, Jeruzalem: leven en werk van Prof. dr. David Cohen (Groningen: Historische Uitgeverij, 2000), 221. 
 See, for example, Henriette Boas, “The Persecution and Destruction of Dutch Jewry 1940-1945” in: Yad Vashem 43
Studies, Vol. 6 (1967), 366-367, 372. Both Herzberg and Kisch also detested Presser’s criticism of the Council. 
 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the Banality of Evil (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), 44
104-119. In this well-known work, Arendt among other things underlined ‘the role of the Jewish leaders in the 
destruction of their own people’ (p. 104) and argued that if the Jewish people had been unorganised and leaderless, there 
would have been chaos and plenty of misery but the total number of victims would hardly have been between four and 
six million people (p. 111). Dutch Jewish Council chairman David Cohen wrote a report in response to Arendt’s 
publication in which he claimed, among other things, that Arendt had made many mistakes and that her view was a 
classic example of Jewish self-hatred, see: Schrijvers, Rome, Athene, Jeruzalem, 236. 
 Loe de Jong, De Duitse vijfde colonne in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1953). The 45
extraordinary military and political successes of Hitler made citizens believe that these successes could be explained by 
the ‘invisible hand’ of intelligence agents of the Fifth Column. De Jong provided an overview of the hysteria 
surrounding this Vijfde Colonne and proved that it had been a mere projection of fears that had existed in the 
Netherlands. The central conclusion of his doctoral thesis was that the Colonne had not played a significant role in 
German military victories between 1939-1940. 
!12
subsequent fourteen-volume Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (The 
Kingdom of the Netherlands During the Second World War, published between 1969 and 1991) 
highlighted a central problem in Dutch historiography: the ‘categorisation of individuals, 
institutions and their actions as either goed (correct) or fout (false)’.  Since De Jong’s work 46
focussed on these two extremes, a moral judgement was inherent in the work, leaving little space 
for the grey areas in between. On the role of the Joodsche Raad, De Jong’s judgement was harsh: 
they had aided the Germans in the deportation of Dutch Jewry, he argued. As a result, he considered 
the Council leadership to be co-responsible for the fate that befell the Jews.  By claiming that the 47
JR members could have refused to cooperate with the Germans, De Jong seems to believe that a 
refusal to do so would have been of benefit to the Jews in the Netherlands. In doing so, he ignored 
the fact that if Asscher and Cohen had refused to cooperate, the Germans would simply have 
appointed a new leadership. 
  
 In 1983, journalist Hans Knoop presented an even more critical verdict. In the only 
monograph dedicated solely to the Joodsche Raad, Knoop suggested that the JR was a creation of 
the two Council chairmen, Asscher and Cohen. Whereas the German representative of 
Reichskommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart for the city of Amsterdam, Hans Böhmcker, had originally 
only conceived of a group to represent the Jewish quarter, it was Asscher who proposed the idea of 
Judenrat insisting that Jews should be represented by notables of whom there were none in the 
Jewish quarter.  In light of this claim, Knoop contended that the chairmen were well aware of 48
where their actions might lead. He considered their decision to take the lead over the Jewish 
community as an act of arrogance by the Jewish bourgeoisie at the cost of poor and working-class 
Jews.  Knoop thereby dismissed the idea that some members of the Amsterdam Jewish community 49
in fact genuinely saw it as their task to take up a leading role under increasingly threatening 
circumstances. In the 1990s, historians adopted a more distanced perspective, positioning the 
activities of the JR and the decisions of its leadership in the broader context of German coercion. In 
1995, Houwink ten Cate proposed a more nuanced approach by emphasising the difficulties faced 
by the leadership. He also underlined that although the socio-geographic background of the Council 
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members might have been unbalanced (75% lived in the richest neighbourhoods of Amsterdam), 
Asscher and Cohen had also exempted middle class Jews from deportation.  In doing so, although 50
he did not dismiss the notion that they failed to act in the interest of the poor, Houwink ten Cate 
challenged the assumption that the Council had only tried to protect the upper class of the Dutch 
Jewish community.   51
 Between the mid-nineties and the present day, research on the JR has varied between 
analyses of its establishment history and moral approaches that condemn the Council’s elite for 
refusing to face reality.  There still is a strong focus on the small circle of JR leaders and their 52
actions. Wassertein’s recent (2013) contribution, looking at one of the members of the Joodsche 
Raad, Gertrude van Tijn, is an example of how a more nuanced perspective might be constructed.  53
Wasserstein underlined how beneficial the work of some of the Council’s departments was, 
focussing in particular on social welfare and education. However, his work also demonstrates that 
there is still a tendency to take a moralistic approach towards the JR and, most often, towards its 
two chairmen. Before the war, Van Tijn, Asscher and Cohen were all involved together in the 
Comité voor Bijzondere Joodse Belangen (the Committee for Special Jewish Interests, CBJB), 
headed by David Cohen and Abraham Asscher in order to protect Jewish interests, and its 
subcommittee, the Comité voor Joodsche Vluchtelingen (Committee for Jewish Refugees, CvJV). 
Despite their shared history, for Wasserstein the choices they made concerning social welfare 
diverged during the course of the war. Wasserstein was keen to promote Van Tijn, who was a known 
critic of the Council leaders, and especially of David Cohen. As a result, he has again created a 
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moral dichotomy in which Van Tijn is seen as goed (correct), while the JR leaders are perceived as 
fout (false).   
The development of historiography on the AJB: Belgium 
In Belgium, historiography on the Nazi occupation developed differently. The first studies on the 
German occupation of the country only appeared around the mid-1960s. Contrary to developments 
in other countries – including the Netherlands and France – there was no remarkable surge of 
research in Belgium in the period directly following the end of the war and initial studies were very 
limited in scope.  Several reasons might explain this delayed development. First, there was the so-54
called Koningkwestie, a political conflict between the Belgian King and the government. Unlike the 
government, which had gone into exile, Belgian King Leopold III had retreated as a Prisoner of War 
to his castle in Laken after the Belgian capitulation. As he was convinced that Germany would win 
the war, he wanted to safeguard his position as leader of Belgium. However, Leopold did not 
receive any jurisdiction over the country during Germany’s occupation. Both during and after the 
war, his choices were severely criticised.  This complex history of the Belgian occupation 55
reinforced the more broadly shared notion in western Europe that it was important to look forward 
rather than backwards in order to rebuild one’s country. This discouraged Belgian historians from 
investigating the German occupation of the country in the postwar period. The continued presence 
of a large majority of immigrant Jews who did not feel a compelling affinity with Belgian-Jewish 
history and the linguistic complexity (knowledge of French, Dutch, German, Yiddish, Hebrew and 
English is required in order to carry out research effectively) also worked as deterrents.    56
 Although the first comprehensive scholarly works on the occupation in Belgium only 
appeared in the 1960s, the Belgian judiciary was forced to deal with the issue of the AJB as early as 
October 1944, when Lazare-Maurice Liebmann filed a complaint with the Brussels Military Court 
against the organisation’s leadership.  Liebmann, whose father had unsuccessfully tried to obtain a 57
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leading position in the AJB, blamed the organisations’ leaders, and the Brussels branch leader 
Salomon van den Berg in particular, for their arrogant and ‘immoral’ behaviour.  He filed a 58
complaint based on Penal Article 118-bis and 115, dealing with political and economic 
collaboration.  Roger van Praag, who had worked for the Comité de Défense des Juifs (Jewish 59
Defense Committee, CDJ), a leftist organisation uniting various Jewish organisations that were 
engaged in clandestine activities, filed a second complaint with the Military Court. His main 
criticism was that the AJB leadership had established registration files, including lists of names, had 
propagated the creation of local AJB sections, and had distributed summonses for mandatory 
labor.  As in the Netherlands, these charges eventually evolved into a move to officially investigate 60
the actions of the seven AJB leaders, lasting throughout 1945 and 1946. In this period, several other 
local leading AJB members were also brought to court.  For more than two years, however, there 61
was no actual investigation. In the end, the Belgian Military Prosecutor decided to drop the charges 
and permanently closed the cases against the less prominent defendants in January 1947. Six 
months later, it closed the cases against Ullman, Blum, Benedictus and Van den Berg, arguing that 
the leadership of the AJB had followed the Belgian policy of ‘the lesser evil’, meaning cooperation 
with the Germans in order to prevent a potentially worse outcome, and therefore could not be 
convicted for collaboration or betrayal of the Belgian State. According to the judgement, the AJB 
had worked with the Germans to protect the interests of the Jewish people, and never intended to 
betray the interests of the Belgian State.  62
 It took almost twenty years before scholars started paying attention to the AJB during the 
war. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the first publications on the German occupation and the 
AJB appeared. On one end of the spectrum, scholars perceived the Association as a resistance 
organisation, while others underlined the detrimental role it had played in the deportation of Jews 
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from Belgium.  In 1965, Betty Bieloguska-Garfinkels published a study on resistance activities 63
during the war. In it, she also discussed the activities of the AJB. The fact that she was the wife of 
the former local Luik AJB secretary, Grigorijs Garfinkels, contributed to her conciliatory and even 
positive approach towards the Association. She venerated the AJB by pretending that the Comité de 
Défense des Juifs had been its clandestine extension.  Although some members were indeed 64
involved in clandestine activities and worked for the CDJ, her portrayal of the AJB as a resistance 
organisation was severely criticised by others, including French historian Lucien Steinberg in his 
study on the Jewish Defense Committee: Le Comité de défense des Juifs en Belgique, 1942-1944 
(1973).  Steinberg proposed a more balanced perspective on the AJB’s functions. In his view, the 65
AJB had played a detrimental role as an intermediary in the deportation of Belgian Jews to death 
camps in eastern Europe.  At the same time, he acknowledged that the AJB had become a cloak for 66
clandestine activities at a later stage, impeding the very regime that had created the instrument in 
the first place. By doing this, Steinberg made an important step in acknowledging that the nature of 
the AJB had changed over time and that it had fulfilled various – apparently contradictory – roles 
simultaneously.  
 Between 1983 and 1996, Belgian historian Maxime Steinberg published the first 
comprehensive study on the fate of Belgian Jewry: L’étoile et le fusil. Despite his attempt to provide 
a solid overview of the period of Nazi occupation, armed Jewish resistance and German 
perpetrators were the main subjects of his analysis. As a result, his approach to the war contained an 
inherent moral dichotomy. This becomes apparent in his largely negative and incriminating 
discussion of the AJB, in which he focused exclusively on the correlation between the activities of 
the AJB and the Endlösung. Steinberg positioned the actions of the AJB directly in opposition to the 
attitude of resistance organisations and argued that the AJB had remained in control of the ‘legal 
ghetto’ during the first period of occupation, informing their fellow Jews that they should obey 
German demands up to the very limits of the politics of ‘the lesser evil’.  Throughout the last two 67
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years of the occupation, the AJB, in his view, played only a minor role due to increasing resistance 
and disobedience among the Jews. By refusing to perceive illegality as an alternative approach to 
Germany’s occupation of the country, Steinberg observed, the decisions of the AJB leaders were ill-
considered: ‘their responsibility lay in the fact that they bowed down before the Germans [..], they 
submitted to the orders of the occupier, and urged the Jewish population to follow this legal 
behaviour’.  68
 Only at the end of the 1990s did Michman propose a more balanced perspective. In 1998, he 
rejected the notion that the actions of the AJB leaders should be exclusively regarded in the context 
of the so-called ‘Final Solution’. A closer look at the emergence of the AJB, together with a 
comparative viewpoint would, in his view, contribute to more ‘subtle conclusions’.  Six years 69
earlier, Michman had published an article in which he compared the Dutch Joodsche Raad with its 
western European counterparts. The failure of subsequent historians to satisfy Michman’s demands 
for more comparative analysis was the result of two factors. First, the number of publications in 
Belgium on the subject was minimal up until the late 1990s. Second, foreign researchers seemed 
little inclined to include the Belgian case in their (comparative) studies since doing so would require 
solid knowledge of both French and Dutch.   70
 The most recent publication on the history of the AJB is an edited volume by Rudi Van 
Doorslaer and Jean-Philippe Schreiber in 2004. The contributors cover various themes relating to 
the Association’s establishment, activities and postwar reception. The focus on the German 
perspective – in particular the continuous struggles between the Military Administration and the 
Sipo-SD – contributes to a better understanding of the opportunities the AJB had to thwart German 
policies. At the same time, the analysis is almost exclusively limited to the AJB and Belgium itself. 
Moreover, the work is largely descriptive and lacks a thorough analytical framework. A broader 
perspective outlining the AJB’s antecedents or its position in contemporary Belgian society, for 
instance, is absent. In addition, the authors were unable to distance themselves from judging 
 Ibid., “The Trap of Legality: The Association of the Jews of Belgium” in: Michael Marrus, The Nazi Holocaust: The 68
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historical events, despite their attempts to use a more objective approach. This is most obvious in 
the concluding chapter where Van Doorslaer and Schreiber condemn the AJB leaders for favouring 
the small minority of assimilated Jews over the more numerous but less fortunate group of Jewish 
immigrants.  In their view, while the AJB had begun with good intentions, it had been unable to 71
disentangle itself from a situation in which it was used by the Nazis in ways that were detrimental to 
Belgian Jewry.   72
The development of historiography on the UGIF: France 
The development of French historiography is less linear than that of the Netherlands and Belgium, 
where the approaches to the JR and the AJB evolved from moralistic studies focussed on individual 
leaders to attempts to position their actions within the context of the German occupation. This might 
be explained by the fact that the UGIF itself was less of a uniform organisation than its western 
European counterparts. The organisation in fact consisted of two organisations, one in the occupied 
and one in the unoccupied zone, and each functioned distinctly.  Moreover, the organisations that 73
were forced under the umbrella of the UGIF in the unoccupied zone also generally functioned 
independently during the occupation. In the immediate postwar period, approaches to the activities 
of the UGIF were nuanced compared to the literature on the JR in the Netherlands and the AJB in 
Belgium. In the period that followed, approaches varied from moralistic assessments of the UGIF 
leaders to attempts to understand their activities in the broader context of the German persecution of 
the Jews. 
 Between 1944 and 1947, the UGIF leaders were, like their Dutch counterparts, tried by a so-
called jury d’honneur (honour court) imposed by the French Jewish resistance.  The aim was to 74
restore the internal cohesion of the Jewish community, which had been seriously dented by wartime 
experiences.  There were two instances in which this was attempted. First, the Comité d’Unité et 75
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de Défense des Juifs de France (Committee for the Unity and Defence of the Jews of France, 
CUDJF) arrested UGIF’s president Georges Edinger and set up a purge commission that 
investigated the activities of the organisation’s employees.  Second, the Conseil Representatif des 76
Israélites de France (Representative Council of the Israelites of France, CRIF) created a jury of 
honour to investigate, among other things, the culpability of five leading UGIF members in the 
arrest of Jewish children who had been living in Neuilly in one of the organisation’s facilities.  The 77
CRIF had been established in January 1944 and officially represented both immigrant and French 
Jews. It was created in order to coordinate political action among Jews in France and included 
representatives from the Central Consistory, the FSJF, the UJRE and other Bundist, Zionist and 
youth groups.  78
 The jury concluded that mistakes had been made, but the president of the CRIF Léon Meiss 
launched a follow-up inquiry in January 1947, after which the verdict was reversed in favour of the 
UGIF. This kept the inquiry from being expanded to examine the conduct of the UGIF in general.  79
Contrary to the Dutch and Belgian cases, the French Court of Justice made no attempt to bring the 
Jewish leaders to trial. In light of the postwar (moral) reconstruction of the country, this was 
apparently not considered desirable. The very fact that there was no official judgement of the 
actions of the UGIF leaders encouraged a re-intensification of moralistic discussions about the 
relationship between the Germans, Vichy and the UGIF in the first decades after the war.  The 80
earliest example of this dates back to 1947, when both leaders of the collaborationist Commissariat 
Général aux Questions Juives (General Commission for Jewish Affairs, CGQJ), a collaborationist 
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Vichy body that directly oversaw the UGIF, were tried: Xavier Vallat and Darquier de Pellepoix. 
Vallat incriminated the Jewish organisation’s leaders. This confused French public opinion on the 
status of the UGIF leaders and their role in the deportation of the Jews even further.  81
 The first major postwar publications in France relied on the archives established within the 
Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (CDJC, Contemporary Jewish Documentation 
Center), which had been clandestinely established during the war in order to document the 
persecution of the Jews in the country. Léon Poliakov, Joseph Billig and Zosa Szajkowski were the 
first historians to investigate the German occupation of France and the role of the UGIF.  In 1947, 82
the Jewish French-American historian Szajkowski (born in Poland) identified the conflicting views 
that existed on the Judenräte in general and the UGIF in particular. His perspective on the UGIF 
was moderate. Whereas the French Zionist leader Marc Jarblum, who had refused to be appointed 
as a UGIF central board member, demanded that the organisation’s leaders should be brought to 
trial immediately after the war, Szajkowski argued instead that the leaders were not to be blamed for 
their actions. He claimed that the UGIF had played a heroic role, because all clandestine activities 
undertaken in France had been cloaked by the organisation.  Besides, he argued that historians 83
should withhold themselves from any moral judgements as they are generally unaware of the 
hardships that the leaders faced.  In a similar vein, Léon Poliakov emphasised how he mistrusted 84
any moral judgement of the past.  However, in his 1954 publication Harvest of Hate: The Nazi 85
Program for the Destruction of the Jews of Europe he failed to follow his own credo by claiming 
that ‘many outright scoundrels insinuated themselves into the councils’.  Around the same period, 86
historian Joseph Billig took a more nuanced approach in his work on the CGQJ in which he 
highlighted the complexity of the history of the UGIF and the multi-faceted nature of the 
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organisation.  These early works focussed in particular on the personalities of the Jewish leaders 87
and their relation with German and Vichy authorities.  88
 
 It would take almost two decades before historians would undertake alternative approaches 
towards the subject, focussing less on the leaders’ personalities and more on institutional contexts. 
In the late 1970s Vicki Caron made an important connection between the UGIF and clandestine 
organisations, arguing that the existence of the UGIF was important, and even essential, to making 
illegal aid to Jews available during the occupation.  In doing so, she encouraged scholars not to 89
perceive the UGIF as a monolithic institution, but instead to understand it within its socio-historical 
environment, and in the context of its relations to other organisations. In the period that followed, 
the nature of studies varied. With the opening of the French national archives and the systematic 
collection of survivor testimonies in the 1980s, more studies appeared on the persecution of the 
Jews in the France, but many failed to follow Caron’s contextual lead. 
 The first monograph on the UGIF appeared in 1980, written by left-wing journalist Maurice 
Rajsfus, whose parents were murdered during the Holocaust: Des Juifs dans la collaboration: 
UGIF (1941-1944). The title of this work – Jews in collaboration – is indicative of its content. 
Rajsfus was himself the son of immigrant Jews from eastern Europe, and his perspective was highly 
moralistic and disapproving. He accused ‘established Jewry’ of sacrificing foreign Jews while 
pursuing their own, class-based interests. In particular, Rajsfus blamed the UGIF leaders for their 
failure to reflect upon their own decisions: ‘[they are convinced] that they have rendered an 
invaluable service to their Jewish community and pursue their actions without departing from this 
certainty’.  In addition, he condemned the fact that they lied to their ‘coreligionists’ about the 90
condition of those who had already been deported.  It is clear that Rajsfus assessed the function of 91
the Jewish organisation with the preconception that they were collaborators. In contrast to this 
approach, Serge Klarsfeld argued that the provision of aid was the central objective of the UGIF. In 
his work Vichy-Auschwitz (1983), he underscored how the majority of French Jewry was able to 
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survive as a result of their activities, even through the deportation of others could not be prevented. 
Even though the UGIF was not established as a resistance organisation, he claimed that its leaders – 
André Baur, Raymond-Raoul Lambert, Marcel Stora and Fernand Musnik – all died as resistance 
fighters. He also emphasised that the number of Jews the UGIF had helped outweighed the number 
it had led towards Drancy.  92
 In the same period, Cynthia J. Haft published The Bargain and the Bridle (1983), in which 
the UGIF was uncritically referred to as a Judenrat. She defined the UGIF as an institutional trap 
and claimed that it was an impeccable machine that could be equally efficient in any country in 
which it was established.  Haft did not make a distinction between the French Jewish organisation 93
and its eastern European counterparts, and the work lacked a thorough understanding of the 
essentially different natures of the UGIF from eastern European Judenräte. Five years later, Jacques 
Adler, who had participated in a Jewish unit of the Communist resistance during the war, assessed 
the function of the UGIF in Paris within a broader context. The prewar differences between the 
bourgeois French Jews of Paris’ western arrondissements and the immigrants in working-class 
communities were accentuated during the war, so much so that the French Jews did little to save the 
immigrant Jews, he claimed. Adler underlined the UGIF’s failure to warn the foreign Jews against 
the major Vélodrome d’hiver (Vél d’hiv) roundup of 16-17 July 1942 in time. That day, around 
13,000 Jewish, men, women and children from Paris were arrested. The UGIF had been informed 
about the upcoming mass arrest on 1 July, but informed immigrant organisations only on 13 July. 
Above all, Adler argued that the UGIF was to blame for its failure to protect children whose parents 
had been deported, or whose parents had voluntarily handed them over to UGIF care. He claimed 
that the UGIF should have dispersed the children into hiding during the last phase of the German 
occupation (July 1944). Their failure to do so, in his view, resulted in the arrest of these children 
and their deportation to Auschwitz.  Despite these accusations, however, he did not consider the 94
organisation’s leaders guilty of betrayal. Rather, he argued they were men of conscience who tried 
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to provide the help they could to deportees.  Even though Adler managed to introduce some nuance 95
into his argument, his judgement of the UGIF remained clear.  
 In the mid-1980s, Annette Wieviorka made an important contribution to the debate by 
making a solid distinction between the eastern European Judenräte and the UGIF. She highlighted 
that in contrast to the Councils in eastern Europe, the UGIF had never been used to directly organise 
deportations. According to Wieviorka, the French organisation was never as instrumental to the 
aims of the German occupier as were the eastern European Judenräte.  In 1985, Cohen edited 96
Raymond-Raoul Lambert’s diary, head of the UGIF-Sud and ‘arguably the most important French 
Jewish official in contact with the Vichy government and the Germans during the war’, for 
publication.   This allowed for a more ‘internal’ examination of the workings of the UGIF and of 97
the dilemmas its leaders faced. Most importantly, Cohen placed the UGIF within the larger context 
of prewar social tensions between different Jewish groups.  Two years later, he published a detailed 98
study of the French Jewish leadership during the Holocaust: The Burden of Conscience: French 
Jewish Leadership during the Holocaust (1987).  Here, Cohen was the first to make an analytical 99
distinction between the nature of the UGIF-Nord in the occupied zone and the UGIF-Sud in the 
unoccupied zone, illustrating his wish to differentiate between the two Jewish organisations in 
France. He underlined how the social structures in which these two bodies operated were markedly 
disparate. The social backgrounds of those individuals who worked for the organisations were by no 
means uniform, either. By focussing on the struggles between the traditional leadership of the 
Consistoire Central des Israélites de France (Central Israelite Consistory of France, CC), the body 
governing the Jewish Congregations of France, and the newly appointed UGIF leadership, Cohen 
provided a thorough insight into the nature of the  prewar Jewish communities in France, providing 
a reference point to explain how the Jewish organisations emerged.  In an attempt to give an 100
overall evaluation of the actions and decisions of UGIF functionaries, he argued that its leaders 
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were forced to operate in an impossible situation, but that they were also guilty of wishful thinking, 
exaggerated legalism and an unfounded confidence in the robustness of French liberal traditions.   101
 In the decade that followed, historiography did not take a uniform direction. Whereas 
Schwarzfuchs focussed on the problematic nature of the UGIF, Laffitte instead showed how the 
UGIF had been beneficial to the Jewish community and to other Jewish social welfare 
organisations. Schwarzfuchs claimed that only because of the aid of other community organisations, 
such as the Consistory and the Rabbinate, the UGIF had not been instrumental in the solution of the 
so-called ‘Jewish question’ in the way the eastern European Judenräte had been.  In his aim to 102
provide a more inclusive picture of the behaviour of Jews in France during the occupation, he 
positioned the UGIF in opposition to that of other Jewish organisations, claiming that the latter did 
everything they could to obstruct Nazi, and Vichy policies – and that the UGIF did not. By doing 
this, he once again made the UGIF an example of the ‘wrong’ kind of Jewish institutional 
behaviour. Schwarzfuchs’ chapter focussing specifically on the UGIF is tellingly named le drame de 
l’UGIF – the disaster of the UGIF.  
 In 2003, Laffitte published a monograph on the UGIF entitled Un engrenage fatal: l’UGIF 
face aux réalités de la Shoah 1941-1944. He provided a different perspective from that of his 
predecessors, denouncing the accusatory approach that had hitherto been a part of research on the 
subject. Instead, he focussed on different aspects of the UGIF’s history, demonstrating, for example, 
its important work as a social welfare organisation.  Laffitte underlined the complexity of the 103
social structures in wartime France, in which various parties – the Consistory, the Comité de 
Coordination and UGIF-Nord and UGIF-Sud – had entirely different and changing perspectives on 
the occupation. The opposition between the various parties involved, including the issue of 
immigrant Jewry, shows the difficult context from which the organisation emerged. The lack of 
comparative analysis, however, makes Laffite’s work less useful for understanding the broader 
context of German rule in which the UGIF functioned. Laffitte touched upon the question of how 
the UGIF has been seen as part of a broader European memory and argued that Michman’s 
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comparative approach towards the Jewish organisations is problematic. He claimed that the UGIF’s 
history is specifically French and its memory specifically Jewish.  His predominant focus on the 104
UGIF in its national context is indicative of the general lack of comparison with the histories of 
other Jewish representative organisations (in western Europe) in existing literature.  
Methodology and structure: a thematic approach 
 
This research is organised thematically and will be based on a series of case studies. The three 
major themes – the Jewish organisations’ socio-historical nature, their organisational structures and 
their connections to clandestine operations – are examined through a combined bottom-up and top-
down analysis. This allows for an understanding of the larger structures from which the JR, the AJB 
and the UGIF unfolded, and of the ambiguity of German intentions throughout the course of the 
occupation, while also examining the choices and experiences of the Jewish leaders. The often 
changing contexts and the ways in which this affected the leaders’ individual agency highlight the 
stressful circumstances in which they were forced to operate. This comparative perspective 
emphasises the impact of varying external conditions on the function of the organisations and on 
their leaders’ choices.  
 The function of these Jewish bodies was largely defined by the national contexts in which 
they operated and a comparative approach, rather than a transnational approach, is therefore central 
to this research. Yet, the transnational nature of the Holocaust, including, for example, the German 
decision-making processes and the passing of information between the countries under 
investigation, will also be reflected upon. The main aim is to compare and contrast the nature and 
function of the Jewish representative organisations and to explain and understand their differences 
and similarities in the broader context of the occupation (in their respective countries). A 
comparative approach allows for a better understanding of the distinctive characteristics of the 
Jewish organisations and the unique national contexts in which they operated. These aspects cannot 
be, and have not been, recognised in analyses that are limited to the level of the nation-state (which, 
as we have seen, has been the predominant approach in existing historiography on these Jewish 
organisations). The fact those responsible for Jewish affairs, the so-called Judenreferenten, met in 
Berlin to discuss and align anti-Jewish measures in the Netherlands, Belgium and France shows that 
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the implementation and execution of measures was also depended upon decisions that were made 
outside the borders of the nation-state. These Judenreferenten exchanged ideas and shared their 
experiences not only when they physically met in Berlin, but also, as we will see, through letters 
and reports on the state of affairs in ‘their’ countries. Transnational aspects such as these were 
inherent to Nazi bureaucracy, and will be taken into accounts throughout this research.  
 It should be noted in particular that the organisational and functional divergence between the 
UGIF-Nord in the occupied zone and the UGIF-Sud in the unoccupied zone, even after the German 
invasion of the southern zone in November 1942, necessitates an approach that considers the UGIF-
Nord and the UGIF-Sud as two separate organisations. The two central UGIF boards, one for each 
zone, in fact never met in common session until 15 February 1943, when the plans for a 
reorganisation of the UGIF into a centralised body in Paris were discussed.  We will therefore 105
examine four case studies: the Dutch JR, the Belgian AJB, the French UGIF-Nord and the French 
UGIF-Sud. This thesis focuses predominantly on the Jewish representative organisations instituted 
in the Netherlands, Belgium and France, excluding other western European countries and colonies 
or overseas territories of these countries, either because similar organisations were not imposed on 
their communities, or because the nature of the organisations in those instances was essentially 
different. In Algeria (under the rule of Vichy France), for example, a Jewish representative 
organisation was established by decree on 14 February 1942: the Union Générale des Israélites 
d’Algérie (UGIA), modelled after the UGIF.  Like the UGIF, the UGIA became the substitute for 106
all existing Jewish organisations and its board members were chosen from among the Jewish 
leadership.  After the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942, the organisation was 107
 Because it was established by Vichy, the presidency of the UGIF and the office of the general-secretary were situated 105
in the unoccupied (later southern) zone. For the meeting on 15 February, see: Adler, The Jews of Paris, 140; Laffitte, 
“Between Memory and Lapse of Memory, 674.
 Yves C. Aouate, “La place de l’Algérie dans le projet antijuif de Vichy (octobre 1940-novembre 1942)” in: Revue 106
française d’histoire d’outre-mer, Vol. 80, No. 301 (1993), 605; Valérie Assan, “Israël William Oualid, juriste, 
économiste, professeur des universités” in: Archives Juives, No. 1, Vol. 46 (2013), 140. It should be noted that Richard 
Ayoun has inaccurately claimed that the UGIA was instituted by decree on 31 March 1942. See: Richard Ayoun, “Les 
Juifs d’Algérie dans la Tourmente Antisémite du XXe siècle” in: Revue Européenne des Études Hébraïques, No. 1 
(1996), 77. 
 Ayoun, “Les Juifs d’Algérie dans la Tourmente Antisémite du XXe siècle”, 77-78. For further reading on the UGIA 107
and its distinct position in relation to the UGIF, see: Aouate, “La place de l’Algérie dans le projet antijuif de Vichy 
(octobre 1940-novembre 1942)”, 605-607. 
!27
disbanded. In Morocco and Tunisia, no traces can be found of a similar Jewish organisation.  This 108
has to be understood against the background of the impediments encountered by Vichy in these two 
countries. Whereas the application of racial laws was done on ‘extremely fertile terrain’ in Algeria, 
Italian and Spanish influence in Tunisia and Morocco served to hamper the implementation of 
Vichy racist policies.  Since the UGIA was hardly functional and operated in a different (colonial) 109
context than the Jewish organisations in the Netherlands, Belgium and France, it was not considered 
fruitful to include this case study. In the case of Luxembourg, the fact that the country had a very 
small Jewish community made the existence of such an organisation superfluous. Over 3,000 Jews 
fled the country immediately after the beginning of the military campaign in the West in May 1940 
or left by October 1941 for France or Belgium. Around 816 Jews remained, of whom 664 were 
deported in a total of seven transports – the first in October 1941 and the last in June 1943.  In 110
Norway and Denmark, Jewish organisations modelled after the Judenräte were never established 
for various reasons, including the fact that relatively few Jews lived in these countries.  111
 The western European Jewish organisations, and the Dutch JR in particular, are often looked 
at as derivatives of the Judenräte in Poland. However, even though the term Judenrat is used across 
the continent, a direct comparison between eastern and western Councils would not be relevant to 
this study. The Netherlands, Belgium and France have been chosen as case studies in a comparative 
framework because the intentions of the Nazi occupiers in these western European countries were 
similar. In contrast to eastern Europe, the West was considered capable of some degree of 
Nazification. The context in eastern Europe was entirely different. The conditions in the General 
Gouvernement, where ghettos were present, is only one example of this. For the same reasons, a 
comparison with Germany and the German Jewish representative organisation, the 
Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland, established in 1939, was not considered useful. The 
Reichsvereinigung was established for different purposes than were the JR, the AJB and the UGIF, 
 For further reading on the Jews in North Africa specifically during Nazism, see: Michel Abitbol, The Jews of North 108
Africa during the Second World War, translation from French by Catherine Tihanyi Zentelis (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1989); Revue d’Histoire de la Shoah: Les Juifs d’Orient face au nazisme et à la Shoah, 1930-1945, 
Vol. 205 (2016). 
 Abitbol, The Jews of North Africa, 74-83. 109
 Marc Schoentgen, “Luxembourg” in: Wolf Gruner and Jörg Osterloh, The Greater German Reich and the Jews: Nazi 110
Persecution Policies in the Annexed Territories 1935-1945 (New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 2015), 307-311.
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Routledge, 2011), 232-247. For Denmark, Mette Bastholm Hensen and Steven Jensen, Denmark and the Holocaust. 
(København: Institute for International Studies, Department for Holocaust and Genocidestudies, 2003). 
!28
namely to encourage mass emigration, an aim that was no longer possible by the time the western 
European organisations were established. In addition, whereas the German association was founded 
in the perpetrator country, the other bodies were established by a foreign occupying power. In the 
cases of the Netherlands, Belgium and France, the ground for making a fruitful comparison is solid 
with similar characteristics across the cases. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to limit the analysis of 
this research to these three countries exclusively. The German Reichsvereinigung as well as the 
eastern European Judenräte unquestionably served as blueprints for the western European Jewish 
organisations and there are parallels between some of their functions and leaders. This thesis 
recognises these connections and, when relevant, takes them into consideration. 
 The first chapter of this thesis explores the structure of society and the composition of the 
Jewish communities in the Netherlands, Belgium and France before the war, and highlights the 
similarities and differences between the three countries’ social structures. These include the number 
and outlook of (eastern European) Jewish immigrants, the presence of official religious Jewish 
representation and Jewish integration in non-Jewish society in each case. The chapter shows the 
impact of contextual variation on the form and function of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the 
UGIF-Sud. Central themes are the level of integration of Jews into the non-Jewish communities, the 
position of immigrant Jews vis-à-vis the longstanding Jewish population, the level of religious 
adherence, the role of religious institutions and the organisational structure of the Jewish 
communities. An investigation of these themes is necessary in order to understand the premises on 
which the Jewish organisations were built. 
 
 The chapter also looks at the position of the Jewish organisations’ leaders within their 
respective communities. With a few exceptions, the representatives of local branches have been left 
out of the analysis because the decision-making processes and the operations of the Jewish 
organisations mostly depended upon the central boards. In the cases of Belgium and France, 
attention is paid to all members of the AJB, UGIF-Nord, and UGIF-Sud central boards (between 6-9 
in total). By contrast, in the Dutch case, the emphasis is on the two Council chairmen, Asscher and 
Cohen, because of the power of their positions. We see that whereas in Belgium and France, all 
central board members played important roles in the organisations’ decision-making process, the 
administration of the JR was exclusively in the hands of these two chairmen.  
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 By assessing the prewar social positions of the leaders, as well as their personal backgrounds 
and (religious) beliefs and convictions, the wide social variation in the organisations’ central board 
membership becomes evident. This allows for a better understanding of the extent to which the 
central board members of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud (felt they) represented 
the Jewish communities. It also contextualises their acceptance by these communities. We will see 
that the variations in this regard affected the motivations of the chairmen to take up a leading role in 
the organisations. Some chairmen exhibited a confident belief that there was no one else who could 
better take up the leadership of such an important organisation, while others felt uncertainty and 
discontent about having been forced into the situation. The central board members’ confidence, or 
lack thereof, determined their choices at later stages. These different attitudes also help to explain 
some organisational divergences, including why some of the leaders of the AJB and the UGIF-Nord 
and the UGIF-Sud were replaced while the Dutch leadership remained in place until the JR was 
dismantled in 1943.  
 The second chapter deals with the organisational structures and functions of the four Jewish 
bodies. Although the German policies for western Europe were decided centrally in Berlin, and the 
Judenreferenten of the Netherlands, Belgium and France (who supervised the deportation of Jews 
from their countries) met there in order to discuss anti-Jewish legislation in their respective 
countries, the structure of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud differed. This chapter 
explores the causes and nature of these discrepancies. Germany’s intentions for each of the 
organisations are highlighted, with a focus on the rivalry between the various German (and, in the 
French case, Vichy) institutions that affected the course of events. The chapter shows that the 
Germans improved and copied blueprints from elsewhere, without taking the context of the specific 
country into consideration. In this sense, it is interesting to assess German expectations of the 
organisations and how these altered during the course of the war.  
 This chapter looks at the organisation and daily obligations of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-
Nord and the UGIF-Sud. In the decades following the war, we have seen that historians like 
Maurice Rajsfus in France, Heinz Wielek in the Netherlands and Maxime Steinberg in Belgium 
have assessed the behaviour of the organisations’ leaders from the perspective of collaboration.  112
This method has stood in the way of an objective analysis of the daily activities of the organisations. 
 Rajsfus, Des Juifs dans la collaboration; Wielek, De oorlog die Hitler won; Maxime Steinberg, L’étoile et le fusil. 112
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The vague wording of the establishment orders indicated that it was partly up to the chairmen 
themselves to find a suitable structure. Although there are similarities in the way such orders were 
executed – social welfare was at the centre of each of the organisations’ activities, for instance – the 
differences are more striking and would prove decisive for the course of events. This chapter 
reflects upon the day-to-day functions of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud, 
unveiling discrepancies between German aims and the practical functioning of the organisations. 
The conclusions of this chapter demonstrate why the JR, from the German point of view, functioned 
better than its Belgian and French counterparts. 
 The last chapter deals with the Jewish organisations’ connections to organised resistance 
groups and other forms of opposition. The topic is delicate since their leaders have often been 
condemned for their failure to resist any form of cooperation with the Nazis. The Jewish 
organisations were, after all, essentially created by the occupying power for the purpose of 
complying with German demands. Resistance, therefore, was an exception. Nevertheless, the focus 
on apportioning guilt to the organisations’ leaders after the war by official courts (of honour) has 
encouraged a misguided analysis of their wartime activities. The perspective from which these 
courts assessed the behaviour of the organisations’ administrators, namely whether they were indeed 
guilty of having collaborated with the Germans, obscured the complexity of activities in which they 
had been (passively) engaged. The aim of this chapter is not to argue that these Jewish organisations 
were resistance organisations. Rather, by providing an overview of the various forms of opposition 
that took place in and around their presence, this research gives more balanced analysis of the 
complex mixture of activities in which the leadership and membership were engaged during 
occupation. 
   
 The chapter assesses two central themes, the first being the way in which the JR, the AJB, 
the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud were used by others as cloaks for clandestine activities. Overall, 
the very presence of these organisations in all three countries facilitated, in varying degrees, 
clandestine activities that would never have been possible without their existence. The connections 
between official Jewish bodies and illegal subversive groups in Belgium and France were complex, 
manifold and fluid. The similarities between these two countries are measured against the different 
situation in the Netherlands, where the legal nature of the Joodsche Raad, and the information and 
financial resources it possessed, were barely taken advantage of by clandestine workers. The 
chapter also reflects upon the illegal activities of the organisations’ members themselves and shows 
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that the JR’s leadership’s absence of engagement in such activities is distinct from the situation in 
Belgium and France.  
Terminology 
The term Jewish Councils (the literal translation of the term Judenräte) is in fact not entirely 
accurate in the context of the Jewish representative bodies of Belgium (the AJB) and France (the 
UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud). Only the Dutch Jewish Council was officially referred to as a 
Judenrat. The AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud were Vereinigungen (Associations), whose 
form and functions were based on the example of the German Reichsvereinigung der Juden in 
Deutschland. This thesis highlights the institutional (dis)similarities between these organisations 
and therefore terminologically differentiates between the JR on the one hand and the AJB, the 
UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud on the other. The Dutch JR will be referred to as a Jewish Council, 
the Belgian and French bodies, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud, are referred to as 
Associations. For general claims on the four organisations, the term ‘Jewish (representative) 
organisations’ is used. Even though the organisations were not always considered as representative 
by a (substantial) part of the Jewish communities, this was essentially what both their leaders and 
the Germans aimed for.  
 For the discussion of Jewish communities in Belgium and France, the plural communities 
rather than the singular community, will be used in order to underline the diverse nature of these 
populations. Using the term community would imply a form of coherence which was absent in these 
two countries. The first chapter shows that the influx of sizeable numbers of immigrants in the 
prewar period contributed to the diversified nature of the Jewish communities in both countries. 
Finally, it should be noted that the term ‘collaboration’ will not be used with reference to the JR, the 
AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud. In historiography, the notion of collaboration has been 
used to describe the behaviour of the Jewish organisations’ leaders. Recently, sociologist Evgeny 
Finkel has re-evaluated the terminology used to describe Jewish behaviour during Nazi rule. He 
introduced four strategies in which the Jews engaged during the Holocaust: (1) cooperation and 
collaboration; (2) coping and compliance; (3) evasion; and (4) resistance. Finkel makes an 
important distinction between ‘cooperation’ and ‘collaboration’, two terms traditionally used to 
describe the behaviour of Jewish leadership during the Second World War. In his view, the key 
difference is the intended goal of the actions taken. Those who cooperated ‘wanted to preserve the 
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community and its members’ and those who collaborated ‘knowingly acted to the detriment of the 
community’s or individual Jews’ survival’.  One can furthermore argue that collaboration implies 113
some form of identification with the enemy’s goals, in this case those of the German occupier, 
which was absent in the case of the representative organisations forced upon the Jewish 
communities. This thesis is built on the notion that cooperation, rather than collaboration, is the 
more accurate term to use in the context of the western European Jewish organisations.  
Sources 
The variety of sources used in this thesis uncovers the heterogeneous nature of the Jewish 
organisations and shows that their function changed over the course of time. Correspondingly, the 
(self-) perception of their leaders and their intentions altered and were by no means consistent. It 
should be noted that only a handful of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud 
employees kept diaries or reported on the course of events during the war. Those who survived gave 
relatively few testimonies after the war. It is therefore necessary to combine administrative 
documents, trial records, personal testimonies (wartime and postwar) and biographical documents 
to reach an understanding of personal motives and experiences and of the choices made by the 
Jewish leaders. The sources used for this thesis fall broadly into four categories: 1) prewar 
immigration and naturalisation reports; 2) administrative documents; 3) wartime reports written by 
the Jewish leaders; 4) postwar (honour) trial reports and accounts of Jewish, German or Vichy 
individuals who were involved in the affairs of the Jewish organisations. These sources are for the 
most part stored in national archives across western Europe, the United States and Israel. In light of 
the themes and scope of this research and in consultation with local archivists, local archives were 
considered less critical since most relevant local archival material (or copies of it) was available at 
central research institutions. 
 In the cases of the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud, the majority of the administrative 
documentation is concentrated in Paris, primarily at the Centre de Documentation Juive 
Contemporaine (CDJC) – Mémorial de la Shoah (YIVO, Fonds UGIF, MDC). The meeting reports 
of the Commission Central and the Central Consistory of late 1941 and early 1942 highlighted the 
traditional leaders’ criticism of the institution of the French Association and this proves essential for 
 Evgeny Finkel, Ordinary Jews: Choice and Survival during the Holocaust (Princeton: University Press, 2017), 7. 113
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understanding its position in French Jewish society. Although this aspect has been examined in 
existing literature, this research sheds new light on the impact of these discussions on the function 
of both the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud.  Its leaders were aware that they were constantly 114
scrutinised, and this contrasts with the Netherlands, where the JR received fairly little coordinated 
criticism. At the National Archives in Paris, the papers of the Commissariat Général aux Questions 
Juives (AJ38) and trial documents, including those of Xavier Vallat (3W/ 336-338), Louis Darquier 
de Pellepoix (3W/142) and Armand du Paty de Clam (3W/168) have been employed by other 
historians seeking to examine Vichy and the Jews.  This research has used these sources 115
specifically in under to understand how CGQJ officials, who directly oversaw the UGIF, as well as 
Jewish leaders, reflected upon the interaction between the two organisations.  
 In Belgium, the entire body of AJB administrative documentation is stored at Kazerne 
Dossin in Malines (the collections of the Joods Museum voor Deportatie en Verzet and the Centre 
National des Hautes Études Juives). This material was first extensively explored in Rudi van 
Doorslaer and Jean-Philippe Schreiber’s 2004 book: De Curatoren van het Getto: De Vereniging 
van de joden in België tijdens de nazi-bezetting. The Belgian Ministry of Justice’s Foreign Police 
(N. 682.302) files, including the naturalisation reports, were hitherto unexplored in the context of 
the AJB. This thesis shows that this source material provides a significant insight into the nature of 
the organisation’s leadership, since some of the leaders were (recent) eastern European immigrants. 
This differs from the situation in the Netherlands and, as we shall see, to some extent from that in 
France too. In the Centre for Historical Research and Documentation on War and Contemporary 
Society (CEGESOMA), interviews conducted with Jews in Belgium in the 1960s and 1970s about 
the Jewish organisations and the resistance (AA1196) proved insightful for understanding how the 
Jewish organisations were wittingly or unwittingly used as cloaks for various forms of illegal 
activity. Postwar reports by various individuals involved in the AJB, including the first chairman 
Salomon Ullman (AAMIC/41) and Maurice Heiber (AA1915/22), head of its social service 
department, also proved useful in this regard. At the Belgian Military Krijgsauditoraat, the 
 See, for example: Adler, The Jews of Paris, 81-82; Laffitte, Juif dans la France Allemande, 46-50; Cohen, “Le 114
Consistoire et l’UGIF: La situation trouble des Juifs Français face à Vichy” in: Revue d’histoire de la Shoah: Le 
Consistoire durant la seconde guerre mondiale, 28-37; Cohen, The Burden of Conscience, 57-67.
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testimonies that were conducted in preparation for the trial against the AJB leaders (No. 8036 N 
1944), in combination with the as yet little explored trial documentation against members of local 
AJB branches (ARA2, Militair auditoraat) show how ambiguously Jewish society reflected upon 
the function of the AJB. 
 The quantity of material available in Belgium and, especially, France is immense compared 
to that in the Netherlands, where substantial parts of the Joodsche Raad archive are missing (with 
much destroyed during the war). The remaining material, including the administrative documents, is 
mainly stored at the NIOD Institute for War-, Holocaust- and Genocides Studies in Amsterdam. In 
existing literature, the personal (both wartime and postwar) documents of the JR’s leaders and 
administrators, David Cohen, Gertrude van Tijn and Mirjam Bolle, have been used independently in 
earlier research, but rarely in a combined analysis.  Since the focus of this thesis extends beyond 116
the level of individual Council leaders or members, the combination of these sources yields a 
multifaceted perspective on the experiences and choices of the Jewish leaders. As the last, and only, 
monograph on the Dutch Jewish Council dates back to 1983 and as the documentation on the JR has 
not been thoroughly explored since, this thesis uncovers new sources.  For example, it uses the 117
documentation of the local Leeuwarden branch of the JR, located at the Yad Vashem archive in 
Israel. Moreover, the author has carried out interviews with Mirjam Bolle, who worked as a 
secretary of the Dutch Council. At the National Archives in The Hague, the legal documents of the 
proceedings against the JR leadership (CABR 107491) and against SS-Hauptstürmbahnführer 
Ferdinand aus der Fünten (CABR 66) and SS-Sturmbahnführer Willy Lages (CABR 140) highlight 
the views of both the JR’s leaders and their German overseers about the course of events. All of 
these sources have their limitations. Administrative documents, for example, rarely show the 
doubts, fears and reluctance of the Jewish organisations’ leaders. Trial documents often contradict 
one another because people largely tried to depict their actions in a positive light. Postwar memories 
and testimonies are coloured by information received after the events. Individuals’ recollection of 
events often changes over the course of time. Nevertheless, by cross-checking sources, it is possible 
to overcome most of these limitations.  
 See, for example, Mirjam Bolle,“Ik zal je beschrijven hoe een dag er hier uit ziet”: Dagboekbrieven uit Amsterdam, 116
Westerbork en Bergen-Belsen, ed. and foreword by Johannes Houwink ten Cate (Amsterdam/Antwerpen: Uitgeverij 
Contact, 2003). In this thesis, the 2005 reprint of this work has been used; David Cohen, Voorzitter van de Joodse Raad: 
de herinneringen van David Cohen, 1941-1943, edited and foreword by Erik Somers (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2010); 
Wasserstein, Gertrude van Tijn en het lot van de Nederlandse Joden. 
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 This research is unique because it combines a large variety of sources, including those to 
which there is limited access such as the Dutch CABR legal records of individuals who were 
accused of collaboration, stored at the national archive in The Hague. Moreover, the comparative 
nature of this research ensures that primary material that might have been considered less relevant 
by researchers who have looked at the Jewish organisations in a national context, is now considered 
relevant. This is true, for example, in the case of the immigration and naturalisation reports of some 
of the AJB’s board members in Belgium. This research constructs a new analytical framework on 
the basis of both previously discovered material and newly discovered documentation.  
!36
Chapter 1.  
The Councils’ Socio-Historical Foundations 
On the eve of the Nazi occupation, the vast majority of the Jews in Belgium and France were 
immigrants from central and eastern Europe. In total, around 95%, 45% and 15% of the Jews in 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands respectively were immigrants.  They had mainly settled either 1
at the turn of the century or during the 1930s, when anti-Jewish hostilities grew in their home 
countries. Their presence affected the nature of the Belgian and French Jewish communities to a 
large degree. Immigrants organised themselves in so-called Landsmannschaften and maintained 
their own traditions. The large majority did not assimilate into the longstanding Jewish population. 
Partly because of this, traditional representative organisations such as the Consistory were under 
pressure. The lack of unity ensured that they could no longer represent the Jewish communities in 
the way they had done for centuries. In the Netherlands, by contrast, the vast majority of Jews 
belonged to families who had been living in the country for at least a hundred years. Since the 
number of immigrants, mostly from Germany, was relatively low, the refugee crisis had less impact 
on the nature of the community.  As a result, the Jewish community and its leadership was better 2
able to keep existing structures in place throughout the 1930s.  
 This chapter shows that the nature of the prewar (Jewish) communities and the position of 
prewar Jewish leadership in these communities was decisive in shaping the self-perception of the 
wartime Jewish organisations’ leaders. Prewar social structures largely determined the level of 
acceptance of these organisations by Jewish communities. The chapter argues, among other things, 
that the relatively well-integrated prewar position of the Dutch Council leadership – Abraham 
Asscher and David Cohen – in combination with a relatively stable Jewish community, resulted in a 
more confident self-perception of their role compared to that of their Belgian and French 
counterparts. This in part explains why they remained in place until the JR was dissolved in 
September 1943, whereas their Belgian and French counterparts were either voluntarily or forcibly 
removed from their positions during the course of the war. This chapter highlights the impact of 
these voluntary and forced removals. It argues that the change of leadership in Belgium and France 
 For an overview of the estimated number of Jews in each country at the outbreak of the war and their composition see: 1
Griffioen and Zeller, Jodenvervolging in Nederland, Frankrijk en België, 170. 
 Ibid. 2
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unintentionally created a form of disorder and chaos and thereby fostered the ideal circumstances to 
delay the execution of Nazi anti-Jewish measures. 
 Three aspects are crucial if we want to understand the context in which the Jewish leaders 
took up their positions. First, unlike the situation in some eastern European countries, those who 
refused to be appointed to the central boards in western Europe were not punished. By contrast, the 
Jews who were appointed to the Judenrat in Bilgoraj (Lublin district in Poland) were threatened 
with the death penalty in the event that they refused to accept their appointment. In the case of 
Kolomyja (Poland, currently Ukraine), Chaim Ringelblum and his family were taken away after 
refusing to accept his nomination. But nothing similar occurred in any of the three western 
European countries.  Moreover, in many communities in eastern Europe, the establishment of the 3
Councils was accompanied by intimidation, threats, humiliation and massacres.  In western Europe, 4
there were Jews who refused their nomination despite German pressure as well as those who 
resigned their positions either before or shortly after having been appointed. For example, in the 
Netherlands Rabbis Lodewijk Hartog Sarlouis and David Francès refused to accept their 
appointment by the Germans.  In France, we see that the same applied in the cases of Marc Jarblum 5
and René Mayer. In Belgium, Joseph Teichmann did not take up his assigned role. There were no 
repercussions in any of these cases. Taking this context into consideration, there is a need to 
examine the motivation of those who did accept appointments as central board members to lead the 
organisations. For some, their appointment was the definitive wider official representation they had 
been working towards for years. This was particularly the case for Asscher and Cohen in the 
Netherlands and to some extent for Raymond-Raoul Lambert, leader of the UGIF-Sud in France. 
For others, including the chairman of the Belgian Jewish Association Salomon Ullman, this aspect 
hardly played a role. It is exactly these kind of differences that this chapter seeks to explain and 
understand.  
 Second, it was not yet clear to the Jewish leaders in 1941, when the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-
Nord and the UGIF-Sud were established, what the exact tasks of these organisations would be. We 
will see that even the Germans themselves were not sure of the organisations’ remit. The basis on 
 Moshe Taytelboym, Bilgoray. Yizkor bukh (Jerusalem, 1955), 108 as cited in: Trunk, Judenrat, 21. 3
 Trunk, Judenrat, 22-26. 4
 Berkley, Overzicht van het ontstaan, de werkzaamheden en het streven van den Joodsche Raad voor Amsterdam, 5
12-13; Cohen, Voorzitter van de Joodse Raad, 80.
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which the Jewish leaders accepted their nomination in 1941 was mainly that of providing social 
welfare, something that has been obscured by the literature, which has understood their function in 
the context of deportation. Third, it was clear that if Jews were to decline their appointment to the 
central board, which occurred in all three countries, others would be nominated instead. Thus, even 
if Jews had refused to take up their designated role, the four Jewish organisations would still have 
been established. Furthermore, a recurring criticism of the Jewish leaders is that they were not 
representative of their communities since they were ‘notables’ and could not represent its (highly 
diversified) nature.  In this context, it is important to acknowledge that the Germans would never 6
have opted for a Jewish representative of the lower echelons of society. Since the Germans in all 
three countries indicated that the organisations ought to unite the Jewish communities, they were 
specifically looking for Jews who had a prominent prewar social standing.  
 
1.1 The pre-1940 structures of the Jewish communities  
 
To understand the leaders of the Jewish organisations in the context of the communities they were 
supposed to represent, and to examine whether their appointment at the helm of these bodies should 
be considered a continuation or discontinuation of prewar structures, one needs to be aware of the 
social structures that predated the establishment of the bodies. Aspects including the level of Jewish 
integration into non-Jewish communities, the position of immigrant Jews vis-à-vis the longstanding 
Jewish population, the level of religious adherence, the influence of Zionist thinking and the 
traditional organisation of the Jewish communities, are all elements that contributed to the different 
fabric of the Jewish communities in the Netherlands, Belgium and France before the outbreak of the 
Second World War. As soon as the Germans invaded the three western European countries, they 
encountered entirely different communities. During the occupation, the Germans voiced the 
intention that the Jewish organisations should represent and coordinate all Jews in each country 
respectively, but the extent to which this was viable will be examined below.  7
 See, for example, Lieven Saerens, Vreemdelingen in een wereldstad: een geschiedenis van Antwerpen en zijn joodse 6
bevolking, 1880-1944 (Tielt: Uitgeverij Lannoo, 2000), 502-503; Knoop, De Joodsche Raad, 22.
 Adler, The Jews of Paris, 57; Van Doorslaer and Schreiber, Curatoren van het getto, 85; Knoop, De Joodsche Raad, 7
81-82. 
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Traditional organisation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries  
 
Between 1870 and 1920, the Netherlands underwent a process of accelerated change, expansion and 
prosperity which was felt by almost all sections of society, including Jews.  In 1889, 98,000 Jews 8
lived in the country. They were mostly concentrated in the major cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and 
The Hague) with the largest percentage in Amsterdam (56%). In terms of religious orientation, the 
1848 declaration of a separation of Church and State resulted in a remodelling of the Portugese-
Israelite and Dutch-Israelite (Ashkenazi) denominations in 1870. Elected in 1874, the Chief Rabbi 
of the Nederlands-Israëlitische Hoofdsynagoge (Dutch-Israelite Synagogue) Jozef Hirsch Dünner 
(1833-1911) and the wardens of the Sephardic Jewish community (parnassim) left their imprint on 
Jewish religious life for years.  Under their leadership, religious life became a remarkable 9
combination of Orthodox religious services, ‘an “orderly” conduct of worship and the acceptance of 
a rather lax observance of the Jewish commandments by large groups of affiliates’.  Apart from 10
major celebrations, a decline in regular synagogue attendance and observance was visible, 
exemplifying the increasing secularisation of Dutch Jews.  The country’s economic, social and 11
cultural circumstances ensured emancipation, assimilation and acculturation as well as integration.  12
It was increasingly difficult to speak of the Ashkenazi and the Sephardi Jewish community from the 
end of the nineteenth century onwards, a distinction that had divided Jews in the Netherlands for 
decades.  We will see that fragmentation of the Jewish community in the Netherlands was less 13
rigid in comparison to neighbouring Belgium and France.  
 
 In the period between the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the social and political 
orientation of Dutch Jews, specifically in Amsterdam, changed. Jewish labour organisations were 
founded and a few pioneer Jewish workers entered the socialist movement. While the anti-
authoritarian disposition of the Sociaal-Democratische Bond (Social Democratic Union, SDB) as 
well as its anti-clericalism, had previously fitted ill with the traditions and convictions of Jewish 
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workers, Jews now became well-integrated in the labour movement and were ‘conscious of being a 
worker and socialist in the first place and a Jew second (if at all)’.  This was partly caused by the 14
general economic decline in the late 1880s. The decline strongly affected the diamond industry and 
spawned unemployment and poverty among the Jewish diamond workers, who were traditionally 
well-represented in this industry. Combined with the fact that the socialists had become more 
moderate and were no longer as unpopular as in the early 1880s, this was a major catalyst for the 
shift of Jewish workers to the socialist movement.  Jews also worked in other areas, including the 15
cigar industry and the garment sector, where they entered the respective unions. Through the 
socialist movement, Jews became involved in the SDAP, the Dutch socialist party in which Henri 
Polak – head of the Algemene Nederlandse Diamantbewerkers Bond (the General Dutch Diamond 
Workers’ Union, ANDB) played a leading role.  Overall, Jewish participation in trade unions 16
meant relative integration into Dutch (working class) society even though inside the SDAP, Jewish 
members were occasionally seen primarily as Jews rather than socialists.  Between 1813 and 1940, 17
positions that officially represented the State, such as those of mayor, Commissioner of the King, 
governor or ambassador, generally remained inaccessible to Jews. Only two Jewish ministers were 
appointed in this period and only a few Jews served in the First Chamber, the Second Chamber 
(which, together with the First Chamber, formed the Dutch parliament), the Provincial Councils or 
Municipal Councils.  In 1940, eight out of 100 members of the Second Chamber were Jews: four 18
socialists, two progressive liberals, one liberal and one communist.  It should be noted that these 19
members of the Dutch parliament had Jewish origins, but did not necessary feel connected to Jewish 
life and culture; they included, for example, converted Jews. It is indicative of prewar anti-Jewish 
sentiment that those in Dutch society generally believed that Jews ought not to fulfil political 
representative functions. In 1933, for example, strong criticisms were voiced when four Jews (of 
different political parties) were simultaneously elected as Aldermen in the municipality of 
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 The relatively high level of Jewish social and cultural integration and assimilation meant 
that Zionist ideas did not flourish well in the Netherlands. For various reasons, including the Chief 
Rabbis’ wishes to combine Orthodox Judaism in the religious sphere with the integration of Jews 
into the national culture, the socialist and orthodox movements were hostile to Zionism.  The 21
neutral position of the Netherlands during the First World War resulted in an increase of Zionist 
activity in the country in this period, in part because the Belgian Zionist Federation transferred its 
office to the Dutch capital city of Amsterdam. Germany’s invasion of Belgium in August 1914 
prompted the exodus of thousands of Belgian citizens who had been predominantly dispersed 
among France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In the following months, ‘all the frontier 
communities in the Netherlands were invaded by a continual flood of refugees’.  On 1 November 22
1914, as many as 320,000 Belgian refugees resided in the country.  The influx of thousands of 23
Jewish refugees from Belgium, almost all of them Jews originally from eastern Europe, caused a 
stronger impulse of organised Zionist activity, although there remains disagreement among 
historians as to the exact impact of Zionist ideas in this period.  Whereas some scholars, including 24
Blom and Cahen, have suggested that the role of Zionism was marginal, others such as Brasz 
underlined its importance in strengthening Jewish identity in preventing further assimilation into 
non-Jewish society.  However, we can say that Zionist activity was stimulated throughout the 25
1930s. By 1936, the earlier rejection of Zionism by the Dutch Rabbis had radically changed: 
Lodewijk Hartog Sarlouis could only be appointed Chief Rabbi of Amsterdam because he agreed 
not to oppose Zionism.  In this period, the Nederlandse Zionistenbond (the Dutch Zionist Union, 26
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NZB) noted a strong increase in members: from 2094 in 1931 to 4246 in 1939.  This can mainly be 27
explained by the fact that Jews were concerned for those Jews being persecuted abroad. In this 
period, the Zionist movement’s sense of national solidarity was turned primarily towards matters of 
social welfare rather than politics.  28
 
 Despite the blurring of distinctions between separate Jewish communities, Jews could 
nonetheless not be considered a homogeneous group in the interbellum. Conflicts regarding 
religious and economic divisions encouraged some to move away from religious observance and 
from regarding themselves as Jewish at all.  The organised Jewish congregations in Amsterdam, 29
both the Hoogduitse (Ashkenazi) and the Portuguese (Sephardi), lost their central function in Jewish 
life. Instead, they focussed on Jewish religious affairs exclusively.  Many Jews felt a stronger 30
connection to their Dutch, rather than their Jewish, roots. However, despite Jewish integration into 
socialist circles and other forms of non-Jewish life, Jewishness continued to remain an important 
distinctive feature. This was in large part the result of the nature of the Dutch society, which was 
structured according to so-called zuilen – pillars. Protestants and Catholics each had their pillar. 
Even though Jews did not officially have their own pillar, they still occupied a distinct position.  31
 
 There exists a gap in the literature about the nature of  Belgian Jewry at the beginning of the 
twentieth century and in the interwar period. In the absence of a comprehensive overview, the 
analysis of this period here is based on book chapters, articles and fragmentary discussions of the 
subject. After Belgian independence in 1830, Jews from the Netherlands and France (mostly from 
Alsace-Lorraine) settled in the country. Increasing poverty in the Dutch countryside and 
discrimination against Jews in Germany and France fuelled immigration to Belgium, which was the 
pioneer country in terms of industrialisation on the continent and provided an open political climate. 
As in other western European countries, the history of the small group of Jews in Belgium can be 
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characterised by increasing emancipation and assimilation from the end of the eighteenth century 
onwards. From the 1880s, there was a significant influx of eastern European Jews from Poland, 
Russia and Austrian Galicia (among other places) who were fleeing antisemitism and poverty. As a 
result, the Belgian Jewish community, which had been very small at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, increased ten times in size in the second half of the nineteenth century to around 20,000 in 
total.  The presence of these newcomers, who settled mainly in the cities of Brussels, Antwerp, 32
Arlon, Gand and Liège, radically changed the nature of Jewish society in Belgium. This was 
particularly visible in terms of demography and in the social and religious outlook of Jews. The 
immigrants introduced new socialist-Zionist ideas and the movement grew in size and diversity, 
varying from the leftist Linke Poale Tsion to supporters of Jabotinsky’s revisionist Zionist ideas and 
from the orthodox-zionist Mizrachie to the atheist and marxist Hashomer Hatsaïr.  Zionist ideas 33
had a larger scope and impact than in the Netherlands and France at this stage. Although at first a 
movement of opposition against the status quo, the Zionist movement underwent a process of 
accelerated change and after the First World War even became part of the Jewish establishment in 
Belgium – unlike the situation in the Netherlands and France.  Even in the more traditional 34
Consistory circles, pro-Zionist views were introduced as early as 1926. Historian Daniel Dratwa has 
convincingly argued that this continued to be the case throughout the 1930s with the nomination of 
Rabbi Joseph Wiener, an adherent of Zionist ideology for the post of Chief Rabbi in 1932.  35
 
 As in France, immigrants to Belgium from central and eastern Europe remained wedded to 
their political and religious traditions. They distinguished themselves from the longstanding Jewish 
population and even more so from Belgian non-Jewish society, despite the fact that there was a wish 
to integrate into Belgian society in exchange for ‘a decent existence’.  As a result, Jews rarely 36
fulfilled representative political functions for the Belgian State.  There were a few exceptions, 37
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including Léon Sasserath and Herbert Speyer. Sasserath was mayor of Dinant and senator of the 
liberal party in the Namur-Dinant-Philippeville department from 1935 but he had no ties to the 
Jewish community.  Speyer was, among other things, senator of the liberal party in the Arlon-38
Marche-Bastogne-Neufchâteau-Virton department between 1912 and 1925.  39
 
 Religious orthodoxy became stronger with the influx of eastern European immigrants in 
Belgium. The traditional Jewish leadership of the Consistory was forced to respond to these 
transformations. Aware of the increasing Jewish orthodox presence in the country, it aimed to 
safeguard the position of this group in Belgian society. It successfully ensured that the renewed 
influence of orthodoxy was acknowledged by the Belgian State and this included the recognition of 
the orthodox Machsike Hadass communities of Brussels and Antwerp.  These communities also 40
participated in the Consistory and, in doing so, played a role in the spiritual development of Belgian 
Judaism.  The liberalism that was an essential feature of the Jewish Central Consistory encouraged 41
the broadening spectrum of ideological diversity and pluralism among Jews. In a Jewish society that 
was increasingly changing, the Consistory managed to remain the central religious representative 
organisation of Jews in Belgium. Combined with top-down governance of Jewish communities 
under the umbrella of the Consistory, this created a form of stability.  As we shall see, this was 42
about to change in the 1930s, after the second influx of eastern European Jews into the country.  
 
 In France, by the end of the nineteenth century, around 72,000 Jews resided in the country.  43
Outside Alsace-Lorraine, Jews were traditionally heavily concentrated in towns, but with the 
exception of a few cases, ‘no city [..] seems to have boasted more than a thousand Jews’.  In Paris, 44
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by contrast, the Jewish population had grown exponentially throughout the nineteenth century. By 
1900, 50-60 percent of the Jews in France lived in the capital city, in part because of the influx of 
many Jewish refugees from Alsace-Lorraine (annexed by the Germans in 1871). During a period in 
which cultural integration was running its course, Jews increasingly integrated in French society 
and competed with other Frenchmen on all professional levels. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
as in other western European Jewish communities, the self-definition of French Jews ‘was 
expressed even more consistently within the acceptable framework of a religious rather than an 
ethnic subculture’.  45
 
 The leadership of French Jewry was traditionally in the hands of the Consistory, which  not 
only enjoyed a monopoly of Jewish religious association, but also spoke for French Jewry at large, 
thereby wielding enormous power. As well as the religious appointment of Rabbis, it made all 
policy decisions affecting French Jewry as a whole. Throughout the nineteenth century, the 
Consistory conservatively asserted that the ideological and institutional structure of Jewish society, 
in which it played a vital role, had proven itself. Consequently, newcomers were expected to adapt 
to the existing institutional framework. This resulted in a relatively homogenous Jewish community 
in France in terms of class, ethnicity and ideology by the end of the nineteenth century.  Having 46
benefited from the economic development of French society, Jewish occupations varied from clerks 
and small tradesmen to financial occupations. All were part of the petite or haute bourgeoise.  47
Some 90,000 French Israelites belonged to families that had long been established in France and 
were well integrated in French society. Up until almost the end of the nineteenth century, French 
Jewry enjoyed the reputation of being the most successfully assimilated and stable Jewish society in 
western Europe.  However, even though earlier historiography has argued that French Jews sought 48
to negate Jewish particularity by embracing a politics of assimilation, more recent studies have 
shown that acculturation was an inconsistent process and that French Jews never intended to 
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fundamentally integrate into French society.  As Birnbaum has shown, even at the highest levels of 49
the French State Jews actively continued to operate in their Jewish circles.  Through institutions 50
such as the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU), founded in 1860 by a group of French intellectual 
Jews dedicated to Jewish emancipation in the territories under French control, the continued ties of 
French Jews to their ethnic background were accentuated.  51
 
 The Dreyfus Affair (1894-1906) was emblematic of the changing perspectives towards Jews 
in the late nineteenth century. On 15 October 1894, Captain Alfred Dreyfus, an officer attached to 
the 39th infantry regiment of the French Army, was arrested and accused of high treason, namely, 
spying for the Germans. The media, including the antisemitic La Libre Parole were quick to seize 
on the fact that Dreyfus was a Jew. The evidence presented during his trial in December of that year 
was far from convincing. A secret dossier, not shown to the defence, in the end convinced the 
judges of Dreyfus’s guilt, but this was only the beginning of the Dreyfus Affair, which attracted 
widespread public attention. By the time Émile Zola published his famous letter J’Accuse, in which 
he criticised the army for covering the errors thad had led to Dreyfus’ conviction, France was split 
into two opposing camps: the anti-Dreyfusards, who were against moves to reopen the case and 
considered these an attempt of the enemy to discredit the army; and the Dreyfusards, who sought to 
exonerate Dreyfus. Even though Zola did not risk alienating potential support by reflecting on 
antisemitism as a motivating force for Dreyfus’s conviction, it had undoubtedly played a role.  52
Antisemitism was pervasive in France in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century following 
the influx of large numbers of Jews from Alsace-Lorraine, Germany and Austria, which nourished 
 For the earlier historiography see: Michael Marrus, The Politics of Assimilation. A Study of the French Jewish 49
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hostile feelings among French workers who accused the Jews of taking their jobs.  These feelings 53
increased after the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, when French 
Jewry had to contend with substantial further immigration by eastern European Jews.  54
 
 In 1906, when the separation of Church and State (which in the Netherlands had been 
introduced as early as 1848) came into effect, the position of the Consistory was undermined. 
Jewish institutions and organisations were now able to function independent of the Consistories. It 
was a period of time in which the disaffected members of the upper class, who had turned away 
from the Consistory, could make their voice heard. They were encouraged to establish their own 
religious associations and they challenged the notion that Consistorial circles could speak for all of 
French Jewry.  The Consistory also found its authority constrained by the immigrant communities 55
which were growing in size and self-confidence. Whereas previously immigrants had not been 
allowed to serve on the Consistory’s council, this decision had to be repealed in 1919 because of the 
ever growing number of immigrants. The Consistory recognised that a policy of exclusion would 
eventually lead to its own marginalisation since newcomers could organise themselves into separate 
communities and would by far outnumber Consistory circles. The acceptance of immigrant Jews 
into their council therefore seems to have been driven more by self-protectionism than by goodwill 
towards the immigrants in question.  There were those, including William Oualid, a prominent 56
jurist of Algerian birth and a member of the Paris Consistory, who publicly criticised the 
organisation for not having allowed immigrant Jews to be part of the organisation’s leadership 
earlier on.  57
 
 As in the Netherlands, but in contrast to Belgium, Zionist ideas were relatively weak in 
France in the interwar period. For the majority of assimilated Jews in western Europe, Zionism was 
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considered to be contradictory, and even a threat to their position as relatively well-assimilated 
citizens. Traditional institutions such as the AIU and the Consistory publicly displayed their anti-
Zionist stance, claiming that the longing for a Jewish nation obstructed emancipation and would 
have severe consequences for Jews in the diaspora.  However, throughout the 1920s, and prompted 58
by French Jewry’s contribution to the First World War, especially with the arrival of central and 
eastern European Jews in the 1930s, Zionism began to leave its imprint on French society.  59
Increasing anti-Jewish persecution led to a growing interest in Zionist activity and its ideas began to 
spread among existing institutions. Some people became convinced that Zionism was the only 
solution to the refugee problem and committees were instituted in order to support Jews, including, 
most importantly, the CAR. Its secretary-general was Lambert, who would later play a crucial role 
in the institution of the UGIF.  Interest in a Jewish Palestine in the 1920s and 1930s is now 60
recognised to have been more widespread than was initially thought.  The movement even began 61
to prevail among the Consistory.  Above all, as Lee has shown, it was the youth who felt a growing 62
affinity with Zionism in this period. Zionism and Jewish culture influenced, for example, the Jewish 
scouts movement (EIF) which by the 1930s had reshaped its focus from traditional religious 
Judaism into a more plural understanding of Judaism in which Jews from a range of social, political 
and religious backgrounds were welcomed. This new understanding of Jewish identity and its 
accompanying support for the Zionist cause did not contradict the youth’s commitment to France, 
however. Instead, Zionism was woven into the identities of Franco-Jewish EIF members.  63
 
Refugees and immigrants in the interbellum  
 
In the aftermath of the First World War, economic stagnation and antisemitism forced eastern 
European Jews to seek refuge elsewhere. With the imposition of immigration quotas by the US, 
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South American countries, Canada, Australia and South Africa, western Europe became the only 
alternative. In the Netherlands, Belgium and France, the influx of Jewish immigrants in the 1920s 
and 1930s (significantly) altered the nature of the Jewish communities. Whereas we have seen that 
each of these country’s Jewish communities was relatively stable and well-integrated into the non-
Jewish community by the turn of the century, this changed in the interwar period. The French and 
Belgian Jewish communities in particular were greatly destabilised in this period because both the 
absolute and relative numbers of immigrants in Belgium and France were large. Since the 
immigrant communities struggled to integrate well into the longstanding Jewish population, a great 
variety of parallel Jewish communities lived alongside each other. In the Netherlands, the number of 
immigrants, mainly from Germany, was smaller and their composition more uniform compared to 
neighbouring countries. We will see that, as a result, it was easier to unite the Jewish community in 
the Netherlands under the umbrella of the Jewish Council.  
 
 The small group of Jews from eastern Europe who settled in the Netherlands after the First 
World War drew attention to a more traditional Jewish way of life. Among Dutch Jewry, this led to a 
greater sensitivity to Jewish origins.  Many spoke Yiddish among themselves and kept their old 64
traditions alive. We have seen that not all Jews, incidentally, were Orthodox; their number also 
included socialists and Zionists. In 1930, the Jewish population numbered almost 112,000 – 77.4% 
lived in one of the three major cities, with 65,523 Jews residing in Amsterdam (58,6%).  This 65
number would increase in the following years. Hitler’s assumption of power on 30 January 1933 
and the subsequent anti-Jewish legislations in Germany, created a stream of German refugees. 
Estimates of the number of German refugees in the Netherlands in the period between 1933 and 
1940 vary from 35,000 to 50,000.  These numbers exclude transmigrants who managed to move on 66
to other countries overseas and those who only stayed in the country for a short period of time, and 
therefore do not represent the number of refugees in the country at any given moment. At the time 
of the German invasion in May 1940, around 140,000 Jews resided in the country, including around 
22,000 Jewish immigrants (16% of the Jewish population), in some cases because they had not been 
able to leave the country in time.  The refugees comprised both Germans and a substantial number 67
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of eastern European nationals and stateless Jews, ‘primarily so-called Ost-Juden, who had been 
resident in Germany but had lost their former nationality and now sought to acquire a new one’.  68
They came from a wide range of classes and occupational backgrounds, ‘from left-wing working-
class activists to the highest echelons of the German Jewish bourgeoisie’.  Overall, 60% of the 69
Jews were concentrated in Amsterdam, 10% in The Hague and 8% in Rotterdam.  The Dutch Jews 70
‘had little in common either with the German-speaking westernised, liberal Jews from metropolitan 
Germany, or with the Yiddish speaking, central European Ost-Juden’.  As was the case in all three 71
countries, albeit to differing degrees, there were tensions and disputes between immigrants and the 
longstanding Jewish population, and these affected the stability of the Jewish community.  
 
 In Belgium and France, the situation was different and more complicated. Here, the 
immigrants deeply affected the nature of the established Jewish communities and the ways in which 
they were represented.  Between 1925 and the beginning of 1940, a wave of immigrants, mainly 72
from eastern Europe, entered Belgium including refugees from Poland (responsible for almost half 
of the total number of immigrants), Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary Austria, Czechoslovakia, the 
Baltic states and the Netherlands.  After the German annexation of Austria in March 1938, around 73
10,000 German refugees also sought refuge in the country. The influx of these immigrants, who 
were motivated by social, economic and political push factors, caused national political unrest in 
Belgium and in western Europe more broadly. In light of economic depression and high 
unemployment rates, these individuals were considered a threat. Legal refugees were housed in 
centres throughout Belgium. Around a thousand Jews obtained asylum in the Belgian colony of 
Congo, where their arrival was heavily contested by the white colonists.  74
 
 Thousands of poor immigrant Jews did not integrate in Belgian society the way their 
predecessors had. Antwerp became an important city for orthodox Jews to settle in, and this was a 
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unique phenomenon in the mostly liberal-oriented cities of western Europe.  As a result, the social 75
and political fabric of the Jewish population in Antwerp changed even more so than that in 
Brussels.  Liberal, religious and socialist Zionism and especially Communism, which had a 76
breakthrough in the 1930s with its political utopia of equality and ideological rigidity, all struggled 
to find their place in the increasing antisemitic climate of Belgium.  Although the Council of 77
Jewish Associations in Brussels and the Central Council of Jewish organisations in Antwerp tried to 
unite the Jews living in Belgium, the politically and socially distinctive elements remained 
deliberately aloof from one another.  As historian Lieven Saerens has indicated in the case of 78
Antwerp, there existed a mosaic of different communities and individuals, all with their own 
convictions and behaviour.  As immigrants remained wedded to the political and social beliefs that 79
had characterised the communities they had left behind, a single ‘Jewish leadership’ cannot be 
identified at the outbreak of the war. As in France, several Jewish administrations headed different 
Jewish communities, often with distinctive religious, social and political backgrounds.  Whereas 80
the Jewish communities had traditionally been mostly governed top-down and served under the 
umbrella of the Consistory throughout the nineteenth century, there was now a de facto grassroots 
community, composed of a large variety of religious, political, cultural, professional and charitable 
institutions.  Symptomatic of this is the fact that more than 100 different periodicals appeared 81
between 1930 and 1940, including 6 daily newspapers in Yiddish.   82
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 Both Antwerp and Brussels were economically attractive for Jewish migrants: Antwerp for 
its diamond industry and Brussels for its leather industry.  The immigrants were therefore primarily 83
concentrated in the agglomerations of these cities.  There was a specific concentration of Jewish 84
immigrants in the small-scale semi-industrialised production of luxury goods: in textile, diamond 
and leather trade companies.  This threw many Jewish immigrants during the economic crisis of 85
the 1930s back into the hopeless situation they had hoped to leave behind in eastern Europe.  By 86
contrast, the Belgian Jewish minority (6.6% of the total Jewish population) formed the social elite 
in trade and industry. They occupied important positions in banking, financing and the diamond 
industry.  The Belgian bourgeoise, small in number, had been living in Belgium from the beginning 87
of the nineteenth century and earlier. They were relatively well-integrated into Belgian non-Jewish 
society, particularly in the capital city Brussels.   88
 
 The figures given for the number of Jews residing in Belgium on the eve of the Nazi 
occupation vary.  There seems to be a consensus that around 66,000 Jews resided in the country in 89
1940, of whom 45% lived in Brussels and 45% in Antwerp – 9% of the Jews lived in Liège or 
Charleroi. Out of these 66,000 Jews, 62,000 (94%) were immigrants and refugees from eastern 
Europe and Germany without Belgian citizenship.  The explanation for the small percentage of 90
Jews in Belgium with Belgian citizenship is twofold. First, these Jews were reluctant to become 
Belgian citizens because of ‘an inherent fear of state bureaucracy, based largely on their experiences 
 Frank Caestecker, Alien Policy in Belgium, 1840-1940: The Creation of Guest Workers, Refugees and Illegal Aliens 83
(New York / Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2000), 104-105.
 For an overview of where exactly Jews of specific origin (Poles, Romanians, Hungarians) resided in these 84
agglomerations, see: Van Doorslaer, De kinderen van het getto: Joodse immigratie en communisme in België 
1925-1940, band 1, Proefschrift Rijksuniversiteit Gent, Faculteit Letteren en Wijsbegeerte (ca. 1990), 20-23. 
 Israël Shirman, “Een aspekt van de ‘Endlösung’. De ekonomische plundering van de joden in België.” in: Bijdragen 85
tot de Geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, No. 3 (1974), 174. 
 Van Doorslaer, De kinderen van het getto: Joodse immigratie en communisme in België 1925-1940, band 1, 86
Proefschrift Rijksuniversiteit Gent, Faculteit Letteren en Wijsbegeerte, 33.
 Griffioen and Zeller,  De Jodenvervolging in Nederland, Frankrijk en België, 163; Van den Daelen, Laten we hun lied 87
verder zingen, 70. 
 Van Doorslaer, Kinderen van het getto, 27-28. 88
 Maxime Steinberg estimated between 64,000 and 70,000 Jews in l’étoile et le fusil. La question juive 1942, 76, 83-85. 89
Dan Michman based his research on data published in 1980, claiming 65,696 Jews lived in the country. See: Michman, 
“Belgium” in: Israel Gutman (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Holocaust (New York: MacMillan, 1990), 161. Lieven Saerens 
claimed there were 56,000 Jews residing in the country by the end of 1940. See: Saerens, “De Jodenvervolging in 
België in cijfers” in: Bijdragen tot de eigentijdse geschiedenis 30/60, No. 17 (2006), 200.
 Griffioen en Zeller, Jodenvervolging in Nederland, Frankrijk en België, 170. For the features of the Jewish 90
population in Brussels and Antwerp specifically, see: Saerens, Vreemdelingen in een wereldstad, 551-552. 
!53
in Tsarist Russia’.  Second, the Belgian State obstructed an easy naturalisation process by ‘insisting 91
upon a “bond” with the country, a ten-year residence period (after 1932), and by making the process 
increasingly costly’.  As a result, the large variety of Jewish communities in Belgium remained 92
non-integrated.  
 
 In France, as in Belgium, there were strong differentiations among the 300-330,000 Jews 
living in the country on the eve of the Second World War – both between foreign and French Jews, 
but also within both of these groups.  In addition to the Jews who had sought refuge in France at 93
the turn of the century and in the early twentieth century, a new wave of immigrants arrived in the 
1930s. They formed small organisations, the so-called Landsmannschaften, which were brought 
under one umbrella in the Fédération des Sociétés Juives de France (FSJF), established in 1913. 
This organisation was headed by Marc Jarblum, leader of the Zionist Poalei Zion, who later refused 
to become part of the UGIF-Sud.  On the eve of the war, around 130,000-140,000 Jews in France 94
were immigrants from eastern Europe and Germany (around 45%).  There were around 95
190,000-200,000 Jews with French citizenship, of whom around 86,000 lived in the greater Paris 
region. Overall, 46% of the Jews lived in this region; 24% lived in Lyon, Marseille or Bordeaux.  96
Around 22,000 Jews resided in Alsace-Lorraine and were expelled into the Vichy zone after the 
German annexation of the region in 1940.  97
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 As in Belgium, these new immigrants distinguished themselves from France’s longstanding 
Jewish population. They spoke Yiddish and generally regarded the government as an entity to be 
wary of.  Their political sensitivity, be they Bundists, Communists, Zionists or militant anti-98
Fascists, was markedly different from that of the French Jews.  Unlike the immigrants, French 99
Jewry was very much wedded to the French State and, after the resolution of the Dreyfus affair, 
they believed they had every reason to put their trust in the government.  Ironically, the Jews of 100
the Consistory believed the immigrants were not sufficiently French, and the immigrants opposed 
the French Jews because they believed they were not sufficiently Jewish.  As in both other 101
countries, the immigrant Jews were seen as a threat: French Jews feared for their position in the 
increasingly antisemitic society. Particularly during the recession of 1926-1927, immigrants were 
perceived as illegitimate competitors for the limited positions available in the French economy.  102
Whereas immigrant leaders expected to be on an equal footing in the prewar period, Consistorial 
circles disregarded the immigrants’ culture and ideologies.   103
 
 A large part of the French Jews rejected the immigrants’ leftist political orientation, 
believing that its revolutionary character was, first, a threat to their own status as Jews and, second, 
a threat to their wealthy bourgeois material interests.  French Jewry’s perception of these Jewish 104
immigrants has been a subject of debate for decades. A number of journalists and historians, 
including Rajsfus, an immigrant Jew himself, accused French Jews of betraying the refugees in the 
1930s, claiming that they failed to offer support to Jewish immigrants and even actively 
collaborated with the government when it sought to restrict immigration.  By contrast, others, 105
including most recently Sémelin, highlighted that even though there was indeed a fear that these 
immigrants would threaten their position in society, French Jewry nonetheless did institute several 
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committees to help refugees.  Vicki Caron has persuasively argued that several phases in the 106
approaches to immigrants can be identified, characterised by a wide range of Jewish responses to 
the new arrivals from central and eastern Europe. Rather than a progressive hardening of policy 
after a brief liberal period in 1933 culminating in the extremely harsh immigrant laws of 1938, as 
historians have generally posited, Caron demonstrated that there were two major periods in the anti-
refugee crackdown of the 1930s; the first in 1934-1935 and the second in 1938. Her work focuses 
on the fluidity of policy towards refugees and rightly makes a distinction between the government 
treatment of the problem, the role of public opinion and the role of the longstanding Jewish 
community.  107
 
 Caron underlined that the Consistory, and especially its director Jacques Helbronner, was 
reluctant to be involved in refugee relief, believing above all that identifying French Jewry with 
foreign Jews would encourage the government to ‘lump all Jews, French and foreign, together’.  108
It also feared that any engagement in non-religious activities would ‘only substantiate the 
administration’s effort to define Jews on ethnic or racial lines, thus facilitating anti-Jewish rather 
than anti-foreign discrimination’.  At the same time, there were also pro-refugee Consistory 109
members. Refugee organisations such as the Comité d’Assistance aux Réfugiés (Committee for 
Assistance to Refugees, CAR), supported by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 
were created by the French Jewish establishment to provide for refugees. The CAR leadership 
maintained a distance from hard-liners like Jacques Helbronner and instead adopted a more 
moderate outlook which was ‘above all represented by Raymond-Raoul Lambert, the CAR’s 
secretary-general, as well by Albert Lévy, its president and member of the Central Consistory; 
William Oualid, a member of the Paris Consistory and vice-president of the AIU; and Louise Weiss, 
a prominent journalist and feminist leader’.  Lévy and Lambert became directors of the UGIF 110
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(both -Nord and -Sud) and the UGIF-Sud respectively. In a period when the traditional Consistorial 
rule was being challenged by a disaffected upper class, differences in perspectives on the ‘refugee 
problem’ crystallised.  
 
Jewish representation and the institution of Jewish refugee organisations  
 
The influx of large numbers of refugees and the passive attitude of the indigenous governments vis-
à-vis these Jews in terms of providing social welfare and shelter encouraged and even necessitated 
initiatives from the Jewish communities themselves. In the case of the Netherlands and France, the 
later chairmen of the JR, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud, along with other central board 
members, fulfilled various representative positions in Jewish refugee organisations before the war. 
We have seen that in France, for example, Raymond-Raoul Lambert was the president of the central 
refugee organisation the CAR. This was not the case in Belgium where the central board members 
had comparatively little prewar social welfare leadership experience. By highlighting either the 
continuation or discontinuation of prewar structures in this regard, we will see that the nature of the 
wartime Jewish leadership was crucially different in the three countries.  
 
 In the Netherlands, Professor of Classical History David Cohen (1882-1967), who served on 
the board of the Permanent commission of both the Dutch-Israelite and Portuguese church 
congregations, took the initiative to establish a committee that would coordinate refugee aid.  111
Cohen was firmly rooted in Dutch social and cultural life and had close bonds with Dutch Jewry. In 
some respects, he represented the assimilationist form and functioning of the Jewish community of 
the time. Although discussions have been raised about the exact position he held in the Dutch 
Zionist movement, we know that he was a convinced Zionist.  Together with Abraham Asscher 112
(1880-1950), who also served as board member of the church congregations, he established the 
Comité voor Bijzondere Joodse Belangen in March 1933. Asscher was the owner of the best-known 
diamond factory in Amsterdam, politically active as the provincial leader of the Liberal party and, 
above all, president of the religious Nederlands Israëlitisch Kerkgenootschap (Dutch Israelite 
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Congregation, NIK), an Israelite church federation established in 1814, with which Cohen was also 
associated.  His appointment at the helm of the NIK, combined with the other functions he 113
fulfilled, made him the principal representative of Jews at the time.  The central aim of the CBJB 114
was to serve as a non-violent response to the Jewish persecution in Germany and to take care of 
German Jewish refugees in the country by providing social and financial support.  In order to 115
promote this aim, its leadership established the Comité voor Joodse Vluchtelingen (the Committee 
for Jewish Refugees, CvJV), as a sub-commission.  The CBJB worked closely together with 116
Stichting Joodse Arbeid, a Zionist organisation that aimed to prepare young Jews for their 
emigration to Palestine.  
 
 In a difficult, unstable period in which Dutch Jewry became increasingly secular, Asscher 
and Cohen ensured there was a close link between refugee work and the NIK. In addition, they tried 
to unite the Jewish community through the CBJB, with the aim of bringing together various Jewish 
interests groups: orthodox and liberal; Ashkenazic and Sephardic; assimilationist and Zionist.  The 117
outlook of the CBJB on its future role in the community was therefore more ambitious than merely 
providing aid to refugees. At the same time, they deliberately excluded the religious leadership as 
well as socialist and communist Jewish groups.  A 1939 letter from Asscher’s hand as head of the 118
NIK sent to the Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Amsterdam, indicates that his aims reached higher 
than merely carrying out the duty of supporting Jewish welfare. Asscher feared the influence of the 
Liberaal Joodse Gemeenschap (Liberal Jewish Congregation) in the Netherlands. This congregation 
consisted mostly of German Jews, many of whom had only recently immigrated into the 
Netherlands.  He considered the fact that its members had to pay dues, that it consisted mostly of 119
Germans and that even non-Jews were accepted in the congregation as ‘a threat for the rest and 
peace’ within the Jewish society.  The firmness and tone of Asscher’s letter marks a line of 120
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demarcation between immigrant and Dutch Jewry, while at the same time he positions himself at the 
centre of the Jewish community. He did not afford the mostly liberal German Jews the same status 
as Dutch Jews. Although the NIK was a cooperation between ‘liberal’ and orthodox Dutch Jews 
which aimed to unite Dutch Jewry and to be a universal volkskerk (church of the people), the 
presence of the German liberal congregation was a step too far for Asscher. Above all, the 
leadership of the CBJB enabled Asscher and Cohen to definitively establish their position as leaders 
within the community in this period.  These two men, as well as Henri Eitje (1889-1943) and 121
Gertrude van Tijn-Cohn (1891-1974), who organised the actual running of the CvJV while Cohen 
served as its chairman, would fulfil (prominent) positions in the Dutch Jewish Council from 1941 
onwards. 
 
 In France, the influx of refugees and the criticisms that were voiced from various sides about 
the way in which the traditional leadership dealt with the problem forced the Consistory to establish 
aid organisations. In reality, however, Consistorial leaders and members generally continued to 
regard refugee Jews with suspicion, believing that they constituted a threat to their own position. 
This mistrustful perspective vis-à-vis immigrant Jews is a tendency that can be identified in the 
traditional Jewish institutions in all three countries where attempts were made to remove refugees 
from the country. For example, throughout the 1930s, the Consistory’s president, Jacques 
Helbronner ensured that migration and repatriation of refugees (rather than providing social 
assistance for immigrants to remain in France) became the sole priorities of the Comité National de 
Secours aux Réfugiés Allemands Victimes de l’Anti-Semitisme (National Aid Committee for 
German Refugees: hereafter Comité National), headed by Baron de Rothschild. Together with the 
Comité pour la Défense des Droits des Israélites en Europe Centrale et Occidentale (Committee for 
the Defence of the Rights of Jews from Central and Western Europe), this was the among the most 
important sources of refugee assistance in 1934.  Helbronner’s hesitant involvement in refugee aid 122
is indicative of a broader sentiment in which the traditional Jewish leaders carefully measured their 
own decisions against the possible repercussions in a larger society which increasingly perceived 
the Jew as a foreign threat.  123
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 We have seen that the approach of French Jewry towards refugees was not exclusively 
negative. A substantial number of French Jews became sympathetic to the achievements of the 
Zionist movement in Palestine. Refugee organisations, such as the CAR and the Comité National of 
the Central Consistory competed with each other to have the upper hand in political influence about 
Jewish matters, and about the influx of Jewish refugees specifically. Throughout the 1930s, as head 
of the CAR, Lambert had taken up a pro-refugee stance after the deteriorating anti-refugee outlook 
of the Comité National. Increasingly influenced by Zionist ideas, he worked hard to find jobs for 
refugees between 1933 and 1935, permitting them to stay in France.  At the same time, Lambert 124
was not an extreme radical on the matter; he accepted certain government policies, such as isolating 
eastern European immigrants and making a distinction between political and economic refugees.  125
Despite this, his opposition to the established Jewish authorities is clear.  
 
 The refugee problem of the 1930s therefore altered the power balances within French Jewish 
communities. With the divisions between immigrant and French Jewry becoming more visible than 
before in this period of political, economic and social instability, the Consistory lost the last element 
of its exclusive authority over the Jews. Although a significant degree of consensus was reached by 
1939 on the issue of refugees among pro-refugee organisations, namely that France could only 
function as a transit country under its contemporary economic and political circumstances, there 
was a range of other issues that divided the communities.  This instability encouraged some Jews 126
who had been part of the Jewish establishment for years to publicly voice their discontent with the 
way the Consistory ruled Jewish society. The future leader of the UGIF-Sud, Lambert, was among 
those who did so. 
 
 In Belgium, as in the Netherlands and France, the government was reluctant to take care of 
Jewish refugees. Jewish communities instituted various aid organisations, including the Antwerp 
Komiteit der verdediging der Rechten der Joden (Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Jews) 
and the Brussels Comité d’Aide et d’Assistance aux Victimes de l’Antisémitisme en Allemagne (the 
Brussels Committee for Aid and Assistance to Victims of Antisemitism in Germany), which were 
both established in 1933 as a response to the influx of German Jewish refugees. The Brussels 
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committee functioned under the auspices of the Central Consistory and was supervised by Max 
Gottschalk (1889-1976), a high ranking international functionary and one of the most important 
community leaders of Belgian Jewry. However, as in the cases of the Dutch and French traditional 
leadership, their solidarity with German Jews was not without limits.  Assuming that Belgium was 127
only a transit country for immigrants, the humanitarian limits of the Comité d’Aide et d’Assistance 
were reached when it turned out that Brazil and Uruguay had closed their borders for immigrants on 
26 September 1933: they advised refugee Jews to go back to either Germany or Poland.  128
Simultaneously, the Central Consistory encouraged the creation of philanthropic societies to help 
immigrants and promoted recognition of the diverse forms of worship they brought with them.  As 129
we have seen, however, when Belgium faced difficulties in integrating large number of refugees, 
the Central Consistory struggled to find a way to substantiate its role as the representative of all 
Jewish communities.  
 
 After the German invasion, many of those who had held leading positions before the war 
fled abroad and did not return after the German occupation. Among them were Chief Rabbi Joseph 
Wiener, the majority of the Board of Directors of the Israelite community and other prominent 
members of Belgian Jewish society.  Consequently, there was a leadership vacuum in what was 130
already a disorganised Belgian Jewish society at the outbreak of the war. This pattern can be seen 
too in the occupied zone in France, where a large part of the traditional leadership also fled after the 
German invasion. In the Netherlands and the French unoccupied zone the situation was different. 
We will see that these differences had an impact on the nature of the wartime Jewish leadership.  
1.2 1940-1941: Restructuring communal representation  
 
In May 1940, the Germans unleashed their forces on France and the Low Countries and their rapid 
advance resulted in chaos, panic and astonishment. Particularly in the Netherlands, where people 
had strongly believed in the power of neutrality, the German invasion shocked its citizens and, 
when it became clear the Dutch army could not resist Germany’s advancement, many tried to flee 
 Caestecker, Ongewenste gasten, 31. 127
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abroad.  In Belgium and France, the fear of a German occupation also incited refugee streams to 131
the South, which resulted in some 3 million refugee civilians in West Flanders and a rapid 
population drain in the towns and cities in the north of France.  The responses of the Jews, who 132
had observed the increasing persecution of their coreligionists in Germany, varied from outright 
distress and panic to more moderate reactions based on the belief that the situation in the West 
would be different from that in Germany and eastern Europe.  The flight abroad of some of the 133
prewar  Jewish leaders after the German occupation, combined with a feeling that the communities 
needed to confront the Nazis in a unified way, resulted in the restructuring of communal 
representation. We will see that this materialised differently in each of the countries.  
 
German representation and the machinery of government  
 
The nature of the German occupation differed across the three countries under investigation. 
Whereas a Civil Administration (Zivilverwaltung) was introduced in the Netherlands, a Military 
Administration (Militärverwaltung) governed Belgium and France. This difference is important in 
terms of understanding the particular contexts in which Nazi and Vichy officials forced the Jewish 
organisations’ leaders to operate. Initially, the plan was to establish a Military Administration in all 
three countries. According to Kwiet, Hitler’s last-minute order to introduce a Civil Administration 
in the Netherlands on 18 May 1940 exemplifies his impulsivity and the improvised nature of his 
decisions.  The choice can be explained by the fact that the Netherlands, in contrast to France and 134
Belgium (Wallonia in particular), was considered a Germanisches Brudervolk (Germanic brother 
people), which at some point ought to be included in the German Reich. By contrast, the German 
generals preferred a Military occupation in Belgium and France for strategic reasons because they 
eventually wished to use these countries as a venture point for an invasion of Great Britain.  The 135
initially accommodating attitude of King Leopold III of the Belgians and the armistice agreement 
with France, leaving the south and parts of the east of the country unoccupied until November 1942, 
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also served to help the establishment of a Military Administration in these countries.  136
 
 In light of the aim to Nazify the Brudervolk in the Netherlands, German leaders with strong 
ideological backgrounds, led by Reichskommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart, were appointed in the 
country immediately after the occupation.  Together with the highest Military commander, 137
Friedrich Christiansen, Seyss-Inquart could make all necessary arrangements for a military 
operation in Britain.  There was a strong presence of the SS in the Netherlands. Höhere SS- und 138
Polizeiführer Hanns Albin Rauter was the highest SS representative in the country and stood in 
direct communication with Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler in Berlin. By contrast, in Belgium 
and France, the party and the SS were hardly represented at first. In France, only Werner Best 
(Military Administration) and Otto Abetz (ambassador) were important ideologists of the 
occupation regime. The SS established an office of the SiPo-SD in Paris, but its influence was 
initially restricted because the Military Administration did not allow it any executive role. In 
Belgium, there were no representatives of the party or SS present within the leadership of the 
Military Administration. As a result, the SiPo-SD had a weaker position here than in France. This 
continued to be the case even after the head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (the Reich Security 
Main Office, RSHA) Reinhard Heydrich appointed a direct representative for France and Belgium, 
Max Thomas, Beauftragter des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD für Belgien und 
Frankreich.   139
 
 The differences in the nature of occupation found their expression in the implementation of 
anti-Jewish legislation. Whereas the presence of the Military Administration in Belgium and France 
resulted in a more gradual introduction of anti-Jewish legislation, the SS in the Netherlands was 
more radical.  This difference can be explained by the fact that the Military Administration took 140
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the responses of the non-Jewish populations more carefully into consideration, in part because it 
was chiefly interested in exploiting resources for the German war effort and limiting the use of 
German manpower; aims that necessitated stability over disruption.  Particularly during the first 141
phase of the occupation, the presence of the Military Administration in Belgium and France served 
as an inhibiting factor in the process of persecution and in the preparations for the large scale 
deportation of Jews. This can be explained by the provisional nature of Nazi policy toward the Jews 
in this period. From the outbreak of the war in western Europe in April 1940 until the autumn of 
1941, the so-called ‘Final solution of the Jewish question in Europe’ still vaguely encompassed a 
‘yet unspecified project of mass emigration’.  142
 
 The various German occupation authorities would pursue anti-Jewish objectives primarily 
by ‘controlling the movements and organizations of Jews, confiscating their property, enumerating 
them, and sometimes concentrating them in certain regions’.  In Belgium, Militärverwaltungschef 143
Eggert Reeder prevented the SiPo-SD from engaging in a Judenpolitik of its own in this period, 
safeguarding his own position as well as stability and order. In order to do this, Reeder confirmed in 
January 1941 that the SiPo-SD was only permitted to arrest Jews when instructed or approved to do 
so by the Military Administration.  Only in the summer of 1942, shortly before the start of the 144
deportations of Jews from Belgium did the SiPo-SD enlarge its influence. As we shall see, this was 
the result of a dramatic reversal of Nazi policy towards Jews. The SiPo-SD’s increasing power is 
highlighted by its authorisation to arrest Jews without the permission of the Military Administration 
through the Schutzhaftbefehl and to send Jews to concentration camps without trial from 1 June 
1942.  145
 
 In France, the Military Administration initially obstructed the French Judenreferent 
Dannecker’s attempts to concentrate Jews in order to commence their forced deportation as quickly 
as possible. It wished to limit the number of internment camps in the occupied zone and considered 
the mass arrest of Jews to be a matter for the French. Moreover, the Military Administration wanted 
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to restrict the power of the SiPo-SD and the Judenreferat in order to safeguard its own position.  146
From autumn 1941, the faltering campaign in Russia showed that the war would last longer than 
Hitler had expected. As a result, Nazi policies changed and Jews in western Europe, no longer 
allowed to emigrate from occupied countries, were segregated and interned.  As a result, the SiPo-147
SD increased its power at the cost of the Military Administration. However, as we shall see, the 
continued rivalry between the two institutions sometimes frustrated Dannecker’s radical plans.  148
The occupation of France had its own peculiarities as the French regime opted for an armistice with 
the Germans, while the country was administered by the collaborationist Vichy regime, headed by 
Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain. The Vichy regime thus operated alongside the German Military 
Administration, creating a rivalry between the French and German institutions. For example, Vichy 
outpaced the Germans by introducing the Statut des Juifs, the first widespread anti-Jewish 
legislation, first in October 1940 and then in June 1941.  Above all, when the deportations began 149
in the summer of 1942, the Judenreferat had to share its control over the deportations of Jews with 
both the Military Administration and Vichy.  
 
 In the Netherlands, the persecution of the Jews was an affair directly overseen by the SiPo-
SD and Rauter, the Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer (HSSPF), which gained increasing operational 
freedom through the course of the occupation.  Unlike its western European counterparts, the JR 150
was exclusively subordinate to the local German civil and police authorities, Beauftragter 
Böhmcker and the Zentralstelle, and this was emblematic of the German aim to oust the Dutch 
government bureaucracy, sitting in The Hague.  In March 1942, Rauter informed Karel Johannes 151
Frederiks, Secretary-General of Internal Affairs, that Jews no longer fell under Dutch government 
authority.  As a consequence, the Germans had more operational freedom to implement anti-152
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Jewish legislation compared to their counterparts in Belgium and France. From the end of February 
1942, the policy of persecution came under the supervision of Eichmann’s IV B4 Berlin office, a 
sub-department of the Gestapo and the RSHA that was directly responsible for the deportation of 
Jews to concentration camps in eastern Europe.  After the summer of 1942, Reichskommissar 153
Seyss-Inquart, who was at first directly subordinate to Hitler, was also overseen by Reichsführer-SS 
Himmler. From this point on, Seyss-Inquart was forced to reach agreements with SS-representatives 
in the Netherlands, most notably Rauter, even in non-police matters.  Seyss-Inquart’s generally 154
good relations with Himmler and, as Gruppenführer of the SS, his affinity with the ideas of the SS, 
combined with the fact that Himmler’s agreement had become necessary ‘for almost every 
development in the occupied Netherlands’ encouraged him in doing so.  We will see that these 155
differences in occupational structure affected the form of forced Jewish representative organisation 
– either a Judenrat model, or a Judenvereinigung model – that was established in the three 
countries.  
 
German dissatisfaction with existing Jewish representative organisations  
 
In the period between the Nazi invasion of the three countries in May 1940 and the institution of the 
JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud in 1941, Jewish representative organisations which 
aimed to unite the Jewish communities were already in existence. They were established either 
before the war, or as direct consequence of the German occupation. All were so-called 
‘Coordinating Committees’ which generally aimed to oversee all Jewish philanthropic work and to 
unite the various Jewish communities.  From the German perspective, the existence of these 156
national representative Jewish bodies may have decreased the perceived need to institute Jewish 
Councils immediately after the occupation. Furthermore, the absence of a central order to force such 
institutions upon the communities in western Europe undoubtedly played a role in delaying their 
establishment. Heydrich’s 1939 Schnellbrief, in which he ordered the establishment of Jewish 
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Councils for occupied Poland, did not apply to countries other than Poland.  157
 
 Prior to the forced establishment of the AJB, the Comité de Coördination (Coordinating 
Committee, CC) of the Jewish communities was established in April 1941 in Belgium at the 
initiative of the German SS.  Initially, Jewish community representatives voiced objections, 158
because they wanted to safeguard the organisational autonomy of religious institutions. However, 
after careful deliberation, the Chief Rabbi – Salomon Ullman – was appointed head of the CC.  159
Various social welfare organisations, including the Hilfswerke für die Juden aus Deutschland (Aid 
Organisations for Jews from Germany), were included in the organisation.  In France, the Comité 160
de Coordination des Oeuvres de Bienfaisance Israélites à Paris (the Coordination Committee of the 
Israelite Charities of Greater Paris) was established by a German order in January 1941, and was 
made up of the Paris Consistory and various Jewish welfare organisations.  In October 1941, the 161
Commission Centrale des Organisations Juives d’Assistance (Central Committee for Jewish Aid 
Organisations, CCOJA) was created in Marseille under the aegis of the Chief Rabbi of France, Isaïe 
Schwartz, ‘regrouping the nine major welfare organisations that were still operative, or had 
reconstituted themselves in the unoccupied zone’.  While Lambert’s CAR was its chief operating 162
agency, the CCOJA worked closely with the Fédération des Sociétés Juives de France (Federation 
of Jewish Societies of France, FSJF), one of the major Jewish immigrant aid organisations, and the 
Oeuvre de Secours aux Enfants (Children’s Aid Society, OSE), a children’s welfare organisation 
that after the armistice focused its efforts on obtaining the release of as many internees as possible, 
primarily children, from the camps in the unoccupied zone.  The CCOJA was disbanded in March 163
1942, unable to achieve many of its objectives. In the Netherlands, Lodewijk Ernst Visser, president 
of the Hoge Raad, the Dutch Supreme Court, and one of the central figures inside the Jewish 
community, initiated the establishment of the Joodsche Coördinatie Commissie (Jewish 
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Coordinating Committee, JCC) in December 1940.  Established under the auspices of the Dutch 164
zionists in the commissions of both the Dutch-Israelite and Portugese-Israelite Church, the aim of 
the organisation was to provide a representative organ for Jews in the Netherlands at the outbreak of 
the war.  In all three countries, the Germans were dissatisfied with how the committees 165
functioned.   166
 
 In the Netherlands, Lodewijk Visser refused to cooperate with the Germans, and this is clear 
from the letters he sent to Cohen in response to the JR’s establishment.  Partly as a result, the JCC 167
was disbanded on 10 November 1941. This is remarkable, because whereas the Coordinating 
Committees in Belgium and France were largely dysfunctional, the JCC functioned comparatively 
well. There was a central committee with local subcommittees in places where Jews lived 
throughout the Netherlands. Although this committee successfully fulfilled the major social welfare 
tasks that were later allotted to the Joodsche Raad, the Germans did not make use of the JCC. In 
part, this was undoubtedly a result of Visser’s refusal to cooperate with the Germans. The Germans 
had the power to put the organisation under severe pressure and to nominate a new director who 
was willing to work with them, and this would have been the easiest solution. Instead, an entirely 
new organisation in the form of a Judenrat was founded. The classic Nazi policy of what we might 
call ‘institutional Darwinism’, that is, superimposing additional organisations rather than 
rationalising existing policies and institutions, can be clearly seen here. The Joodsche Raad 
competed with the Coördinatie Commissie and, in the end, proved to be more useful for Nazi aims. 
In Belgium and France, the Military Administration and the SiPo-SD respectively did not believe 
that the Coordinating Committees had successfully united the Jewish communities.  In all three 168
countries, the supposed failures of the committees served as the springboard for establishing 
alternative representative bodies: the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud.  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The organisations’ establishment: Judenrat versus Judenvereinigung  
The attempt to marginalise the Jews through the ‘Jewish Councils’ was part of increasing anti-
Jewish legislation that aimed to exclude and isolate Jews from the non-Jewish public sphere. To 
understand the nature of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud and the tasks which 
their leaders were assigned, we will now analyse the two models of Jewish representative 
organisations that were implemented in western Europe. Aiming to unite the Jewish communities in 
the Netherlands, Belgium and France, and to establish a properly functioning representative 
organisation through which they could communicate their regulations, the Germans appointed at the 
head of these Jewish organisations Jews whom they believed would achieve these goals. In all 
cases, the Germans first approached (Chief) Rabbis. Only in Belgium, however, did the Chief Rabbi 
take up the chairmanship of the Jewish organisation.  As we shall see, the official nomination of 169
Jews to serve as heads of the organisations depended on two factors. First, the German conception 
of who would make the most suitable leaders, and second, whether or not the ‘chosen’ leaders were 
willing to serve in this capacity. A 1939 report of the SD’s Jewish Department shows that the 
Germans analysed the Dutch Jewish community prior to the occupation of the Netherlands.  In 170
Belgium and France, the Germans also issued reports concerning the structures of the (prewar) 
Jewish communities shortly after the occupation.  Even though it is impossible to prove that these 171
investigations directly resulted in the appointment of specific individuals at the head of the Jewish 
organisations, it is clear that the power balances in the communities were known to the occupiers.  
 Extensive documentation on how the Jewish organisations were established in western 
Europe is lacking. However, it is clear that the difference in functional structure between the JR on 
the one hand, and the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud on the other, was a consequence of 
the distinct occupational structures to which the countries were subjected. In the Netherlands, the 
Germans followed the example of the so-called Judenräte in eastern Europe, which were Jewish 
representative organisations on a local scale. In Belgium and France Judenvereinigungen, inspired 
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by the German model, were established. As Michman has convincingly shown, wherever the SS and 
police were strongly represented, the local model was applied.  In the Netherlands, the presence of 172
the Civil Administration in combination with the generally harsher occupation, where the influence 
of the SS was larger, did indeed lead to the establishment of a Jewish Council based on the eastern 
European Judenrat model.  
 Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart and Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer Rauter, both Austrian 
born, had previously observed the establishment of Judenräte with only local authority in eastern 
Europe. They had also witnessed the transformation of the Viennese Israelitische Kultusgemeinde 
(IKG) into an organisation directly overseen by Nazi SS-Obersturmbannführer Eichmann, 
regrouping all existing Jewish organisations in 1938.  Most likely inspired by these examples, an 173
identical institution was established in the Netherlands.  The use of the term Judenrat, the literal 174
copy of the wording that was also used in Heydrich’s Schnellbrief of 21 September 1939, and the 
fact that the Council, contrary to the AJB and the UGIF, was not anchored in law, all demonstrate 
how its inception was based on that of the eastern European Judenräte.  Even the personal order 175
of Hans Böhmcker to institute the JR resembled that of the eastern European Councils, which were 
usually established on a personal basis (e.g. by the town commander appointing a prominent 
Jew).  By contrast, we will see that the AJB and the UGIF were established on the basis of an 176
official decree.  177
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 In Belgium and France, where the Military Administration had a strong presence, 
Judenvereinigungen were established. This model was introduced in order to limit the power of the 
SiPo-SD.  In both countries, the Military Administration was initially reluctant to force a Jewish 178
representative body on the Jewish societies, in part because it feared the responses of non-Jews to 
this measure, a theme we will explore later. Partly as a result of the Military Administration’s 
reluctance, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud were established, under pressure from the 
SS authorities, only in November 1941.  Documents suggest that the ‘Jewish experts’ of the SS in 179
Belgium preferred the eastern European Judenrat organisation to the Judenvereinigung type.  180
However, their limited power meant that they had to compromise with the Military Administration 
who favoured a different model.  In France, the collaborationist Vichy regime commanded the 181
establishment of the UGIF after prolonged negotiations with the Nazis.  This body replaced the 182
Comité de Coordination in the occupied zone and filled an organisational vacuum in the unoccupied 
zone. We will see later that the tasks of the Jewish organisations as envisioned by the German 
occupier, and their responsibilities, were different in each of the three countries under investigation.  
 The main functional difference between the Jewish Council of the Netherlands and the 
Associations of Belgium and France is the authority the organisations were initially supposed to 
have over their respective communities. Contrary to institutions with a nationwide authority, such as 
the Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Germany, the Belgian AJB and the French UGIF, the Joodsche 
Raad was initially meant to have authority only over the Jewish community in Amsterdam.  On 25 183
October 1941, the Amsterdam Jewish Council, which until then had only had jurisdiction in the city 
of Amsterdam, officially extended its influence to the entire country. As a result, local branches of 
the Coördinatie Commissie, including those in The Hague, Rotterdam and Den Bosch, were taken 
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over and transformed into local branches of the central Amsterdam Jewish Council.  The local JR 184
branch of Enschede, whose leaders were involved in the Comité Duitsche Vluchtelingen 
(Committee for German Refugees) that had provided social welfare to German refugees before the 
occupation, was also created in October 1941, while the Groningen branch was established one 
month later.  In a memorandum of May 1941, David Cohen emphasised the need to establish local 185
branches of the JR throughout the country. The leaders of these local branches (between 3 and 5 in 
total per branch) ‘will be appointed by the Jewish Council of the Netherlands [sic]’, he wrote.  186
However, he seemed to have been overly optimistic about the central board’s influence on these 
local branches. Although the local branches were dependent upon Amsterdam, they could be used 
directly by the SiPO-SD – without the involvement of the Amsterdam central board.  The Belgian 187
AJB had a nationwide authority from the outset with a central seat in Brussels and local branches in 
the most important cities where Jews lived: Brussels, Antwerp, Charleroi and Liège. The leaders of 
these four cities were also represented in the AJB’s central board. As in the cases of the JR, the 
UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud, there were also representatives of the Belgian Jewish Association in 
other cities where Jews lived, including Gand, Oostende and Arlon, although these were not official 
local branches.  188
 In France, we have seen that the physical occupation of the northern half and the western 
coastal areas of the country until November 1942 resulted in a split of the UGIF into an UGIF-Nord 
and UGIF-Sud, both of which functioned differently.  The structure of the UGIF was 189
heterogeneous and its eighteen members never met as a group.  Unlike the UGIF-Nord, which 190
was German-inspired, the UGIF-Sud came into being as a result of the initiative of Xavier Vallat, 
head of the Vichy Commissariat Général, to unify the anti-Jewish laws in both zones and to 
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promote French sovereignty ‘by making the law of the French State prevail in both zones’.  The 191
UGIF-Sud was thus established in a unique way, wholly unlike the eastern European model of a 
Judenrat, and was given the rare opportunity to develop its own bureaucratic structure. As a 
consequence, compared to the JR, the AJB and the UGIF-Nord, the framework of UGIF-Sud was 
entirely different; it was a federative structure in which existing Jewish organisations such as the 
OSE and FSJF were assembled together and retained their (administrative) autonomy. Itself a 
heterogeneous entity, whose members preferred a loose association with the UGIF, the UGIF-Sud 
lacked any real authority and influence over its departments and over the Jewish communities.  Its 192
main office was situated in Marseille, with regional and local offices in a large number of cities, 
including Lyon (three offices), Nice, Montpellier, Perpignan, Valence, Saint-Etienne, Grenoble, Pau, 
Limoges, Périgueux and Vichy.  193
 The UGIF-Nord had a complex bureaucratic structure that was based on numerous 
departments and sub-departments. The majority of its services were concentrated at various 
locations in Paris, with 32 localities in different arrondissements. Georges Edinger was responsible 
for establishing local UGIF branches in the occupied zone, ‘wherever there were sizeable 
communities’ and local Consistories were approached to find representative French leaders.  194
Local branches were instituted in Amiens, Besançon, Montbéliard, Le Mans, Lunéville, Montargis, 
Nancy, Poitiers, Troyes, Versailles, Bayonne, Bordeaux, Epinal and Rouen.  Whereas the UGIF-195
Sud in practice consisted of organisations which were still operating autonomously, the leadership 
of the UGIF-Nord attempted (in vain) to oversee and control all 48 departments of its 
organisation.  The aim to unite the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud, which was inspired by the 196
German wish to establish a stronger and more effective Jewish representative body, proved futile: 
reorganisation challenged the existence and independence of the UGIF-Sud and could therefore ‘not 
be but rejected by it’.  197
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1.3 1941-1944: Continuation or discontinuation? The nature of the Jewish leadership 
 
The varied nature of the communities from which the Jewish organisations emerged affected the 
ways in which their leaders perceived their role. We have seen that whereas the Dutch Council 
chairmen fulfilled major representative functions in the prewar Jewish community, this was not the 
case in Belgium, where a leadership vacuum existed after the prewar leaders had fled the country in 
May 1940. In France, the situation was different yet again, since the central board of the UGIF, both 
in the occupied and the unoccupied zone, consisted of a mixture of people who had belonged to the 
traditional Consistory and Jews with relatively little leadership experience. These variations in 
prewar positions influenced the self-perception of the organisations’ leaders, their acceptance by the 
Jewish communities, and the decisions they made. This, in turn, affected how the Jewish 
organisations could function. Whether the position of the leaders was either a continuation or 
discontinuation of prewar structures played an important role in this regard.  
 
The JR: a continuation of prewar social structures  
 
To turn to the Netherlands first, the Germans approached three influential Jews to head the Joodsche 
Raad on 12 February 1942: the famous diamond merchant Abraham Asscher; Lodewijk Hartog 
Sarlouis, Chief Rabbi of the Dutch-Israelite Hoofdsynagoge (Main Synagogue); and David Francès, 
Chief Rabbi of the Portugese-Israelite community. The formation of a Judenrat was ordered after 
the provocative actions of the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging (National-Socialist Movement, 
NSB) against the Jews in Amsterdam resulted in a fight with a Jewish knokploeg (action group) in 
early February 1941. One member of the NSB’s paramilitary Weerafdeling (WA), Hendrik Koot, 
was seriously injured and died three days later.  This disruption fostered the idea that a 198
representative Jewish body should be established that could be held responsible for maintaining 
order in the Jewish quarter.  199
 
 The choice of Asscher, Sarlouis and Francès was well-founded, as the three men played a 
central role in the community: Asscher on a social and economic level, and Sarlouis and Francès on 
a religious level. Whereas Asscher agreed to his assigned role, Rabbis Sarlouis and Francès refused, 
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because they felt they could not carry out any other task than the provision of religious and spiritual 
care.  They may also have been discouraged by seeing what the Viennese Kultusgemeinde or the 200
eastern European Judenräte had been manipulated into. Even though it is impossible to assess 
exactly what knowledge Jews had of Councils in eastern Europe at this stage, the (German) Jewish 
refugees who had emigrated to the Netherlands did bring information. Undoubtedly, this also 
included information about the German Reichsvereinigung and similar institutions elsewhere. Once 
the Council was established, Sarlouis took a seat on the central board of the JR, though not as 
chairman. We might also therefore explain his refusal to take on the position of chairman in light of 
decreasing religious activity in Dutch Jewish society. Sarlouis might not have considered himself to 
be the most appropriate official representative of the community. As a result, Asscher turned to 
David Cohen, with whom he had worked closely together for years while he headed the CBJB; the 
latter agreed to cooperate.   201
 
 The two chairmen were responsible for appointing the other central board members, 
between 15 and 20 in total throughout the JR’s existence. In his memoirs, Cohen emphasised that 
they mainly chose Jews who fulfilled official representative functions in the community – Chief 
Rabbis, chairmen of the Church councils and leaders of major Jewish organisations.  These 202
included J. Arons (a doctor), N. Beneditty (a judge), A.B. Gomperts (a lawyer), I. de Haan 
(occupation unknown), A. de Hoop (former chairman of the Nederlandse bioscoopbond, the  Dutch 
cinema association), M.L. Kan (a lawyer and chairman of the Nederlandse Zionistenbond, the 
Dutch Zionist Association), I. Kisch (a university teacher), A. Krouwer (director of the 
Handelsmaatschappij Europa-Azië, the Europe-Asia Trading Company), S.J. van Lier (secretary of 
the Amsterdam municipality), A.J. Mendes da Costa (former secretary of the Portugese-Israelite 
community), J.L. Palasche (a professor at the University of Amsterdam), M.I. Prins (an expert in 
constitutional law), A Quiros (a butcher), D.M. Sluys (secretary of the Dutch-Israelite 
Hoofdsynagoge Amsterdam), A. Soep (a diamond trader), H.I. Voet (former chairman of the 
 Berkley, Overzicht van het ontstaan, de werkzaamheden en het streven van den Joodsche Raad voor Amsterdam, 13.200
  Documents sent by David Cohen to his lawyers during the State investigation of his wartime activities, 10 January 201
1949, p. 79, 181j, Inv. No. 11, NIOD; Cohen, Voorzitter van de Joodse Raad, 80.
 Cohen, Voorzitter van de Joodse Raad, 83. 202
!75
Algemene Diamant Bewerkers Bond, the General Diamond Workers Union) and Rabbi Sarlouis.  203
Despite his initial reservations, Isaac Kisch, a member of the Jewish Coordinating Committee, also 
took a seat on the JR’s board in order to have the JCC represented on the newly established body. 
He did so after consultation with the JCC’s head Lodewijk Visser who objected to any form of 
cooperation with the Germans.  His letter of resignation to Cohen shows that he left the board 204
again on 21 September 1941 because he objected to the JR’s functions. After the second major raid 
had taken place in June 1941, Kisch believed the Council should have been dismantled which, as 
we will see, Asscher had in fact proposed (though the plan was not carried out).  Shortly after 205
Kisch sent this letter, the Germans ordered the Coordinating Committee to cease all its activities.  206
 
 There were two Jews who refused to take positions on the JR board: Professor Herman 
Frijda, who believed the JR was an instrument in the hands of the Germans, and A. van Dam, for 
medical reasons.  The central board members were primarily notables: doctors, lawyers, Rabbis, 207
leading functionaries within the Jewish congregation, university professors and affluent and 
influential traders.  As in the eastern European Jewish Councils, the JR leadership was in the 208
hands of the two chairmen rather than those of the entire central board. Neither the other members 
of the central board, nor the members of the Joodsche Beirat – the sub department of the Joodsche 
Raad that consisted of, and represented, German Jews in the Netherlands – and not even the leaders 
of the local branches established throughout 1942 possessed the power to change the directives of 
the JR.  Nor did they have a voice in any matters of principle. Gertrude van Tijn, who headed the 209
Hulp aan Vertrekkenden (Aid to those Departing) section of the JR, highlighted in a 1944 report 
written in Palestine that these local branches were simply informed about the new procedures and 
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about decisions that had already been taken.  210
 
 We have seen that Abraham Asscher and David Cohen were firmly rooted in Dutch social 
and cultural life and maintained close bonds with Dutch Jewry.  Both men were well integrated 211
into wider Dutch society. In addition, they had fulfilled leading functions in the prewar refugee aid 
organisations CBJB and the CvJV. Considering the initial social welfare remit of the western 
European Jewish representative bodies, the leadership of Asscher and Cohen can be considered a 
continuation of the prewar activities in which they had both been engaged. The contacts they had 
established through these organisations ensured they were able to build upon a network of people 
familiar with social welfare work. In a society characterised by decades of assimilation and 
secularisation, in which the influx of immigrants did not drastically affect the existing structures of 
the Jewish community as it did in Belgium and France, Asscher and Cohen were in fact more 
appropriate representatives of their community than has been often argued.  Of course, they were 212
notables, part of the upper class bourgeoisie, and they did not mirror the nature of Jewish society at 
large, which had a large presence of poor Jews and Jewish proletarians who were not represented in 
the central board at all. At the same time, it would be naive to think that a representative from the 
lower echelons of the community would have been acceptable to the German occupier. With the 
absence of an official secular representative of Dutch Jewry, Asscher and Cohen served as 
spokespersons. As Mirjam Bolle, former secretary of the CvJV which was incorporated into the 
Joodsche Raad in 1941, said during a recent interview: if Asscher and Cohen were not 
representatives of their community, then who would have been?  213
 
 It has been argued that even though the socio-geographic background of the JR members 
might have been unbalanced, with 40% living in the richest neighbourhoods of Amsterdam, the 
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leadership also aimed to protect Jews who belonged to the lower social classes.  They did this 214
through the so-called sperre system, administered by the Jewish Council. The sperre stamp 
temporarily harboured its bearer against arrest and deportation bis auf weiteres (until further notice). 
The Council members and Jews who were essential to the war industry, or possessed passports of 
‘friendly states’, were automatically exempted from deportation. Since the stamps provided some 
sort of security in an unstable period, many Jews attempted to arrange them for themselves or their 
families. At the end of July 1942, SS-Stürmbannführer aus der Fünten indicated that around 25,000 
Jews in total (including Jews in the provinces) could receive a sperre which fed the belief that the 
JR would be able to save a substantial number of Jews from deportation.  As Houwink ten Cate 215
has pointed out, overall less than a quarter of those who received a temporary exemption from 
deportation lived in the richest Amsterdam neighbourhoods (Appollobuurt, Museum and 
Concertgebouw buurt), 40% resided in middle class neighbourhoods (Rivierenbuurt, Stadionbuurt, 
Plantage) and around a quarter lived in the poorer areas (Oude Pijp, Oude Jodenhoek, 
Oosterparkbuurt, Weesperstraat, Weesperzijde, Nieuw Pijp, Transvaalbuurt).  The JR ensured that 216
younger Jews from service professions, such as carpenters and cooks, received a protective stamp in 
their identity cards.  Even though there was nepotism involved in the appointment of JR 217
employees, the implication that the JR exclusively served the interests of the bourgeoisie is therefore 
too simplistic.  
 
 Asscher and Cohen considered themselves the most appropriate representatives of the Dutch 
Jewish community. After the war, Cohen stated that he considered that he and Abraham Asscher 
were the most suitable and capable leaders of the Dutch Jewish community at that moment. 
According to Cohen, at different stages during the war, both men had considered resigning. 
However, he writes, the thought of two other Jews taking over their position was one of the reasons 
that forced them to take up their position in the first place and to remain until the very end.  In a 218
similar vein, Asscher indicated he was convinced he had the confidence of the Jews in the 
Netherlands: ‘we (Cohen and Asscher) thought it was evident we would do it, because we had been 
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doing this work our entire lives’.  Their prewar involvement in the community contributed to the 219
idea that they would be best able to defend the position and rights of the Jews. This idea is 
supported by, among other things, Asscher’s unwillingness to flee the country. Postwar testimonies 
like that of Abraham van Dam indicate that the JR leader did not want to abandon the Jewish 
people: ‘he would rather shoot himself through the head than join us in Switzerland [..] he 
considered that to be treason vis-à-vis the other Jews’.  In the 1990s, the son of David Cohen, 220
Herman Cohen, indicated it would have surprised him if his father had not taken up the position. He 
claimed that his father undoubtedly drew on his extensive leadership experience and probably never 
even hesitated to head the Council, not yet knowing that his task would be very different from his 
previous leading roles.  221
 
 There is another motivation that needs to be taken into consideration here. For years, 
Asscher and Cohen had committed themselves to the well-being of the Jews in the Netherlands. 
Both men had aimed to serve the interests of the Jews in various roles. However, they were not (yet) 
the undisputed leaders of Dutch Jewry. Taking up the leadership of the Joodsche Raad might have 
contributed to a feeling that this was a chance to finally and officially establish their leading 
position in relation to the Dutch authorities. Both Asscher and Cohen had been angling for official 
government recognition for some years and their appointment at the head of the JR was an 
opportunity to achieve that status. This idea is strengthened when we consider the attitude of the 
chairmen towards the only other major Jewish representative organisation in the Netherlands: the 
JCC. Cohen considered this organisation an impediment to the power of the JR. The anger of 
Asscher, and particularly of Cohen, during a meeting of the Council on 16 October 1941, after the 
JCC had encouraged Jews not to follow the instructions of the JR, is indicative thereof.  The 222
meeting report shows that Cohen wanted the JCC to be dissolved in case it continued to obstruct the 
work of the JR. The entire board supported this viewpoint.  After Cohen’s repeated requests to the 223
Germans to give the JR national authority, the Council’s sphere of influence extended to the entire 
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Dutch occupied territory in October 1941, after which the JCC was disbanded.  Cohen did not 224
reflect his own role in the dissolution of the JCC in his memoirs. He only stated that the German 
disbanded the organisation and that the two organisations had continued to cooperate closely until 
the JCC’s dissolution.  225
 
The UGIF-Sud: a break with decades of Consistorial rule  
 
The nature of the UGIF central boards has previously been assessed by French historian Michel 
Laffitte. This research deviates from his approach by differentiating between the social standing of 
the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud central board members. Laffitte underlined the heterogeneous 
nature of those on the UGIF central boards by highlighting that their paternal origins were diverse. 
They came from Algiers (Alfred Morali and Marcel Stora in the unoccupied zone), from Poland 
(Joseph Millner) and from Holland (Juliette Stern in the occupied zone). Around half of the central 
board members were of Alsatian descent.  At the same time, Laffitte emphasised the uniform 226
middle-class social standing of the UGIF central board membership. He showed that the UGIF 
consisted of a mixture of lawyers (Lucienne Scheid-Haas, Wladimir Schah and Raphaël Spanien), 
doctors (Benjamin Weill-Hallé and Alfred Morali), translators or journalists (Marcel Stora and 
Raymond-Raoul Lambert), and engineers (Marcel Wormser, Joseph Millner and Robert Gamzon) 
and that some came from the families of Rabbis.  Middle-class bankers and merchants were also 227
represented and only a few belonged to the upper middle class: André Baur, a banker from a 
prominent family that was closely linked to the Rabbinate, and Albert Weil, former member of the 
Coordinating Committee.  However, whereas Laffitte has approached the UGIF as one 228
organisation, arguing that the central board membership was highly heterogenous in terms of 
professions, ancestry, education and religious practices, it is important to differentiate between the 
UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud central boards. Only then can we understand the foundations of 
these two distinct organisations. By making a differentiation, we can identify more common 
patterns among the UGIF-Nord central board members, and, in turn, among the UGIF-Sud central 
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board members, than has hitherto been recognised.  
 
 The prewar position of the UGIF-Sud leadership was unlike that of the UGIF-Nord, the JR 
and the AJB. Whereas the JR leadership can be considered a continuation of prewar structures, we 
will see that the appointment of Ullman at the head of the AJB represents a discontinuity in this 
regard. The UGIF-Sud leaders stand inbetween these two ‘opposites’ since their appointment at the 
helm of this organisation on the one hand represented a break with decades of traditional Consistory 
leadership (a discontinuity), while many had fulfilled prominent leading positions at the same time. 
It has been argued that, with the exception of Robert Gamzon, founder of the first EIF Jewish scout 
troop in Paris, the UGIF central boards (both Nord and Sud) did not consist of true representatives 
of the Jewish communities.  In 1923, Gamzon had created the first EIF Jewish scout troop in Paris 229
– by then, the scouting movement was highly popular in France with separate Catholic, Protestant 
and Secular scouting associations – and attempted to create a unified movement among Jewish 
political youth factions.  The EIF members were diverse and Jews from all religious and 230
educational backgrounds were welcome.  Before the war, ‘the movement’s overwhelmingly 231
French leadership had built connections with high-ranking personalities in the national 
administration and had developed excellent relations with France’s other scouting associations’.  232
We will see that the other UGIF central board members did indeed not represent the various Jewish 
communities in France equally, although it would have been difficult to truly represent the many 
Jewish groups who lived in the country. Nevertheless, if we compare the French to the Belgian case, 
the UGIF-Sud leadership was more fundamentally part of the traditional structures than was the 
case in Belgium. Rather than being a continuation of prewar structures as was the case in the 
Netherlands, however, the core of the UGIF-Sud leadership symbolised an alternative form of 
representation. While its leaders had been part of traditional structures for years, they represented a 
deviation from the Consistory rule that had been predominant for decades at the outbreak of the 
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 Prewar instability in French Jewish society, where the Consistory failed to function as a 
(religious) representative organisation, had in some respects created a leadership vacuum, though 
not to the same extent as in Belgium. After the German order for the establishment of a French 
Jewish representative organisation, the head of the CGQJ – Xavier Vallat – approached Jacques 
Helbronner, president of the General Consistory from 1940 and the most influential Jew in France 
at the time, and asked him to cooperate in the institution of an overarching, mandatory 
organisation.  The connection between these two men dated back to the First World War, when 233
Helbronner headed the military department and ‘was alleged to have supported Pétain’s nomination 
to lead the French armies in 1917’.  According to Helbronner, he met Pétain once a week until 234
July 1941 as a result of which he became known as the ‘Juif de Maréchal’ in the Jewish 
community.  The Vichy government had established the CGQJ primarily in order to oversee 235
Vichy’s spoliation and Aryanisation measures. It also supervised and organised the implementation 
of anti-Jewish policies in France which until then had been the responsibility of individual 
ministerial departments.  The draft for a Jewish representative organisation that Vallat presented to 236
Helbronner was more comprehensive than the Germans had proposed and grouped all existing 
Jewish organisations together under one umbrella, undoubtedly in an attempt to show the Germans 
that ‘France was equally capable and determined to deal with the Jewish Question’.  Since 237
Helbronner refused to cooperate, there was an opportunity for a new leadership to present itself. As 
Laffitte claimed, the German occupation was a chance for the ‘new elite’ to establish their power 
and to break the Consistorial monolithic power for good.  The opportunity was used by Raymond-238
Raoul Lambert, whose disappointment in the Consistory’s dealings with the Jewish immigrants 
made him into someone who aimed to break permanently with centuries of Consistory rule.  
 
 Born in 1895 in Montmorency (Seine-et-Oise), Lambert had received several Military 
decorations for his efforts during the First World War. Before the Second World War, he had been 
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involved in several humanitarian (refugee) organisations, among other things, as secretary-general 
of the CAR in Marseille. He condemned both the xenophobic responses by French Jewry and those 
of French society more generally towards the arrival of thousands of refugees and believed that 
French Jewry had a responsibility to take care of their coreligionists. Lambert was also a board 
member of the Zionist Federation in France, where he had tried to improve the integration of Jews 
in French society while simultaneously preparing them for emigration to Palestine. Former editor of 
the Univers Israélite, the mouthpiece of the Central Consistory, he was a leading figure in French 
Jewry who, similar to Asscher and Cohen in the Netherlands, held key posts within the non-Jewish 
community as well.  Lambert felt strongly connected to the French State; ‘pulling off these roots 239
would be worse than amputation’ he wrote in his diary.  With his background in relief work, one 240
of Lambert’s aims was to represent and protect the interests of immigrant Jews through the UGIF, 
as their voice had often been ignored, particularly by the French ruling class.   241
 
 While he negotiated with Vallat on the establishment of the UGIF, Lambert claimed he was 
afraid that if he did not take up a leading role, there would be a lack of concern for immigrant 
representation.  Richard Cohen has indicated that Lambert’s meeting with Vallat in preparation for 242
the establishment of the UGIF in the summer of 1941 was the turning point in his career: ‘it was to 
catapult him into one of the most influential positions in Jewish life in unoccupied Europe’.  The 243
leading role Lambert took up was not well received by the Rabbinate and Consistory, and they 
belittled his actions as the ‘unauthorised acts of a layman’.  This is unique compared to the 244
Netherlands and Belgium, where the Dutch-Israelite religious community was represented in the JR 
central board through Rabbi Sarlouis while Chief Rabbi Salomon Ullman served as head of the AJB 
in Belgium. The Consistory’s rejection of Lambert’s leadership was a constant source of trouble for 
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him and he often vented his anger and disappointment in his diary. In one entry, he described an 
encounter with the Consistory’s president on 30 July 1942 on the platform of Lyon-Perrache station: 
‘I ask for a meeting the next day, but Mr. Helbronner will not agree to meet before Sunday. He is 
expecting Mr. Schwartz the same day. The president of the Consistory seems more deaf to me, more 
pretentious and older than ever. The fate of the foreigners doesn’t move him in the least’.  245
 
 Although the UGIF did not officially represent the Consistory, neither was it disconnected 
from it. We have seen that Lambert had been closely involved with the Consistory through his work 
for the Univers Israélite. The same applies to Albert Lévy, the first president of the UGIF.  Lévy 
was a member of the Consistory from 1935 until his choice to take up the presidency of the UGIF 
forced him to resign in February 1942.  He had close personal, social and institutional ties to 246
Lambert, not least as leader of the CAR and also as fellow member of the Paris literary community 
in the 1930s.  In a report written at the end of February 1942, Lévy indicated that he had been 247
nominated president of the UGIF without having been informed of this beforehand. It was a role he 
had not been willing to take and he initially signed a collective refusal letter. Eventually, however, 
after Vallat threatened to choose central board members who had never been involved in welfare 
activities, Lévy claimed he agreed to take on his position in the UGIF in order to ensure social care 
for all Jews living in France. Like Lambert, he felt forced to do so because he believed that the 
position taken by the Consistory in relation to the refugee problem was wrong. For Lévy, taking up 
a leading position in the UGIF was a good way to represent and protect immigrant Jewry.  A few 248
days thereafter, the Consistory accused him of treason: ‘[t]he Consistory repudiated me [because of 
my decision], but it simultaneously tried to hide from responsibilities and it was grateful that I did 
take on this [responsibility] vis-à-vis the government and French Jewry’.  As we shall see, despite 249
the antagonism between the two organisations, the Consistory and the UGIF grew closer again 
during the course of the occupation, aiming to use their combined efforts to help Jews.  
 
 For the central board of the UGIF-Sud, Xavier Vallat nominated Jews who had fulfilled 
prominent positions in the prewar Jewish society. Gaston Kahn had close ties to the CAR, where he 
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had served as director. Other appointed members were David Olmer and Professor William Oualid, 
both of whom worked for the Organisation de Reconstruction et le Travail (Organisation for 
Reconstruction and Work, ORT). Oualid, born in 1880 in Algeria, was one of the central leaders of 
French Jewry before the war. Among other positions, he held the chair of Political Economy at 
Sorbonne, was chief of the Employment Office at the Ministry of Labor in 1919, and was vice-
president of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU). As a respected member of the Central 
Consistory, Oualid was actively engaged in several refugee organisations in the prewar period and 
was closely associated with Marc Jarblum, the president of the FSJF.  The other appointed 250
members were René Mayer, head of the HICEM, an organisation that helped European Jews to 
emigrate, Maurice Pléven, representative of the AIU, and Dr Joseph Weill, who worked for the 
OSE. Clearly, the majority had been involved in (immigrant) aid organisations before the war.  
 
 Contrary to Lambert, who already had agreed to fulfil a leading position in the UGIF 
through his negotiations with Vallat, the majority of these Jews had not agreed to work for the 
Jewish organisation prior to their appointment. Some were uncertain about whether to accept their 
nomination. The community leaders were split between those who advocated either continuing 
negotiations in order to improve the UGIF’s establishment decree or terminating negotiations, and 
those who recognised the inevitable and resigned themselves to this new form of organisation. The 
Consistory publicly advocated terminating further negotiations.  Initially, many refused their 251
nomination. In his diary, Lambert wrote that that Mayer and Olmer were the first to do so; ‘Oualid 
and Jarblum then followed them’.  Jarblum opposed bringing all Jewish organisations under the 252
control of an antisemitic government that collaborated with the Germans.  Mayer refused on 253
personal grounds and suggested someone else be appointed in his place. Olmer refused on the 
grounds of legal principles, and Oualid refused unless Vallat could provide guarantees about the 
nature of the organisation.  Larger underlying factors also played a role here. At this stage, it was 254
not yet clear what kind of organisation the UGIF would become. There also existed a general fear 
that the responsibilities of the organisation would go beyond providing social welfare.  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 Although Lévy, Gamzon, Millner and Lambert were prepared to accept their nomination, 
they decided to support the réfus collectif (collective refusal) out of solidarity.  Lambert reflected 255
upon this episode in this diary:  
 Albert Lévy, Millner, Gamzon, and I could not possibly accept under the circumstances. So we   
 decided to go along with the others, and all of us signed the same letter declining the office.   256
On 24 December 1941, all appointed members sent a letter to Vallat stating the reasons for 
declining their nomination: ‘the reasons mainly concern the limited competences of the Union and 
its board of directors’ and the fact that ‘it could not exclusively dedicate its attention to uniting 
French Jewry and welfare work’.  From Lambert’s diary becomes clear he was dissatisfied with 257
the course of events:  
 I am convinced that this is an imbecilic step to take, but we’ll see what happens! Oualid had a failure 
 of nerve…I wrote a personal letter to Vallat to notify him of this collective refusal, since I am the  
 only one who has any power to save this thing any longer – I’m right about that.   258
Vallat, who had become increasingly agitated, initially decided to replace those individuals who had 
expressed their reservations. In his diary, Lambert reflected upon the course of events at the end of 
December 1941: 
 Vallat can’t wait any longer. He is leaving for Paris on the 5th [of January]. Besides Mr. Marcel  
 Wormser, whom he chose himself and who had accepted, he will choose eight Jewish individuals not 
 involved in our  social work. He will have an easy time finding eight “mercenaries” he says, people 
 living in Vichy who know nothing about our organizations but will be happy to have a role in them, 
 if only because this will give them the authorization to stay.  259
Lambert asked Vallat to reconsider the appointment of alternative ‘mercenaries’, encouraging him 
to send personal telegrams to all those who had initially sent a collective refusal.  This effort was 260
successful as most of them then accepted their nomination to the central board. Existing literature 
has claimed that Olmer, Oualid and Jarblum refused to work for the UGIF and that they saved their 
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honour and that of the Jewish community in so doing.  Nonetheless, the acceptance telegrams sent 261
by these men on 4 January 1942, sent alongside those of Lévy, Lambert, Millner and Gamzon, show 
otherwise.  All men emphasised they would only engage in charity and social work. Olmer and 262
Jarblum added an attachment to their telegram, outlining three conditions: 1) the tasks of the entire 
organisation would be limited to questions d’assistance; 2) there would be no other task than this; 
and 3) they wanted to personally discuss the composition of the organisation with Vallat.  263
Lambert’s diary shows that the ‘qualified replies’ from Oualid, Olmer and Jarblum were not 
accepted. Instead, Lambert proposed three others to serve in the UGIF-Sud board: Raphaël Spanien, 
Laure Weill and André Lazard.  264
 
 On 9 January 1942, all positions in the central board of the UGIF-Sud were assigned and 
approved.  Although Albert Lévy was officially the president of the UGIF, Lambert was in fact the 265
one taking the lead.  It is therefore not surprising that when Lévy fled to Switzerland in December 266
1942, Lambert took over his presidency in March 1943.  In sum, the UGIF-Sud central board 267
comprised Lambert, Gamzon, Schah, Spanien, Lazard, Weill, Marcel Wormser and Millner, who 
was replaced on 11 May 1942 by Pierre Seligman. Seligman had been honorary member of the 
State Council where Helbronner had been his colleague until he was forced to resign as a result of 
the Statut des Juifs of October 1940 that, among other things, banned Jews from top government 
administrative positions. During the war, he also worked for the juridical service of the Consistory. 
In a letter to Lambert, he showed his reservations about working for the UGIF-Sud: ‘Although I 
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could accept being appointed by Mr. X.V. (Xavier Vallat) it did not please me to be named by a note 
signed by his successor (Louis Darquier de Pellepoix). I am afraid it will be impossible to work 
with the latter’.   268
 
The UGIF-Nord: a continuation of the Comité de Coördination  
 
In the French occupied zone, the appointment of leaders at the helm of the UGIF-Nord proved less 
difficult. The central board was a mere continuation of the Comité de Coördination des Oeuvres de 
Bienfaisance, the umbrella of philanthropic organisations established at the end of January 1941. 
The UGIF-Nord therefore inherited its staff, areas of activity and points of conflict. Many Jews 
were concentrated in Paris, partly because of the refugee influx from the Alsace-Lorraine region. As 
a result of the mass exodus of Jews from Paris in May-June 1940, the former centre of Jewish life in 
Paris had been broken apart. Instead, Jews were concentrated in the provinces. It was the first stage 
of the scattering of Jews throughout France, which made it difficult for umbrella organisations to 
carry out their work.  Of the nine central board members of the UGIF-Nord, six had previously 269
worked for the Comité de Coordination.  As a consequence, whereas immigrant movements were 270
represented in the unoccupied zone through the CCOJA, this was not the case in the occupied zone, 
where the CCOJA’s equivalent, the Amelot Committee, had not been involved in the 
negotiations.  The Paris negotiations with Vallat only involved leaders close to the Consistory. 271
Therefore, immigrant leaders had little trust in the goodwill of their French counterparts and in their 
apparent concern for immigrant communities.  272
 
 André Baur was appointed leader of the UGIF-Nord. He was a banker from a wealthy 
family with links to both the Rabbinate and Zionism. Baur, only 37, was the son of a prominent and 
established Jewish family with close ties to the Paris Consistory. He was the grandson of the former 
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Chief Rabbi of France, Emmanuel Weill, and second cousin to the Chief Rabbi of Paris, Julien 
Weill. He accepted his nomination without hesitation and to the very end, he aimed to preserve the 
links between the notables of the Consistory and the UGIF-Nord.  In the occupied zone, Baur’s 273
close connections to the Consistory decreased the tensions that existed between these two 
organisations.  German pressure quickly intensified in the occupied zone, and there was therefore 274
a need to unite Jewish responses despite the existing opposition between the UGIF and the 
Consistory.  Baur, like Lambert, considered Zionism as a lifebuoy, a solution to the crisis in which 275
European Jewry found itself.  Other members of the first UGIF-Nord central board were also 276
Zionists, including Juliette Stern, Georges Edinger, Benjamin Weil-Hallé and Fernand Musnik. In 
that sense, the impact of the large number of refugees who introduced Zionist ideas into French 
society was visible in the UGIF-Nord leadership.  
 
 The UGIF-Nord central board members had a different background and social standing in 
society from their UGIF-Sud colleagues. Some of the central board members did have 
organisational experience, including Juliette Stern (general secretary of the WIZO), Fernand 
Musnik (a member of the Directory Board of de Fédération de la Jeunesse Sioniste et Pro-Palestiene 
de France), and Georges Edinger (President of the Temples Consistoriaux since 1916 and treasurer 
of the CAR). Furthermore, Baur had played a prominent role in the Comité de Coördination and 
represented the haute bourgeoisie of Paris while Marcel Stora had been his secretary.  Stora had 277
lived by doing modest jobs until the 1930s. He had worked as a representative for a funerary marble 
firm and later obtained a position as translator for the publishing house Gallimard.  However, they 278
were not representative at the same level in the prewar Jewish communities when compared to 
those in the UGIF-Sud and the JR. In fact, many of the leaders designated by the Germans and 
chosen by Vichy in the occupied zone had never held a high public position before the war. As a 
result, the social foundations of the Jewish society in the occupied zone were, compared to the 
unoccupied zone, much more unstable.  Some members of the UGIF-Nord were not experienced 279
leaders at all. The experience they had gained through the Comité de Coördination was very limited 
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in duration. Lucienne Scheid-Haas, for example, who had had only a minimal prior commitment to 
and involvement in the Jewish society, became head of the juridical service of the UGIF. After the 
war, Scheid-Haas indicated that she was encouraged to take part in the organisation by her strong 
feeling that she ought to aid her fellow Jews.  The larger number of inexperienced leaders in the 280
UGIF-Nord central board was a direct result of the flight of the traditional leadership to the 
unoccupied zone, where some joined the UGIF-Sud.  
 
The AJB: improvised leadership  
 
In Belgium, there was a discontinuity in Jewish leadership after the German occupation of the 
country. This had two causes. First, the absence of those who had taken up leading positions before 
the Nazi occupation. Second, the generally disorganised state of the Belgian Jewish communities. 
Although the future Dutch Joodsche Raad leaders had established their positions as key 
functionaries in the Jewish community in the 1930s, the large influx of Jewish immigrants meant 
that it was impossible to identify a distinctive Jewish leadership in Belgium before the war. Both the 
German occupier and the Jews had to look for people who could appropriately fill the leadership 
vacuum resulting after the flight from Belgium of the prewar leadership. Only Salomon Ullman, 
Chief Rabbi of Belgium, former head of the Comité de Coördination and military chaplain, and 
Rabbi of Antwerp Markus Rottenberg, both representatives of the former Jewish communities’ 
structures, remained.  Ullman had been made a prisoner of war, but was returned to Belgium on 281
12 June 1940.  This leadership vacuum might explain why, despite German disapproval of the 282
way the Comité de Coordination had functioned, the majority of the Jews who had been active in 
this committee were again appointed to serve in the AJB, including Salomon Ullman who was 
appointed as its first head.  Although it has been argued that the choice of Chief Rabbi Ullman 283
was somewhat arbitrary, it can very well be explained from the German perspective.  In a 284
splintered Belgian Jewish society where numerous sorts of Jewish life were represented, from non-
Zionist to Zionist, from Bundist to communist, and from conservative to Modern Orthodox, 
including Agudat Yisrael and even Hasidic Jewry, the choice of a traditional Rabbinic leadership 
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 The position of the AJB central board members in Belgian society was essentially different 
from that of their Dutch and French counterparts. Although AJB members had fulfilled 
representative functions within Jewish public life before the war and also had ties to the Consistory, 
which was unlike the example of the Netherlands, their appointment cannot be considered a 
continuation of prewar structures.  Overall, the Belgian AJB leaders had either not been involved 285
in prewar Jewish communal life, or had been involved in activities only on a local scale. To some 
extent, Brussels’ AJB representative Salomon van den Berg was an exception in this regard, despite 
the fact that he had ‘only’ been a wholesale dealer before he was nominated vice-president of the 
Jewish community in 1940. After he returned from his flight to southern France in 1940, he was one 
of the few members of the prewar Belgian Israelite establishment who remained in Brussels. In the 
face of few alternatives, he was nominated vice-president of the community, a role he was more 
than willing to take on. In his diary, Van den Berg wrote: ‘I allowed myself to be nominated vice-
president of the Israelite community, being one of the oldest members present in Brussels in 
Belgium, which was a rare thing in these times’.  Very much focussed on his own well-being, and 286
with a negative perception vis-a-vis German Jews who continued to play a role in the Hilfswerk für 
Deutsche Juden, Van den Berg seemed to consider the AJB as a mere continuation of and substitute 
for the Consistory tradition he had been part of before the war.  In fact, he did not even try to hide 287
his feeling of repugnance towards foreign Jews. His diary shows that his central aim was to 
maintain his privileged position in society, using the AJB to establish his longed-for position of 
leadership.  288
 
 The first chairman of the AJB, Salomon Ullman, was not involved in major public activities 
before the war in the way that Asscher and Cohen in the Netherlands or Lambert in France had 
been. Ullman was born in Budapest in 1882, went to school in Antwerp but then returned to 
Hungary to attend yechivah, a talmudic school. After studying in Frankfurt am Main and Bern, he 
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once more returned to Hungary between 1907 and 1909 to continue his Rabbinic education. Ullman 
unsuccessfully applied for the post of Rabbi of the Brussels orthodox community in 1914 but was 
not elected. After living in the Netherlands for seven years, he eventually became secretary of the 
Machsike Hadass community, a small ultra-orthodox, generally non-Zionist, Antwerp community 
his father had founded in 1892.  It was a minor movement with a largely immigrant congregation. 289
A few years later, Ullman became the community’s Rabbi. From 1937, he was the main chaplain 
(hoofdalmoezenier) of the Belgian Army but his leadership cannot be seen as the product of a long-
term development in Belgian Jewish society and Ullman can hardly be considered typical of 
Belgian Jewry at this time.  
 
 After the German occupation of Belgium and the disappearance of Jews who had fulfilled 
major representative functions before the war, Ullman had been unwillingly put forward as a 
candidate to become Chief Rabbi of the country. Yitzak Kubowitzki, leader of the Brussels Jewish 
Zionist community, had been important in the process of reorganisation after the Nazi occupation 
and was anxiously looking for any Jewish representative left who could take care of the remains of 
the Jewish community.  Via Marcel Blum, the only board member of the Israelite Community of 290
Brussels left in the city, Kubowitzki approached Antwerp Rabbi Halevi Brod and Rabbi Schapiro to 
become chief Rabbi of Belgium. Both of them refused.  In a postwar report on the activities of the 291
AJB, Ullman claimed he was not inclined to accept this job either. However, Rabbis Brot and 
Markus Rottenberg declared that a refusal on his part would have a disastrous impact on the Jewish 
communities of Belgium.  Kubowitzki, Brod and Schapiro encouraged Ullman to take up the 292
position.  Ullman claimed that his decision to do so was among other things motivated by German 293
Jewish refugees who tried to ‘profit’ from the lack of representation and leadership within Jewish 
society by presenting themselves to the Germans as the communities’ representatives. Ullman 
considered this potentially harmful. In addition, the pressure from the German side was severe, he 
claimed.  As a result, he gave in to demands voiced by both the Jewish and German sides and 294
became interim chief Rabbi of Belgium, in the absence of Joseph Wiener. Quite unexpectedly, 
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Salomon Ullman therefore suddenly fulfilled a central role in the Jewish communities of Belgium 
only two years before he was appointed head of the AJB. Fela Perelman, wife of Chaim Perelman 
and who, as we will see, worked both for the AJB and the clandestine CDJ, claimed after the war 
that Ullman was not able to play the important role of chairman of the AJB at such an important 
moment in Jewish history because he lacked the necessary experience: 
 Seeing as though you’ve asked me, Chief Rabbi Ullman was certainly not a traitor in my opinion. He 
 was just ignorant. And he was not able to assume such an important role at such an important  
 moment in Jewish history in general and the Jewish community in Belgium in particular. Chief  
 Rabbi Weiner was gone. Ullman had never been a Chief Rabbi before. He was a secretary. And  
 suddenly he held this responsibility [..].  295
The same pattern of having relatively minor prewar representative positions, if any, can be 
identified if we look at the other AJB central board members. This issue affected the self-perception 
of the central board membership. In a number of cases, they were either unwilling to head the 
organisation or not confident about their leadership. We will see that this eventually resulted in 
resignations from the central board. As a consequence, the status of the AJB and the way in which 
its leadership carried out their functions was different from that of the JR or the UGIF-Sud. The 
other members of the central board were appointed by the Germans and could only resign if 
approved by the Militärbefehlshaber of Belgium and Northern France, Alexander von 
Falkenhausen. Ullman was not involved in this nomination process.  Unsurprisingly, the central 296
board members were chosen from among the largest Jewish communities in Belgium, representing 
Antwerp (Maurice Benedictus), Brussels (Salomon van den Berg), Charleroi (Jules Mehlwurm) and 
Liège (Noé Nozyce).  
 
 The appointment of the Antwerp AJB representative, who would also serve as the AJB’s 
vice-chairman, had been a complex process. Initially, the secretary of the Antwerp Diamant Club, 
M. Louis Judels, was chosen to head the Antwerp branch, but he pretended to be a half-Jew and 
instead nominated Isaac Benedictus, who belonged to one of the oldest families in Antwerp. As he 
was too old, his son Maurice Benedictus was put forward in his place. Arguing that he lacked the 
necessary competence and would not be at all capable as a leader, Maurice refused. His reluctance 
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was not unreasonable. He had been a cigar-maker before the war and was not at all involved in 
Jewish public life.  Like Ullman, he had been unwilling to take up a leading position in Jewish 297
society after the German occupation. Despite this, Ullman informed Benedictus that he was obliged 
to take on this responsibility due to intense German pressure.  As a result, someone who had only 298
been remotely connected to Jewish public life became leader of the Antwerp AJB branch.  The 299
story of Maurice Heiber is very similar. He entered the central board as head of the local Brussels 
AJB board on 9 December 1942. He reflected on his involvement with prewar Jewish society: 
‘[until the end of 1940] I did not have any contact with the Jewish community in Belgium, whose 
problems and members were entirely unfamiliar to me’.  There were also AJB members whose 300
prewar position in the society had been better established, such as Salomon van den Berg, former 
administrator of the Israélite Community and Nico Workum, director of the Belgian 
Communications Network, but they were few and far between.  
 
 When we look at other central board members, some of whom joined the AJB at a later stage 
in the war, we see that some had immigrated to Belgium only recently. Although the existing 
literature has emphasised the fact that the vast majority of AJB board members possessed Belgian 
nationality, the presence of some Jews who did not (yet) have Belgian citizenship constitutes a 
major difference with the JR, where none of the central board members was a recent immigrant.  301
The following individuals were all involved in the local branches of the AJB, while simultaneously 
taking a seat on the central board. Noé Nozyce, president of the local AJB Liège board, was born in 
Cieszyn (Poland), and arrived in Liège in 1928 where he became a fur trader.  Grigorijs 302
Garfinkels, board member of the local Liège board, was born in Liepaja (Latvia) and immigrated to 
Belgium in 1925.  Chaïm Perelman, born in Warsaw, was throughout the 1930s still going through 303
 Schreiber, Dictionnaire Biographique, 48. 297
  Maurice Benedictus, “Historique du problème Juif en Belgique depuis le 10 Mai 1940 jusqu’au 21 Décembre 298
1942”, 18 Feb 1943, p.5, A006683, Kazerne Dossin. 
 Ibid. Also see: Steinberg, “The Trap of Legality”, 801. 299
 Eyewitness account by Maurice Heiber, “The Jewish Children in Belgium” (1956), p.2, 1656/3/9/274, Wiener 300
Library. 
 See, for example: Steinberg, La Persécution des Juifs en Belgique, 181-182; Saerens, Vreemdelingen in een 301
wereldstad, 502-503. 
 Report on Noé Nozyce, Inv. No. 19186/45, Conseil de Guerre de Liège, Auditorat Militaire, Algemeen Rijksarchief 302
België (ARA 2).
 Report on Grigorijs Garfikels, Inv. No. 4030/44, Conseil de Guerre de Liège, Auditorat Militaire, Algemeen 303
Rijksarchief België (ARA 2). 
!94
a process of naturalisation to become an official Belgian citizen.  Perelman’s family had settled in 304
Antwerp in 1925 and while Chaïm quickly pursued a career at the Université Libre de Bruxelles 
(ULB), he only received Belgian nationality in 1936.  One of the founders of the local Liège AJB 305
branch, Idel Steinberg, born in Rezina (Bessarabia, Romania) was also in the middle of a 
naturalisation process in the 1930s.  The president of the Charleroi branch of the AJB, Juda 306
Mehlwurm, who was born in Poland, arrived in Charleroi in 1923 and only received Belgian 
citizenship after the war, in March 1955.   307
 
 Mehlwurm’s successor, Louis Rosenfeld, nominated at the end of 1942, never intended to 
live in Belgium. Shortly before the Nazi occupation of the country, Rosenfeld was still uncertain 
about whether or not he would reside only temporarily in Belgium. He was a German trader in 
women’s clothing and visited Belgium occasionally in this capacity. It was only as late as April 
1939 that he asked for a Belgian visa, because his intention to emigrate to Britain was suddenly 
thwarted when the British Consul failed to grant him authorisation to enter the country.  After the 308
German invasion, he became president of the Oeuvre de Secours aux Israélites d’Allemagne (Aid 
Society for the German Israelites) that succeeded the Hilfswerk der Arbeitsgemeinschaft von Juden 
aus Deutschland.  Despite this, his prominent position in the AJB, attained only a little over two 309
years after circumstances forced him to remain in Belgium, does seem remarkable. The fact that the 
board consisted of people whose integration into the prewar Jewish communities of Belgium was 
only recent suggests that the nomination of the majority of these individuals to relatively prominent 
positions in the Belgian AJB was somewhat random.  
 
 Saerens has argued that in the case of the Antwerp AJB branch, the board members were not 
at all representative of the city’s Jewish communities, since almost all possessed Belgian citizenship 
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and belonged to the moyenne bourgeoisie, as well as living in non-Jewish neighbourhoods.  He 310
has highlighted the fact that these were assimilated Jews and that even Machel Majer (Max) 
Grätzer, of Polish origin, was representative of the Jewish bourgeoisie because he served as 
secretary of the Consistory.  In a similar vein, Steinberg highlighted that the vast majority of AJB 311
employees were Belgian citizens, which was in accordance with the demands of Wilhelm von Hahn, 
the spokesperson for the AJB at the Militärverwaltungsstab of Eggert Reeder. When the 
deportations commenced, Von Hahn indicated to Benedictus and Nozyce that the positions of the 
AJB ought to be occupied as much as possible by Belgian Jews.  The examples we have seen here 312
suggest that the nature of the AJB leadership was rather different, reflecting a more complex reality. 
In the organisation’s central board, there were in fact a number of Jews who did not possess Belgian 
citizenship and, compared to their Dutch counterparts, the relative lack of overall experience in 
leading positions among the board members was significant. They were not representative of the 
highly diverse Jewish (immigrant) communities of Belgium but neither were they traditional leaders 
with years of leadership experience like Asscher and Cohen.  
 
 The social-historical context in which the AJB central board was established meant that its 
acceptance by the Jewish communities was minimal.  In a postwar interview, Ullman was asked 313
whether those nominated as central board members of the AJB received the confidence of the 
Jewish communities in Belgium. He answered: 
 None. They were generally never in touch with Jews. I mean, some of them you have to  know, one 
 of them was Benedictus, that was the cigar factory Benedictus in Pienkov, in the Catenstrasse. He  
 was a member. And one of them was Nossatsche (?) [Nozyce], a short man from Liège, A fur trader. 
 Then you had Hellendahl [Hellendall], from Brussels, he had a well-known company in Brussels, he 
 was hardly in touch with Jews.  314
Whereas Belgian historians Schreiber and Van Doorslaer have argued that there was a general sense 
of trust among the Belgian population in the AJB at least until the summer of 1942, the image 
 Saerens, Vreemdelingen in een wereldstad, 502-503. 310
 Ibid. 311
 Report of meeting between Benedictus, Nozyce and Von Hahn, 14 September 1942, A007418, Centre National des 312
Hautes Études Juives (CNHEJ), Buber Collection, Kazerne Dossin; Steinberg, La persécution des Juifs en Belgique, 
181-182. 




portrayed here by Ullman is quite different.  This again underlines the point that he had little trust 315
in the form and function of the AJB.  
 
 The fact that the Belgian Jewish leaders’ positions were not a continuation of prewar 
structures certainly affected their perceptions and choices. The treasurer of the local Brussels AJB 
board, Alfred Blum, indicated in a postwar interview that Ullman regretted he had been appointed 
as director: il était fort ennuyé.  Without any real previous leadership experience and also a rather 316
unwilling leader, he never seemed to take his role as Jewish Association leader as seriously as either 
Asscher or (particularly) Cohen had done in the Netherlands, nor as Lambert had done in France. 
The postwar testimony of Alfred Rosenzweig, who was a lawyer in Berlin before fleeing to 
Belgium in the 1930s, gives a valuable insight in the way Ullman was perceived in his role as a 
communal leader. According to Rosenzweig, Ullman was an honest and good man but was not the 
most capable person to represent the Belgian Jewish communities and was even less prepared for 
his job than other members of the central board.  As a consequence, his leadership lacked 317
determination.  Ullman’s role in the AJB was therefore secondary. Maurice Benedictus occupied 318
the central position instead, first as secretary and later as head of the administration of the AJB 
which presided over the local branches and various commissions.  Despite Benedictus’ initial 319
unwillingness to become a representative, he fulfilled his positions with much more confidence and 
courage than Ullman.  320
 
 The unwillingness Ullman and Benedictus initially felt was shared by others. It has been 
argued that the AJB leaders did not use the establishment of this body to gain power in Jewish 
society, but we might take this claim one step further, and conclude that the majority of the future 
central board members were far from willing to take on any representative position whatsoever.  321
They rejected the ‘offer’ to form the leadership of the Association as they considered it to be a guet-
apens – a trap.  Although only Joseph Teichmann, who was designated to become the local 322
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Antwerp representative, refused to work for the Association, the general lack of eagerness to 
become AJB representatives among the central board members, and in the case of Salomon Ullman 
specifically, is an important difference from the examples of the Dutch Council chairmen and the 
UGIF-Sud chairman Raymond-Raoul Lambert.  From a comparative viewpoint, two important 323
observations can be made. The AJB’s leadership, and specifically its chairman, did not have the 
same prewar status as the majority of their counterparts in the Netherlands and France. Even 
compared to UGIF-Nord, the AJB leadership was less entrenched in the country’s Jewish 
communities. As a result, the confidence which particularly Asscher and Cohen especially had in 
their own leadership and their feeling that they were the right representatives of Jewish society in 
the Netherlands, was generally absent in the Belgian case. The following paragraphs show how this 
affected the course of events.  
 
1.4  Self-perception and the choices of the Jewish leaders  
 
Internal pressure? (The absence of) coordinated institutional criticism  
 
The nature of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud was such that their leadership 
received criticism from the communities they were forced to represent. Their function as 
spokespersons while also cooperating with the Germans led to disagreement, protest and anger 
among the Jewish communities. In all three countries, Jews generally seemed to feel that it was 
wrong to comply with the German demand of establishing a Jewish representative organisation in 
the first place. At the same time, many understood the motives of the central board members for 
taking up their role during the earliest stages of the organisations’ existence. It was clear that in the 
event that the appointed leadership refused to serve, there would always be others who were willing 
to do the job. In the case of France, historians seem to agree that the UGIF was initially perceived 
more positively by Jews in France than during the last phase of the German occupation. The critics 
in part based their anger on the fact that the organisation had failed to protect the Jewish children 
who lived in the UGIF-Nord home of Neuilly. Initially, the children of the Neuilly home had been 
evacuated in anticipation of upcoming raids. However, they were brought back because the UGIF 
leaders feared reprisals. On 25 July 1944, these children were arrested and sent to Drancy, after 
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666, DOS. 
!98
which they were deported to Auschwitz.  This supposedly highlighted the detrimental role the 324
organisation’s leadership played in the last phase of the occupation.  The same holds true for 325
Belgium, where the AJB initially gained the trust of an important part of the Jewish population, at 
least until the summer of 1942 and even thereafter. Even though the Association was considered an 
instrument in the hands of the Germans, aiding them in their policies of persecution, it also 
responded to the increasing needs of the Jewish population.  This ambivalence was inherent in the 326
way the Jewish organisations in all three western European countries were perceived.  
 
 At all levels of society, Jews criticised the organisations’ leaders and the way they responded 
to German demands. In the case of the Netherlands, for example, the Dutch Council popularly came 
to be referred to as Jewish treason (verraad) or trouble (onraad), in part because the chairmen had 
agreed to hand over a list of the names of unmarried men between the ages of 18-40 for work-
camps in the Netherlands in order to ‘forestall disruptions as far as possible’.  Mirjam Levie, 327
secretary of the JR, alluded to a joke that was common among Jews in the Netherlands, highlighting 
that its leaders were considered too cooperative with the Nazis: The Germans summon Asscher and 
Cohen and inform them that the Jews will be gassed, to which Cohen immediately responds ‘do you 
deliver the gas, or are we responsible for doing so?’  Criticisms of the Jewish leaders were also 328
voiced by the organisations’ own members. In France, for example, one month after the liberation 
of the country, Joseph Lehman, the director of the UGIF-Sud Marseille branch, denounced the 
actions of Gaston Kahn, interim director of the UGIF, in the Notre Voix newspaper (a French 
edition of the Yiddish newspaper Unzer Wort, which had been published clandestinely since June 
1940). In Lehman’s view, Kahn had failed to prevent the deportation of Jewish children, knowing 
full well their destination.  He claimed that the UGIF never fought against the orders of Vichy or 329
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Gestapo officials and instead followed such orders faithfully.  In Belgium, the lack of trust in the 330
organisation is underlined by the fact that affluent Jews with Belgian nationality refused to support 
the AJB through the cotisations – the forced contributions. As a result, the Association had little 
income from contributions by its own community members.  In all three countries the intensity 331
and degree of these criticisms changed during the war and, naturally, the perception of these Jewish 
organisations varied from person to person. Rather than analysing the disapproval that existed on 
the individual or societal level, we will examine (the absence of) coordinated criticisms voiced at 
the institutional level. While in all three countries similar criticisms were voiced, the level of 
coordinated protest against the Jewish leaders’ actions varied. This research suggests that this 
affected the self-perception of the leaders and, as a consequence, their position in the communities 
and the choices they made.  
 
 The nature of the institutional criticism the JR received was markedly different from that 
received by the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud. Whereas Asscher and Cohen faced criticisms, 
including from their own board members, the strength of this can hardly be compared to the 
centrally orchestrated condemnation of the Consistory which the UGIF leaders faced. In fact, we 
have seen that the Jewish religious authority in the Netherlands was represented in the JR’s central 
board through Chief Rabbi of Amsterdam Sarlouis, which was not the case in the French equivalent. 
The criticism of the Dutch Council was voiced most powerfully by Lodewijk Visser, President of 
the Hoge Raad, the Dutch Supreme Court, and head of the Coördinatie Commissie.  From the first 332
moment, Visser strongly opposed the establishment of the Joodsche Raad. As we have seen, he 
rejected the idea of any form of cooperation with the Germans and strongly disagreed with the 
decrees with which the Joodsche Raad had complied, most notably that which resulted in Jews no 
longer being allowed to address the Dutch government on their own account. The letters Visser 
exchanged with Cohen in the period after the JR’s establishment give a valuable insight in the 
different viewpoints of the two Jewish notables.  While Visser actively fought to combat the 333
Germans, Asscher and Cohen continued their ‘policy of lesser evil’, gaining (minor) concessions 
through cooperation. Through this strategy, Asscher and Cohen were, for example, often able to get 
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 Report on the functioning and activities of the CDJ, AA1915, Dossier 13, CEGESOMA. 331
 Melkman, “De briefwisseling”, 108. 332
 Ibid., 110. 333
!100
Jews in mixed marriages released after they were arrested.  334
 
 We have seen that there were prominent Jews who refused to serve in the central board of 
the Dutch JR, including professor of Economics Herman Frijda. Isaac Kisch initially fulfilled a 
position in the JR in order to keep Visser updated about the latest developments but resigned before 
the Council became an entity with nationwide influence. In a postwar trial testimony, Kisch 
indicated that he had considered the Joodsche Raad an unsound machine, with two incapable 
leaders.  These people who openly challenged the existence of the Joodsche Raad and the actions 335
of its leadership were generally from the same haute juiverie as Asscher and Cohen.  However, 336
there was never an organised anti-movement that provided an alternative to the strategy of the JR. 
Visser’s attempts to remain in touch with Dutch Secretaries-General and to act against the Nazi 
statutes were all personal efforts.  He opposed the working of the JR through the Coordinating 337
Commission until it was abolished in November 1941.  It therefore never had the chance to truly 338
affect the course of the JR. There were also occasions on which the choices of the chairmen were 
disputed by JR central board members. Gertrude van Tijn, who headed the Hulp aan Vertrekkenden 
(Aid to those Departing) department of the JR, highlighted in a report written in 1944 that there 
were several occasions on which the other central board members showed their discontent with the 
decisions taken by Asscher and Cohen. For example, on 4 July 1942 there was a meeting of the 
entire JR central board after the Germans had announced that Jews would be called upon to work in 
Germany. The task of the JR was to ensure that Jews would report themselves when they received a 
call for deportation. According to Van Tijn, the meeting became heated: ‘many of us thought the 
Jewish Council should refuse to cooperate in what we rightly assumed to be the beginning of the 
deportations’.  These kinds of criticisms were not sufficient to make Asscher and Cohen alter their 339
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decisions or rethink their position at the helm of the JR. As Mirjam Levie wrote in her diary, Cohen 
listened (to objections of) the board members but in the end acted the way he wanted.  In a 340
postwar interview, she claimed that even though other board members at times voiced their 
uncertainty about increasing German demands, Asscher and Cohen had often already agreed to 
cooperate.  Overall, Cohen was the one who at times, according to Mirjam Levie, at times acted 341
the despot, making all the decisions while the other JR board members, including Asscher, hardly 
had any say.   342
 
 In France, there were strong voices of protest against the establishment of the UGIF. 
Opposition took various (organised) forms and was expressed on different levels. The Jewish 
communists, who radically opposed the Jewish organisation, remained completely underground and 
published illegal newspapers in which the UGIF members were referred to as ‘little brown Jews’, a 
reference to the Sturmabteilung (SA) uniform, and were accused of helping the Germans to 
organise deportations.  We have seen that in August 1941, the Chief Rabbi of Paris Julien Weill, 343
and Rabbi Marcel Sachs refused to meet the demand to establish a Jewish representative 
organisation as ordered by SS Hauptsturmführer and chief of the Judenreferat Theodor Dannecker. 
The idea that a Jewish leadership might be secular disturbed the Consistory and the French 
Rabbinate.  In the period prior to and after the institution of the UGIF in November 1941, there 344
was strong opposition between the Consistory and the UGIF central board, which lasted for a 
year.  The Consistory condemned the German racial definition of Jewishness and ‘upheld the 345
secular interpretation: a religion confined to private life’.  Helbronner, who became president of 346
the Consistory in 1940, was careful to maintain contacts with the Vichy government and believed 
that the French authorities would not undermine the status of French Jews.  He indicated he did 347
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not want to be involved in the establishment of the UGIF and openly objected to the course taken by 
Lambert, fearing that the UGIF would result in the formation of a ghetto.  More broadly, leaders 348
of the Consistory objected to the principle of a mandatory organisation because it would place 
French and foreign Jews in the same group; it would ‘implicitly replace the religious definition of a 
Jew with a racial one, and further widen the gap that each new antisemitic measure was creating 
between French Jews and their non-Jewish compatriots’.  In short, it would separate French Jews 349
from their fellow Frenchmen.  The UGIF leadership believed this approach could not be 350
maintained in the context of the antisemitic government decrees of October 1940 and June 1941. As 
Lambert wrote in his diary on 30 November 1941: ‘The Union des Juifs [Union of Jews] will be 
created with us, without us, or against us’.  351
 
 The outright refusal of the Consistory, and Helbronner in particular, to establish any form of 
cooperation with Xavier Vallat was less absolute than has been proclaimed.  While historian 352
Adam Rayski, for example, claimed that Lambert was the sole negotiating partner, he does not refer 
to the endless meetings Lambert had with representatives of the Commission Central and the 
Consistory to report on his conversations with Vallat.  In fact, reports of the meetings indicate that 353
Helbronner even visited Vallat to discuss the establishment of the UGIF with him.  The Central 354
Consistory and CCOJA drew up a counterproposal and presented it to Vallat, aiming for a change of 
wording in the central tasks of the UGIF, from that of particularly (notamment) limited to relief and 
social assistance, to exclusively limited to these tasks.  These attempts underline that there was a 355
strong feeling against the UGIF becoming anything more than a purely welfare agency.  Although 356
Vallat did make some amendments, the final text remained unacceptable to many among the Jewish 
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leadership. We have seen, however, that some felt it was their duty to accept their assigned positions 
in order to aid the vulnerable Jewish population and also believed it was possible to operate solely 
as a welfare organisation. Through a legalistic argument accepted by Vichy, namely that religious 
institutions were not allowed to assume responsibilities in secular organisations, the Consistory 
retained its independence from the UGIF.  The official stance of the Consistory in relation to the 357
UGIF remained deliberately critical. It thereby functioned as a check on the UGIF and provided an 
alternate source of authority. In his diary entry of 29 March 1942, Lambert compared himself to 
Léon Blum in 1936, who faced scepticism when he tried to forestall the hatred of the far Right: 
‘The very wealthy Jews, who are the majority of the Consistory, are afraid the Union will make 
them pay too much for the poor [..] What a sad, confused mentality!’  While concerns about the 358
role of the Jewish organisations were raised in all three countries, it was only in France that the 
level of criticism and discontent was voiced in such an intense and organised manner. Although the 
power of the Consistory had been fading, the impact of its negative view on the UGIF should not be 
underestimated as it had the means and power to frustrate the actions of the organisation.  
 
 After the German occupation of the south of France in November 1942, the two bodies grew 
closer to one another and the Consistory acknowledged the value of the UGIF’s work to relieve the 
hardship of the Jews. The deterioration of both of their financial situations furthermore brought the 
two organisations closer together.  This conciliation was strengthened in January 1943, with the 359
start of deportations from Marseille, where many French Jews resided: ‘Jewish leaders from the 
UGIF, the chaplain’s office, the rabbinate, and the Central Consistory frantically tried everything 
they could to bring a halt to the arrests of Jews, or at least shelter certain categories (French Jews, 
war veterans, Jews from the Alsace-Lorraine region, and Jews working with the charitable 
programs) [..]’.  There were frequent consultations and even joint appeals by the organisations’ 360
leadership: ‘Helbronner had seemingly reached the conclusion that the real enemy of the Consistory 
was neither Lambert nor the UGIF, but the German Gestapo and its French collaborators’.  On 13 361
August 1943, Lambert went to Lyon to talk with Consistorial leaders about the Jews’ deteriorating 
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situation because, as he wrote in his diary, ‘in hard times one makes peace’.  In late August 1943, 362
after Lambert and Baur were interned in Drancy, Helbronner even went so far as to say that it was 
imperative that they be released, realising that the two men were crucial to the provision of social 
welfare to Jewish communities in France.  363
 
 Despite this rapprochement, differences between the UGIF and Consistory remained. This 
was particularly so in the case of the UGIF-Sud, where Lambert did not align himself with the 
French Jewish aristocracy and, unlike the majority of Consistory officials, felt driven by a 
primordial social need to protect immigrant Jews.  Throughout 1943, the Consistory was finally 364
able to control the UGIF through Georges Edinger who had been appointed as its last president.  365
Georges’ father, Léon Edinger, was president of the administrative department of the Central 
Consistory from 1943 onwards. Edinger’s close ties with the Consistory enabled him to restore the 
authority of the Consistory. The same was true in the case of Raymond Geissman who was 
appointed the head of the UGIF-Sud in December 1943. Like Edinger, he had close family 
connections to the Consistory and was able to reinstate its power ‘which had been temporarily 
breached by the maverick Raymond-Raoul Lambert’.  366
 
 The discussions between various Jewish organisations on the role of the UGIF continued 
and increased in the summer of 1944. By then, the dissolution of the Jewish organisation was 
discussed by representatives of the Consistory, the Comité Générale de Défense des Juifs (CGD)  367
and the UGIF.  One of the CGD representatives, Adamitz, proposed the dissolution of the UGIF 368
because Jews did not trust the organisation and disapproved of its activities: ‘[t]he UGIF is an 
organisation imposed on the Jews by the Germans and Vichy with a specific goal: to help the 
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Germans surround Jews to better control them’.  He continued that ‘[s]ince the outset of its 369
existence, the UGIF has not been able to rule out or prevent anti-Jewish persecution, including 
raids, arrests and deportations. It did not even manage to release either its own arrested employees 
no other arrested Jews’.  In the end, partly as a result of the (practical) objections to the UGIF’s 370
dissolution raised on various sides, for example by the UGIF-Sud director Geissmann and by Léon 
Meiss, there was no definitive decision taken about its liquidation.  371
 
 In Belgium, the establishment of the AJB also provoked discussion among Jews. However, 
the debates between opponents and supporters seemed not so bitter, and did not materialise on such 
a personal level as they did in the Netherlands and France. While Asscher and Cohen, for example, 
were often perceived as arrogant, the general unwillingness of the AJB leadership to take up the 
positions they were assigned probably contributed to less outrage in this regard. Moreover, whereas 
in France the Consistory was a strong opponent of the UGIF, the withering of Consistorial power in 
Belgium combined with Chief Rabbi Ullman’s chairmanship of the organisation meant that the AJB 
never faced the same level of organised protest. Still, anti-AJB attitudes existed. The Belgian 
Communist Party (PCB/KPB) opposed the AJB and accused the organisation of ‘playing cards with 
the Nazis’,  while the left-wing Socialist-Zionists appealed to the Jewish people to ‘defend its 372
human and national honour’, encouraging them not to participate in the mission the AJB 
represented.  We will see that other organisations, including the Comité de Défense des Juifs, also 373
advised Jews to ignore the regulations of the AJB.  374
 
 The differences in institutional criticism faced by the Jewish organisations affected the 
position of the Jewish organisations’ leaders. For example, tensions between the UGIF and the 
Central Consistory in France and the latter’s criticism of the organisation’s policies divided the 
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community.  In his diary, Lambert reflects on the different positions taken by Helbronner and by 375
the Consistory more broadly: ‘the Jewish agencies, the militants, the philanthropists, and those 
whom I call the “Jewish princes” are agitated, jealous, and already critizing me…Mr. Helbronner, 
who kept his head down before the Statut was published, when he should have been courageous, 
asked me indiscreet questions when I saw him in Lyon’.  It has been argued that the Consistory’s 376
criticism hardly affected Lambert since he made no further effort to achieve peace with its officials 
and turned his energies elsewhere.  From a comparative viewpoint, with the (relative) absence of 377
coordinated institutional criticism from rival authorities in both Belgium and the Netherlands, we 
have to conclude that the position of the UGIF leadership was different from that of its counterparts. 
Despite Lambert’s efforts to ignore the rivalry, it is clear that it was a major determinant, 
particularly in the first years of the German occupation. 
 
Resign or remain? Jewish leaders faced with a difficult choice  
The foundations of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud central boards and the 
presence or absence of coordinated criticism affected how the organisations’ leaders understood 
their role and the extent of representation they were to offer. This analysis will reveal how far these 
differences affected the decisions made by the organisations’ leaders. Whereas the JR chairmen 
decided to remain in place until the JR was dissolved in September 1943, Salomon Ullman and 
Maurice Benedictus in Belgium voluntarily withdrew from their positions. The position was 
different again in France, where the first chairmen – Lambert of the UGIF-Sud and Baur of the 
UGIF-Nord – were forcibly removed from their chairmanship by the Germans. In both Belgium and 
France, the removals necessitated the appointment of new leaders. In addition, substantial parts of 
the Belgian and French central boards were replaced during the occupation. It should be noted that 
the composition of the JR central board also changed over the course of its existence. Whereas 
some Jews were arrested, others, including Krouwer and Van Lier, were forced to resign because 
they were not considered Volljuden, meaning they did not have three or four Jewish grandparents.  378
We have also seen that Kisch raised moral objections and in September 1941 he refused to work for 
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the JR any longer. Because Asscher and Cohen maintained their solid position in the central board 
by autocratic means, the replacement of these members did not make a real difference to the 
functioning of the JR. During the transitional phase that followed the replacement of board 
members, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud could not maintain the level of continuity 
which characterised the JR. As a result, the position of the Dutch Council was different to that of its 
counterparts. As we will see, these differences affected the German view of the organisations’ 
function and effectiveness.  
 
 Although the context of occupation in which the JR operated, with the strong presence of the 
SS, proved to be particularly challenging, the two Dutch chairmen remained in place until the JR 
was dissolved in 1943. During the war, Cohen at times seemed to question his own tactics of 
cooperation. For example, while he aimed to convince prominent members of the Amsterdam 
Jewish community of the importance and usefulness of the JR in early January 1942, he also 
showed his uncertainty by asking for the opinions of those present (including Marinus Levenbach 
and the voorganger of the liberal-German Jews) on the impact of the Council’s policies.  Although 379
historian Jacques Presser, who was present at the meeting, indicated after the war that it was a one-
sided exposé of the political directions of the JR, the urge Cohen felt to convince others about his 
policies, as well as his quest for their opinions, does suggest his feelings of vulnerability in regard 
to the choices that were being made. At the same time, he never truly reconsidered his policies. 
Asscher seemed to harbour more serious doubts about the course of the Joodsche Raad and about 
his own role in this process. For example, he proposed the dissolution of the JR on 12 June 1941 
because there had been a mass arrest of Jews shortly before. The Jewish leaders had demanded they 
would be informed about upcoming raids ever since the first mass arrest on 22 and 23 February 
1941 in Amsterdam, during which 425 Jewish men were arrested. Out of this group, 390 were 
deported to Buchenwald concentration camp on 27 February and while forty died of maltreatment 
and inhuman living conditions, others were transported to Mauthausen in May 1941.  Reports of 380
the death of these young and healthy men soon reached the Netherlands, causing unrest among the 
Jewish community. In a postwar interview, the secretary of the JR, Mirjam Bolle-Levie said: 
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 When all these letters came in indicating ‘Auf der Flucht erschossen’ or ‘pneumonia’ or    
 anything of that sort, we understood it was a matter of only a few months before everyone would be 
 dead. And that is how it was. There were rumours that this was not true. I did not believe those   
 [rumours].  381
Rather than keeping their promise not to undertake another mass arrest without the JR’s knowledge, 
SD officials arranged a meeting with Asscher and Cohen under false pretences on 11 June 1941. 
While the Jewish leaders were kept in the office of the SD for hours, more than 200 Jews were 
arrested.  The next day, Asscher’s proposal to dissolve the Council was rejected during the 382
meeting of the central board, with only one vote in favour of his plan.  383
 
 On 27 June 1942, another occasion arose at which the JR leadership questioned whether the 
continued existence of the JR would serve the interests of Jews in the Netherlands. The day before, 
SS-Hauptsturmführer aus der Fünten had communicated to Cohen, Abraham de Hoop, head of the 
Lijnbaansgracht department, and Edwin Sluzker, head of the Expositur, that all Jewish men and 
women between the age of 18 and 40 would be subject to work under police supervision 
(Polizeiliche Arbeitseinsatz). Although this disturbing new regulation caused unrest among the other 
board members, Cohen decided in the end to continue the activities of the JR, fearing that the 
Germans would otherwise turn to violent measures to secure the implementation of the measure.  384
Sustained by the idea that they were the most suitable representatives of the Jewish communities in 
the Netherlands, both men decided to stay at the helm of the Council. Until after the war, Cohen 
remained convinced of the strength and quality of his leadership. Former Jewish leaders from across 
the European continent generally either remained silent about their wartime activities, or could no 
longer comment upon their role because they had been murdered. By contrast, Cohen did not show 
any reluctance to discuss his choices after the war. On various occasions, he explicitly indicated that 
he still approved of the choices he had made during the war.  At the same time, though, his letter 385
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to James G. McDonald, former League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, indicates that 
even though he considered he ‘acted in the right way’, he also made it clear that if he had ever 
learned about the fate of those who had been deported (he was adamant that he did not), he should 
have resigned immediately.  The attitude of the JR leadership bears a resemblance to that of 386
Benjamin Murmelstein, who served as head of the Jewish Council in Theresienstadt from 
November 1944 onwards. Murmelstein was criticised by many after the war for being a 
collaborator. In a postwar interview with Claude Lanzmann, Murmelstein indicated he had tried to 
maintain the model camp Theresienstadt and compared himself to Sancho Panza, ‘a pragmatic and 
calculating realist’ who achieved more than Don Quixote, who continued to fight a useless battle.  387
 
 In Belgium, chairman Ullman was not the absolute ruler of the AJB. Instead, he was quickly 
overpowered by the members of the central board.  Rather than being personally involved in 388
issues related to the functioning of the AJB, Ullman seemed to function more as a symbolic 
figurehead, distanced from the realities of leadership. In the context of scattered Jewish 
communities which could not be easily united and the general reluctance to head the AJB, Ullman 
fulfilled his position very different from that of his Dutch counterpart. On 24 September 1942, a 
series of events seems to have given Ullman the last push to quit his position as AJB chairman. On 
this day, Kurt Asche sent Ullman, Van den Berg, Blum, Hellendall and Benedictus to Fort 
Breendonk, a prison and Auffangslager (detention centre) where conditions were similar to those of 
a concentration camp.  Here, they were told they would be interned until all Jews had been 389
evacuated from Belgium. They were accused, among other things, of passive resistance, acts of 
sabotage and seeking contact with the Belgian queen.  Rotkel, a Hungarian Jew, was arrested as 390
well and immediately sent to Malines transit camp from where he was deported to the East. 
Salomon van den Berg described these days in the camp as a traumatic experience; after not having 
eaten for two days, they had to consume ‘infected soup with white cabbage’.  Thereafter, they 391
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were locked with many others in tiny rooms. The work they were forced to do was physically 
exhausting ‘especially for a Chief Rabbi’ and they were beaten if the work was not done fast 
enough.  Ullman’s traditional beard was cut, ‘which was a miserable thing to see’.   392 393
 
 On 3 October, the AJB leadership was released as a result of interventions by the 
Militärverwaltungschef Eggert Reeder.  The conditions during internment had been inhumane. 394
Ullman sent his letter of resignation to Von Falkhausen, the Militärbefehlshaber of Belgium and 
Northern France, shortly after this short internment in Breendonk on 8 October 1942.  In the 395
existing literature, Ullman’s decision to resign as AJB chairman has been understood either in the 
context of his experiences in Breendonk, or as a response to the mass raids of August 1942.  396
However, the reality was more complex. His resignation should be understood against the 
background of a combination of factors that include his initial reluctance to become Chief Rabbi 
and his intrinsic belief that he could not represent the Jews in Belgium. The increasing German 
pressure on the organisation, the mass arrests, the indignity with which he had been treated and the 
horrors he had witnessed in Breendonk also played a role. As we shall see, after the raids in August 
and September 1942, Belgian and Jewish resistance became more organised and provided 
alternatives to the AJB. This undermined and weakened the AJB’s position, and this may have 
strengthened Ullman’s notion that his organisation was no longer of use to the Jews.  397
 
 A letter from the Militärbefehlshaber of Belgium and Northern France sent to the AJB on 28 
December 1942 shows that only two and a half months later, Von Falkenhausen officially approved 
Ullman’s resignation.  In the existing historiography, the role that Ullman continued to play in the 398
Jewish community as Chief Rabbi from this moment onwards has been entirely neglected, perhaps 
because he himself claimed that he had not been in contact with the organisation after he had 
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resigned.  The exchange of letters between the AJB Antwerp branch and Ullman nevertheless 399
shows that he remained tied to the organisation. For example, on 6 May 1943, a letter he sent to the 
administration of the AJB Antwerp branch highlights how he encouraged the AJB to provide care to 
a woman named ‘De Leeuw’, whose husband had died in Breendonk and who had no family to 
support her.  In turn, the AJB depended upon Ullman’s support, for example to ensure the 400
provision of parcels to individuals in the internment camp of Rekem. Ullman replied to the AJB 
Antwerp leadership’s request that he was taking care of the situation in Rekem, but that the 
internees themselves had already sent ‘hundreds of begging letters’ and that there were some who 
were receiving between five and ten parcels a week.   401
 
 Ullman’s resignation did not have direct consequences for him personally. He was neither 
punished, nor deported. Nevertheless, he indicated in a postwar report on the activities of the AJB 
that the Military Administration accepted his resignation reluctantly.  This reluctance is 402
highlighted by the months it took the Military Administration to accept Ullman's resignation 
officially. In addition to Ullman, Maurice Benedictus also decided to withdraw in December 1942. 
From the beginning, his role had been complicated and laden with uncertainty. He was appointed as 
the chief individual responsible for the forced labour of Jews in eastern Europe, and soon became 
conscience-stricken. In his memoirs, he wrote that some of his colleagues considered him a traitor 
while others understood his attempt to lighten the burden on the Jewish communities.  Benedictus 403
claimed he tried to deal with this difficult task, knowing about the situation in the Netherlands, 
where the JR had taken up a similar task.  Testimonies show that he discussed his difficult 404
position with others, including prominent people in the Belgian resistance.  At the end of 1942, 405
Kurt Asche announced that, from 1943 onwards, Belgian Jews would be deported alongside 
immigrant Jews. In doing so, Asche deliberately thwarted the Military Administration. Wilhelm von 
Hahn had promised AJB representatives that he would speak to Asche about arranging a higher 
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level of protection for the AJB leaders and their families. In response, the AJB leaders encouraged 
those close to them not to go into hiding.  However, Asche still decided to deport Belgian Jews. 406
As a result, Benedictus felt he could no longer help the Jewish communities in his role as the 
Association’s leader. In the second week of December 1942, he embarked on a difficult journey and 
managed to reach Portugal via France and Spain, where he arrived in January 1943.  He returned 407
to Belgium in September 1945.  408
 
 In the meantime, the replacement of Ullman and Benedictus spawned debate between the 
AJB, the Military Administration and the SiPo-SD. The AJB central board proposed Machel Majer 
Grätzer, chairman of the representative body of the Israelite communities in Antwerp.  409
Judenreferent Kurt Asche was strongly opposed to the appointment of a Polish Jew and opted for a 
German representative instead. He proposed Felix Meyer and Louis Rosenfeld, both German Jews. 
After the interference of Salomon Ullman and Gerard Romsée, secretary-general of the 
collaborationist Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (VNV), the Military Administration voiced its 
objections to Asche’s proposal and argued that a Belgian Jew should take up the position of leader. 
In response, the AJB central committee suggested Salomon van den Berg, representative of the AJB 
Brussels branch, but Judenreferent Fritz Erdmann, Asche’s successor, rejected this proposal.  In 410
December 1942, 2,5 months after Ullman’s resignation, the SiPo-SD, the Military Administration 
(and the AJB representatives) finally agreed that he would be succeeded by Marcel Blum.  As a 411
compromise, Meyer and Rosenfeld were appointed as members of the AJB central board and local 
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Charleroi branch respectively.  Other members of the AJB central board were replaced as well, 412
either because they had been arrested or because they no longer wished to fulfil their representative 
function. For example, Juda Mehlwurm, the Charleroi representative on the AJB, had gone into 
hiding in September 1942 after the Germans had asked him for an updated list of Jews resident in 
the city.  Eugène Hellendall and his wife were arrested because they had left their home on 23 413
October 1942 without wearing the yellow star.  Neither his Belgian citizenship nor his position in 414
the AJB could help Hellendall. Most likely, the ‘passive resistance’, for which he was interned in 
Breendonk played a role in his arrest as well. All these events weakened the AJB.  415
 
 In France, the first general director of the UGIF, Albert Lévy, fled to Switzerland in 
December 1942 in order to avoid persecution.  As previously noted, the two leaders of the UGIF-416
Sud and the UGIF-Nord respectively, Lambert and Baur were forcibly withdrawn from the central 
boards because they refused to cooperate with increasing German demands. Throughout 1943, SS-
Hauptsturmführer Aloïs Brunner had increased the pressure on Jewish society by his brutal actions 
and by the continuous arrests taking place throughout France. For Lambert, the measures were too 
much to accept and he spoke out against the direction of events. On 16 May 1943, he wrote in his 
diary that it had been ‘a month of anxiety, or ordeals and actions difficult to carry out’.  He 417
objected in particular to the increasing anti-Jewish measures taken by the Gestapo in the weeks 
preceding his arrest. In the spring of 1943, Lambert, as well as Baur and Marcel Stora, negotiated 
with the SS about the ‘redundancy’ of foreign employees of the UGIF, whose removal they were not 
able to prevent.  As a result of his attempt to negotiate with the Germans, combined with the 418
objections he was increasingly voicing, Lambert was arrested on 21 August 1943 and interned in 
Drancy, together with his wife and their four children. Gaston Kahn replaced Lambert and was in 
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turn replaced by Raymond Geissmann in mid-December 1943. Other UGIF central board members 
who had tried to negotiate with the Germans were arrested as well, including André Lazard and 
Marcel Stora.  419
 
 In the UGIF-Nord, in contrast to the AJB and the UGIF-Sud, none of the central board 
members voluntarily resigned or fled abroad.  However, as in the case of Lambert in the 420
unoccupied zone, important members of the organisation were forcibly removed from the central 
board: André Baur, Marcel Stora and Fernand Musnik were deported to Auschwitz in the summer of 
1943. Up until this moment, as we shall see, the UGIF-Nord had limited itself mainly to social 
relief activities and had not been called upon to change its course of action. However, when 
Brunner demanded that the UGIF-Nord become a watchdog over the community, pressuring 
families to join their arrested family members so they could be deported all at once, rather than 
individually, to eastern Europe, the UGIF-Nord leadership refused.  In doing so, as its members 421
declared after the war, they saved the soul (‘l’âme') of the UGIF.   422
 
 We can identify a pattern in the four case studies under investigation. In those cases where 
the social foundation of the initially appointed leaders was – relatively speaking – weaker, the 
fluctuation of central board members was larger. This is especially true for the UGIF-Nord and the 
AJB. It shows that the individuals in question were either not sufficiently confident about their 
leadership, or that they disagreed with the way in which their positions were being used by the 
Germans, or that the Germans were dissatisfied with their function. In fact, the first two factors 
have much in common. Taking the case of Salomon Ullman as an example, we can see that he had a 
low perception of his own leadership qualities. When he was faced with the horrors that the Jews in 
Belgium were going through in Kazerne Dossin, and was asked by the Germans to continue and 
even expand his activities, his limits were quickly reached. The combination of these factors 
undoubtedly caused him to resign willingly whereas Asscher and Cohen, who were confident about 
the quality of their leadership, did not do so. Naturally, there were other contextual factors that 
affected these choices as well. The personalities of each of the leaders differed and they had 
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different motivations for having taken up the leadership in the first place. In the French case, where 
the chairmen were forcibly removed, Lambert and Baur, for example, felt that they could no longer 
cooperate with the Germans in light of the worsening anti-Jewish legislation. They increasingly 
objected to the regulations and were arrested as a result. This feeling was not shared by their Dutch 
counterparts, who believed there was a need to maintain their position for the sake of their 
community. We will see that the existence of other Jewish representative aid organisations in 
Belgium and France also played an important role in this regard. Whereas the JR quickly became 
the sole representative body that could aid Jews, the existence of alternatives to the AJB, the UGIF-
Nord and the UGIF-Sud might have contributed to the feeling that their work was not 
indispensable.  
 
 In both French zones, as well as in Belgium, the (voluntary or involuntary) withdrawal of 
the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud central board members affected the course of events. The 
continuous changes to the board created a certain disorder that was advantageous to the AJB and to 
the UGIF leadership as it meant there was room to delay and postpone new anti-Jewish regulations. 
For example, after Baur and Lambert were arrested in the summer of 1943, the UGIF was only 
reorganised towards the end of that year. On 23 November 1943, Georges Edinger was appointed as 
chairman of the UGIF while Gaston Kahn replaced Lambert as head of the UGIF-Sud. One month 
later, Kahn was again replaced by Raymond Geissmann, the UGIF regional director for Lyon, Vichy 
and Clermont-Ferrand and the former head of the Entr’aide Français Israélite (EFI), the French 
Israelite mutual aid organisation devoted to the assistance of French Jews.  The successors of the 423
initial organisations’ leaders were already much better aware of German aims in relation to the 
Jewish organisation than those who had been forced to take up leadership at the end of 1941. Their 
agreements to work for the organisations was therefore based on different premises and principles.  
 
 By late 1942 and early 1943, in response to the radicalisation of the Nazi occupation in the 
summer of 1942, resistance organisations were fully operative in Belgium and France. There was a 
gradual trend towards the unification and coordination of the various resistance groups across the 
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countries, even when they had different political, organisational or ideological backgrounds.  As a 424
result, being part of the Jewish organisations’ central board became an opportunity to, for example, 
communicate information and financial resources to illegal organisations. This does not necessarily 
mean that the later heads were more outspokenly anti-German. As Zuccotti claimed in the case of 
France, especially after the arrests of courageous leaders like André Baur and Raymond-Raoul 
Lambert, the UGIF directors and employees were ‘weak and terrified of breaking the law’.  425
Nevertheless, as we shall see, there were central board members, like Marcel Blum and Juda 
Mehlwurm in Belgium and Juliette Stern and Robert Gamzon in France, who decided to use their 
position in the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud to facilitate illegal activities, particularly 




This chapter has examined the various contextual factors that contributed to the position of the 
leaders of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud in their respective communities, and 
at the ways they perceived their leadership roles. These factors have been overlooked in existing 
historiography, yet they are crucial in understanding the nature of the organisations and the 
foundations on which they were built. This chapter has three central conclusions. First, while the 
nature of the communities from which the four organisations emerged had similarities, there were 
also some crucial differences. The traditional organisation of the communities, the number of 
immigrants and the impact of those immigrants on the Jewish communities were important 
distinguishing factors. Most importantly, the position of the Jewish leaders in these communities 
was markedly different in different cases. Second, those Jews who had a stable and well established 
leading position in the prewar Jewish communities were more self-confident about their leadership 
during the war than those who had not. Third, the presence or absence of coordinated institutional 
criticism was a determinant in the outlook of the central board members. In the Netherlands, where 
such institutional criticism was absent, the leadership was more inclined to follow their initial 
policy of ‘lesser evil’ than in France, where the leaders were continuously subjected to criticism 
 For further reading on (the organisation of the) resistance in Belgium and France, see, for example: Moore, 424
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from rival Jewish (representative) institutions, most prominently the Consistory. We will see that the 
presence of coordinated criticism might in fact have encouraged Lambert to look for alternative 
(illegal) forms of representation.  
 
 In the Netherlands, the leadership of Asscher and Cohen from the establishment of the JR in 
February 1941 until the day they themselves were transported to Westerbork was confident and 
determined and their leadership can be considered as a continuation of prewar social structures. The 
social construction of the Belgian AJB central board was entirely different. To some extent, Van 
Doorslaer and Schreiber were right when they claimed that the leading figures of the AJB in 
Brussels and Antwerp occupied religious, official, or even representative functions prior to the AJB 
being established.  At the same time, the comparative analysis has shown that Salomon Ullman, as 427
well as the majority of AJB central board members, did not have representative functions before the 
war in the same way that the JR leadership had done. We should take a nuanced view of the notion 
that AJB central board members considered their appointment to be a logical result of their prewar 
position.  It was only because those Jewish notables who had fulfilled leadership roles in the 428
Belgian prewar Jewish communities were absent that the appointment of these individuals instead 
could be considered a logical alternative. From a comparative viewpoint, the AJB central board 
never obtained the same unequivocal status as their Dutch counterparts. This meant, too, that their 
position was also not as autocratic. These factors affected the position of Ullman as chairman of the 
AJB. Whereas Asscher and Cohen in reality made all decisions together without seeking the consent 
of the entire board, Ullman was soon overruled by the other members of the central board. The 
majority of the AJB’s central board lacked real leadership competence and was not used to 
representing diverse communities.  
 
 In France, we have seen that Raymond-Raoul Lambert, the central protagonist of the UGIF 
during the first period of the Vichy regime, used the Jewish refugee problem and the need to have a 
representative Jewish organisation as an opportunity to establish once and for all his leadership 
position in the community. Although the same has been said about Asscher and Cohen in the 
Netherlands, the situation was nonetheless quite different. Asscher and Cohen were representative 
of change in a Jewish community that had gradually developed over the years. Lambert represented 
an anti-movement and a break with the dominance of the Consistory. Furthermore, the impact of 
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French leadership was never as predominant and monolithic as it was in the Netherlands. This was 
in part the result of organisational differences, but the ongoing debates between, most importantly, 
the Consistory on the one hand and the UGIF on the other, about the position of the organisation’s 
leadership also contributed.  
 
 The fluctuation of board positions in both Belgium and France prompted discussions about 
the role and position of the organisations, both among the Jewish leaders and among the Germans. 
For example, after Baur and Lambert were arrested, the latter attempted to persuade the remaining 
leaders to dissolve the entire UGIF, which had been weakened since his removal.  Lambert, who 429
had increasingly become involved in clandestine activities, criticised the leaders who had replaced 
him for their failure to disperse the children of the La Verière children’s home run by the UGIF. All 
children and staff there were seized by the Gestapo and sent to Drancy, including the director who 
voluntarily joined the transport.  Indeed, the few letters he sent from Drancy show Lambert’s 430
disappointment with the leaders’ decision to do so.  At the same time, the Consistory encouraged 431
the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud to continue their activities.  We have seen that in Belgium, the 432
replacement of Ullman and Benedictus resulted in tensions between the AJB, the Military 
Administration and the SiPo-SD and delayed the appointment of new representatives.  
 
 The replacement of the organisations’ leaders meant that the Germans (and in France, Vichy 
officials) lost the central contact through which, for a significant period of time, they had 
communicated with Jewish communities. The period of transition to a new leadership undoubtedly 
hampered the effectiveness of the Jewish organisations from the German perspective. The change of 
leadership in Belgium and France unintentionally created a form of disorder that risked delaying the 
execution of Nazi anti-Jewish measures. For example, after Ullman resigned the AJB was rendered 
useless as far as the Germans were concerned.  The appointment of Blum months after Ullman’s 433
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resignation did not serve German interests either, since the AJB limited itself to social work, while 
deportation remained in German hands.  As Michman has argued, the Germans made only limited 434
use of the organisation in doing the ‘dirty work’ and the AJB hardly participated at all in the 
deportation process in Belgium.  In September 1942, the AJB leaders had already refused to send 435
out further notices for deportation, and Ullman’s resignation shortly thereafter seems to have served 
as a reminder that the AJB should not become anything but a social welfare organisation. We will 
see that some members of the AJB in this period took the step to coordinate illegal Jewish activities; 
this is also true in the cases of both the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud.  
 Ibid. 434
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Chapter 2.  
The Councils’ Organisational Differences and Similarities: Causes and Consequences 
At the end of January 1942, Ernst Ehlers, head of the Dienststelle of the SiPo-SD in Brussels, 
published “Sonderbericht. Das Judentum im Belgien", covering various topics related to the Jews in 
Belgium. The report covered, among other things, the institution of the AJB and highlighted the 
active cooperation of the Dienststelle with the Military Administration.  In the Sonderbericht, 1
Ehlers was clear about the nature of the AJB: it was modelled after the Reichsvereinigung der Juden 
in Germany.  As Michman has pointed out, the establishment order of the AJB, published on 25 2
November 1941, was indeed an exact copy of its German counterpart. Ironically, the objective of 
the Association was to ‘promote emigration of the Jews’ while the directive to prohibit emigration 
of Jews from Belgium was drafted by Chief of the Gestapo Heinrich Müller in the same period 
(October 1941), on the orders of Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler.  In fact, on 23 October 1941 3
Müller informed Beauftragter des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD für Belgien und 
Frankreich Max Thomas of the prohibition on emigration.  It is clear that German policies towards 4
Jews had fundamentally changed and it is implausible that those responsible for the AJB’s 
establishment were unaware of this. That the Reichsvereinigung’s blueprint was copied word for 
word highlights the fact that Nazi policies were improvised and were not adapted for the specifics 
of the Belgian situation. This is especially remarkable when we go on to consider that the Belgian 
Jewish Association, and the Jewish organisations in western Europe more broadly, seemed so 
important to the various German institutions involved in their establishment.  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 The notion that the Germans did not carefully think through the establishment of the AJB 
fits into a broader trend in historiography that highlights the improvised nature of Nazi rule. In the 
earliest studies on the Holocaust, historians assumed that Hitler had given ‘the order’ for the Final 
Solution.  In 1961, Raul Hilberg was the first to suggest that such an order might not have existed. 5
Instead, Hilberg suggested that the genocide of the Jews resulted from a sequence of decisions. To 
him, the annihilation of European Jewry was above all a bureaucratic process of destruction.  6
Rather than searching for an exact chain of events that would explain Nazi policies as controlled 
continuity, some historians were increasingly convinced of their unplanned nature and also that the 
role of Hitler in the decision-making process was less than had been previously thought.  This 7
resulted in decades of debate between functionalists and intentionalists as well as those who 
positioned themselves somewhere inbetween. Functionalists focussed on the structure of the Nazi 
regime to explain the course of events, while intentionalists emphasised Hitler’s ideology and 
intentions. It gradually became clear that the destruction of European Jewry was the result of an 
interplay between Hitler and the Nazi leadership at the centre and those on the periphery at the local 
level.  8
 
 In his influential 2008 work on Nazi rule in Europe, Mazower elaborated on this 
perspective. From his point of view, the incredible speed of military expansion outpaced the level of 
administrative and intellectual preparation by those Nazis who were responsible for the 
implementation of measures. This explained why Nazi rule in eastern Europe was unplanned and 
apparently irrational: there was a need to improvise, particularly at the local level.  Although 9
Mazower focused mainly on eastern Europe, the same could be argued for the West. We shall see 
that in the Netherlands and France, as well as in Belgium, the absence of a clear plan for Jewish 
representative bodies also resulted in improvisation and the borrowing of blueprints from 
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elsewhere. The Nazi leadership in western Europe used examples from eastern Europe, Germany 
and, in the cases of Belgium and France, from the Netherlands as well. In so doing, they often 
ignored the specific contexts of the countries concerned. The absence of a clear and carefully 
thought out master plan resulted in rivalry between the various German institutions, and this 
continued after the JR, the AJB and the UGIF had been officially established. The exact remit of 
each of the Jewish organisations was unclear and interpreted differently by the various institutions 
involved in the process. There was uncertainty on all sides about the precise role that Jewish 
organisations were meant to play and this again led to much improvisation. As a result, the Jewish 
organisations in western Europe were all organised in different ways and all functioned differently, 
despite the strong German desire to unify anti-Jewish policies.  
 
 This chapter examines the discrepancy between the German desire to unify (the 
implementation of) anti-Jewish policies in the Netherlands, Belgium and France on the one hand, 
and the differences in form and function between the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-
Sud on the other. In February 1941, Reeder, the Belgian Militärverwaltungschef, indicated that a 
uniform Judenbegriff (understanding of what constitutes a Jew) must be developed throughout 
Europe, following the Reichsgesetzgebung, the laws of the Reich.  In a similar vein, there was an 10
attempt to implement antisemitic legislation equally across western Europe and the Jewish 
organisations were used, to varying degrees, to try to accomplish this. Reichsführer-SS Heinrich 
Himmler and Director of the Reich Security Main Office Reinhard Heydrich did not want any 
deviations (in timing) between the countries in the occupied West in terms of the implementation of 
anti-Jewish legislation, because they believed that any differences would lead to a wave of Jewish 
refugees. A variable policy might encourage Jews to flee from the country where a particular anti-
Jewish law was implemented to a neighbouring country where this was not yet the case. For these 
reasons, SS-Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann also preferred the simultaneous implementation 
of legislation in the Netherlands, Belgium and France.  The relative similarities in terms of the 11
nature and timing of the occupation of these three countries, which contrasted with the situation in 
eastern Europe, enabled equivalence in this regard. The policies for these three countries were 
therefore decided centrally during meetings in Berlin in which the Judenreferenten of the 
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Netherlands, Belgium and France took part. These Judenreferenten, advisors in Jewish affairs, 
supervised the deportation of the Jews in the countries for which they were responsible and they 
served under the direct responsibility of Adolf Eichmann’s RSHA in Berlin.  
 
 In the Netherlands, Wilhelm Zöpf was the Judenreferent. In Belgium and France, Kurt 
Asche and Theodor Dannecker respectively served in this capacity. Wilhelm Zöpf was born in 
Munich in 1908, and while studying law he became a member of the NSDAP in May 1933. Four 
years after joining the SS in 1937, his close connection to Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und 
des SD (BdS) Wilhelm Harster brought him to the Netherlands, where he served under the BdS 
from March 1941.  Kurt Asche, born in 1909, joined the Nazi party in 1931 and the SD in 1935. 12
From 1936, he became Hilfsreferent, assistant expert, in the Jewish department, where he operated 
alongside Adolf Eichmann, Theodor Dannecker and Dieter Wisliceny. He was sent as SS-
Einsatzkommando member to occupied Poland in 1939, where he served as expert on Jewish affairs 
under SS-Polizeiführer Odilo Globocnik.  At the end of 1940, he became Judenreferent in Brussels. 13
Dannecker, born in 1913, was a fanatical antisemite with years of experience in the anti-Jewish 
bureaucracy of the SS. After subscribing to the NSDAP in 1932, he served in the SS in one of the 
local sections of the SD. In March 1937, he joined the SD in Berlin and worked for Eichmann's 
Jewish affairs department.  In 1938, Dannecker, Eichmann and Herbert Hagen went to Vienna in 14
order to establish the Central Office for Jewish Emigration, and at the end of the following year 
Dannecker was sent to Poland to explore the possibilities for emigration in the region.  In the 15
summer of 1940, he was appointed as Eichmann’s representative advisor on Jewish affairs in France 
and, as Judenreferent, headed the IVB4 Paris RSHA office. This was ‘the most active of the German 
agencies involved with long-range planning of Jewish policy in France and with efforts to prod 
Vichy into more active anti-Jewish measures’.  16
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 Throughout the course of the war, these Judenreferenten were in touch with each other to 
discuss the impact and execution of anti-Jewish measures in their respective countries.  For 17
example, a letter to Amsterdam SS Sturmbahnführer Willy Lages on 15 March 1942 shows that 
Kurt Asche and Theodor Dannecker wanted to create a uniform policy on the implementation of the 
yellow star.  We have seen that Asche and Dannecker had already worked together in Berlin and 18
they continued to do so in their respective positions as Judenreferenten of Belgium and France. 
They were both directly supervised by the Beauftragter des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 
für Belgien und Frankreich Max Thomas. Both held similar roles in almost identical contexts where 
the Military Administration operated as their direct superior. As a result, Asche and Dannecker 
faced similar procedural and political problems.  Nevertheless, despite their wish to unify the 19
timing and implementation of anti-Jewish measures across all three countries, there are a number of 
factors that obstructed the ability of the Jewish organisations (which were held responsible in 
varying degrees for the communication and execution of these measures) to function in parallel.  
 
 We will explore where the differences of form and functions in the Jewish organisations 
originated highlighting, among other things, the variations in German power structures and the 
diverse ways in which the organisations were governed by their Jewish leaders. In doing so, this 
chapter makes three key points. First, it shows that the Germans did not have a carefully thought-
out plan about what the remit of these Jewish organisations was supposed to be. Instead, we see 
ongoing institutional rivalry between the various German institutions and local bodies involved. 
Second, this absence of a clear plan laid the foundation for differences between the Jewish 
organisations in terms of their efficiency and effectiveness (from the German viewpoint). The 
rivalry between German departments meant that the Jewish leaders often interpreted their role 
according to their own understanding and preferences and these divergent interpretations formed the 
basis of the different organisational structures. Third, the Germans’ perceptions about how these 
organisations functioned in practice differed widely in each country. Whereas the Germans were 
 There were numerous occasions on which the Judenreferenten met in Berlin, see, for example, ‘Meeting of the 17
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reasonably satisfied with the organisational effectiveness of the Dutch Council, they took issue with 
how the Belgian and French Associations functioned. By highlighting the factors that led to the 
differences between the organisations, we can better understand the various contexts in which the 
Jewish leaders were forced to function.  
2.1 Institutional rivalry and conflicting German aims  
The introduction to this thesis has shown that the actions and decisions of the Jewish leaders have 
been a central theme in the historiography. Especially in the first decades after the war, the 
interrelation between the leaders’ actions and the deportation of Jews from their respective countries 
was highlighted.  A proper analysis of the contemporary situation shows that the JR, the AJB and 20
the UGIF were not in the first instance instituted in order to carry out anti-Jewish legislation, nor 
were they set up as instruments to enable mass deportation of Jews to eastern Europe. As Michman 
has indicated, the Jewish Councils and Associations, both in eastern and in western Europe, were 
not originally perceived as the means to implement the solution to the so-called ‘Jewish question’.  21
Instead, one could argue that the establishment of these organisations was seen simply as a way to 
structure society and to coordinate diverse Jewish communities. This notion is strengthened by the 
fact that, in all three cases, the Jewish leaders were first ordered to unite and calm agitated 
communities. As far as we know, there was never a single order by a supreme Nazi authority to 
establish these Jewish representative bodies in western Europe. As we have already seen, the 
Schnellbrief in which Heydrich ordered the establishment of Jewish Councils in September 1939 
related only to Poland.  The history of the institution of the western European Jewish organisations 22
should rather be understood in the context of the struggle for dominance between the various 
German bodies that were in charge in the Netherlands, Belgium and France.  
 
 The idea of forcing a Jewish representative body into existence was voiced in France in 
October 1940 by Theodor Dannecker who wanted the Jewish Consistorial Association of Paris 
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(1969-1991); Garfinkels, Les Belges face à la persécution raciale, 1940-1944 (1965); Liebman, Né juif. Une enfance 
juive pendant la guerre (1977); Jacques Adler, Face à la persécution: les organisations juives à Paris de 1940 à 1944 
(Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1985); Van den Bergh, Deportaties: Westerbork, Thersiënstadt, Auschwitz, Gleiwitz (1945). 
 Michman, “Judenräte, Ghettos, Endlösung”, 171. 21
 Michman, “On the Historical Interpretation of the Judenräte Issue”, 392. 22
!126
(ACIP) to serve as a representative force for the Jews in occupied France. However, in this early 
stage of the occupation, he was ‘unable to force the Jews to voluntarily join in a central Jewish 
organisation’.  We shall see that his plans for a Jewish organisation modelled on the German 23
Reichsvereinigung der Juden were obstructed both by the Military Administration and by Xavier 
Vallat after Vallat’s appointment as head of the CGQJ in March 1941.  In Belgium, there were 24
several attempts to organise the Jewish communities in early 1941 which eventually resulted in the 
establishment of the Comité de Coordination, the predecessor of the AJB, in April of that year.  In 25
terms of the formation of an actual Jewish Council, only in the Netherlands was an early decision 
made to force this body upon the Jewish community (in February 1941, nine months before the 
Council’s counterparts in Belgium and France were established). Various levels of institutional 
rivalry were at the root of these differences in timing.  
The Netherlands: Civil Administration versus the SiPo-SD 
The period in which the JR was established was marked by contradictions and by the competing 
interests of the German institutions involved. Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart, appointed by Hitler 
himself and dependent upon his support, headed the Civil Administration while Friedrich 
Christiansen was the highest military commander. The position of the SiPo-SD, headed by Wilhelm 
Harster, was always stronger in the Netherlands than in Belgium and France, and grew in 
importance as the occupation progressed.  Because there is little documentation about the 26
establishment of the JR, historians continue to disagree about exactly how it came to be. Houwink 
ten Cate claimed that Hans Böhmcker and Generalkommissar Schmidt (a protégé of the Propaganda 
Minister Joseph Goebbels and Martin Bormann, head of the Nazi Party Chancellery), took 
advantage of Hanns Albin Rauter’s sick leave and initiated the institution of a Jewish Council in 
Amsterdam. Neither Schmidt nor Böhmcker was an SS functionary.  Michman has argued instead 27
that BdS Wilhlem Harster, with the backing of Rauter ‘and following the guidelines of the Jewish 
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expert of the SD’, proposed the establishment of an Amsterdam Jewish Council of the Polish type. 
He also claimed that Seyss-Inquart, who had served as head of the Civil Administration of the 
Militärverwaltung in Cracow in late 1939, accepted the idea ‘because this was the only model he 
knew from personal experience’.  As a result, Michman says, he ordered Hans Böhmcker to apply 28
this idea. Whereas Michman has claimed that Seyss-Inquart played a role in this process despite his 
absence from the country at this time, Houwink ten Cate argued that Seyss-Inquart was not 
involved. Houwink ten Cate asserted that the SS was not involved in the establishment of the 
Council, while Michman has stated that Harster in fact proposed the establishment of the JR. 
Neither during his trial interrogations in 1948, nor during his conversations with prominent Dutch 
historians Louis de Jong and Dolf Cohen in 1949, did Harster describe what his exact role in the 
establishment of the JR had been.  29
 
 In light of the absence of documentation, it is impossible to offer a definitive conclusion on 
the history of the JR’s creation or about the specific role of the various German officials and 
departments involved. Nevertheless, we can establish that the rivalry between, and among, various 
German offices was an important part of its institution. The wish of the SiPO-SD to dominate anti-
Jewish policies at the expense of the Civil Administration became increasingly visible in the two 
months following the JR’s establishment in February 1941. Rivalries surfaced regarding the 
supervision of the Council, primarily between Seyss-Inquart, who answered to Hitler directly, and 
the highest SS representative Rauter, who was subordinate to Heydrich and Himmler. The SiPo-SD 
had already tried to take over anti-Jewish policies when its officials pressed for the establishment of 
a Judenreferat in the Netherlands in the autumn of 1940.  In Belgium and France the 30
Judenreferaten were, as part of the office of the SD, responsible for Jewish affairs. Seyss-Inquart 
opposed this idea because he did not want to lose his control over anti-Jewish policies. At the same 
time, Heydrich had grown increasingly dissatisfied with Seyss-Inquart’s policies and ordered the 
establishment of a branch of the Zentralstelle für Jüdische Auswanderung, perhaps hoping that it 
would function in a similar way to the Judenreferaten in Belgium and France.  The Zentralstelle 31
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was intended to work as the body that would oversee the emigration of Jews from the Netherlands. 
For Heydrich at this time, emigration was to be part of the solution of the so-called ‘Jewish 
question’ in all European countries.  32
 
 As soon as the Zentralstelle was established, Seyss-Inquart unsurprisingly attempted to 
decrease its sphere of influence. After continued discussions between Rauter and Seyss-Inquart 
about who should exercise authority over the Zentralstelle, Wilhelm Zöpf, a protégé of Harster 
(head of the SiPo-SD) was nominated on 1 April 1941. In response, Seyss-Inquart formulated an 
alternative plan with the help of jurist Kurt Rabl. In this, the Zentralstelle would be governed by the 
Reichskommissar (that is, Seyss-Inquart himself). In addition, the Jewish Council would be 
replaced by a Verband der Juden in die Niederlanden which, in turn, would be subject to the 
Zentralstelle.  As Michman has indicated, the task of the Verband der Juden was, among other 33
things, ‘to supervise all aspects of Jewish life in the occupied Dutch territories and to give them the 
necessary instructions’ as well as to promote ‘the emigration of Jews living in the occupied Dutch 
territories’.  The regulations for the proposed Jewish organisation were very similar to that of the 34
Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland which had been established in February 1939.  35
Clearly, Seyss-Inquart wanted to keep the authority of the Joodsche Raad within the sphere of his 
Amsterdam representative Hans Böhmcker. The alternative model he presented indicates that, to 
him, the Joodsche Raad as it existed at that point in time was not the definitive version. However, 
Seyss-Inquart’s proposals were never implemented.  As Zöpf did not arrive in Amsterdam until 36
August 1941, Willy Lages was in charge of the Zentralstelle and transferred the supervision of its 
daily work to SS-Hauptsurmführer Ferdinand aus der Fünten.  In practice, the Zentralstelle was 37
largely dysfunctional, as it never actually assisted in arranging the emigration of Jews. Instead, it 
took on an executive role in the deportation process while also directly supervising the work of the 
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 Over time, the SS became increasingly powerful in the Netherlands at the expense of Seyss-
Inquart and the Civil Administration. Seyss-Inquart had previously successfully obstructed attempts 
to establish a separate department responsible for Jewish Affairs (similar to the Judenreferaten in 
Belgium and France). However, through the course of 1942, the situation began to change. In 
February 1942, in response to decisions at the Wannsee Conference in which the position of the 
SiPo-SD was strengthened in the occupied territories, an official Judenreferent was placed at the 
head of the IV B 4 in the Netherlands. The department was remodelled on the basis of Eichmann’s 
Referat IV B 4 in Berlin and headed by Harster’s protégé Zöpf. As a result, Harster became 
responsible for a framework in which IV B 4 was the central organisation in charge of Jewish 
affairs.   39
 
 It is evident that the German authorities involved had no clear idea about what the remit of 
the proposed Jewish Council ought to be. Since Hans Böhmcker had not given any specification 
about the (long term) tasks of the JR, there were differing interpretations of its function.  Whereas 40
overseeing the emigration of Jews was the primary task outlined for the German Judenvereinigung, 
we have seen that the JR’s initial task was to restore order after the fights that had broken out in the 
Jewish quarter in early February 1941. Additionally, the JR would be held responsible for 
controlling the ‘Ausweisen’ necessary to enter the ghetto.  It should be noted that a closed-off 41
ghetto similar to those in eastern Europe was never established in Amsterdam, despite Böhmcker’s 
wish that it should be. Consequently, the Ausweisen were not introduced.  What, then, were the 42
longer term tasks of the JR? After the war, Harster claimed that the JR was primarily instituted to 
allow mediation with the Jews and that the restrictive measures it communicated did not constitute 
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preparations for the deportation of Jews.  To complicate things further, the establishment order of 43
the JR, the so-called ontwerpstatuut, indicates that the organisation was held responsible for the 
‘non-religious interests of Dutch Jews’.   44
 
 The vague wording of the ontwerpstatuut, together with the varying descriptions of the JR’s 
responsibilities, have led to different interpretations on what its exact function was supposed to 
have been. De Jong, Presser and Herzberg have argued that Hans Böhmcker wanted to establish a 
Judenrat headed by the experienced religious authorities of both the Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jewish 
communities, and that he entrusted Asscher with its formation.  Knoop argued instead that 45
Böhmcker was only aiming for a representative institution of the Jodenwijk – the Jewish quarter – 
in Amsterdam and that the idea of the JR as an umbrella organisation was introduced by Abraham 
Asscher rather than by the Germans.  This lack of a clearly defined purpose fostered improvisation 46
and created an atmosphere in which the rivalry between the various German institutions could 
continue to prosper.  
 
Belgium and France: Military Administration versus the SiPo-SD  
 
In Belgium, the presence of a Military Administration rather than a Civil Administration (as in the 
Netherlands) limited the authority of the SiPo-SD, particularly during the first phase of the 
occupation. Conflicts arose between the SiPo-SD and the Military Administration about the 
implementation of anti-Jewish regulations and the creation of a representative Belgian Jewish 
organisation. The nature of the discussion was nevertheless different from that in the Netherlands. 
The question of who should be responsible for the organisation’s establishment and functioning was 
less important in Belgium than whether a Jewish representative body should be established at all.  
 
 During the first phase of the occupation of Belgium, the different outlooks of the SiPo-SD 
and the Military Administration were immediately apparent. As a result of the restricted power of 
the Sipo-SD in relation to the Military Administration and of the limited cooperation of the Belgian 
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authorities, it was initially difficult to institute anti-Jewish legislation in Belgium.  Whereas 47
Heydrich and Himmler wanted a unified, centralised SS policy for western Europe, the Belgian 
head of the Militärverwaltung, Eggert Reeder, was not willing to consent to a diminution of his 
power.  In March 1941, SS-Obersturmführer Kurt Asche tried to increase his control of Jewish 48
affairs. He initiated the institution of a Belgian version of the CGQJ, the Vichy body that directly 
oversaw the French UGIF, so that a local Belgian authority would be involved in the execution of 
anti-Jewish policies. The reasoning behind this was simple: if Belgians were involved, attention 
would be deflected from German responsibility. Asche also suggested a name for this putative 
Belgian institution: the Commissariat Royal aux Questions Juives. However, he never succeeded 
because the Military Administration, fearing that Belgian extremists would take over such an 
institution, failed to cooperate.  They were especially afraid that their position would be threatened 49
by radical Belgian civil servants in the event of the establishment of a Belgian Commissariat headed 
by Asche.  
 
 In contrast to the Civil Administration in the Netherlands, the Belgian Military 
Administration was strongly preoccupied with the responses of the native non-Jewish population. 
This explains why it opposed the institution of a Belgian alternative to the Judenräte from the start, 
making a number of objections. In a letter to the Generalkommissar für Verwaltung und Justiz in the 
Netherlands, Friedrich Wimmer,  the head of the ‘Fürsorge’ department of the Militärbefehlshaber 50
in Belgien und Nordfrankreich argued that the Belgian non-Jewish population did not feel that the 
country had ein rassisches Problem (a racial problem).  From his perspective, this meant that it 51
would be impossible to implement anti-Jewish regulations in the same way as in Germany, where 
anti-Jewish sentiments had been growing over the years as a result of deliberate Nazi policies.  In 52
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September 1941, another objection was raised: namely that it would be difficult to find a Belgian 
leadership willing to head the organisation since the upper layer of Belgian Jewry had fled to France 
at the time of the Nazi invasion in May 1940. This, in turn, raised questions about the financial 
backing that could be offered by the Jewish community.  At the end of October 1941, 53
representatives of the Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat (OKVR) and the Kriegsverwaltungsrat (KVR) of 
the Military Administration, Löffler (OKVR), Duntze (OKVR) and Höllfritsch (KVR) raised more 
objections, including the notion that Belgian Jewry was by no means united. They argued that this 
lack of homogeneity would prevent the emergence of a sense of communal responsibility among the 
Jews. This in turn would provoke tensions which could endanger Nazi interests.  The absence of a 54
unified Jewish leadership and the lack of support from the Belgian authorities could also prove 
problematic. Prominent officials inside the Militärverwaltung argued that these issues could not be 
ignored.  55
 
 During the course of the war, the authority of the Military Administration was increasingly 
challenged by the SS. Although Reeder had wanted to take a cautious approach in relation to 
Belgian Jewry, he was quickly pressured to implement the same anti-Jewish measures that had been 
implemented in neighbouring countries.  The power of the Militärverwaltung was further damaged 56
by the regular meetings of the Judenreferenten in Berlin, during which anti-Jewish legislations in all 
three countries were discussed.  Perhaps to maintain what influence they could over the process, 57
and because they realised that it was necessary to isolate Jews from their non-Jewish neighbours, 
officials inside the Military Administration took the decision at this point, in the autumn of 1941, 
not to hamper the creation of a Belgian Jewish organisation any longer, despite their initial 
objections.  In light of these developments, the AJB can be considered a compromise between SS-58
Obersturmführer Kurt Asche’s wish for a Judenrat modelled on the eastern European style, and the 
initial reluctance of the Military Administration to institute a representative organ at all.  The AJB 59
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was eventually set up following the more moderate model of a Vereinigung (Association) rather 
than that of a Judenrat. As a result, it was officially anchored in Belgian law and placed under the 
control of the Ministry of Interior and Public Affairs. Whereas the SiPo-SD supervised the eastern 
European Judenräte and eventually the Dutch JR as well, the AJB was directly overseen by the 
Military Administration.  As the SiPo-SD was responsible for the planning and execution of the 60
deportation of Jews to eastern Europe, it continued to clash with the Military Administration during 
the course of the war about the question of the supervision of the AJB. Partly because of this, it was 
often not clear to the Jewish leaders which of the two institutions was in charge.  61
 
 German views about the role of the AJB had already changed a number of times before the 
organisation was officially established. In line with the antisemitic laws that were already in place, 
the Military Administration’s officials agreed during a meeting in October 1941 that the principal 
aim of the Association would be the restriction of Jewish economic activities in Belgium and the 
elimination of Jews from public social life.  At the end of this meeting, an important addition was 62
made: the Vereinigung had to support all tasks that in the future might be ascribed to it.  In short, 63
while the initial aim of the AJB was to eliminate Jews from social and economic life, all options 
were kept open. We have seen that the actual establishment order of the AJB on 25 November 1941 
indicated that its main task was the ‘promot[ion] of emigration of the Jews’ and the provision of 
social welfare and schoolwezen (education).  In addition, the Zwangsorganisation was supposed to 64
function as an executive power for anti-Jewish legislation; all Jews in Belgium had to become 
members.  In doing so, the primary aim of the AJB was to unite Belgian Jewry.  The tasks 65 66
outlined here, on 25 November 1941, differ from those outlined less than a month earlier, and this 
discrepancy requires consideration.  
 
 The fact that the written establishment order of the AJB was identical to that of the 
 Steinberg, La Persécution des Juifs en Belgique, 182; Schreiber and Van Doorslaer, “Inleiding” in: ibid., Curatoren 60
van het getto, 8. 
 Meinen, “De Duitse bezettingsautoriteiten en de VJB”, 38-49, 64-66. 61
 Report concerning the establishment of a Vereinigung der Juden in Belgium, 15 October 1941, 184/Tr50.077, 62
Marburg Documentation, DOS. 
 Ibid. 63
 Michman, “De oprichting van de VJB in internationaal perspectief”, 41-42. For the establishment order, see: Verordnungsblatt des 64
Militärbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich, No. 63, 2 December 1941, A012077, CNHEJ, Buber Collection, Kazerne 
Dossin. 
 Meinen, “De Duitse bezettingsautoriteiten en de VJB”, 46. 65
 Ibid., De Shoah in België, 85.66
!134
Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland, and that the AJB was subsequently held responsible 
for the emigration of Jews abroad, raises questions about how carefully the functions and structure 
of the AJB had been thought through by the Germans. We have seen that by the time the 
establishment of the organisation was publicly announced, Himmler had decided that the emigration 
of Jews would be formally prohibited. The change in wording in relation to the central tasks of the 
AJB is indicative of uncertainty about its precise role. The feeling that there must be a 
representative Jewish organisation simply because these also existed in the Netherlands, eastern and 
central Europe, seems to have been more of a driving force than any carefully considered sense of 
how and why such a body would be necessary or helpful in the solution of the so-called Judenfrage 
in Belgium itself. This conclusion is reinforced by the knowledge that the Military Administration 
did not consider a Jewish representative institution would be in any way beneficial.  
 
 In France, there were similarities with the Belgian case, as rivalry between the Military 
Administration and the SS can be identified here as well. The Militärbefehlshaber in France, headed 
in 1941 by Otto von Stülpnagel had sole authority at the beginning of the occupation but was 
increasingly forced to share its powers with other German agencies. In fact, no fewer than five 
branches of German government authority were involved in Jewish matters in France.  The 67
Security Police, which Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler had, in 1939, merged with the 
Sicherheitsdienst into the Reich Security Main Office, was the most important rival to the Military 
Administration.  The differences in approach to the so-called ‘Jewish question’ between the two 68
institutions continued throughout the occupation. Whereas the Military Administration ‘worried 
about international law, feared antagonizing French public opinion and were eager to obtain the 
cooperation of the French government’, SS-Haupstürmführer Dannecker did not have such 
reservations.  When the Security Police was granted administrative autonomy in May 1942, after 69
which it answered directly to Himmler’s office in Berlin, the friction between the two bodies, 
including on Jewish matters, increased still further.  70
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 The existence of the Vichy regime made the situation even more complex compared to the 
two other countries. Whereas German departments directly supervised the JR and the AJB, it was 
the Vichy CGQJ that held direct authority over the UGIF. In recent years, the role of Vichy, and the 
nature of the relationship between the regime and its Jewish citizens, has been reevaluated. In the 
early 1980s, Marrus and Paxton published their famous work revising the long held view that 
Vichy’s policies towards Jews were created as a result of German orders. They provided a detailed 
overview of the level of collaboration and the initiatives taken by Vichy officials themselves in 
carrying out anti-Jewish policies. In their view, Vichy’s own antisemitism offered the Germans 
more substantial help than they received anywhere else in western Europe and more, even, than 
they received from allies like Hungary and Romania.  As we shall see, Vichy sometimes resorted 71
to measures even more radical than the Germans proposed, with the aim of maintaining its own 
authority of the Jews in France. The institution of the UGIF in both the occupied and the 
unoccupied zones, while the Germans had only opted to have such an organisation in the occupied 
zone, bears witness to this.  72
 
 Recent studies do, however, show that the nature of French society and the Vichy regime 
was more diversified than has been argued by Marrus and Paxton and by others in the decades that 
followed.  These studies underline its ambiguous nature. Wolfgang Seibel, for example, 73
investigated the negotiations between Vichy officials and the Germans in 1942 and 1943. He 
demonstrated that Vichy officials provided crucial assistance to the deportations in 1942, but were 
more hesitant later on. The massive roundups of foreign Jews in Paris and in the unoccupied zone in 
the summer of 1942, which provoked public outrage, resulted in a Vichy-German agreement that 
the French police would not be responsible for arresting French citizens. Throughout 1943, Vichy 
cooperation with the solution to the so-called "Jewish question” decreased, which culminated in the 
Laval’s refusal to denaturalise all Jews who were provided French citizenship since 1927.  In 1944, 74
deportations intensified again with the aid of the Milice Française, headed by Laval. Vichy thus 
both facilitated and (temporarily) obstructed the solution to the so-called "Jewish Question" in 
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France. Sémelin emphasised that 75% of the Jews in France managed to survive despite the 
presence of the collaborationist Vichy regime. Without exonerating Vichy’s antisemitism, he argued 
that historians need to understand the ‘French paradox’ within a many-layered analytical 
framework.  Moreover, as a recent study by Lee has convincingly shown, Vichy policies were 75
inconsistent, especially during the first two years.  On the one hand, there were senior Vichy 76
officials who considered the marginalisation of Jews an ‘absolute priority’, as well as those who 
believed that ‘Jewish influence had brought about the defeat’.  On the other hand, for a number of 77
Vichy’s leading figures ‘the antisemitic legislation only served as an inconvenience and a 
distraction from their principal ministerial responsibilities’.  To many, the reconstruction of the 78
country, rather than ideological antisemitism, was the central driving force in this period. Most 
recently, Joly has highlighted the ambiguous nature of the Vichy regime, arguing that its policies 
against Jews can be characterised as a combination of antisemitism, impulses towards sovereignty 
and the desire for collaboration.  We can therefore conclude that Vichy was never a monolithic 79
bloc.  
 
 Recent studies have also reevaluated the relationship between the Militärbefehlshaber and 
the SiPo-SD. Eismann, for example, has argued that the differences between the Military 
Administration and the SiPo-SD in France were not as clear as has been argued in the past.  Rather 80
than considering the Military Administration as a restraining factor in the implementation of anti-
Jewish legislation in western Europe, she claimed that it pioneered the radicalisation of antisemitic 
policy in occupied France, outpacing the SiPo-SD. Eismann showed that the German Military and 
Security forces often cooperated closely with each other at the local level.  Since the UGIF-Nord 81
and the UGIF-Sud, as well as the JR and the AJB, were overseen by the central authorities in Paris 
and Berlin, where institutional rivalries were omnipresent, this argument is hard to sustain in this 
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context. However, we shall see that prominent German officials involved with the UGIF did at 
times disagree while also cooperating, not least because they often had strong ties to both the SS 
and the Military Administration. Werner Best offers an example of this. As a senior member of the 
SS, he also served as head of the administrative section of the Military Administration in France.  82
 
 The inconsistent nature of the Vichy regime, together with the rivalry between the SiPo-SD 
and the Military Administration, created a complex situation. The representatives of these bodies all 
had different views about the scope of anti-Jewish regulations and the pace at which they ought to 
be implemented. When, after repeated demands from Heydrich and Himmler, army officials agreed 
in October 1940 that the development of anti-Jewish policies in France would be in the hands of the 
SiPo-SD-led Judenreferat, Dannecker became one of the central figures in initiating anti-Jewish 
legislation in France.  Continuing conflicts of interest between the three bodies over the execution 83
of anti-Jewish legislation seems to have been an important driving force in allowing Dannecker to 
establish his authority by forcing a Jewish organisation into existence. The rivalries and 
disagreements between different institutions, in particular between the SS and Vichy officials, 
affected the course of events even more in France than they did in Belgium or the Netherlands. In 
Belgium, the power of the Military Administration began to fade as the war continued. In the 
Netherlands, the position of the Civil Administration in relation to the SS began to weaken. But the 
presence and influence of Vichy could not be downplayed and it served to influence how the UGIF 
was established and how it functioned.  
 
 Shortly after his arrival in France on 5 September 1940, Dannecker pressured Jewish leaders 
in Paris to establish a Zwangsvereinigung to deal with all political, social and cultural problems 
relating to the Jews in France. He wanted to merge the existing Jewish relief agencies and hoped to 
gain access to their financial resources.  He contacted Chief Rabbi Julien Weill ‘to inform him that 84
he expected the ACIP to acknowledge itself as the representative of all the Jews in Paris and accept 
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responsibility for their social and charitable needs’, which was the first indication of the German 
intention to represent Jews officially through a single body.  His efforts failed, largely due to the 85
lack of the support from the Military Administration ‘which in September 1940 was more 
concerned with the preparations of the campaign against England’.  The situation in France was 86
radically different from that in Germany or eastern Europe, where Judenräte had first been 
established: ‘there was no ghetto as in eastern Europe [..]; and direct German control was limited to 
the occupied zone [where] the German authorities had neither the manpower nor the desire to run 
things without the assistance of French services’.  Furthermore, Dannecker was unable to force the 87
ACIP to act as he wished because the 1905 Law of Church and State Separation ruled that no 
representatives of religious institutions were permitted to assume responsibilities in secular 
organisations. Sachs and Weill used this legal principle as the basis for refusing Dannecker's 
demand.   88
 
 After this failed attempt, Dannecker changed track, emphasising the philanthropic 
possibilities for French Jewry once all were united under one umbrella organisation.  As the needs 89
of the Jewish people increased, both immigrant and French Jewish leaders decided to use this 
opportunity to improve their relief activity, despite their reservations about German involvement. As 
we have seen, this gave rise to the Comité de Coordination, established in January 1941 on the basis 
of a German order. It was made up of the Paris Consistory, the Comité de Bienfaisance Israélite, 
Organisation Reconstruction Travail (ORT), OSE and Amelot Committee. Dannecker hoped the 
organisation would form the essence of a full-scale French Jewish Council.  In order to ensure this, 90
on 18 March 1941, he brought two Austrian Jews, Leo Israelowicz-Ilmar and Wilhelm Biberstein, 
to Paris. They were members of the Viennese Israelitische Kultusgemeinde (IKG), which served as 
an intermediary between Jews and Germans until December 1942, when it was transformed into an 
Ältestenrat (Council of Elders). By then, most Austrian Jews had either migrated or been 
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deported.  Irsaelowicz-Ilmar and Biberstein took control of the Comité de Coordination and were 91
ordered to transform it into an ‘effective’ Jewish organisation, using the experience they had 
acquired in Vienna.  German reports show that Dannecker believed the two men to be technischen 92
Ratgeber and considered their advice important.  Israelowicz, for example, reported to Dannecker 93
about the nature and organisation of French Jewry before the war and advised him which 
organisations – he included the Comité de Bienfaiscance de Paris, the OSE and La Colonie Scolaire 
– could continue their activities through the CC.  94
 
 Unsurprisingly, the aims of the Jewish community and Dannecker were different. While 
participating Jewish organisations were determined to continue offering aid through the Comité de 
Coordination without losing their financial and operational autonomy, Dannecker wanted the 
committee to be geared towards the solution of the so-called ‘Jewish question’, which at that 
moment still meant the emigration of Jews from the country.  In order to achieve this, he felt that 95
the community had to be united under the umbrella of the Comité de Coordination. In response to 
increasing German pressure and the arrest of 3,710 foreign Jews on 14 May 1941, the Amelot 
Committee seceded from the committee four months after its establishment.  As we shall see, 96
Amelot then explored the potential for a shift to illegal activity.  Since the Comité de Coordination 97
failed to unite Jews in France, Dannecker began to look for alternatives and decided to involve the 
French government more actively in his plans. He believed that experiences in Germany and the 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia proved that forcing an organisation into existence would be 
essential for the progressive removal of Jews from French society.  In Austria, the Zentralstelle für 98
Jüdische Auswanderung (Central Office for Jewish Emigration), instituted in August 1938 by the 
Security Police, had successfully supervised the emigration and expulsion of the Jews from the 
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country and later also from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.   99
 
 In a similar way, the Jewish Religious Congregation of Prague (JRC) had been given 
jurisdiction over all individual Jews and congregations in the Protectorate on 5 March 1940.  100
While it was initially concerned mainly with the provision of social welfare and the liquidation of 
Jewish assets, from October 1941 the JRC was held responsible for the concentration and 
evacuation of Jews from the area; in 1943 it was converted into an Ältestenrat.  It is notable that 101
Dannecker refers to the situation in Bohemia and Moravia even though the nature of the occupation 
of France was very different and the organisation of the Jewish community in France did not lend 
itself to supervision by a body resembling either the Zentralstelle or the JRC. If we look at his 
previous attempts to transform the Comité de Coordination into a more effective Jewish 
organisation, based on the Viennese IKG, we can see that Dannecker had not taken into 
consideration the realities of the French context when developing his plans.  
 
 In the winter of 1940-1941, one of Dannecker’s central objectives had been to establish a 
French body that would bring together all anti-Jewish policies. However, Vichy officials were 
reluctant to carry out a unified anti-Jewish policy dictated by the Germans.  Furthermore, they 102
were ‘thrown off balance’ by the Nazi system of rivalry and conflicting jurisdiction that more than 
once forced them to deal with several German agencies.  Between December 1940 and February 103
1941 relations between Vichy and German officials, which had been complicated since the 
armistice on 22 June 1940, further deteriorated. Pétain had fired his vice-president Pierre Laval who 
had formed a close working relationship with the German ambassador Abetz in the autumn of 1940 
and was ‘the only French leader who possessed an independent link to the Führer’.  The German 104
occupying authorities strongly disapproved of Pétain’s actions and immediately banned the passage 
of civil servants and men aged from 18 to 45 over the demarcation line.  After this conflict, 105
Admiral François Darlan – Minister of Navy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Interior 
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and, from February 1941, vice-president of the Council of Ministers – ‘was ready for all 
concessions to win the favour of Nazi Germany and to reach a negotiated peace’.   106
 
 In early 1941, Dannecker set up various meetings with the representatives of all German 
agencies involved in Jewish affairs, including the Military Administration, in order to press ahead 
with his radical approach.  He proposed the establishment of a central Jewish office – a 107
Zentraljudenamt – to trace Jews, remove them from all professional and social domains, and 
centralise the administration of their property ‘until the date of their deportation’.  In a detailed 108
report on the institution and function of this central Jewish office in Paris, Dannecker claimed that 
while the Military Administration had already taken the first steps towards removing Jews from the 
country, it had become clear that the French authorities wanted to follow the strict letter of the law 
and showed ‘no political understanding of the necessity of a general cleansing [of Jews]’.  Within 109
weeks, the other German agencies agreed with Dannecker’s plan and were well aware that they 
needed the cooperation of Vichy officials to carry it out.  In a telegraphic report to Minister of 110
Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop on 6 March 1941, Otto Abetz wrote that Vichy’s support 
was necessary because the central Jewish office would then have a legal basis, and the German 
influence on the office’s work in the occupied zone could have such an impact that the unoccupied 
zone would also be forced to implement the measures taken.  Initially, Darlan was reluctant, 111
taking refuge behind objections he attributed to Pétain who, he said, was worried about the impact 
upon French Jews and about distinguished war veterans.  Afraid he would be surpassed by rival 112
institutions and aiming to safeguard a working relationship with the Germans which, as we have 
seen, had been seriously dented in the months prior to this, Darlan eventually succumbed less than 
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two weeks later in mid-March 1941.  On 29 March 1941, he officially instituted the CGQJ.  113 114
 
 French and German politics seemed to have found common ground: the persecution of 
foreign Jews. The policies of Darlan became emblematic of the approach of senior Vichy officials 
towards the Jews: to sacrifice the foreigners under the pretext of saving the French. In reality, 
between 1940 and 1944, leading Vichy officials like Darlan, Laval and Bousquet, head of the 
French police, came to see the Nazi projects as a way of getting rid of the Jews in their country.  115
Although the Germans had provided two lists of candidates they preferred for the position of head 
of the CGQJ – one signed by Otto Abetz and the other by Kurt Ihlefeld, the Paris correspondent of 
the NSDAP’s newspaper Völkischer Beobachter – , the Germans gave Darlan the autonomy to 
make the final decision.  He chose Xavier Vallat, a fanatical antisemite and proponent of the 116
extreme nationalist movement Action Française.  Vallat, a distinguished First World War veteran, 117
was active in conservative and Catholic political circles and a strong supporter of Pétain. In July 
1940, he was appointed secretary for veterans’ affairs and created the Légion Française des 
Combattans, ‘whose supporters intended to become the principal mass organization of the new 
regime’.  Vallat reflected upon his appointment at the head of the CGQJ when he was brought to 118
court after the war and claimed that that he felt competent to take up this position because he had 
been deliberating about the ‘Jewish question’ for a long time.  To Vichy, Vallat was a logical 119
choice given that, as we will see, Vallat had an anti-German outlook and would therefore be able to 
hamper German influence on the solution to the so-called ‘Jewish question’ in France. This, in turn, 
fostered Vichy’s autonomy.  120
 
 The forced establishment of a well-functioning representative Jewish body in France 
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remained a problem in the first half of 1941. SS-Sturmbahnführer Kurt Lischka, deputy of Knochen 
at the Paris SD department, insisted that the Comité de Coordination would be transformed into 
such an organisation in early 1941.  Dannecker communicated Lischka’s demand to Vallat on 3-4 121
April when they met in presence of Abetz and Werner Best, head of the administrative section of the 
Military Administration in France.  Vallat, who ardently hated German interference in affairs 122
relating to the ‘Jewish question’, initially refused to institute an umbrella organisation.  He 123
managed to stall Dannecker’s wish for a Zwangsvereinigung until August 1941. In the existing 
literature, the role of the various German departments involved in the establishment of the UGIF 
remains unclear. Laffitte has pointed out that the law establishing the organisation, published on 2 
December 1941, was a loi d’État, decreed by Pétain and co-signed by various Vichy officials, 
including Darlan, but he reflects hardly at all on the role of the Germans in this specific process.  124
Cohen emphasised the role of Jonathan Schmid, head of the Verwaltungsstab of the Military 
Administration, who supposedly pressured Vallat to establish the Zwangsvereinigung.  Billig has 125
asserted that Dannecker, bypassing the authority of the Military Administration, approached Vallat 
on 17 September 1941 and threatened to establish a Judenrat himself in the event that Vallat 
refused. According to Billig, it was specifically in response to Dannecker’s pressure that Vallat 
quickly established a Jewish organisation in both zones, in consultation with the relevant Vichy 
government officials.  Documentation shows that the Military Administration was directly 126
involved in the establishment of the UGIF. On 29 November 1941, Military commander Otto von 
Stülpnagel in fact ordered the creation of a Jewish Zwangsorganisation.  Pétain published the 127
decree for the establishment of the UGIF several days later, on 2 December, while the UGIF-Sud’s 
establishment was decreed on 8 January 1942.  From this we can deduce that from the summer of 128
1941, pressure on Vallat increased, from both the SS and the Military Administration. In the end, the 
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ongoing institutional rivalry between representatives of the Military Administration, the Vichy 
regime and the SS were instrumental in the formation of the UGIF. In particular, Dannecker’s 
willingness to overpower those who in his view were not sufficiently radical was crucial to the 
establishment of the organisation. The pressure he exerted to ensure that a Jewish representative 
organisation was established was probably inspired by his wish to suppress the influence of the 
Militärverwaltung which had thwarted his plans and ideas for such an organisation on numerous 
occasions.  129
 
 An important motivation for Vichy officials in instituting the UGIF was their belief that they 
would lose control over the confiscation of Jewish property in the occupied zone if the organisation 
were to serve under German authority.  The choice to have a Jewish representative organisation in 130
both zones was prompted by the fear that foreign Jews would otherwise be expelled to the Vichy-
controlled unoccupied zone which the Germans considered a ‘place to dump their unwanted Jews’ 
well into 1941.  Vallat tried to maintain Vichy sovereignty and aimed for complete control over 131
the UGIF. His mistrust of Dannecker furthermore encouraged him to make the UGIF directly 
subordinate to the CGQJ.  In September 1941, Vallat wrote to Dr Storz, the Ministerial Advisor to 132
the Administrative Department of the Military Administration, that three important points had to be 
settled: 1) that the organisation (UGIF) should function across all of France and that the members in 
the occupied zone should be appointed by French authorities; 2) that the central board of the 
occupied zone should be under the authority of the CGQJ and; 3) that the security of (UGIF) 
members would be safeguarded.  Despite Vallat’s attempts to gain the upper hand, the UGIF was 133
formed according to the wishes of the Germans and ultimately controlled by them.  The UGIF-134
Sud’s leader Lambert reflected upon this in his diary and wrote that the promises of Vallat about the 
protection of First World War veterans, should not be taken for granted ‘since he is not free [to 
act]’.  135
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 The third condition in Vallat’s letter to Storz is indicative of his particular attitude towards 
French Jewry, which dated back to his experiences in the First World War. As a French soldier 
during the First World War, he had fought alongside Jews at the front.  The friendships he formed 136
at that time help to explain the distinction Vallat would continue to make between Jews ‘in general’ 
and those Jews whom he believed deserved to remain members of the national community because 
they had defended la patrie.  During a personal meeting with Dannecker on 17 February 1942, 137
Vallat highlighted the ways in which his own antisemitism differed from Dannecker’s.  He 138
elaborated on this in his memoirs, where he claimed he did not hate Jews and underlined that he had 
Jewish friends, including three Jewish ‘combat friends’ made in the period 1914-1918. Instead, he 
‘mistrusted’ and ‘feared’ strangers or outsiders (l’étranger), a feeling that he considered to be 
universal.  He was particularly influenced by the Catholic Church and the measures it had passed 139
against Jews through the centuries.  His racial laws were therefore ‘a continuation of French and 140
Catholic restrictive measures that sought only to reduce Jewish influence in France’.  Like Charles 141
Maurras, Vallat advocated a form of ‘State antisemitism’ that attempted to regulate Jewish existence 
by State agencies 'for the benefit of all Frenchmen’.  Even though his general antisemitic outlook 142
did not significantly alter after the First World War, his differentiation between the minority of 
‘israélites’ who were able to forget their origins and the large majority of dangerous, unassimilated 
Jews, whom he felt constituted a threat to the French race, does suggest a modestly nuanced 
viewpoint.  143
 
 Vallat and German officials like Dannecker and Best had different perspectives on the role 
of the CGQJ in the solution of the so-called ‘Jewish question’ in France and about the 
responsibilities of the UGIF. This had become clear during the first meeting between Vallat, Best 
and Von Stülpnagel on 3-4 April 1941. Vallat explained that he considered the expulsion and 
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internment of Jews to be a matter for the government and the police, whereas the Germans had 
hoped for the cooperation of the French in this regard.  In his memoirs, Vallat reflected upon the 144
disagreements between himself and the Germans and claimed that he considered Dannecker’s 
attempts to separate Jews from non-Jews in Paris in early 1941 through the formation of a ghetto 
‘old-fashioned’; he could not grasp how Dannecker imagined a ghetto could exist in a city like 
Paris.  As to the function of the UGIF, Vallat considered it to be an institution permitting notable 145
Jews to control the untrustworthy and generally lower class immigrant Jewry.  By contrast, the 146
Germans wanted the UGIF to be part of a new phase in the process of separation between Jews and 
non-Jews. Dannecker also aimed to unite Jewish relief agencies under one umbrella.  It should be 147
noted that although the existing literature asserts that Dannecker wanted a French Judenrat, he 
himself did not use this word.  This is important because the eastern European Judenräte were 148
very different in form and function from the Associations in Germany, Belgium and France. We 
have seen that Dannecker was affected by his experiences in eastern Europe and referred to 
Bohemia and Moravia as proof that an organisation which had been forced into existence could be 
vital for the progressive removal of Jews from French society. However, he did not use the term 
Judenrat, used to describe the Jewish organisations in eastern Europe, but instead referred to the 
French Jewish representative organisation as a Zwangsvereinigung, modelled on the German 
Reichsvereinigung.  149
 
 These examples show that if we want to understand the context in which the Jewish 
organisations were established, it is important to look beyond the limits of national borders. In all 
three cases, the Jewish organisations were built using blueprints from elsewhere. The rivalry 
between the various German institutions in each of the countries found its origin at the very top of 
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the Nazi party in Berlin. This means that the establishment of these organisations should be 
understood within the broader context of Nazi rule in occupied Europe. Looking at the creation of 
the Jewish organisations in the three countries, there are a number of important similarities. First, 
their existence resulted in part from competition between various (Nazi) institutions as prominent 
officials rushed to take the initiative and tried to consolidate their own power over anti-Jewish 
legislation at the cost of rival institutions and individuals. The second factor relates to the first, as 
the examples demonstrate that a clear notion of exactly what the (long-term) tasks of the 
organisations would be was not made explicit. Therefore, the months and weeks prior to, and even 
after, the establishment of the organisations were characterised by improvisation more than 
anything else. This can be explained by the fact that events often followed each other so quickly 
that German policy-making could not catch up and responses had to be ad hoc. The majority of 
Nazi bureaucrats did not have any prewar experience in dealing with the kind of situation they now 
found themselves in. It is therefore not surprising that anti-Jewish policies and regulations that had 
been introduced elsewhere were simply copied without any serious account being taken on the 
particularities of the country in question. The fact that Dannecker was thinking of instituting a 
Zwangsvereinigung in France by reference to Bohemia and Moravia, and planned to establish a 
ghetto in Paris even though it would have been impossible to do so, further supports this view. The 
foundations on which the organisations were built were therefore far from predetermined. Instead, 
they were largely the result of institutional rivalry and questions about their exact form and function 
were moved to the sidelines.  
 
 Institutional rivalry surfaced between the various sections of the German occupation regime 
and in all three countries the SS encountered obstacles when trying to establish its dominance in the 
execution of anti-Jewish policies. In practice, the situations varied. In the Netherlands, we have seen 
that the presence and influence of the SS increased more rapidly during the course of the war than it 
did in Belgium and France. Rivalry with the SiPo-SD was an important factor in motivating 
Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart to make sure that the supervision of the JR would be in the hands 
of the Civil Administration. In a similar vein, both Asscher and Cohen tried to ensure that the JR 
would continue to be responsible to Hans Böhmcker rather than to the SS. This made it vulnerable 
because there was always the threat that the SS would take over if they did not comply with 
Böhmcker’s orders.  The rivalry between the SS and the Civil Administration was directly felt by 150
 Houwink ten Cate, “Heydrich’s Security Police”, 384. 150
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a JR member of the local Arnhem branch in February 1943. After this individual had approached a 
Wehrmacht commander on his own initiative, he was arrested and most likely deported to 
Westerbork, something SS-Hauptstürmbahnführer Ferdinand aus der Fünten pointed out during a 
meeting of all chairmen in February 1943.  Above all, the increasing influence of the SiPo-SD 151
together with an overlap of functions resulted in a rapid succession of anti-Jewish measures in the 
Netherlands.  
 
 In the two other countries, the situation was different. In Belgium, we have seen that it 
remained unclear which of the rival institutions supervised the AJB because both the SiPo-SD ánd 
the Military Administration continued to be actively involved with it. Furthermore, the Belgian 
authorities were also in communication with the AJB. Even Judenreferent Asche was unsure who 
was responsible for policies vis-à-vis the AJB. On 17 April 1942, Maurice Benedictus and Saül 
Pinkous, representative AJB Antwerp branch and secretary of the central board respectively, asked 
Asche whom they should approach in order to gain more information about the recently announced 
legislation concerning the specific identity card Jewish workers in Charleroi and Liège would need 
in order to be on the streets after 8pm.  Initially, Asche directed them to the Feldkommandatur but 152
a few days later he claimed instead that the Sicherheitspolizei of Charleroi was responsible in this 
case.  In order to buy time, the AJB could approach different institutions and, in doing so, was 153
able to create organisational confusion to its own benefit. For example, Benedictus used the absence 
of a formal order to hamper the provisions for forced labour by Jews in the Organisation Todt (OT) 
camps in the north of France that had been announced on 11 March 1942.  In June 1942, he 154
refused to hand over lists of Jews to the Arbeitsamt (labor office) of the Belgian secretaries-general, 
one of the authorities with which the AJB leaders communicated and which sat in a larger 
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disorganised web of Belgian and German organisations overseeing the forced labour of Jews in the 
OT camps.  He claimed that he could not do so in the absence of a formal order from an 155
‘authorised authority’, aiming to use the organisational ambiguity to his own advantage.  Even 156
though the Germans in the end did not need the lists because they already had the necessary 
documentation, this example shows how the AJB leadership used the presence of rival institutions 
to attempt to frustrate German plans.  
 
 In France, the ongoing institutional rivalry between the Military Administration, the SiPo-
SD and Vichy officials dominated the politics of the UGIF. As in Belgium, this rivalry delayed the 
establishment of the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud in the first place. Furthermore, it affected the 
implementation of anti-Jewish measures like that of the yellow star for which the Germans needed 
the cooperation of the French administration, and, in particular, of the French police. After Louis 
Darquier de Pellepoix, who succeeded Xavier Vallat, had taken office at the CGQJ, Werner Best and 
Theodor Dannecker hoped against all odds that the former would see to it that the yellow star was 
imposed in both zones.  However, Vichy officials at this point drew a line between foreign and 157
French Jews and were unwilling to introduce a measure that would stigmatise all Jews equally. In 
the unoccupied zone, the star was never introduced and the UGIF-Sud was the only Jewish 
organisation in western Europe that was not held responsible for distributing the stars.  In both 158
Belgium and France, institutional rivalry resulted above all in postponements and, from the German 
perspective, in a looser grip on the organisations. As a result, as we shall see, there was more room 
for manoeuvre for the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud, allowing them to foster their 
engagement in illegal activities.  
 
2.2 The “Councils’” organisational structures and day-to-day operations 
 
Despite the plethora of sources on the daily functions of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the 
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UGIF-Sud, including the letters of Mirjam Bolle and the diaries and reports of David Cohen, 
Salomon van den Berg and Raymond-Raoul Lambert, the organisations’ activities have not been 
examined to the same degree in existing literature. They are highlighted in some of the (most 
recent) literature on the AJB and the UGIF but not within the broader context of the nature and 
impact of these Jewish organisations. Nor are the AJB’s and UGIF’s activities compared to those of 
their western European counterparts.  The large majority of the organisations’ operations 159
concerned very basic and practical activities, mostly related to social welfare and assistance. 
Although analyses have been primarily focussed on questions of whether and why the Jewish 
leaders collaborated or cooperated with the Nazis, this was only a marginal question during the 
period of occupation itself. Rather, the leaders were busy providing assistance with housing, 
education and medical care. For example, the communication of the JR central board with the 
Leeuwarden branch shows that the Dutch Council aimed to find out the whereabouts of Jews who 
were missing, and that it also discussed financial issues and the general functioning of the 
organisations and distributed information sheets indicating, for example, what to do in case family 
members died or when people moved.  A telling example of the minor details with which the 160
Joodsche Raad busied itself is the notice it sent to Jews in the provinces urging them to make sure 
they would shut down the electricity in their houses before their forced relocation to Amsterdam.  161
A detailed description sent out by the Dutch JR of how people should pack their bags, also bears 
witness to this.   162
 
 The four Jewish organisations were in touch with one another in order to try to control the 
movement of Jews to neighbouring countries. The AJB, the JR, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud 
communicated amongst themselves when trying to find out the whereabouts of Jews who had fled 
to one of the two other countries, urging their counterparts to protect members of the community. 
There were also requests to send the personal papers of Jews. In June 1943, for example, the JR 
contacted the AJB in order to retrieve the baptismal papers of a Jewish woman who lived in the 
Netherlands. The AJB managed to retrieve these documents at the municipality and sent them to 
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Amsterdam. The AJB and the UGIF also exchanged lists of known concentration camps in eastern 
Europe, encouraging one another to supplement the lists with available information.  There was 163
also communication between the Jewish communities in Germany and Belgium. Before the AJB's 
creation, members of the German Reichsvereinigung der Juden had been in touch with a 
predecessor of their Belgian counterpart. On 26 February 1941, for example, the German 
Association sent a letter to the Assistance Sociales Juives, urging the Jewish leaders to inform 
Günther Hertz, in possession of an American passport, that he was summoned to the US consulate 
in Stuttgart. The Reichsvereinigung representative asked whether the organisation could take Hertz 
to the US consulate in Antwerp as soon as possible.  164
 
 The provision of social welfare characterised all Jewish organisations, but the ways in which 
the leaders carried out these activities varied, in part because the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and 
the UGIF-Sud were structured differently and operated in different contexts. Whereas the JR 
quickly gained the exclusive power over the Jews in the Netherlands, the existence of still other 
Jewish (representative) organisations meant that the AJB and the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud 
never fulfilled the same function in their respective societies. The autocratic position of the JR in 
combination with the absolute power of its chairmanship was markedly different from the Belgian 
case, where local boards were effectively represented in the central board. In the French unoccupied 
zone, the situation was yet again different because the Jewish organisations within the UGIF-Sud 
generally retained their autonomy. As we will see, these differences affected the daily organisational 
reality and the effectiveness of the organisations, both from the Jewish and the German perspective. 
The ways in which the Jewish organisations were structured depended on a variety of factors: the 
institutional rivalry between the various German (and Vichy) departments involved as highlighted 
previously, the blueprints they were modelled after, the structure of the communities and the 
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The JR: the absolute power of the two chairmen  
 
We turn first to the Dutch case. As we have seen, the Amsterdam Jewish Council became a body 
with nationwide authority in September 1941, seven months after its establishment. As early as May 
1941, the JR leadership had developed a blueprint for the structures of a nationwide Council: the 
Joodse Raad voor Nederland (the Jewish Council of the Netherlands), even though this name was 
never used in practice. A memorandum from this period notes that all other Jewish associations and 
foundations were to be incorporated into the JR. While they were allowed to maintain their name 
and outward independence, their activities and financial resources were directly overseen by the 
JR.  The blueprint shows that the plan was to establish eight provincial JR branches in cities 165
across the country with each representing either a few cities or entire provinces: 1) Haarlem, for the 
province of Noord-Holland (with the exception of Amsterdam); 2) Den Haag for the cities of The 
Hague and Leiden, 3) Rotterdam for the city of Rotterdam and other cities in the province of Zuid-
Holland; 4) Utrecht for the province of Utrecht; 5) Arnhem for the province of Gelderland; 6) 
Enschede for the province of Overijssel; 7) Groningen for the northern provinces (Groningen, 
Drenthe, Friesland) and, 8) Eindhoven for the southern provinces (Limburg, Noord-Brabant, 
Zeeland).  At the time the plan was drafted, the JR was still officially functioning only as a local 166
Amsterdam organisation. After the Coördinating Commission was dissolved in November 1941, the 
JR took over the local committees that had previously served the CC and began to extend its 
influence to the entire country.  
 
 A letter to all local and provincial Jewish representatives dating from 18 November 1941 
shows that the eventual structure of the local branches was slightly different from that proposed in 
May of that year. Rather than eight provincial branches, a representative was appointed in each of 
the provinces, eleven in total, and each was obliged to report directly back to Asscher and Cohen.  167
The appointment of these local representatives had to be approved by the central board in 
Amsterdam first. In every city or town where Jews lived, there was also a community 
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representative: the plaatselijk hoofdvertegenwoordiger (main local representative). The number of 
community representatives depended on the size of the local Jewish community; larger 
communities had more representatives.  On 24 February 1942, the JR distributed a list of all 168
employees, including the representatives of the provincial JR branches.  Whereas Jozeph 169
Michman has argued that there was relative autonomy for the local branches, especially for 
Enschede and The Hague, we will see that, compared to Belgium and France, local branch 
representatives in the Netherlands generally had little or no impact on the central board’s policies 
and decisions.  170
 
  It should be noted that the Enschede branch was unique because it functioned relatively 
independently of the JR’s central board. Its chairman, Sig Menko, was convinced that the directions 
of the central board in Amsterdam ought not to be followed. As various testimonies indicate, the 
Enschede leaders encouraged Jews to go into hiding while being seemingly loyal to the Germans.  171
This was in contrast to what Asscher and Cohen were doing in Amsterdam. In the end, around half 
of the Jews in Enschede managed to survive, and this can partly be ascribed to the position taken by 
Menko.  It should also be noted that Enschede is situated near the border with Germany, through 172
which many German Jewish refugees had passed in the 1930s, so it is likely that the Jews there may 
have been more aware of the consequences of German persecution and were therefore more willing 
to go into hiding. The presence of an active organised resistance group in the area, the Overduin 
group, which arranged hiding places for Jews, together with the considerate attitude of Enschede’s 
non-Jewish population have also been emphasised in this context.  Other contributory factors 173
include the presence of an anti-German police commissioner until the end of December 1942 and a 
mayor who protested against the German measures on a number of occasions.  174
 
 The dependence of the other local branches was in part the result of their financial reliance 
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on the Amsterdam main office. The JR central board was unwilling to give the local boards freedom 
to act. Wartime exchanges between the central board and the local Leeuwarden branch show that 
the central board encouraged local branches to execute the instructions of the central board in 
Amsterdam as quickly and precisely as possible.  In the blueprint of May 1941 about the 175
transformation of the Joodse Raad voor Amsterdam to the Joodse Raad voor Nederland, the specific 
role of the local branches as perceived by the JR leadership was outlined. The text highlights the 
intended centralised power of the Amsterdam main office: 
 The provincial Jewish Councils are subject to the Joodse Raad voor Nederland and execute its orders 
 and decrees in their respective areas. They communicate externally only with consent of the Joodse 
 Raad voor Nederland.  176
There was extensive communication on an almost daily basis between the central JR board and its 
local branches. Indeed, on one occasion, the representative of the province of Friesland 
(Leeuwarden), Maurits Troostwijk, expressed dissatisfaction that there had not been communication 
for several days, showing just how often the central board was usually in touch with local 
branches.  Local branches were not only subject to the Amsterdam central board. They also 177
worked under the direct supervision of the SiPo-SD – the Nazi authorities thus had the power to 
intervene without informing the Amsterdam leaders. This created some room for manoeuvre for the 
local boards but never altered the high-level policies carried out by the JR leadership.  178
 
 In addition to the local branches that were responsible for the Jews in certain towns and 
regions, the JR had various sub-departments that were responsible for particular social sectors, 
including the department of immigration, the Hulp aan Vertrekkenden (Central Bureau for 
Assistance to People Departing), the education department and the socio-pedagogic department. 
Whereas the local branches were simply taken over from the Coördinatie Commissie, these social 
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departments were newly established. Administrative documents show that all these departments 
frequently reported back to the JR’s central board.  There was also the so-called Joodsche Beirat, 179
which was formed by, and represented, German Jews in the Netherlands. In a postwar report, Cohen 
indicated that the task of the Beirat was to advise the JR and that, as such, it had a major impact on 
the decisions of the organisation.  However, in practice, the Beirat was never officially part of the 180
Joodsche Raad. It had neither substantial autonomy nor a real say in the Council’s decisions or 
regulations, in part because its members did not have the right to vote.  By  contrast, the Expositur 181
department of the JR, headed by Austrian Jew Edwin Sluzker, was more important in its function. 
Initially, it exclusively aided Jews filling in their emigration forms. However, its responsibilities 
increased as the war progressed, in particular after the evacuation of Jews in the Netherlands to 
Amsterdam and the first deportations to eastern Europe commenced in the summer of 1942. It was 
responsible for providing social welfare to Jews in the Hollandsche Schouwburg (during the war 
renamed Joodsche Schouwburg), an assembly place of Jews before they were sent to Westerbork in 
the north of the country. The Expositur also arranged exemptions at the office of the Zentralstelle, 
headed by aus der Fünten.  182
 
 An investigation of the JR’s activity reports shows that its members dedicated much of their 
time to offering practical help for Jews. For example, from 7 November 1941 onwards Jews were 
no longer allowed to travel (or to move to a new place) without a travel permit. The JR responded to 
this measure by arranging permits for Jews who needed to travel on a daily basis, including those 
wanting to visit family members who had fallen ill.  When the deportations of Jews to eastern 183
Europe commenced, the JR’s employees busied themselves with the practical necessities that 
needed to be taken care of in this context, in the same way that their counterparts in the AJB, the 
UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud were doing. Among other things, the Jews needed proper, solid 
shoes and rucksacks. At the end of July 1942, The Hulp aan Vertrekkenden department was 
 See: Joodse Raad voor Amsterdam, Landelijke bureaus 182.4, NIOD; Letters and documents sent between the JR 179
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instituted in order to safeguard this aid for Jews. Gertrude van Tijn, who worked for the emigration 
department of the JR, by now largely redundant, was asked to head the newly established 
department. Its central aim was to ‘prepare Jews for the journey that awaited them’.  Van Tijn has 184
indicated that she focussed exclusively on the provision of social welfare and did not want to be 
held responsible for the political decisions of the JR leadership.  In the first months of its 185
existence, Hulp aan Vertrekkenden provided thousands of blankets, 350 overcoats, 900 packs of 
sanitary napkins, 4,000 plates, 500 sets of baby underwear, thousands of other items of clothing, 
boots and towels, medicine and over 2,000 tubes of toothpaste.  In the meantime, other JR 186
departments were also primarily concerned with the provision of social welfare. The Ondersteuning 
en Maatschappelijk werk (Support and Social Work) department, for example, attempted to arrange 
exemptions from deportations. The JR also oversaw the provision of education to Jewish children 
who were banned from public schools from the end of August 1941.   187
 
 During the course of the occupation, the Joodsche Raad continued its welfare activities, 
despite increasing German pressure. This pressure was felt, for example, in July 1942 when 700 
Jews were held hostage by the Nazis and Asscher and Cohen were coerced into encouraging 4,000 
Jews who had received an oproep (call) to report themselves.  Overall, the leadership tried to 188
make communication with the Germans as efficient as possible, aiming to win time by giving in to 
certain demands while at the same time asking for concessions from the Germans: om erger te 
voorkomen. This phrase was used to explain and excuse the tactics of the Jewish leaders in that they 
had attempted to ‘prevent worse’, including deportation to Mauthausen, by complying with German 
regulations. Mauthausen gained an unsettling reputation in the Netherlands in the spring of 1941 
when a group of Jewish hostages was sent there and reports of their death soon reached their 
families. After that, the Germans used Mauthausen as a threat to make the JR carry out its 
instructions.  Apart from the situation in this particular camp, Cohen claimed after the war that he 189
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had not known the fate of the Jews who were deported to camps in the East; a claim that was widely 
criticised by historians such as Knoop and Van der Zee.  Cohen also said after the war that in 190
order to make their tactics work, he and Asscher at times divided the meetings with particular Nazis 
between themselves, because, for example Cohen got along better with aus der Fünten and Asscher 
with Willy Lages.  Cohen elaborated on their strategy and indicated that the central aim had been 191
to receive exemptions, to gain time and, in doing so, to serve the interests of the Dutch Jewish 
community at large.  As we have seen, whether or not this was a successful strategy has been a 192
subject of debate in the historiography of the persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands for 
decades.  
 
The AJB: the authority of local branch leaders  
 
As in the case of its Dutch counterpart, the Belgian AJB was instructed to incorporate into itself 
Jewish charitable institutions, as stated in its establishment order of 25 November 1941.  The 193
Military Administration could either insist upon incorporation or, alternatively, give the order to 
dissolve social welfare organisations other than the AJB, transferring their possessions and financial 
resources to the newly established Jewish organisation.  In order to achieve the centralisation of 194
welfare activities under the organisation’s umbrella, the AJB planned several meetings with existing 
organisations, including with the most important ones in Brussels: The Rusthuis voor Bejaarden, a 
home for the elderly, the OCIS, the central Jewish relief society established in 1920, and the 
Israëlitisch Weeshuis, the Israelite Orphanage.  In January 1942, the AJB central board still 195
 See, for example, Cohen, Voorzitter van de Joodse Raad, 136. For the criticism on Cohen’s statements see: Nanda 190
van der Zee, Om erger te voorkomen. De voorbereiding en uitvoering van de vernietiging van het Nederlandse 
jodendom tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1997), 97-140; Knoop, De Joodsche Raad, 
passim. 
 Statement of David Cohen in the preparations for the trial against Willy Paul Franz, NA, CABR, nummer toegang 191
2.09.09, inventarisnummer 140-VIII (BrC 394/49). 
 Ibid. 192
 Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich, No. 63, 2 December 1941, A012077, 193
CNHEJ, Buber Collection, Kazerne Dossin. 
 Report of the Military Administration, “Betr: Errichtung einer Vereinigung der Juden in Belgien”, 15 October 1941, 194
Administration Department. Group 7: Care, Marburg Collection, SVG- R.184 / Tr 50 077, DOS; Verordnungsblatt des 
Militärbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich, nr. 63, 2 December 1941, Buber Collection, Kazerne Dossin; 
Report of meeting of M. Benedictus, E. Hellendall and S. Pinkous with the Comité de la Rue Ruysbroeck, 27 March 
1942, A008428, CNHEJ, Buber Collection, Kazerne Dossin; Schreiber, “Tussen traditionele en verplichte 
gemeenschap” in: Van Doorslaer and Schreiber (eds.), De curatoren van het getto, 73.
 Catharine Massenge, “De sociale politiek” in: Van Doorslaer and Schreiber (eds.), De curatoren van het getto, 195
216-218. 
!158
granted these organisations financial autonomy, allowing them to receive membership dues and 
gifts.  During the following months, individual local AJB branches developed different policies in 196
relation to the various social welfare organisations. For example, while the Brussels branch in 
February 1942 ruled that none of these organisations would be allowed to receive memberships 
dues any longer, the Antwerp branch still allowed Beth Lechem, a Jewish organisation dedicated to 
poor relief, to do so.  197
 
 In May 1942, despite the incorporation of organisations such as the Hilfswerk für Juden aus 
Deutschland, the centralisation of Jewish social welfare remained ineffective and the AJB 
leadership accepted at this point that it would merely oversee the organisations rather than 
incorporate them.  In the report “La Centralisation de la Bienfaisance” written in the spring of 198
1942, Oscar Teitelbaum, a member of the AJB Antwerp branch, indicated that centralisation was no 
longer the main aim. He claimed it would be detrimental to armenzorg (poor relief) and that 
members of the individual organisations were reluctant to serve in a subservient role under the 
leadership of the AJB.  Whereas social welfare was centrally organised by the Dutch JR in late 199
1941, the AJB in the spring of 1942 thus still depended upon autonomously operating welfare 
organisations that worked in conjunction with its local branches. During a meeting in this period 
between the Jewish leaders and Wilhelm von Hahn, spokesperson for the AJB at the 
Militärwaltungsstab of Eggert Reeder, the decentralised nature of Jewish social welfare was 
highlighted. Individual Jewish aid organisations continued to receive financial support from a 
variety of Belgian institutions in response to the financial difficulties they faced in the wake of the 
liquidation of Jewish enterprises.  Von Hahn voiced his dissatisfaction with the Jewish 200
community’s dependance on the financial aid of non-Jewish organisations, emphasising that the 
Reichsvereinigung successfully took care of all the costs of social work in Germany.  This 201
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comparison with the German Jewish Association underlines once again that the Nazis continued to 
see this body as the AJB’s reference point.  
 
 Some social welfare organisations continued to function outside the AJB throughout the 
course of the occupation in Belgium, including the OCIS. The situation was similar in the 
unoccupied French zone, where Jewish welfare organisations also maintained their autonomy. 
However, in France, organisations were still officially grouped under the umbrella of the UGIF-Sud, 
whereas the OCIS in Belgium was not officially part of the AJB. The diverse nature of the Jewish 
communities in both Belgium and France and the influx of large numbers of Jews in the decades 
before 1940 necessitated the existence of a large variety of Jewish aid organisations.  As there 202
were no retaliation measures for the failure to bring all organisations under the umbrella of the AJB, 
these social welfare groups did not feel pressured to surrender their autonomy. According to 
Schreiber, the fact that the Belgian administration legally recognised organisations like the OCIS, 
which was part of the Israelite congregation, made it impossible for the Germans to disband this 
organisation.  The unwillingness of the OCIS to be incorporated in the AJB Brussels branch led to 203
increasing tension between the two organisations in February 1943, because the former wanted to 
remain functionally autonomous while the AJB was trying to consolidate its hold on the Brussels 
community. By then, the OCIS was no longer financially autonomous since it received substantial 
financial support of the AJB.  Leo Feiertag, secretary of the Brussels AJB branch, complained 204
about the function of the OCIS, arguing that it was not working properly because it failed to help 
people who were ill and dependent on social support.  Although the OCIS finally agreed that it 205
would be incorporated in the AJB’s social service division on the condition that its executive 
committee remained in existence, the AJB disagreed and its leadership’s wish for close cooperation 
between the two organisations was therefore not realised.  206
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von Falkenhausen, aware that the unification of Belgian Jewry under the AJB’s umbrella had not 
been successful, commanded that all Jewish welfare organisations had to be incorporated into local 
AJB branches as soon as possible. Among these were local aid organisations such as the Société 
Israélite des Secours Efficaces, the Société des Mères et Orphelines Israélites and the Orphelinat 
Israélite de Bruxelles, as well as the OCIS.  One month later, Chaïm Perelman was appointed to 207
function as an intermediary between the AJB Brussels board and the executive committee of the 
OCIS in order to meet Von Falkenhausen’s demand.  Whether or when these organisations were 208
officially incorporated into the AJB remains unclear. In April 1944, the OCIS still operated 
alongside the social service department of the AJB and the two bodies cooperated in providing care 
to 753 families in Brussels.  The difference with the Netherlands, where the JR served as the sole 209
representative body of the Jews in the Netherlands soon after its establishment (even more so after 
the Coördinatie Commissie was dissolved in November 1941), is striking.  
 
 We have seen that the AJB central office was situated in Brussels and that local branches 
were established in cities with large numbers of Jews: Brussels, Antwerp, Charleroi and Liège. 
There were also Jewish representatives of the AJB in Gand, Oostende and Aarlen, but these were 
not official local branches.  Unfortunately, the records of the Antwerp and Charleroi branches 210
have been almost completely destroyed. Most of the  archival material for the local Liège branch 
has not been found and was probably destroyed as well. Whereas the chairmen of the local Councils 
in the Netherlands only had an advisory role to the central board, the local AJB leaders of the 
largest communities in Belgium were in fact also part of the central board themselves. Juda 
Mehlwurm, for example, headed the local AJB Charleroi board and was also member of the central 
board.  This gave these local leaders a much larger role in determining AJB policies. Meeting 211
reports of the central board show that at least one representative of each of the local boards was 
required to be present in order to make the meetings, and the decisions made in them, legitimate. 
Seven members of these local boards were appointed by the central board, and three others could be 
appointed by the local branches themselves, although the central board had to approve these 
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 Members of the local boards implemented the decisions made by the central board and had 
to provide a monthly report of their daily activities. To take the local Liège branch as an example, 
its first task was to ensure that all Jews in the area would become AJB members, in line with the 
regulation of 25 November 1941.  The AJB Liège leadership immediately compiled an updated 213
Jewish register, most likely based on sources such as the municipal record of Jews, in order to 
inform all Jews in the area that they had to register at the AJB.  At the outbreak of the war, around 214
1,900 Jews lived in the Walloon city of Liège, situated in the east of Belgium, not far from the 
border with the Netherlands. In the broader Liège area, with a total of 161,073 inhabitants, there 
were 2,560 Jews in residence.  The Liège board consisted of seven Jews, headed by Noé Nozyce, 215
who had little leadership experience in the prewar Belgian community. As we have seen, this was 
emblematic of the AJB leadership more broadly.  The local branch was responsible for six 216
advisory commissions: Finance, Charity and Social Work, Education, Worship Services, 
Emigration, and Arts and Culture.  217
 
 The Liège branch, like its Dutch counterparts, was also forced to provide education for 
Jewish children, who were no longer allowed to attend public schools after the regulations of 25 
November 1941. This was difficult because there was a lack of Jewish teachers with a degree.  On 218
15 July 1942, AJB central board members were summoned to Kurt Asche and Anton Burger, SS-
lieutenant and representative of Adolf Eichmann. They were instructed to facilitate the forced 
employment of Jews ‘within the boundaries of the former German empire’.  The first calls for 219
employment reached the Liège branch by the end of July. The local board distributed the calls 
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among the designated Jews in the region.  In addition, it provided social welfare to Jews in the 220
region, including the supply of clothes and food to the interned.  In September 1942, the Gestapo 221
raided the AJB Liège office, arresting all present. Because of his Belgian citizenship, Grigorijs 
Garfinkels was released. Shortly thereafter, he decided to dissolve the physical office in Liège 
because the raid had shown that it was an easy target. Despite the absence of an office, the AJB 
Liège branch continued to function under the leadership of Nozyce until April 1943, when all Liège 
board members were arrested and deported.  222
 
 The local branches thus carried out the policies that were forced upon them, and dictated by 
the central board in Brussels. The central board also supervised the expenses of the local branches 
and, as a document on the organisation of the AJB dating from December 1941 indicates, their 
financial resources were considered the exclusive property of the AJB central board.  Local 223
branches were only allowed to communicate with the Germans through the central board.  Despite 224
these restrictions, the local AJB branches in Belgium were in practice more independent than most 
of the JR’s local branches, with the exception of Enschede. For example, the Brussels branch had 
large sums of money at its disposal and organised many welfare activities autonomously. It 
coordinated its own schools, children’s homes, homes for the elderly and hospitals.  On 3-4 225
September 1943, an extensive operation (Iltis) was launched against all Jews of Belgian nationality, 
with the purpose of placing them to work in the East. As a response, all local AJB branches, except 
for the Brussels local office which merged with the central office, ceased to exist.  Between April 226
and October 1943, all the Jewish communities of Antwerp, Charleroi, Gand, Mons, Arlon and Liège 
were liquidated. Members of the local AJB branches were generally relocated to the central 
Brussels board.  227
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 Whereas the AJB central board had a different kind of relation to its local branches than its 
Dutch counterpart, the organisation and structure of the social welfare provision was almost 
identical. Departments such as Maatschappelijke Hulp (Social Assistance), Centrale 
Onderwijscommissie (Education), Speciale Hulp (Special Aid), Centrale Huisbeheer (Housing 
Management) and Onmiddelijke Bijstand (Immediate Assistance) all had their own specific 
function and fell under a more broadly defined division of labour (including local committees, the 
secretary, finances, welfare, education, emigration, and culture and the arts).  These departments 228
were responsible for large numbers of Jews and this, together with rapidly changing circumstances 
and the lack of prewar organisational working experience of most of the Jews involved in these 
organisations, meant that communication and cooperation between the various departments was 
strained.  Those involved had almost no experience, for example, in how to set up, structure and 229
operate an education system. The only exception was Chaïm Perelman, who had been a professor at 
the Université Libre de Belgique (ULB) before the war.  The lack of coordination in some 230
sections, including the department of education, resulted at times in the development of complex 
and confusing organisational structures. The Jews in Belgium therefore depended far more than 
their counterparts in the Netherlands upon local organisational branches and their initiatives.  
 
The UGIF-Nord: an extensive social welfare apparatus through complex bureaucracy  
 
As in the Netherlands and Belgium, the provision of social welfare was one of the central 
preoccupations of the UGIF in both zones. Vicki Caron has convincingly argued that this is a crucial 
distinction between the UGIF, and western European Councils more broadly, and the Judenräte of 
eastern Europe which developed into political organisations whose duties included the forced 
roundup of Jews.  We have seen that the UGIF had a different organisational foundation in the 231
occupied and unoccupied zones. This affected the daily activities of the two bodies. As in the two 
other countries, the UGIF-Nord was divided into individual departments, each with particular social 
welfare responsibilities, including Jeunesse et Reclassement Professionnel (Youth and 
Redeployment, groupe 4), Maisons d’Enfants et Dispensaires (Children’s Homes and Clinics, 
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groupe 5) and Cantines et Approvisionnement (Canteens and Supplies, groupe 6).   232
 
 The majority of the UGIF-Nord central board members were assigned to administer 
individual departments. For example, Georges Edinger, Fernand Musnik and Juliette Stern were 
responsible for administration and finances (groupe 2), youth and redeployment (groupe 4) and 
social services (groupe 3) respectively. Groupe 2 had direct control over certain UGIF provincial 
offices such as Seine-et-Oise, Lunéville, Nancy, Bordeaux and Rouen.  Groupe 1, including all 233
general services and headed by Marcel Stora, was the most important section. Besides the general 
secretariat, it included ‘the population card index, the legal department, dispatch of food supplies to 
camp inmates, the Bulletin de l’UGIF, liaison with the Germans and the Préfecture de Police, the 
control commission, the administrative committee, and the administration of the UGIF’s provincial 
committees’.  We shall see that, as in Belgium, the entire central board, including Edinger, Musnik 234
and Stern, was important in defining the course of the organisation. This contrasts with the Dutch 
situation, where authority rested exclusively in the hands of the two chairmen.  
 
 Despite the fact that the structure of the UGIF-Nord seemed clear in terms of the existence 
of these individual ‘groups’, its bureaucratic structure was highly complex. In the second half of 
1942, it consisted of 48 different departments.  In the first groupe, for example, there were many 235
sub-departments, including department 14, which served as the liaison between the UGIF and the 
Germans. The leadership’s wish to maintain firm control over all these departments resulted in an 
impractical situation in which ‘[n]o independence of operation within departments was tolerated’.  236
Moreover, in a similar way to its predecessor the Comité de Coördination, the UGIF-Nord suffered 
from a lack of cooperation from immigrant community leaders.  This has been explained by the 237
fact that the UGIF-Nord leaders followed a legalistic model of behaviour, ‘rooted in a trust in 
France and fostered by generations of emancipation’.  However, as will see, this analysis is too 238
narrow since we know that clandestine activities were undertaken under the cloak of the UGIF-
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Nord and by its own members. The strong divisions among French Jewry and its non-unified nature 
combined, with central and eastern European Jewish immigrants’ distrust of Nazi policies better 
explain the lack of immigrant support for the UGIF. They had, after all, already voiced their 
opposition during the establishment of the UGIF when Communists and Bundists stated that no 
collaboration with Vichy was acceptable.  239
 
 One of the major tasks of the UGIF-Nord was to provide aid to Jews suffering from hunger 
in internment camps in the occupied zone like those at Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande. The 
organisation also secured contact between Jews in the camps and their family members outside.  240
Conditions were especially harsh in Drancy, which the Germans established as an internment camp 
for foreign Jews in August 1941 and from where Jews were systematically deported from the 
summer of 1942 onwards.  The UGIF-Nord became directly responsible for relief activities in the 241
camp, including the supply of nursing staff and medical supplies.  When deportation from France 242
commenced in March 1942, Dannecker, inspired by the effectiveness of the eastern European 
Judenräte which were made to deliver the required number of Jews for each transport, wished to 
make the Jewish organisation instrumental in achieving his objectives.  He aimed to introduce the 243
ghetto system in France in order to achieve this, but was once again obstructed by the Military 
Administration.  In lieu, he chose to make the UGIF instrumental in providing supplies for the 244
Jews who were to be deported. For example, the UGIF-Nord leadership was held responsible for the 
collection of shoes and blankets for 1,000 men in early March 1942. As a result of this demand, the 
central board faced a political and moral dilemma: ‘it neither wished to collaborate in a police 
measure nor did it want these men to be deported without basic survival equipment’.  In the 245
period that followed, we shall see that disagreements prevailed between Dannecker and the UGIF-
Nord leaders who believed that Dannecker’s wish to make the UGIF instrumental in the deportation 
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of Jews was incompatible with the organisation’s social objectives.  246
 
 As the mass deportations began in July 1942, the German demands for supplies drastically 
increased. In early July, the UGIF was required to supply goods on an industrial scale. This made it 
clear to the Jewish leaders that there was a direct relation between these demands and the 
deportations.  André Baur, for example, noted in a letter to the CGQJ on 6 July 1942 that asking 247
his coreligionists for donations would demonstrate that deportations were imminent and that this, in 
turn, would spread unwanted panic and fear.  Despite his objections to the ways in which both 248
Vichy and German officials attempted to make the UGIF(-Nord) instrumental to their aims, his wish 
to help persuaded Baur to emphasise the social objectives of his organisation, including the care for 
Jewish children.  After the first deportations of adult foreign Jews had commenced in March 1942, 249
their French-born children had been left behind because the Germans proved unwilling to transport 
anyone under the age of 16.  The UGIF-Nord took care of those Jewish children who were 250
released from Drancy while their parents were interned, deported or otherwise absent (enfants 
isolés), housing them with together with orphans and other children whose parents had voluntarily 
entrusted them to their care (enfants libres).  Initially, the social service employees dispersed these 251
children among various children’s homes and Jewish families in the occupied zone.  During a 252
meeting between the French authorities and Dannecker on 8 July 1942, in preparation for the major 
Vél d’Hiv raid a little more than a week later, it was decided that all Jewish children would be 
assembled in the children’s homes that were overseen by the UGIF.  Because of this centralisation 253
of care, it became easier for the German authorities to trace the children. Shortly thereafter, Vallat 
asked Baur how many Jewish children the UGIF-Nord could accommodate, indicating that he 
 In the section on the German perceptions of the Jewish organisations’ effectiveness, these disagreements between the 246
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expected the organisation to take care of an even larger number of Jewish children in the future.   254
 
 When the first deportations began, Vichy officials had attempted to persuade the German 
authorities in Berlin to deport foreign Jewish children with their parents, but they had not yet 
received a decision by 16 July 1942 when the first major round-ups commenced.  As a result, 255
while some children were interned and deported with their parents, others were left on their own.  256
The UGIF did not have enough capacity to house the children either in orphanages or in other 
institutions and whereas some, mainly French, children were distributed among their neighbours or 
relatives, others were housed under inhumane conditions or left on the streets.  In January 1943, 257
all children in the care of the UGIF were ‘blocked’ and their addresses carefully inventoried by the 
authorities, making them easy targets for arrest. This is indeed what happened in Paris on 10 
February 1943, when 42 children were arrested. A few months later, children in the departments of 
l’Oise and La Seine-et-Oise suffered the same fate.  258
 
The UGIF-Sud: a federation of departments and sections  
 
The UGIF-Sud's federative structure resulted in a situation where a substantial number of Jewish 
(welfare) bodies were officially administered by the organisation while in practice they remained 
autonomous. Its different directions (sections) therefore represented organisations that already 
existed before the war. In designing the UGIF-Sud, Lambert had been well aware of the differences 
between the groups of Jews who resided in France. When he instituted the seven departments with 
subsections, he therefore allowed a wide range of welfare activities that represented the prevailing 
currents in the different communities.  For example, the first department of the organisation 259
consisted of two sections, incorporating the CCOJA, the Entr’aide française Israélite de Société de 
Bienfaisance Israélite de Marseille (French Israelite Mutual Aid Society of Marseille), the Maison 
Israélite de Refuge (Israelite Refuge House) in Lyon and the Union des Sociétés de Bienfaisance 
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Israélite (Union of Israelite Charity Societies) in Toulouse. The second section incorporated the 
Oeuvre d’Aide Sociale Auprès des Populations Repliées d’Alsace Lorraine (Organisation for the 
Social Aid to Displaced Populations of Alsace Lorraine) in Périgueux. Other sections, seven in total, 
incorporated Jewish welfare organisations such as the ORT, OSE, EIF and HICEM.  In contrast to 260
the JR, the AJB and the UGIF-Nord, the individual departments of the UGIF-Sud were also 
financially autonomous. The OSE and the Jewish scouts were, for example, only loosely associated 
with the UGIF-Sud and could follow their own policies with little intervention.  These 261
organisations legally aided the Jewish communities in the unoccupied zone by providing social 
welfare such as clothing and food. As we shall see, they simultaneously engaged in clandestine 
activities, including the provision of hiding places for children.  
 
 The UGIF-Sud was similar to the JR, the AJB and the UGIF-Nord, in that local branches 
were put in place in cities with a (large) Jewish presence (Marseille and Toulouse, for example). 
Compared to the JR and the AJB, the number of local branches of both the UGIF-Nord and UGIF-
Sud was considerable and, in the case of the UGIF-Sud, these local branches remained operative 
well into 1944. Correspondence between the various UGIF directors show that some of the UGIF-
Sud branches were centralised in April/May 1944. In early April 1944, the local branches of le 
Brive, Perigueux and Vichy were closed, after the Chambéry-Grenoble branch had been closed two 
months earlier and the personnel arrested.  As a consequence, the UGIF's last director Geissmann 262
sent a letter to Kurt Schendel, who as chef de liasion served as an intermediary between the UGIF 
and the Germans, and indicated that the local branches of Chateauroux, Guéret and St. Amand had 
transferred their activities to the regional office of Limoges while the Peau branch had been 
transferred to Toulouse.  263
 
  Initially, the UGIF-Sud leadership expected a gradual dissolution of welfare organisations 
and their transference into the Jewish organisation. However, this did not happen.  In contrast to 264
its western European counterparts, the UGIF-Sud ‘remained a federation of the departments and 
their sections, in which the decentralised nature of French Jewry prevailed’ and its leadership lacked 
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any real authority and influence over departments or the Jewish community.  With the aid of 265
organisations such as the OSE and EIF, which merged into the organisation’s departments 3 and 4 
respectively during the summer of 1942, the UGIF-Sud was responsible for a large variety of relief 
activities, including the provision of care for interned Jews and for thousands of children whose 
parents had been interned or deported.  As a result of its federative structure, the organisation was 266
never exploited by the Nazis to carry out arrests, deportations or selections. Moreover, as Cohen has 
indicated, the leadership never attempted to direct the communities into a particular course of 
action.  Despite the negative public perception of both the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud, which 267
increased during the war, we have to conclude that their actual scope of action was limited.  Since 268
the UGIF-Sud did not have independent financial resources and only had a few autonomous areas 
of activity, which included its relations with the authorities and their engagement in relief work, it 
had limited influence. The organisation was functioning as a polyarchy ‘unable to serve the German 
designs even if it so desired’.   269
 
 Throughout the war, various attempts by the UGIF-Nord’s leader André Baur to unify the 
entire UGIF under one umbrella were rejected by the UGIF-Sud leadership, which was unwilling to 
give up its autonomy. The UGIF-Nord leadership, which considered Lambert and Lévy inadequate 
leaders, had favoured their removal from the inception of the UGIF and wished to take over the 
leadership at their expense. On 3 March 1943 André Baur even composed a report in which he 
recommended the centralisation of the two boards into a single board located in Paris, with which 
the UGIF-Sud, so he claimed, complied. The new board would exist of the UGIF-Nord board 
accompanied by three UGIF-Sud board members. However, this plan was never realised.  On 21 270
March 1943, Lambert reflected upon this episode in his diary: ‘[o]ur colleagues in Paris act a bit as 
though they want to treat us, here in the field of battle as we say nowadays, as if we were minors 
and needed a guardian’.  Only during the last months of the occupation in 1944 was UGIF no 271
longer separated between two zones, but centralised in Paris.  272
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 The four case studies have shown that the Jewish organisations all had a comparable 
outlook. Overall, the leaders aimed to use a legal framework to provide social welfare to their 
Jewish communities. The social welfare departments in each organisation resembled one another. At 
the same time, we have seen how the structures and functions of these departments differed in 
practice. The same is true for the position of the chairmen versus other central board members, and 
(local) branches versus the central organisation. Whereas the JR and the UGIF-Nord leadership 
attempted, with varying degrees of success, to maintain firm control over all local branches, the 
AJB’s local branches enjoyed relative autonomy. In the case of the UGIF-Sud, the various sections 
even had full (financial) autonomy. Furthermore, there were major differences in the ways in which 
the Jewish leaders organised and managed their organisations; Asscher and Cohen’s autocratic rule 
can be considered an exception in this regard. The responsibilities of the leaders varied. The UGIF-
Nord, for example, carried a heavier burden of responsibility than its southern counterpart, 
particularly from the summer of 1942 onwards. It had to take care of impoverished Jews in the 
occupied zone and was forced to bear the full cost of deportations. This included Jews from the 
Vichy zone, who had begun arriving in Drancy in the summer of 1942. It was also forced to make 
material preparations for the deportations. In that respect, the position and responsibilities of the 
UGIF-Nord were more similar to those of the AJB and JR. As we shall see, these variations in 
structure affected how their Nazi (and in the case of France, Vichy) overseers judged their 
effectiveness.  
 
2.3 German views on the organisations’ effectiveness: from optimism to frustration  
 
In light of how vaguely the responsibilities of the Jewish organisations had been set out, there is a 
need to examine how the Germans judged their effectiveness throughout the course of the war. 
German satisfaction or dissatisfaction can tell us whether and how the functions of the JR, the AJB, 
the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud were (re)considered at various stages during the war. As the 
occupation continued, the German (and Vichy) departments involved in Jewish affairs increasingly 
wanted to consolidate their control over the Jewish organisations, either to gain more power at the 
cost of their rival institutions or to speed up the process of anti-Jewish legislation and persecution. 
Whether or not the Jewish organisations lived up to German expectations is important for our 
understanding of both the nature of the interaction between these organisations and their German 
(or Vichy) overseers, and the broader dynamics of occupation in each of the three countries.  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 In the case of Belgium and France, the responsible German officials were largely 
dissatisfied with the organisations’ effectiveness. In the Netherlands, by contrast, the role of the JR 
in the implementation of anti-Jewish legislation was more positively received. German perceptions 
about the nature of the organisations changed during the course of the war. The same is true for the 
Jewish leaders, who envisioned a different task than the one the Germans had set for them. If we 
start with Belgium, we can see that the AJB’s leadership focussed primarily on providing social aid 
to the Jews in their country. Initially, they concentrated on saving as many arrested Jews as possible, 
but from the summer of 1942 onwards, the priority shifted to arranging exemptions from 
deportations.  After SS-Obersturmführer Kurt Asche indicated that he expected the AJB to 273
scrupulously carry out the tasks set out by the Germans, Maurice Benedictus – Antwerp 
representative in the AJB central board – candidly replied that, from his perspective, the AJB only 
existed in order to serve the interests of the Jewish community in Belgium.  At this point, in April 274
1942, Asche also communicated that he did not want the AJB to become a continuation of the 
passive resistance previously offered by other Jewish organisations. Benedictus replied in his 
defence that the AJB had busied itself exclusively with the obligations imposed on it since the 
organisation’s establishment. Asche’s fear was, he said, therefore unfounded.  This lack of trust so 275
soon after the AJB’s establishment encapsulates the nature of the communications between the 
Germans and the Belgian Association leadership throughout the war.  
 
 On 16 July 1942, the SiPo-SD announced the first deportations of Jews from Belgium and 
demanded that the AJB make the necessary preparations for this. Only half of the Jews who were 
called for reported themselves to Kazerne Dossin in Malines.  As a result, the SiPo-SD pressured 276
the AJB to encourage Jews to comply with the calls for deportations in order to avoid retaliation 
measures. During a meeting of the AJB with twelve representatives of other central Jewish 
representative organisations, not including the communist Main d’Oeuvre Immigrée (immigrant 
workforce, MOI) and the zionist Linke Poalei Zion, Ullman was pressured by the other community 
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representatives to sign a ‘call for obedience’ that encouraged the Jews to obey the German orders.  277
Despite this commitment, the Germans did not consider the AJB to be useful in helping with the 
deportation of Jews in the period that followed.  The SiPo-SD did not manage to gain a direct and 278
definitive grip on the Jewish leadership, most importantly because alternative representations 
outside the AJB remained in existence, as the following sections of this chapter will show.  
 
 German discontent with the AJB’s function led both the Militärverwaltung and the SiPo-SD 
to maintain contact with the Hilfswerk for German refugees, an aid organisation whose leadership 
was not represented in the AJB. In doing so, both German institutions undermined the power of the 
AJB. The German motivation for turning to this alternative organisation has been described as 
laziness.  However, in the context of German dissatisfaction with how the AJB was functioning, 279
the choice to turn to Hilfswerk as an alternative representative body should be differently explained. 
Officials from both the SiPo-SD and the Militärverwaltung were anxiously looking for a Jewish 
representative organisation that would promote two of their major aims: 1) the facilitation of the 
implementation of anti-Jewish regulations in the country and; 2) an increase in their own authority 
at the expense of their rival German institution. In the end, the two Jewish organisations ended up in 
rivalry themselves and this increased still further when one of the Hilfswerk committee members 
falsely presented himself to the Germans as an AJB representative in June 1942. Without informing 
the AJB leadership, or asking for its consent, he agreed that the AJB would be responsible for the 
distribution of the yellow star.  German attempts to create a more functional line of 280
communication with Jewish community representatives by approaching the Hilfswerk did not 
contribute to a more effective implementation of anti-Jewish regulations. On the contrary, the 
existence and position of the Hilfswerk complicated an already difficult situation in which the AJB 
aimed to serve as an umbrella relief organisation for all Jews in Belgium.  Therefore, the plan was 281
a failure.  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 The AJB dealt with the various departments of the Military Administration and the SiPo-SD 
through a complicated network of communication. The fact that it was unclear to which German 
authority the AJB leaders ought to address themselves prevented effective communication. For 
example, when the central board members approached the Military Administration and asked who 
was directly responsible for the daily functioning of the AJB, Johannes Duntze, representative of the 
Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat, directed them to three different functionaries.  At the SiPo-SD, the 282
Jewish leaders were forced to address four subsequent Judenreferenten: first SS-Obersturmführer 
Kurt Asche (until the end of November 1942); then SS-Hauptsturmführer Fritz Erdmann; from mid-
October 1943 SS-Hauptscharführer Felix Weidmann; and from March 1944 SS-Obersturmführer 
Werner Borchardt.  Moreover, the AJB also had to communicate with the Antwerp Jewish 283
department of the SiPo-SD, headed by Erich Holm, and with the administrators of Mechelen camp: 
SS-Hauptsturmführer Steckmann, SS-Sturmbannführer Philipp Schmitt and SS-Sturmscharführer 
Johannes Frank.  This complex network of communication led to tensions among those in 284
responsibility in the German authorities. In September 1942, Kurt Asche, who felt he was losing 
grip on the AJB, summoned 20 of the organisation’s leading members to his office, blaming them 
for disloyalty and sabotage which resulted in the internment of five members of the central board 
and the local Brussels board in Auffangslager Breendonk.  They were told they would not be 285
released until all Jews were deported from the country.  Although the interned AJB leaders were 286
released nine days later, after both the Belgian authorities and the Military Administration put 
pressure on Asche, the SiPo-SD’s ongoing dissatisfaction with how the AJB functioned is clear.  
 
 We have seen that after Salomon Ullman and Maurice Benedictus resigned and Juda 
Mehlwurm went into hiding, the quest for a new head of the Association resulted in a meeting 
between Felix Meyer, Louis Rosenfeld and Kurt Asche in mid-November 1942. The latter wanted 
Rosenfeld to become the new director, but Rosenfeld’s refusal led to the nomination of Meyer 
instead. In turn, Rosenfeld became an AJB central board member. Both men immediately voiced a 
number of demands that they wished to have met in order to relieve the situation of the Jews in 
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Belgium, including an immediate amnesty for those Jews who had been arrested after they had 
failed to wear the yellow star, a halt to deportations until the spring and the possibility of 
establishing an intermediary service for those who had already been deported. Asche replied that he 
might be able to give in to these demands, but he simultaneously criticised the AJB’s lack of 
effectiveness up to that point.  Perhaps hoping the leadership would become more amenable to his 287
own aims, Asche proposed to organise a new inscription of Jews in Belgium onto a ‘special 
register’. The Jews inscribed in this register would not have to fear deportation until the spring of 
1943.  There are no indications, however, that this plan was executed. Above all, the AJB 288
leadership adhered to social welfare aims, hoping to use the negotiations as a way of protecting 
their community (although often without much success), and this did not correspond to Asche’s 
perceptions of what the Jewish organisation should be. Furthermore, German functionaries were 
convinced that the AJB was engaged in illegal activities and were concerned that the organisation 
was offering help to Jews in hiding. As late as spring 1944, there was an official prohibition for the 
AJB on offering financial aid to these illegal Jews, proving the level of German suspicion about the 
AJB’s activities.  289
 
 In France, the situation was different from Belgium and the Netherlands, as the Vichy-led 
CGQJ functioned in practice as an intermediary between the UGIF and the Germans.  The relation 290
between the Germans and the CGQJ was complicated. Theodor Dannecker did not feel supported 
by Vallat in his ferocious attempt to remove the Jews from France as soon as possible and he 
harboured a strong sense of mistrust towards him.  Since Vallat believed his role did not stretch 291
beyond isolating Jews socially and categorically refused to collaborate in the arrest, internment and 
deportation of Jews, this view was shared by other German officials.  As Joly has highlighted, the 292
relation between these two men was calamitous and Vallat, in turn, considered Dannecker, who was 
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22 years his junior, to have a ‘juvenile impulsiveness’ and ‘a deceitful intransigence’.  This 293
difference in understanding is indicative of the difference between the Germans and the Vichy 
regime more broadly. As Paxton has argued, without German pressure Vichy would probably have 
been content with professional discrimination and measures to hasten the departure of foreign 
Jews.  We have seen that Vallat was reluctant to execute German orders and believed that French 294
and immigrant Jews should not be treated identically. This is why he had opposed the establishment 
of a Jüdische Zwangsvereinigung – a Jewish compulsory organisation – in the first place. To be 
sure, Vallat was an ardent antisemite and, like Dannecker, he aimed to remove Jews from French 
society. However, his feeling of revulsion towards the Germans, and Dannecker in particular, was as 
strong as, and perhaps even stronger than, his antisemitic outlook.  295
 
 Whereas in eastern Europe, the Jewish Councils were directly responsible for delivering the 
required number of Jews for each transport, none of the western European Jewish organisations was 
made to do so.  In the case of France, historian Jacques Adler has argued that this was because, 296
despite attempts by the Gestapo, no ghetto system was introduced. The fact that the Jewish 
population remained dispersed over the country made internment a necessary transitional stage. 
When the deportations began in 1942, the UGIF was not yet ready to play the role Dannecker 
assigned to it.  The legal basis for the UGIF had barely been completed and ‘it ha[d] just begun to 297
be drawn into the concentration camp vortex’.  Dannecker became angry with Vallat’s attitude and 298
could not understand that there was still no properly functioning Jewish representative organisation 
in France by February 1942. He also wondered why Vallat had not financially supported the UGIF 
to help them establish an effective organisation. Vallat replied that Dannecker was not supposed to 
interfere as this was his responsibility alone.  Their conflicting views continued to hamper their 299
relationship and in the end resulted in the discharge of Vallat in mid-May 1942. Dannecker’s 
outspoken dissatisfaction with Vallat’s obstinate attitude and with his refusal to become a tool in 
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Nazi hands, played a major role in this decision.  300
 
 The position taken by Vallat to some extent worked to the benefit of the UGIF – at least, this 
is what the UGIF leaders believed. Lucienne Scheid-Haas, a member of the UGIF-Nord central 
board and head of its juridical service, gave a fairly positive account of Vallat’s actions and attitude 
vis-à-vis the UGIF.  She highlighted the ways in which Vallat tried to protect French Jews and 301
even more so the anciens combattants (veterans) and she recollected two occasions on which he 
involved himself in acts of benevolence.  It should be noted that some prominent UGIF members 302
were First World War veterans, including Raymond-Raoul Lambert, Alfred Morali, Georges 
Edinger and Albert Weil.  In his diary entry of 16 July 1941, Lambert reflected upon this and 303
stated there seemed to have been a mutual sense of respect between him and Vallat because of their 
shared First World War experience: 
 With my friend Pierre Bloch [..] I went to see Xavier Vallat [..] who received us cordially. A strange 
 conversation! [..] Xavier Vallat considers the two of us as comrades-in-arms, but, as a good follower 
 of Maurras, he no longer wants any Jews in the administration, in politics, or in banking… He  
 doesn’t know anything about the issue but seems relatively sensible, well brought up and very much 
 the “war veteran”.  304
Raymond Geissmann, general director of the UGIF from December 1943 onwards and member of 
the Paris Consistory, also indicated that Vallat’s attitude towards him seemed to be one of 
comradeship. Vallat promised to do as much as he could to take care of veterans. As Geissmann also 
noted, however, it seemed that Vallat actually did very little to ameliorate the situation of the 
Jews.  Gaston Kahn, interim director of the UGIF, agreed with Geissmann on this point. He 305
referred to the hypocrisy of only protecting former First World War combatants and gave examples 
 For the process of the marginalisation of Xavier Vallat and the disputes that led to his discharge, see: Joly, Vichy dans 300
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of Vallat’s harmful behaviour towards all Jews in France.  We have seen that in his memoirs, 306
Vallat referred to his Jewish First World War comrades as friends, insisting that he did not hate Jews 
as such but instead feared strangers.  He also said that he had helped the coreligionists of André 307
Baur, an ancien combattant, and that he had no difficulty in ‘recognising in this charitable and 
profoundly religious Israelite a privileged and righteous soul’.  We have to understand these 308
statements in light of the analysis of Vallat by French historian Laurent Joly. Vallat was an ardent 
antisemite who (only) made an exception for Jews who had managed to fully integrate into French 
society and who had defended the country during the First World War. Notwithstanding the 
concessions he had made for this specific group, Vallat nonetheless harboured fundamentally 
antisemitic views.  309
 
 Although opinions on Vallat may vary, all the UGIF’s employees were united in believing 
that, compared to his successor Darquier de Pellepoix, Vallat better served the interests of the 
French Jews. After the war, for example, Gaston Kahn indicated that there was no doubt that the 
attitude of Darquier de Pellepoix towards the Jews had been more rigorous and brutal than that of 
Vallat.  The fact that the UGIF-Nord suffered from Dannecker’s decision to deny Vallat access to 310
the occupied zone, as historian Richard Cohen has argued, supports this view.  Vallat followed a 311
broader Vichy tendency to increasingly resist German pressure in order to maintain some form of 
administrative autonomy. In this case, autonomy meant control over the spoliation of Jewish 
industrial and commercial property. Paxton has argued that this was probably motivated by self-
interest since ‘aryanisation all too often meant Germanization’.  Nevertheless, Vichy resistance to 312
German measures in some cases worked to the benefit of the Jews in France. Vallat, for example, 
resisted the introduction of the yellow star in the unoccupied zone when this was proposed in March 
1942 and ‘even [Vallat’s] successor, Darquier de Pellepoix was forced to succumb to Vichy pressure 
not to cooperate on this issue’.  The star was therefore never implemented in the unoccupied zone. 313
These ambiguities in Vichy policy in general and the differing viewpoints of its officials make it 
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difficult to assess how the CGQJ functionaries judged the effectiveness of the UGIF. As previous 
sections have demonstrated, the Germans were highly critical of the Jewish organisation and were 
dissatisfied with the position taken by the CGQJ, and by Vallat in particular.  
 
 It is not surprising that Dannecker loathed the way Vallat dealt with anti-Jewish policies and 
that the UGIF’s ineffectiveness angered him. Although the UGIF-Nord had not protested about the 
deportations, it had definitely not been helpful in achieving the number of deportees Dannecker had 
wanted.  Hoping to make the UGIF more instrumental in achieving German aims, the SiPo-SD 314
was closely involved in the appointment of Vallat’s successor, Darquier de Pelleppoix, in May 1942. 
In contrast to his predecessor who had been chosen by Darlan, Darquier was the candidate of the 
German Embassy and the Sicherheitsdienst.  As former director of the Rassemblément Antijuif 315
(Anti-Jewish League), a federation of antisemitic organisations officially instituted in 1938, 
Darquier was in several ways different from Vallat. Whereas Vallat was ‘a personage of rank and 
distinction’ at Vichy, Darquier – an ‘unsuccessful businessman and a marginal journalist’– always 
remained an outsider. He also did not carry out his work at the CGQJ with the same care and 
diligence as Vallat did.  Above all, he did not share any of Vallat’s principled anti-Germanism and 316
can be considered an even more radical antisemite than his predecessor.    317
 
 Even after the appointment of Darquier de Pellepoix, the German perspective on the 
effectiveness of the UGIF did not significantly alter. In May 1942, Darquier de Pellepoix presented 
his vision for the role of the CGQJ. He underlined that he wanted to take a different approach from 
his predecessor by ensuring that the Statut des Juifs, the anti-Jewish legislation passed by the Vichy 
regime, was implemented and applied to all Jews.  A letter Darquier sent to Albert Lévy, written 318
on 18 July 1942, shows that he was keen to tell the UGIF’s president about the changes he was 
planning to make. He noted that, in terms of its expenses, the UGIF had gone through a phase of 
trial and error which he considered ‘inevitable’ for a newly instituted organisation but he claimed 
that new responsibilities would soon be given to the UGIF.  The letter highlights that the UGIF’s 319
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sphere of activity was still not strictly defined in July 1942 which is remarkable when we consider 
that the Dutch JR had already been fully operational for almost a year and a half by this point.  320
Despite his ambitions, Darquier was unable to make the UGIF more effective in implementing anti-
Jewish legislation and the Germans continued to be dissatisfied with how it worked. The 
organisation’s leaders persisted in their refusal to be responsible for the internment of Jews, and 
Dannecker was enraged when only 5,000 Jews (out of  the 20,000 he had anticipated) were interned 
in the unoccupied zone in the summer of 1942.   321
 
 In neither zone did the UGIF become an organisation uniting French Jewry, though this was 
one of the central aims the Germans had voiced prior to its establishment. Throughout 1942, 
Dannecker’s radical approach to the Jews and towards Vichy officials had become a source of 
irritation for Helmut Knochen, head of the Security Police in France. Both men had successfully 
increased the authority of the SiPo-SD over that of the Military Administration. After they 
succeeded in doing so, Knochen, having reached his goal, even seemed to lose interest in the Jews. 
He wanted to cooperate with the Vichy regime for the sake of order and to safeguard his 
authority.  Knochen’s unwillingness to jeopardise collaboration with the Vichy regime, or to 322
further alienate French public opinion, was highlighted when he vetoed SS-Obersturmführer Heinz 
Röthke’s plan for a major roundup of French Jews by the German policy in Paris in September 
1942.  By contrast, Dannecker, like Röthke and SS-Hauptsturmführer Aloïs Brunner, wanted to 323
deport all Jews from France.  Dannecker's ‘undiplomatic’ attitude towards Vichy undermined 324
Knochen’s work and his authority. In July 1942, Dannecker, who became Eichmann’s representative 
in Bulgaria (and later in Italy and Hungary), was replaced by Heinz Röthke.  325
 
 In the summer of 1943, the German authorities altered their approach to the UGIF-Nord. 
While the CGQJ was given a free hand in overseeing its affairs in the first years of its existence, the 
presence of Aloïs Brunner, who directed Drancy camp from 2 July 1943, drastically changed things. 
Between 1938 and 1942 Brunner had worked for, and later headed, the Zentralstelle für Jüdische 
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Auswanderung in Vienna. In February 1943, he was posted as Judenberater to Greece, where he 
brutally and efficiently organised the deportation of at least 43,000 Jews.  Sent by Eichmann, 326
Brunner arrived in Paris in early June 1943, aiming to speed up the process of deporting Jews from 
France. In order to strengthen the position of Röthke’s Judenreferat, Brunner brought his own task 
force with him, consisting of around 25 Austrian SS men.  While Röthke remained Judenreferent 327
for France, Brunner was authorised to act independently of the German police chain of command 
and was accountable only to Berlin. Both men competed to gain the upper hand in the so-called 
‘Final Solution’ in France. Brunner soon managed to secure the leading role.   328
 
 Aiming to outmanoeuvre the French police, Brunner ‘launched a violent press campaign 
against Bousquet and Laval and accused them of “protecting” the Jews’.  After Brunner’s 329
takeover of the direction of Drancy camp, Vichy lost control over the administrative network of 
deportation and the French police and bureaucracy ‘were excluded from any influence on the 
composition of convoys to the east’.  In June 1943, in response to Germany’s need for manpower 330
and the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO) which Laval had introduced in February 1943, 
Brunner and Röthke ordered the UGIF-Nord to open its own factories.  One month later, in his 331
attempt to remove the Jews from France as quickly as possible, Brunner aimed to directly oversee 
the UGIF, thereby sidestepping Röthke as well as the Commissariat.  On 30 June, Brunner 332
identified one of the main ‘problems’ of the UGIF during a discussion with UGIF-Nord leader 
Baur: ‘the discipline and solidarity among the Jewish population in Paris is not sufficiently 
developed [..], [therefore] the UGIF does not have any authority among this population’.  333
 
 Brunner indicated to Baur that he wanted the UGIF-Nord to take on two key tasks in order 
to speed up the process of deporting the Jews. First, the organisation would oversee the 
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administrative management of the camp at Drancy, which Brunner now wanted to transform into a 
concentration camp under the direct control of the SS. Second, the UGIF-Nord should encourage 
families of interned Jews to report themselves so that the whole family could be deported 
together.  The UGIF-Nord leadership refused to turn the UGIF into an arm of the Gestapo and was 334
unwilling to carry out or participate in any police measures.  André Baur agreed only to function 335
as an intermediary between Brunner and the French administration in the reorganisation of the camp 
and made it clear the UGIF would only engage in relief activities that would ease the situation of 
the Jews as they departed.  His refusal to do more was not taken lightly and tensions between the 336
UGIF-Nord leadership and Brunner increased still further when two men, including Baur’s cousin 
Adolphe Ducas, escaped from Drancy and the UGIF-Nord, despite its best efforts, failed to find the 
two men. Shortly thereafter, Baur was arrested together with his wife and their four children. On 4 
September, Stora and Musnik, the other main protagonists of the UGIF-Nord who had temporarily 
assumed the leadership of the organisation, were arrested as well because they failed to meet 
Brunner’s previously voiced demands.  All three men were deported on 17 December 1943 and 337
none of them survived the war.  Brunner’s pressure on the UGIF’s leaders and his dissatisfaction 338
with the organisation’s effectiveness in the deportation of Jews from France did not change the 
UGIF-Nord’s policies. Its leadership, headed by Georges Edinger and Juliette Stern, viewed the 
organisation as the only relief agency still available to the Jews and continued to focus on its relief 
work.   339
 
 The UGIF-Sud was even less successful in living up to German expectations. The 
heterogenous federative structure of the organisation meant that there was anything but a unified 
UGIF policy in the unoccupied zone. We have seen that the UGIF-Sud central board had neither any 
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real authority over their departments, nor any influence over the Jewish community.  In the 340
summer of 1943, the German authorities were still not satisfied with the numbers of Jews being 
deported from France; those arrested had already been taken from the camps and it became harder 
to find Jews.  As we shall see, rather than acting to achieve the German aim of swiftly arresting 341
and deporting Jews from France, the UGIF-Sud in this period was increasingly being used as a 
cloak for clandestine activities, both with and without the direct participation and knowledge of its 
leaders. The arrest of Lambert, who refused to cooperate with the Germans any longer in the 
summer of 1943 is indicative of the level of German dissatisfaction with the UGIF-Sud’s function 
and the position taken by its leadership.  
 
 The CGQJ was also not content with the organisation’s effectiveness. Auguste Duquesnel, 
the CGQJ director responsible for the control of the UGIF, believed that the problem stemmed from 
organisational deficiencies and claimed that the organisation was not cooperating sufficiently.  A 342
plan to reorganise the entire UGIF, centralising its organisation in Paris, had been discussed by both 
the Germans and CGQJ officials, in liaison with the UGIF-Nord leadership, from the summer of 
1942 onwards.  The plan became even more relevant when the financial situation of the UGIF-343
Nord reached a critical state in April and May 1943 and it was considered that the resources of 
UGIF-Sud could be applied to resolve the problem.  However, as we have seen, the UGIF-Sud’s 344
leadership rejected any proposals for unification and resolutely maintained the organisation's 
independent structure.  In September 1943, the CGQJ had changed its perspective and opposed 345
the unification of the UGIF under one umbrella, possibly fearing that it would lose its authority over 
the organisation. By then, Duquesnel claimed in a report that centralisation would result in the 
elimination of the UGIF-Sud’s leadership and a loss of control by Vichy.  That the CGQJ was 346
uncertain about the role and future of the UGIF-Sud becomes clear from a statement in the same 
period saying that there was no alternative for the UGIF’s deplorable situation but to dismiss the 
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UGIF-Sud leadership and ‘proceed with the centralisation in Paris’.  The ongoing discussions 347
about the reorganisation of the UGIF show that both German and Vichy officials were dissatisfied 
with the way it worked.  
 
 The nature of the occupation and of the Jewish communities in France meant that the 
function and structure of the UGIF was not significantly altered during the course of the war, 
despite the occupier’s pronounced dissatisfaction with the organisation. The Germans took a 
number of measures to improve the effectiveness of the UGIF. First, we have seen that CGQJ-head 
Vallat, who was considered too moderate by Dannecker, was replaced by Darquier de Pellepoix 
who, in turn was replaced by Charles du Paty de Clam in February 1944. In June 1944, Du Paty de 
Clam was himself replaced by Joseph Antignac.  Second, Dannecker was replaced in July 1942 in 348
order to improve the communication with both Vichy officials and the Military Administration.  349
Third, as we have seen, those UGIF leaders who refused to cooperate and who displayed troubling 
signs of independence were interned and deported. Ultimately though, even apparently compliant 
leaders such as Edinger and Geissmann were no more obedient to German rule than their 
predecessors had been.  The UGIF failed to unite Jews in France or to become a tool in the hands 350
of the German occupier. Instead, it continued its social welfare activities within the limits provided 
by the Nazis and, as the next chapter will show, at times also outside these limits (resistance). At the 
same time, like their western European counterparts, the French Jewish leaders were forced to make 
decisions that harmed their communities and even led to the arrest and deportation of their 
coreligionists. The example of the arrested children in the UGIF homes in July 1944, and Edinger’s 
refusal to disperse these children through a mass escape by disbanding Jewish organisation, was one 
of the three points for which the UGIF leadership was criticised during the commission of inquiry 
imposed on the organisation after liberation by the CRIF.  The decision not to dissolve the 351
organisation was inspired by the feeling that it still had an important role to play as a relief 
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organisation and its continued existence was considered imperative for the maintenance of the 
remaining Jews in France.  352
 
 As in Belgium and France, Dutch JR leaders clashed with their German overseers. These 
conflicts were mainly caused by the fact that the JR believed the Germans were not living up to the 
promises they had made. For example, the leadership protested against the raid of 11 June 1941, 
during which many so-called Palestina Pioniers (Palestine Pioneers), formerly residents of the 
working village in the Wieringermeer, were arrested and sent to Mauthausen concentration camp in 
Austria. In March, the village of the Palestine Pioneers had been evacuated. When the Germans had 
ostensibly agreed in June to allow the Palestine Pioneers to go back to the working village in order 
to continue their preparations for emigration to Palestine, David Cohen had provided the names and 
addresses of the Jews concerned.  Thereafter, the Jews were arrested and deported. The Germans 353
had thus asked the JR’s chairman to provide this information under false pretences. There were also 
other occasions on which the JR’s leadership objected to the course of events, for example when 
head of the Zentralstelle aus der Fünten indicated during a meeting on 21 May 1943 that 7,000 JR 
members ought to report themselves for forced labour in Germany only four days later.  Asscher, 354
Cohen and Edwin Sluzker, head of the Expositur, protested and claimed that it would be impossible 
to continue the work of the JR without these individuals. The meeting report indicates that Lages 
then threatened them with severe retaliations in the event that they would not comply.  When the 355
chairmen communicated the measure to which they eventually consented, ‘in order to prevent 
worse’, to the other central board members, some considered resigning from their position, 
including Gertrude van Tijn and Abraham Asscher himself, who seemed to have reconsidered his 
decision.  In the end, Van Tijn and Asscher continued to work for the Council until it was 356
dissolved in September 1943.  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 Despite the inevitable conflicts between the JR leaders and the Germans, the apparently 
friendly ‘cooperation’ between the Germans, in particular aus der Fünten and Lages, and the 
Council leadership, was emphasised by both sides after the war.  Reischskommissar Arthur Seyss-357
Inquart as well as commander of Westerbork transit camp Albert Conrad Gemmeker and SS-
Sturmbannführer Willy Lages infamously claimed that the Germans would never have been able to 
deport so many Jews without the aid of the Joodsche Raad.  Lages even referred to the Joodsche 358
Raad as a ‘German department’ because Asscher and Cohen were so cooperative that it was not 
necessary to appoint a German at the head of the Council.  Lages also claimed that his Nazi 359
colleagues in Belgium and France were surprised about the results that had been accomplished: 
‘they indicated they were incapable of achieving the same in Belgium and France’.  While these 360
statements need to be treated with caution, given that the Nazis were trying, in court, to downplay 
their own involvement in the deportation of the Jews and to shift blame onto the JR, we must 
acknowledge that the level of cooperation in which Asscher and Cohen were prepared to engage 
went beyond what their Belgian and French counterparts were forced to do or were willing to do. 
The assistance provided in registering Jews who had been called for transport and the fact that the 
JR’s leadership became responsible for the registration of Jews who were forced to work under 
police supervision (Polizeiliche Arbeitseinsatz) are just two examples of this.  After the war, 361
Cohen indicated that ‘they’, most likely he and Asscher, believed that those who were called for 
Arbeitseinsatz were better off than others who were deported, which is why they agreed to 
cooperate.  Overall, in contrast to the Associations of Belgium and France, the JR seemed to have 362
met the constantly changing, and often poorly defined, German expectations. The disagreements 
between the JR and the Germans never reached a point of outright conflict. This partially explains 
why Asscher and Cohen, in contrast to their Belgian and French counterparts, were able to remain 
leaders of the JR until it was dissolved in September 1943.  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2.4 The origins of the functional dissimilarities and German (dis)satisfaction  
 
The preceding sections have highlighted the differences in the foundations of the Jewish 
organisations and in German views of their effectiveness. Although the obvious similarities cannot 
be ignored, it has become clear that the Dutch Jewish Council was distinctively different in both 
respects from the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud. Only in the Dutch case did the 
leadership have an autocratic position in relation to other central board members, local Councils and 
other Jewish aid organisations. The JR was the only Jewish organisation whose functioning was 
viewed positively by the Germans. We have also seen differences between the Associations of 
Belgium and France, although these are less obvious at first glance. The following sections address 
the roots of these differences, which can be broadly divided into two areas: 1) factors inherent to the 
Jewish communities and the nature of their leaderships; and 2) the nature of the German occupation. 
In offering an analysis at this level, the aim is to deflect attention from the choices of the Jewish 
leaders, an area which has often occupied the centre of attention in explaining events in the three 
countries, and to focus instead on the context in which these choices were made.  
 
The nature of the Jewish leadership  
The differences in the motivations of the Jewish leaders when taking up the chairmanship of the 
organisations should not be underestimated as a factor in explaining the differing forms and 
functions of these bodies. Asscher and Cohen’s will to gain power and control over the Dutch 
Jewish community was significant. In addition, we have seen that the country’s Jewish community 
had been moving in a particular direction, of which both Asscher and Cohen were representative: 
they were secular, well-integrated Jews. The starting position of the JR’s chairmen, in February 
1941, was different from that of their counterparts in Belgium and France, who were appointed nine 
months later. Although anti-Jewish regulations had already been implemented by the time Asscher 
and Cohen took up their positions (Aryan civil servants, for example, were forced to register 
themselves in the ariërverklaring, Jews had to register themselves, Jewish civil servants were fired 
and Jews were not allowed to visit cinemas), mass arrests and deportations had not yet taken place 
in western Europe. Whereas the UGIF and the AJB came into existence as Nazi policies were 
slowly evolving from antisemitic regulations into the attempt to remove all Jews from these 
countries, this was by no means the case in the Netherlands. The Dutch Council leadership thus 
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accepted their nomination on different grounds.  
 
 Even as anti-Jewish policies unfolded, the German intentions with regard to the Jews were 
never entirely clear and the JR’s leaders rarely attempted to understand what fate awaited the Jews 
as the war went on. Their strong belief in their own ability to make the right decisions and their trust 
in the legal path they had chosen, perhaps combined with a feeling they could not truly obstruct 
Nazi policies even if they wanted to, resulted in a degree of blindness with respect to German 
intentions. Even though recent studies have dedicated much attention to the question of what people 
in the Netherlands ‘knew’ of the fate that was awaiting the Jews, wartime documentation shows that 
this was rarely discussed by the Jewish leaders during the JR’s board meetings.  Instead of trying 363
to anticipate unpredictable Nazi regulations, or trying to understand what was going on in ‘the 
East’, the Dutch Jewish leadership, like its western European counterparts, was predominantly 
focused on the (time-consuming) provision of social welfare to impoverished Jewish communities. 
The wish to maintain order was central to the leadership’s policies, and this is highlighted in 
Asscher’s speech of 14 February 1941, made in response to the unrest that had broken out in the 
Jewish quarter. At this, one of his first public appearances as head of the JR, he encouraged Jews to 
hand over their weapons so that order could be reinstated.  There were further occasions when the 364
JR’s leaders voiced this aim. During a meeting between Willy Lages, Ferdinand aus der Fünten and 
the two Council chairmen on 4 August 1942, for example, Asscher and Cohen encouraged the two 
men not to spread information that would cause distress in the community. They were referring to 
Generalkommissar Schmidt’s public statements on the tough fate that awaited Jews once they were 
 See: Bart van der Boom, ‘Wij weten niets van hun lot’: gewone Nederlanders en de Holocaust (Amsterdam: Boom, 363
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deported to the East. Although Asscher and Cohen were interested in the accuracy of this 
information, they emphasised above all that these type of statements caused disquiet in the 
community which would hamper their own work.   365
 
 A similar situation can be identified in the French unoccupied zone, where Raymond-Raoul 
Lambert sought recognition for his prewar role in the French Jewish community, particularly in the 
CAR welfare organisation. The distaste about the treatment of immigrant Jews by the Consistory 
and the rift this caused within the organisation were decisive factors in fostering his desire to take a 
leading role providing aid to Jewish refugees before the war. The same factors continued to affect 
his perception of the Consistory during the war, and he had little faith in the competence and 
compassion of its leaders.  His prominent position was reaffirmed when he entered negotiations 366
with Vallat about the establishment of the UGIF. Whereas the power of the Consistory was still 
significant in France, the Nazi occupation proved to be an opportunity to make a different voice 
heard: ‘I am now a central figure in French Jewry, which means I am discussed and attacked by 
some and flattered and encouraged by others, but I am acting and that is what matters’, Lambert 
wrote in his diary on 11 December 1941.  He continued with the same confidence: ‘It was I who, 367
for personal reasons and because of my experience (I have been known to the ministry people for 
ten years) was summoned by Vallat to act as an unofficial liaison agent or technical expert. From 
there it’s only a step to saying that I am Vallat’s man’.  Despite his self-confidence, Lambert could 368
not carry out his role as UGIF-Sud chairman in the autocratic way that Asscher and Cohen did in 
the JR. We have seen that the prewar positions of both Lambert and the UGIF-Nord chairman Baur 
ensured that their status was less absolute compared to their Dutch counterparts. Both men 
represented opposition to the century-long domination of the Consistory and even though they had 
played a significant role in the prewar Jewish community, the presence of powerful men within the 
Consistory who did not wish to see the UGIF established in the first place, affected Lambert and 
Bauer’s self-perception and their choices. Because of the organised criticism of and interference in 
their work by the Consistory, which created divisions in the communities, the UGIF leaders did not 
have the same level of autonomy as Asscher and Cohen in the Netherlands.  
 
 Report of a meeting between Lages, aus der Fünten, Asscher and Cohen, 4 August 1941, NA, CABR, nummer 365
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 Unlike Asscher and Cohen, Lambert refused to cooperate with the Germans when pressure 
on the Jewish communities, and on him personally, was increased. On 1 May 1943, a bombing in 
Marseilles left two SS men seriously wounded. In response, the Germans asked for a list of persons 
to be arrested in retaliation. On 5 May Lambert’s diary records: 
 At 6 p.m. I am called to the German police who demand, under the threat of arresting me and 10  
 percent of my staff, a list of two hundred prominent Jews of Marseilles. I refuse, as I must. Their  
 answer is that I will find out in the morning the decision of the German authorities as a result of my 
 refusal, and that I will be informed of this decision by telephone during the morning.   369
His growing refusal to cooperate with the Germans in this period resulted in his arrest in May 1943. 
In the UGIF-Nord, André Baur, like Lambert, refused to become a watchdog over his community 
and focussed instead on welfare work.  This is not to say that the UGIF leaders never gave in to 370
German demands, or that they were immune to threats. For example, on 4 March, 1943, André Baur 
wrote to Lambert that the threat of measures against the rest of their personnel and against the 
French Jews had compelled him to reconsider his resistant, anti-German attitude. After weeks of 
negotiation the UGIF central board agreed to the German concession that they might retain up to 
15% of their foreign workers, surrendering the rest of them (they had until then been exempt from 
deportation) to the Nazis.   371
 
 In Belgium, we have seen that the position of the leadership was relatively weak. Both 
Ullman and Benedictus were unconfident and had not even wanted to become the AJB’s leaders in 
the first place. Unlike the Dutch leaders, they did not consider themselves the most suitable 
representatives, as the testimonies of both men make clear.  There were exceptions in this regard, 372
most notably Salomon van den Berg, who was more than willing to take up a position in the AJB 
‘being one of the oldest members present in Brussels in Belgium, which was a rare thing in these 
times’ as he claimed in his diary.  Overall, however, the Belgian AJB was never able to function as 373
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a truly representative organisation because most of its leaders had fled the country and those who 
remained often lacked leadership experience and a solid network of contacts.  The scattered nature 374
of the Belgian Jewish communities contributed further to this problem.  The fact that Jews who 375
had immigrated to Belgium in the late 1920s were part of the AJB board, including Noé Nozyce, 
Louis Rosenfeld, Grigorijs Garfinkels and Chaïm Perelman, highlights how the nature of the AJB 
leadership differed when compared to the JR.  This is exemplified by the case of Maurice Heiber, 376
head of the AJB Brussels branch from 9 December 1942, who in a postwar interview claimed that 
he did not have any prewar connection to the Belgian Jewish communities.  377
 
 Whereas Asscher and Cohen were prepared to make serious concessions in order to 
safeguard their position and the continued existence of the JR, for example by providing a list of JR 
employees who ought to be exempted from deportation at the expense of others, the first leaders of 
the Belgian AJB and the French UGIF-Nord and UGIF-Sud were more reluctant to do this sort of 
thing.  We have seen that on a number of occasions the JR leaders exhibited doubts about the role 378
of the JR, but they were more afraid that if the Council were to be dissolved, the Germans would be 
free to impose arbitrary measures.  By contrast, in Belgium and France, important board members 379
(they included Ullman, Baur and Lambert) stepped down from their positions, or were forced to do 
so, when they disagreed with German regulations and when pressure on their organisations 
increased. In general, the boards here did not carry out policies that went beyond the realm of 
welfare activities. For example, we have seen that when on 30 June 1943 Brunner presented André 
Baur with an outline of his proposed changes and an account of the role he expected the UGIF-Nord 
to play in carrying out his demands, the UGIF-Nord board refused to carry out, or participate in, any 
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police measures.  Their successors were also not willing to do so. As Adler has noted, for 380
example, the ‘arrest of most of the leaders of the UGIF in Paris did not [..] mean a change of policy 
on its part’.  Edinger and Stern, rather than cooperating with the Germans, focused primarily on 381
the welfare activities of the UGIF-Nord and, as we shall see, also engaged in clandestine activities 
to achieve this.  382
 
 The varied nature of the different leaderships explains why the Jewish organisations were 
governed differently. In particular, it explains why Asscher and Cohen ruled the Jewish Council 
autocratically, with little room for intervention of others. This aspect of the JR probably contributed 
to German satisfaction with the organisation’s functioning; German policies could be 
communicated fairly easily through the leadership and we have seen that there were few formal 
objections from other board members or from Jewish organisations to obstruct the implementation 
of these policies. In Belgium and France, we have seen that the changes of leadership that followed 
after the initially appointed chairmen either voluntarily resigned, or were forced to do so, resulted in 
the Germans losing their grip on the Associations. The different backgrounds and motivations of the 
Jewish leaders in taking up their positions, as well as the concessions they were prepared to make in 
order to safeguard them, partially explain the varying German perceptions about the effectiveness of 
the organisations.  
 
The nature of society: alternative representations in Belgium and France  
 
A second factor that explains the differences in the function and potency of the Jewish organisations 
is the nature of the societies from which they emerged. More specifically, the presence or absence 
of alternative kinds of representation could affect the extent of the control that the organisations 
could exercise over the communities and therefore, from the German perspective, their potential 
effectiveness. We have seen that large numbers of immigrants in both Belgium and France had 
brought with them whole new sets of ideas and convictions before the war. In these two countries, 
the highly diversified and scattered nature of the Jewish communities made it impossible to 
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represent the Jews through umbrella organisations such as the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-
Sud. The wide range of social welfare organisations that were established to take care of these 
different groups of Jews, such as the Main d’Oeuvre Étrangère (MOE), a communist foreign 
workers’ organisation, and the Solidarité Juive, which was created in 1939 specifically to aid 
political refugees from Poland, continued to exist after the German invasion of Belgium and France 
in May 1940.  The existence of other Jewish representative organisations in both Belgium and 383
France, compared to an absence of alternative powerful Jewish representative bodies in the 
Netherlands, is an aspect that has been overlooked in the existing historiography because there has 
until now been no solidly comparative approach. Whereas Adler, for example, has indicated that the 
UGIF, as the sole official source of support and assistance, occupied a central place in the Jews’ 
struggle for survival, we will see that there were strong alternative representative groups in the 
French Jewish communities that continued to operate alongside the UGIF.  These included both 384
the Consistory and secular aid institutions. In Belgium, alternative forms of representation came 
primarily in the form of secular aid institutions. These served to hamper the potential organisational 
effectiveness and absolute power of the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud.  
 
 The Germans initially considered the Jewish Associations in Belgium and France as 
potential coordinators of both social and religious life. We have seen, for example, that Dannecker 
attempted in the first instance to convince Rabbis Sachs and Weill to transform the ACIP into an 
organisation representative of the Jews in Paris, responsible for the social and charitable needs of 
the Jewish people.  Nevertheless, the nature of the Jewish communities in France was such that 385
the Consistory continued to represent religious Jewry independently. The law even required that 
religious institutions should be able to execute their practices independently.  Above all, the vast 386
number of Jewish immigrants, whose religious orientation varied widely, could not be represented 
by a singular umbrella organisation that failed to respect the specificity of their spiritual beliefs. 
Although the Consistory did not represent the large variety of religious beliefs either, it was at least 
focussed on religious life exclusively whereas the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud were not.  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 In the Netherlands, the religious Dutch Israelite Congregation (NIK) remained in existence 
during the war and, as Michman has shown, the Joodse Coördinatie Commissie, headed by Visser, 
encouraged cooperation between the leaders of the NIK and liberal Jewry in order to face difficult 
times together during the first phase of the German occupation.  However, the dissolution of the 387
Coördinatie Commissie meant that pressure to unify the two church federations faded from 
November 1941. This can be explained by the fact that the JR received national authority in this 
period and Asscher and Cohen were attached to the traditional church federations of the NIK, whose 
chief Rabbis remained reluctant to cooperate with the liberal Jews.  Above all, even though the 388
Portugese and Dutch Israelite church federations continued to cooperate alongside the JR, we have 
seen that increasing secularisation, shown in the decline in regular synagogue attendance, 
diminished their power and influence before the war.  The waning influence of the church 389
federations was further reinforced by internal disputes among and between the various Jewish 
factions, most notably the liberals, zionists and the Dutch-Israelite representatives.  Therefore, 390
unlike France, there was no powerful religious authority in the Netherlands that could function as an 
alternative to the JR.  
 
 We have seen that the French Consistory at times (vehemently) opposed the UGIF’s 
existence and policies. Disagreements between the UGIF leadership and the Consistory were 
omnipresent, especially in the period prior to, and immediately after, the organisation’s 
establishment.  The Consistory believed that the institution of the UGIF would be a major 391
mistake. Although tensions decreased during the course of the occupation, and the two bodies 
occasionally even cooperated, some discord was always present.  The UGIF central board 392
members were closely watched by highly esteemed members of the French Jewish community, who 
still exerted a significant influence and at times led the UGIF reevaluate their decisions or dissolve 
the organisation.  It becomes clear from Lambert’s diary that the first meeting of the UGIF-Sud’s 393
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central board was held as late as 4 May 1942, almost half a year after its official establishment 
order.  By then, the Dutch JR had already been fully operative for more than a year. While this 394
delay can partially be explained by the problems that surfaced during formation of the board which, 
as we have seen, took two months, the further delay in the UGIF’s organisation resulted from the 
Jewish communities’ internal disputes and from the disapproval shown by leading Consistory 
members towards the UGIF. Lambert reflected upon the continuing anxiety in this period:  
 
 there continues to be agitation and back-fence talk among the Jews, led by people who have nothing 
 to do and are jealous of our useful action, jealous especially of the trust the authorities have shown in 
 me [..].  395
In Belgium, the situation was different because Ullman presided over the Consistory while he 
simultaneously headed the AJB. In contrast to France, where the opposition to the UGIF took a 
solid, organised form, the protests against the AJB were therefore not centrally orchestrated by the 
Consistory. The fact that prewar Consistorial leaders, as we have seen, had fled abroad at the 
outbreak of the war, removed the main potential mouthpiece for criticism of Ullman’s policies. 
Only in France did the criticisms voiced by the Consistory therefore actually serve as a constraint 
on the policies of the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud.  
 
 Secular aid institutions that obstructed the authority of the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and UGIF-
Sud were manifold in Belgium and France. In Belgium, zionist youth movements engaged in 
welfare activities and increasingly cooperated with one another during the war. As Moore has 
indicated, ‘the cooperation between different welfare and resistance organizations in Belgium 
during the occupation, coupled with the willingness of Jewish and non-Jewish groups across the 
political spectrum to work together provided the basis for an organization unique in Western 
Europe’.  This attempt at unity materialised through the CDJ, a leftist charitable organisation that 396
united various Jewish organisations and originated among members of the Front d’Indépendance 
(FI).  The FI was a resistance movement founded on 15 March 1941 by journalist Fernand 397
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Demany, who brought together leaders from various political strands.  The initiative for the CDJ 398
emerged from far-left Jewish circles almost simultaneously in five major cities in response to the 
first threats of deportation in July 1942.   399
 
 While the organisation’s activities were centred in Brussels, Antwerp lagged behind and 
engagement in the CDJ only commenced at the end of 1943.  Saerens has explained this 400
difference by focussing on the specificity of Antwerp under Nazi rule. In the 1930s this city had 
seen a remarkable increase in the display of hatred against foreigners by Belgian nationalists. A 
combination of factors contributed to this ‘Antwerp specificity’, including the large refugee stream 
into the city at the end of the nineteenth century, coinciding with the emergence of a new, ‘modern’ 
form of antisemitism: a combination of religious, socio-economic, socio-political and racial 
prejudices.  These factors, combined with the ignorance of the local authorities and a lack of 401
resistance compared to that shown in other Belgian cities, led to Antwerp becoming the first city in 
which Jews were called for forced work at the Atlantikwall, the systematic fortification of the 
Atlantic coastal areas in 1942. Fearing they would fall into the hands of the Germans, the Jewish 
communists that were united under the MOI immediately left Antwerp and moved to Charleroi 
where they played a central role in the institution of the CDJ. Their departure from Antwerp further 
hampered the development of Jewish resistance in this city.  402
 
 The CDJ functioned in close connection with the FI and was eventually taken under its 
wing.  Hertz Jospa, a communist of Romanian/ Bessarabian origin and member of the Conseil 403
National of the FI, proposed the establishment of the CDJ as a way to assist the Jewish 
population.  He was supported by his wife, Yvonne Jospa. Another important individual was 404
Emile Hambresin, former editor of the periodical Avant Garde and president of the Comité Belge 
Contre le Racisme, who knew Jospa from their shared membership in the Ligue pour combattre 
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l’Antisémitisme in the 1930s.  Jospa and Hambresin were joined by six others, including Abusz 405
(Abous) Werber of the left-wing Poale-Zion, and Israël (Maurice) Mandelbaum of Solidarité 
Juive.  In order to create a broad base of representation in the CDJ, the right-wing oriented Chaïm 406
Perelman, who was associated with the AJB, was also included.  Other CDJ representatives were 407
Benjamin (Benno) Nykerk, industrialist, and Edouard Rothel, secretary of the Brussels Jewish 
community and Eugène Hellendall, a wealthy industrialist who also served for the Brussels branch 
of the AJB.  They all set aside their fears about becoming involved with left-wing organisations, 408
including the communists, in order to create an organisation that would help the Jewish 
communities in Belgium.  The only major Jewish organisation that was not represented in the CDJ 409
was the Bund.  410
 
 From September 1942, the CDJ was a powerful alternative to the AJB for the Jews in 
Belgium, helping an estimated 15,000 people into hiding.  In total, the organisation ‘may have 411
helped up to 30,000 individuals with false papers, encompassing not only the Jews in Belgium, but 
also those passing through the country, and several thousand labour draft evaders’.  The group 412
also attempted on a number of occasions to sabotage the German war machine by derailing trains 
and setting fire to factories. The CDJ became one of FI’s most effective groups.  While focussing 413
on propaganda, finance and the provision of false papers and material aid, the rescue of children 
was the CDJ’s central occupation.  We will see that its members actively aimed to hamper the 414
actions of what they considered the collaborationist AJB, for example by encouraging Jews not to 
cooperate with its directives, even though the opposition of CDJ members to the AJB was not as 
 Steinberg, L’étoile et le fusil. La traque des Juifs, Vol. 1, 66. 405
 Moore, Survivors, 175. 406
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uniform as has been suggested in the literature.   415
 
 In addition to the CDJ, there were other social welfare organisations still functioning during 
the occupation, including the Secours Mutuel (Mutual Aid), Secours Populaire (Popular Aid), 
Secours Sioniste (Zionist Aid), Solidarité Juive (Jewish Solidarity), and Oeuvre Nationale de 
l’Enfance (National Children’s Aid, ONE). Furthermore, Jewish youth organisations had been 
officially united under one umbrella: sports-club Maccabi (Maccabi Hatsair) an organisation which 
was able, with the help of the AJB, to carry out illegal activities.  In Belgium, the organisation and 416
unification of Jewry by means of the AJB (which was what the Germans wanted), had not been 
achieved by the middle of 1943, despite Asche’s demand (reiterated in the summer of 1942) to ban 
any autonomous activity of organisations other than the AJB.  A number of organisations 417
continued to provide alternatives to the assistance offered by the AJB. Indeed, after the first wave of 
deportations in the summer of 1942, the AJB’s importance lessened for the majority of non-Belgian 
Jews.  In contrast to its counterpart in the Netherlands, the organisation also became less 418
important to the occupier towards the end of 1942 because it was not managing to effectively 
represent the Jews in Belgium.   419
 
 In France, there were various secular organisations that offered aid to Jews (illegally) with 
the aim of ensuring that they could escape from Vichy and from German persecution. George 
Weller has divided Jewish resistance in France into three categories: 1) those devoted to self-help 
through escape or hiding, including the Amelot Committee and the OSE: 2) those who were part of 
both the Jewish resistance and the armed French resistance, including Organisation Juive de 
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Combat (OJC), Main d’Oeuvre Immigrée – Franc-Tireurs et Partisans (FTP-MOI)  and the EIF; 420
and 3) the communist armed resistance organisations which included Jews but had no direct contact 
with the Jewish community.  Alternatives to the UGIF primarily belonged to the first group. The 421
Amelot Committee was made up of three political groups (the Bund, and the left and right wings of 
the Poale-Zion), and two other organisations, the FSJF and the Colonie Scolaire.  Its leaders had 422
been politically active long before they arrived in France. Léo Glaser, Amelot’s first treasurer, had 
been sought by the Tsarist police after the 1905 uprising in Russia, and the first secretary-general of 
the organisation, Yéhuda Jacoubovitch, was a Bundist from Poland who had been imprisoned for 
his opposition to Tsarism.  David Rapoport had been involved in the Russian revolutions of 1905 423
and 1917 before he arrived in France in 1920. As Moore has shown, the leftist background of these 
men did not result in the cooperation of the Amelot Committee with the communists, in part 
because cooperation of this sort would have increased the chance of surveillance by the Gestapo.  424
Instead, the communists were organised under the umbrella of the Solidarité which was founded in 
September 1940.  425
 
 We have seen that the Amelot Committee was represented on the Coordinating Committee 
instituted on 30 January 1941 to oversee the distribution of relief France.  After Amelot seceded 426
from the Coordinating Committee twice, finally in the summer of 1941, it continued its 
ameliorative aid alongside the communist Solidarité, primarily helping immigrant Jews in the larger 
cities and those held in internment camps.  Another organisation that falls into this ‘self-help’ 427
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group was the Jewish scout movement EIF. After the institution of the UGIF in November 1941, all 
these organisations – whether legal, illegal, or quasi-legal – remained operative and assisted those in 
need.  The EIF, for example, was incorporated into the UGIF as the Service Sociale des Jeunes 428
(SSJ), but it also engaged in clandestine operations from July 1942. It primarily focused on the 
provision of aid to young people, but also developed a section to help adults in securing hiding 
places and false identity papers. Some of its members also became involved in armed resistance 
activities, although this kind of activity had never been envisaged by the group’s founders.  429
 
 From the summer of 1942, after the indiscriminate mass arrests and deportations of foreign 
Jews (including men, women, children and the old and sick), these (aid) organisations faced serious 
problems. The communist Solidarité had lost a high portion of its members as many immigrant 
Jews had either been arrested or were in hiding.  The Amelot Committee was paralysed and had 430
not yet decided whether it would make use of the protection offered by the UGIF’s identity cards 
which provided temporary exemption from deportation.  However, both organisations managed to 431
resume their operations: Solidarité increased its armed resistance activities and Amelot, encouraged 
by Solidarité, sought to direct its welfare activities towards close liaison with non-Jewish 
organisations.  We will see that some of the organisations that remained in existence after the 432
summer of 1942, most notably Amelot, operated alongside the UGIF-Nord while at the same time 
providing a counterweight to the collaborationist agenda forced upon it. These organisations were 
important alternatives to the UGIF-Nord, especially for immigrants, because they provided advice 
and, even more important, they provided contacts with trustworthy people who could help.  433
 
 In the French southern zone, the fact that the UGIF-Sud served as an umbrella for welfare 
organisations that in practice continued to function autonomously created the unique situation: such 
organisations were officially part of the UGIF while also serving as an alternative to it. Before the 
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establishment of the UGIF-Sud, both national and international Jewish organisations were part of a 
commission that coordinated assistance for those in internment camps, as decreed by the Vichy 
Ministry of the Interior on 20 November 1940. They included the OSE, EIF, HICEM and Joint 
Distribution Committee (JDC).  The EIF, whose institutions were moved to unoccupied France in 434
June 1940, was the largest and most important Jewish youth movement during the occupation; its 
predominantly French leadership had access to a substantial network of high-ranking officials in the 
Vichy administration. The organisation was restructured in the summer of 1940 and worked, among 
other things, in the Vichy internment camps to improve conditions for internees, and specifically for 
children (at the behest of the Ministry of Youth).   435
 
 The incorporation of the EIF into the UGIF-Sud in 1941 had very little effect on the daily 
activities of the organisation, even though it officially lost its independent juridical status.  436
Through his contacts with General Lafon, the head of the Scoutisme Français whose friendship with 
Vallat was known to many, Robert Gamzon was able to secure a special status for the EIF: while the 
organisation was part of the UGIF, it was under direct control of the Ministry of Youth and 
Scoutisme Français.  Gamzon furthermore managed to obtain a position on the UGIF’s central 437
board, while the EIF became the organisation’s youth department. Lambert’s diary entry for 28 
December 1941 notes that Gamzon was already involved in the organisation from early on. 
According to Lambert, Gamzon encouraged André Weil, Oualid, Millner and Lambert to agree to 
work for the UGIF at the end of 1941.  Robert Gamzon’s wife Denise indicated in her memoirs 438
that there had been doubts among the EIF’s leadership about whether the EIF should become part of 
the UGIF.  Refusing to join the UGIF would mean that all rural and local scout groups and the 439
EIF children’s homes would be dissolved. She indicated that, as most French citizens were 
indifferent or even hostile towards the Jews, it would therefore have become much harder to secure 
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hiding places for Jewish children and youth. In the end, therefore, the decision was taken to join the 
UGIF.  After the summer of 1942, the EIF launched its programme to hide foreign Jewish children 440
and, in so doing, it relied strongly on the network it had established among the Scoutisme 
Français.  As we shall see, the interconnections between the illegal work of the organisation and 441
the legal UGIF were many, and this was in part because of Gamzon’s dual role.  
 
 Another longstanding welfare organisation from which Jewish children in France 
particularly benefited was the OSE. Established in 1912 in St Petersburg, the OSE provided aid for 
children and Jewish victims of Tsarist persecution. When it moved its headquarters to Berlin in 
1923, the OSE became an international organisation, also gaining an office in Paris established by 
Professor Eugène Minkowski.  From 1938, the OSE primarily dedicated its efforts towards 442
refugee aid, mainly helping children from Austria, Czechoslovakia and Germany.  After May 443
1940, the organisation continued its prewar activities, centred on the coordination of children’s 
homes. In 1941, the OSE started transferring children out of the camps. By November 1941, it 
controlled nine homes housing 1,200 children and in 1942 the number of children’s homes under its 
direct control had grown to 14.  By the end of 1941, although it remained operative in the 444
northern zone, the OSE’s main office had been moved to Montpellier in the unoccupied zone. From 
here, it concentrated on the improvement of conditions and medical care in the internment camps 
where Jewish children were being held. It also organised help for children across the country. 
Joseph Millner, born in Poland, headed the organisation in the southern zone.  As Laffitte has 445
indicated, Millner’s life course reflects that of many Jewish immigrants who were forced to adapt to 
the new conditions in their host countries. Born in Chelm in Poland in 1882 (some documents 
indicate 1888), then part of the Russian Empire, Millner fled to France in 1921, where he was 
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unable to practise his profession as a chemical engineer until his naturalisation in 1938.  During 446
the negotiations with Vallat about the establishment of the UGIF, Millner had been Lambert’s 
confidant, but in January 1942, he was deprived of his French citizenship and forced to resign from 
the UGIF’s central board. Millner continued to play a central role in the OSE and used the 
organisation to arrange the clandestine passage of Jewish children to Switzerland until the end of 
1943, at which time he advised the UGIF to disperse those children who were still resident in the 
homes overseen by the organisation.  447
 
 On 8 March 1942, the OSE was forced to function under the umbrella of the UGIF, but 
continued to work in cooperation with the ORT and EIF even as pressure on its facilities increased 
with the liberation of children from the camps and the disbandment of many smaller charitable 
organisations.  As we shall see, though the OSE initially only operated legally, from the summer 448
of 1942 it began to engage in clandestine operations in both the occupied and unoccupied zones. 
The operational autonomy of organisations like the OSE and the EIF ensured that there was a wider 
range of welfare organisations available to Jews in the unoccupied (later: southern) zone of France 
than in the Netherlands. Although immigrant organisations in Paris suffered as a result of arrests, 
deportation and continuous supervision by the Gestapo, they were nonetheless firmly established by 
mid-1943, not least because a constant stream of refugees continued to need their help.   449
 
 The existence of alternative (welfare) organisations as late as the summer of 1943 and even 
thereafter undermined the exclusive authority of the AJB and of the UGIF’s leaders. In both 
countries, Jews could turn for advice and social welfare to representative organisations that were 
not directly supervised by the Nazis, when they were willing to take the risks that were frequently 
involved in this. Doing so offered more opportunities for Jews not to follow the legal approach and 
to investigate non-legal ways to escape German persecution, for example by going into hiding. The 
large number of independent organisations and the range of beliefs they represented fostered strong 
internal divisions which lasted until after the war. This became apparent in the case of the CUDJF, 
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established in 1944 in Paris by organisations including the OSE and the Amelot Committee.  In 450
August 1944, after the liberation of Paris, the CUDJF arrested Edinger, the last head of the UGIF, 
and instituted a purge commission. After the CUDJF transferred its documents to the CRIF, the 
latter instituted a commission of inquiry, headed by members of organisations that had provided 
alternatives to the UGIF, including Marc Jarblum (president of the FSJF) and André Weill (from the 
Central Consistory).  The CRIF held the UGIF leadership accountable for its failure to remove 451
children from the homes that were overseen by the Germans.  These children had become easy 452
targets for arrest and deportation, but when the Allies drew closer in July 1944 and Brunner aimed 
to seize as many Jews as possible, the UGIF workers in Paris had not taken special measures to 
protect these children.  Between 21 and 25 July, Gestapo agents raided eight of the eleven UGIF 453
children’s homes and all but around ten of the children were deported to Auschwitz on the large last 
convoy on 31 July.  454
 
 In the Netherlands, organised Jewish self-help groups were rare. In contrast to Belgium and 
France, the secular community organisations that existed before May 1940 had no political or 
representative role, ‘continued to eschew any involvement with political refugees and kept a 
distance from any communist or social democratic organizations’.  Furthermore, the ban on 455
political activity by foreigners prevented refugees from organising their own representation.  As 456
early as May 1941, many Jewish organisations in the Netherlands were dismantled and their 
activities taken over by the JR.  There were some organisations that continued to operate illegally 457
outside the JR, but their area of influence was limited. One of these was the Palestine Pioneers who, 
in response to the first deportation in August 1942, planned an escape line for their group to 
Switzerland.  Although the plan failed and the initial group of ten was arrested, one of the group’s 458
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members, Joop Westerweel (a non-Jew), continued their work and managed to help between 150 
and 200 Jews. Among them were 70 Palestine Pioneers, and while most were given shelter in 
France, around 80 crossed into Spain. Westerweel also helped to find hiding places for Pioneers 
who could not leave the country.  459
 
 Other illegal organisations, including the Nanno and Oosteinde resistance groups, were 
engaged in similar activities. The Oosteinde group, which consisted of German Jewish refugees, 
was assisted by the JR member Jacques van de Kar.  The Oosteinde group had come into 460
existence in the years before the German occupation. Its activities included taking care of illegal 
immigrants by trying to ameliorate their living conditions in the refugee camps.  When it became 461
clear that refugees from Germany would first be targeted for deportation, the group’s area of 
activity increased. From the first deportation in July 1942 until the spring of 1944, the Oosteinde 
group distributed illegal papers, including Het Parool, Vrij Nederland and De Waarheid, and 
falsified documents for themselves and other resistance groups. It also took care of people in 
hiding.  Nevertheless, the scope of these Jewish organisations, considered in terms of the number 462
of Jews they helped, was not on the same scale as those Jewish aid organisations operating in 
Belgium in France alongside the Jewish Associations. They therefore never had the capacity to 
serve as an alternative to the JR.  
 
 The Jews in the Netherlands continued to depend on the JR, because it was the only 
organisation that provided social welfare for them. Their dependence increased even further when, 
from 1 January 1943, the Joodsche Raad began to supervise the 26,000 bank accounts held by Jews 
at the Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co (LiRo), a Jewish bank that was taken over by the Nazis with the 
aim of registering and then plundering the money and possessions of these Jews. Such supervision 
meant that Jews holding these accounts could no longer directly withdraw their monthly stipends. 
Instead, they became dependent upon the JR for financial support.  On 18 December 1942, the 463
Joodsche Weekblad, the Jewish weekly published under the auspices of the JR, announced: 
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 Since the firm of Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co., Sarphatistraat, will cease to make payments to Jews 
 from 1 January and since, from that date, such benefits will be paid by the Jewish Council, it is  
 essential that everybody who has been drawing, or has applied for, benefits in accordance with  
 Verordnung 58/1942 in November and December 1942 from the above mentioned firm, resubmits 
 these applications to the Jewish Council.  464
We have already seen that the structure of the Jewish communities affected the jurisdiction and 
authority of the four organisations. The fact that the authority of the Belgian and French 
Associations was constrained by the existence of alternative representative groups meant that they 
never gained the same representative power as the JR in the Netherlands. This allows us to better 
understand why they functioned differently. It also serves to explain different German perspectives 
about the effectiveness of the organisations because, as we have seen, it was precisely the lack of 
representative power held by the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud that led the Germans to 
become dissatisfied with them.  
 
The nature of the German occupation  
 
The difference between the German occupation regimes in the Netherlands, Belgium and France is 
a third factor that has to be understood when we examine the Jewish organisations’ (perceived) 
functionality. As we have seen, in all three countries, rivalries played out between the various 
German departments responsible for supervision of the Jewish organisations. In the Netherlands, the 
presence and control of the SS was soon felt, despite several attempts by Reichskommissar Seyss-
Inquart to outmanoeuvre them.  Compared to the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud, the JR 465
had fairly limited room for manoeuvre. The strong presence of the SS and the German police meant 
that the JR gradually became completely subordinate to the orders of the German police in 
Amsterdam.  In Belgium and France, by contrast, the Jewish bodies had a broader scope for 466
negotiation with rival German institutions. In France, as we have seen, both the Military 
Administration and the Vichy regime delayed or even restricted the implementation of anti-Jewish 
measures during the first phase of the occupation. Despite the increasing authority of the SS in 
France and Belgium through the course of the war, the situation remained markedly different from 
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that in the Netherlands.  For example, although Dannecker aimed to increase pressure on the 467
Jewish community, he was not able to meet the expectations he set for himself in terms of the 
solution to the so-called ‘Jewish question’. The nature of the occupation in France, including the 
presence of the Vichy regime and the fact that, initially, only the north-western part of the country 
was occupied, obstructed the Judenreferat in France from effectively carrying out the deportation of 
Jews from the country.   468
 
 The institutional rivalry between the various departments involved in anti-Jewish politics 
worked out favourably for the Jewish Associations in Belgium and France. Because there was no 
unified policy, and as rival departments obstructed one another with competing interests, there was 
a delay in the implementation of anti-Jewish measures compared to the Netherlands.  This 469
lessened the pressure on the AJB and the UGIF relative to that exerted on the JR. We can say how 
this played in, for example, the display of the yellow star, which was implemented in the 
Netherlands six weeks earlier than in Belgium and France. The delay was largely due to practical 
constraints, together with the Military Administration’s concern about the response of the non-
Jewish population in these two countries.  As we have seen, the measure was not even introduced 470
in the French unoccupied zone because of the objections of Vallat. The leaders of the AJB, the 
UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud could use disagreements between rival institutions to their own 
advantage. In the case of Belgium, we know that the central board of the AJB used the rivalry 
between the SiPo-SD and the Military government to create room for manoeuvre in their 
negotiations with both of these departments.  In the Netherlands, by contrast, the struggle for 471
dominance did not result in a delay in the implementation of anti-Jewish legislation because the 
various German institutions overall agreed on the nature of the policies. The rivalry resulted in an 
 For the shifting power balances between the Military Administration and the SS throughout the war, see: Marrus and 467
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overlap of responsibilities, and these were carried out faithfully by the departments involved. As a 




In order to understand how the organisations functioned, it is essential to understand the context in 
which they began. Although there was an attempt to reach a unified policy across all three of the 
western European countries, many factors ensured that the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the 
UGIF-Sud operated differently. As a result, German perceptions about their effectiveness were also 
different in each case. The nature of the occupation, rivalries between the various German 
departments responsible for the execution of anti-Jewish measures, the attitude of the Judenberater 
responsible for the deportation of Jews, and the nature of society from which the Jewish 
organisations emerged, together with the personalities of their leaders, led to differing types of 
foundations in the case of each organisation and to the development of different structures. Above 
all, the lack of a carefully thought out plan about the exact remit of these organisations played a 
crucial role in determining the course of events. Ad hoc personal initiatives and competing interests 
became decisive for their form and function.  
 
 Putting these findings into a broader context shows that the moral approach taken in the 
existing scholarship has paid too much attention to the behaviour and attitude of the Jewish leaders. 
The actions and decisions of the organisations’ leaders have been disproportionally scrutinised and 
evaluated. In the Netherlands, the relatively well-integrated Jewish community, the nature of prewar 
immigration, and the strong prewar positions of Asscher and Cohen, as well as the absence of other 
authoritative representative organisations that could operate alongside the JR, ensured a solid 
foundation for Asscher and Cohen’s leadership. This, in combination with their personalities, meant 
that they felt increasingly empowered as leaders of the Dutch Jewish community. As a result of the 
relative security of their positions, they also felt able to shrug off criticism. All these factors 
reinforced the belied of the JR's leadership that their approach to the Germans was the right one, 
that is, that following German directions would prevent a potentially worse outcome. The particular 
nature of the occupation in the Netherlands, as rival German agencies vied to be in control of 
executing anti-Jewish legislation, combined with the attitude of the JR’s leadership, increased the 
 Boterman, Duitse daders, 99-101; Griffioen and Zeller, Jodenvervolging in Nederland, Frankrijk en België, 236. 472
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pace of the implementation of anti-Jewish measures, and this acceleration proved harmful to the 
Jews in the Netherlands.  
 
 In Belgium, we have seen that the existence of plural Jewish communities, resulting from 
the large influx of immigrants, meant that there was no comprehensive Belgian leadership, 
especially after the elite of the Jewish community fled the country in May 1940. The leadership 
vacuum could not be properly filled, and neither Salomon Ullman’s position at the helm of the AJB, 
nor the position of the other board central members, was comparable to that of the JR chairmen. 
This instability resulted in several changes to the Association’s leadership. These factors, combined 
with the nature of the occupation and the continued conflicts between the Military Administration 
and the SiPo-SD, ensured that the tactics used by the various AJB leadership differed from those of 
the Dutch leadership. The presence of other Jewish representative organisations also contributed to 
this difference. Although the leadership naturally wanted to protect their Jewish communities, their 
particular situation meant that they reached the limits of cooperation with the Germans much sooner 
than their counterparts in the Netherlands.  
 
 The same argument holds for France, where the UGIF leadership, and, in particular, the 
UGIF-Sud’s chairman Raymond-Raoul Lambert, was determined and self-confident. However, 
pressure from various organised groups, not least the Consistory, as well as the continued existence 
of other representative Jewish organisations ensured that the authority of the UGIF was, from the 
first, weaker than that of its Dutch counterpart. The autonomy of the various departments of the 
UGIF-Sud, which in reality were mere continuations of prewar (social welfare) organisations, 
decreased the effectiveness of the Jewish organisation from the German perspective. The presence 
of other representative groups, along with the rivalry between and among German and Vichy 
officials for control over the implementation of anti-Jewish legislation, resulted in a disorderly 
situation which was to the benefit of the Jews in France.  
 
 The form of the Jewish organisations as well as their functionality thus depended on much 
more than the character and choices of their leaders alone. The three occupied countries offered 
such different contexts that the German aim to have a unified plan for the implementation of anti-
Jewish regulations across all three countries, and for the functioning of the Jewish organisations in 
particular, seems in retrospect naive. It shows that there was a lack of understanding about the 
specific conditions in each of the three countries, particularly in terms of the impact of the 
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occupation, and of the differences between the Jewish communities. A detailed understanding of 
this variety of factors allows us to offer a more nuanced analysis of the nature of the JR, the AJB, 
the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud specifically and of the period of occupation more broadly.  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Chapter 3 
Between Legality and Illegality: Resistance and the ‘Jewish Councils’ 
In August 1942, Irène Zmigrod entered the social welfare department of the Belgian AJB and was in 
direct contact with those Jews who needed help.  Her main task was to take care of children whose 1
parents had been arrested. In order to achieve this, Belgium, like France, had specifically designated 
children’s homes that were, directly or indirectly, associated with the AJB.  Zmigrod used her legal 2
position in the organisation to give clandestine aid to Jewish children whose parents had not (yet) 
been deported. During an interview in 1953, she outlined how the AJB operated alongside the 
illegal CDJ:  
 Many parents came to the AJB and asked us to put their children in the homes. We refused this  
 placement, since the Gestapo forbade us to keep children whose parents were not deported.  
 However, we took note of the name and addresses of these people, which we forwarded to the CDJ. 
 [The CDJ] then sent a social worker to the address and made every effort to hide the child.  3
 
Even though the organisations forced upon the Jewish communities by the Nazis have traditionally 
been seen as channels of collaboration, this example shows that the wartime reality was more 
complex. We shall see that the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud were either wittingly 
or unwittingly used as cloaks for various forms of illegal activities that aimed to prevent Jews from 
being deported throughout the course of the war. To varying degrees, the Jewish leaders used their 
cooperation with the Nazis to simultaneously resist Nazi policies. Although, as we have seen, the 
provision of social welfare was at the centre of the organisations’ activities, increasing German 
pressure on the Jewish communities made the leaders reconsider the law-abiding position they had 
adopted. For some central board members, including Raymond-Raoul Lambert and Salomon 
Ullman, their original motivation for leading the organisations, namely that by cooperating with the 
Nazis they could serve the interests of the Jewish communities through law-abiding means, began 
to change over the course of time. In other words, they either passively allowed the organisations to 
 Massenge, “De sociale politiek”, 217. 1
 Ibid., 220. In an attempt to safeguard the protection of children and the elderly, the number of institutions in which 2
they were housed by the AJB increased during the course of the war. See, for example, the meeting report of the central 
board, 12 January 1943, CNHEJ, Buber Collection, Kazerne Dossin. 
  Eyewitness account by Irène Zmigrod entitled “A Social Worker’s Report on her Experiences in Belgium during the 3
Time of the Nazi-Occupation”, 1956, p.8, 1656/3/9/262. Testimony Collection, Wiener Library. Also see the interview 
with Maurice Heiber in which he corroborates Zmigrod’s statement, R.715/Tr248.00, Archives Marcel Blum, DOS.
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be used as cloaks for clandestine operations or they became actively involved in facilitating such 
activities.  
 
 The JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud were all used in various ways to protect 
Jews against persecution and to prevent them from being deported through illegal means. The 
purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it highlights the diverse ways in which the Jewish 
organisations were wittingly and unwittingly used as cloaks for clandestine activities by individuals 
and groups. Second, it examines the active engagement of the organisations’ leadership and 
membership in these activities. The central aim is to explore the concepts of opposition and 
resistance in relation to the legal character of these bodies. Existing scholarship has focussed 
primarily on individuals who crossed the line between legality and illegality, outwardly conforming 
while also working outside the legal organisations.  This research takes the analysis one step further 4
and investigates whether and how the organisations were used for clandestine activities in ways that 
extended beyond this individual level. By examining the interconnections between the legal 
existence of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud and illegal organisations more 
broadly, we shall see that the very existence of the Jewish organisations led to a wide range of 
activities that were not necessarily consistent with their official policies, but would nevertheless 
have been impossible without their existence.  
 
3.1 ’Jewish resistance’: the evolution of a term  
 
The historiography on the subject of ‘Jewish resistance’ is large and the concept itself remains 
contested by many scholars. In the period following 1945, there was little appreciation of Jewish 
resistance because ‘so few Jewish resisters survived’ and because their efforts had been carried out 
 See, for example: Cohen, The Burden of Conscience, 123-129; Laffitte, Juif dans la France Allemande, 261-261; 4
Massenge, “De sociale politiek”, 229-230; Schreiber and Van Doorslaer very briefly reflected upon the nature of the 
interrelations between the AJB and illegality in their conclusion to De curatoren van het getto (p. 349-350), questioning 
whether the presence of some resistance members in the AJB (Perelman, Heiber and Ferdman) was the personal choice 
of those involved or part of a wider strategy of the resistance. However, they do not provide a satisfactory answer to this 
question. In Dutch historiography on the Jewish Council, no attempts have been made to investigate the interrelations 
between clandestine activity and the JR, most likely because, as we shall see, there were comparatively few direct 
interconnections between illegal groups and the Jewish leaders. 
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in secret.  The overwhelming focus on Nazi documents in this period, contributed to a distorted 5
view of Jewish behaviour in which those who either did offer armed resistance, or fled Nazi 
persecution, were considered to have gone to their death ‘like lambs to the slaughter’.  In the early 6
1960s, Raul Hilberg and Hannah Arendt invoked this famous phrase and stressed the passivity of 
the victims of the Holocaust in their respective works The Destruction of the European Jews (1961) 
and Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963).  Hilberg emphasised that the Jewish victims had exhibited 7
little, if any, outward defiance. Their behaviour was characterised by an ‘almost complete lack of 
resistance’ which was consistent with a 2,000-year-old experience of ‘placating and appeasing’, 
rather than resisting, their enemies.  Arendt mainly focussed on how the Jewish Councils had served 8
as instruments in the hands of the Nazi occupiers.  Assertions of Jewish passivity in the late 1950s 9
and early 1960s stimulated research into armed resistance. In this period, the term resistance was 
therefore exclusively used to indicate the armed struggle against the enemy and research on Jewish 
resistance predominantly focused on ghetto uprisings and armed struggles in eastern Europe.  In 10
1972, Isaiah Trunk’s comparative work on the eastern European Judenräte led to a broader 
understanding of the term that went beyond armed confrontation. Trunk highlighted that the Jewish 
leadership had been very active in supporting cultural and spiritual resistance against Nazi efforts to 
dehumanise the Jews.  This notion of retaining spiritual integrity and dignity in the context of 11
persecution and dehumanisation altered the perspective about Jewish responses, including Jewish 
 Michael Marrus, “Jewish Resistance to the Holocaust” in: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1995), 5
96; Yehuda Bauer, They Choose Life: They Chose Life: Jewish Resistance in the Holocaust (New York: American 
Jewish Committee, Institute of Human Relations, c. 1973), 25 as cited by Richard Middleton-Kaplan, “The Myth of 
Jewish Passivity” in: Patrick Henry (ed.), Jewish resistance agains the Nazis (Washington: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2014), 15. 
 Middleton-Kaplan, “The Myth of Jewish Passivity”, 15; Robert Rozett, “Jewish Resistance” in: Dan Stone (ed.), The 6
historiography of the Holocaust (Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 341-342. 
 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 104-111; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European 7
Jews, passim. The phrase itself was taken from contemporary testimonies. See, for example, Emmanuel Ringelblum, 
Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto: The Journal of Emmanuel Ringelblum, ed. Jacob Sloan (New York: McGraw Hill, 
1958), 316 and Abraham Lewin, A Cup of Tears: A Diary of the Warsaw Ghetto, ed. Anthony Polonsky (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1988), 151 as cited in: Moore, Survivors, 369n. 
 Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, as cited in Michael Marrus, The Holocaust in History (New York: 8
Penguin, 1987), 109.
 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 104-111. 9
 See, for example, Philip Friedman (ed.), Martyrs and fighters: the epic of the Warsaw ghetto (New York: Praeger, 10
1954);  Keshev Shabbetai, As Sheep to the Slaughter? The Myth of Cowardice (Bet Dagan: Keshev Oress, 1962); Meyer 
Barkai (ed.), The fighting ghettos (Philadephia: Lippinicott, 1962); Yuri Suhl, They Fought Back: the story of the Jewish 
resistance in Nazi Europe (Michigan: Crown Publishers, 1967); Lucien Steinberg, La Révolte des justes: les juifs contre 
Hitler, 1933-1945 (Paris: Fayard, 1970). For an overview of the historiography on Jewish resistance, see: Rozett, 
“Jewish Resistance”, 341-363; Patrick Henry (ed.), Jewish resistance against the Nazis (Washington D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2014), passim. 
 Trunk, Judenrat, 388ff. 11
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resistance, to Nazi rule.  
 
 In the decades that followed, concerted attempts were made to define the complex nature of 
Jewish resistance. This resulted in a more nuanced understanding of the term. The concept of 
amidah, a Hebrew term that can be literally translated as ‘making a stand’, was central in reframing 
the discussion on Jewish resistance during the Holocaust. In 1968, Mark Dworzecki argued that the 
term included ‘all expressions of Jewish “non-conformism” and [..] all the forms of resistance and 
all acts by Jews aimed at thwarting the evil designs of the Nazis’.  In addition to their physical 12
destruction, this also included the German aim to deprive Jews of their humanity.  Rather than 13
perceiving resistance exclusively as an armed form of revolt historians in the field began to 
formulate more inclusive definitions. Among those doing so were Yehuda Bauer, Isaiah Trunk, Dan 
Michman, Michael Marrus and Lucien Lazare.  They all stressed in their own manner that Jewish 14
resistance took many forms, including those of everyday sabotage and survival. Bauer argued that 
‘any Jewish action, whether by a group or by an individual, that ran counter to real or perceived 
Nazi-German policies, has to be regarded as active nonacceptance of such policies, that is, 
resistance’.  In direct opposition to the claim that Jews passively complied with their destruction, 15
Bauer contended that: ‘in Poland, after the war had begun, German rules were so brutal that, had the 
Jews passively acquiesced – even though every infringement of Nazi law was punishable by death – 
they would have died out in no time at all’.  For Bauer, amidah included ‘smuggling food into 16
ghettos; mutual self-sacrifice within the family to avoid starvation or worse; cultural, educational, 
religious, and political activities taken to strengthen morale; the work of doctors, nurses, and 
educators to consciously maintain health and moral fiber to enable individual and group survival; 
and, of course, armed rebellion or the use of force (with bare hands or with “cold” weapons) against 
the Germans and their collaborations’.  17
 
 Mark Dworzecki, “Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust”, 153 as cited in Rozett, “Jewish Resistance,”, 346.12
 Ibid. 13
 Bauer, They Chose Life, passim; Ibid., The Jewish emergence from powerlessness (London: MacMillan, 1980); Isaiah 14
Trunk, Jewish responses to Nazi persecution: collective and individual behavior in extremis (New York: Stein and Day, 
1979); Lazare, Rescue as Resistance, passim. For an overview of the studies in the 1970s and 1980s that assessed 
Jewish behaviour from the perspective of resistance, see: Rozett, “Jewish Resistance”, 352. 
 Bauer, “Jewish Resistance in the Ukraine and Belarus during the Holocaust” in:  Henry, Jewish resistance against the 15
Nazis, 483. 
 Bauer, They Chose Life, 23-24. 16
 Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 120; Ibid.,“Jewish Resistance in the 17
Ukraine and Belarus during the Holocaust”, 483. 
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 Marrus contributed to the debate by arguing that Jewish resistance encompassed symbolic, 
polemic, defensive, offensive and enchained resistance. Symbolic resistance in his understanding 
included gestures and (religious) expressions which showed that Jews remained committed to their 
religion or culture.  Sémelin has pointed out that it is impossible to categorise exactly what 18
resistance encompasses as the motivations of those involved are many and various.  Above all he 19
argued that we must recognise that ‘resistance’ involves many layers of ‘non-cooperation, 
disobedience and opposition to Nazism and the foreign invader’.  In the context of the legal nature 20
of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud, this chapter understands resistance as the 
ways in which their leaders and members attempted to act against the interests of the Germans 
while continuing to serve as spokesmen of a legal representative body. The last president of the 
UGIF, Georges Edinger, reflected on this idea and argued that the official work of the UGIF was 
resistance to the extent that it served to alleviate the suffering of the Jews and reduce the impact of 
racial persecution.  21
 
 The provision of social assistance was of great importance to the Jewish communities and 
has received comparatively little attention in the literature on the four Jewish organisations. As 
French historian Michel Laffitte asserted, assistance to impoverished Jews in France was vital up 
until the very last weeks before the liberation.  Cohen, in turn, highlighted that the UGIF was 22
criticised by the Germans for distributing financial resources for welfare purposes beyond what was 
deemed necessary but noted that ‘the council ignored the criticism and continued to allocate close to 
4 million francs monthly for welfare purposes to more than 7,000 Jewish families’.  In a similar 23
vein, Klarsfeld showed that UGIF aid was of the utmost importance, since it allowed the majority of 
the French community to survive. Even though the organisation was not established for the purpose 
of resistance, the UGIF was primarily an instrument of survival and those leaders deported in 1943 
 Michael Marrus, “Varieties of Jewish Resistance: Some Categories and Comparisons in Historiographical 18
Perspective” in: Yisrael Gutman (ed.), Major Changes within the Jewish People in the Wake of the Holocaust 
(Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1996), 269-300; Ibid., “Jewish Resistance to the Holocaust”, 92-103. 
 Sémelin, Unarmed Against Hitler: Civilian Resistance in Europe, 1939-1943 (Westport CT: Praeger, 1993), 25. 19
 Bob Moore, “Introduction: Defining Resistance” in: Ibid. (ed.), Resistance in Western Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 20
1. 
 Georges Edinger, Report on the activities of the UGIF: concerning its ‘official work’ and  ‘clandestine work’ from 21
1941 to 1944, p. 1, CCCLXXIX-33, CDJC, Mémorial de la Shoah.
  Michel Laffitte, “Was the UGIF an obstacle to the rescue of Jews?” in Jacques Sémelin, Claire Andrieu et al. (eds.), 22
Resisting Genocide: The Multiple Forms of Rescue (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 407. 
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(Lambert, Baur, Stora and Musnik) all died, according to Klarsfeld, as ‘resistance fighters’.  He 24
noted, furthermore, that the UGIF helped more Jews to preserve their freedom and their lives than 
that it led Jews towards the transit camp in Drancy.  Overall, the Jewish leaders were not in a 25
position to stop German anti-Jewish legislation from being implemented, but they could certainly 
aim to alleviate the suffering of the Jews. We have seen that the central board members in all three 
cases were clearly determined to provide social welfare even though they were operating under 
severe pressure.  
 
 Whereas some members of the central boards – including Raymond-Raoul Lambert, André 
Baur, Salomon Ullman and Maurice Benedictus – decided that it was no longer in the interests of 
the Jews for them to keep their posts when the implementation of anti-Jewish legislation increased, 
others decided to remain in place.  Kurt Schendel, liaison officer between the UGIF and the 26
Germans, explained his motivation for maintaining his position during the postwar honour trial 
initiated by the CRIF. To Schendel, it would have been fairly easy to abandon his position at the 
UGIF, to get himself faux papiers (fake papers) and to go into hiding along with his wife. However, 
he decided not to: 
 Time and again, people whom I had saved proposed this to me. I did not do it and stayed in my  
 position until the liberation, despite all the risks that my work entailed. I considered it my duty to  
 fulfil my task until the last moment: to save as many Jews as possible and to relieve the fate of the 
 internees.   27
His willingness to provide aid to the Jews in France outweighed the dangers inherent in that choice. 
Similar explanations have been voiced by those in the Dutch leadership who decided to remain in 
place until the end of the Council’s existence, despite receiving encouragement from others to go 
into hiding.  Even though the JR’s leaders, like their counterparts in Belgium and France, had the 28
financial means and social connections to go into hiding, they continued to serve at the helm of the 
organisation. They sincerely believed that they could still aid the Jewish communities by continuing 
to act legally. While the provision of social welfare as a form of resistance to German intentions and 
 Klarsfeld, Vichy-Auschwitz: le rôle de Vichy dans la solution finale de la question juive en France, Vol. 2 (Paris: 24
Fayard, 1983), 167, 171 as cited in Laffitte, “Between Memory and Lapse of Memory”, 680. 
 Ibid.25
 Laffitte, Juif dans la France allemande, 180.26
 Statement of Kurt Schendel, 2 December 1946, CRIF MDI-310.7, Mémorial de la Shoah; For Schendel’s report on 27
the service de liasion, see: Rapport sur le Service de Liaison et mon activité dans ce service, 2 September 1944, 
CCXXI-26/27, CDJC, Mémorial de la Shoah. 
 See, for example, the notes of David Cohen ‘Aantekeningen II’, 181j, Inv. No. 11, NIOD. 28
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actions is important in the context of the Jewish organisations, we will shortly be focussing 
primarily on those (organised) clandestine activities that aimed to prevent Jews from being deported 
and help them survive. This will allow us to examine the level of interplay between legality and 
illegality.  
 
3.2 The development of organised resistance in the Netherlands, Belgium and France 
 
In order to help Jews escape German persecution, and, especially, avoid deportation, Jewish 
organisations operated alongside non-Jewish bodies, and vice-versa. As we shall see, the types of 
interconnection between Jewish and non-Jewish organisations were different in Belgium, France 
and the Netherlands. Considerable differences can be identified between the Netherlands on the one 
hand and Belgium and France on the other. In the Netherlands, there was comparatively little 
engagement in (organised) clandestine activities during the first phase of the German occupation.  29
A number of factors have been used to explain this: geographical position and topography; the fact 
that the main response to occupation after 1940 remained one of reaching an accommodation with 
the occupier; and the absence of a First World War experience.  It was fairly easy for the Germans 30
to track down and dissolve the earliest organised illegal activities, as those arranging them had little 
relevant knowledge or experience.  As we shall see, differences in the development of resistance in 31
western Europe affected how illegal organisations’ used the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the 
UGIF-Sud. 
 
 In Belgium and France, the echo of the First World War fed patriotic feeling and stirred very 
early expressions of resistance after the defeat in 1940.  However, this did not immediately yield 32
organised forms of resistance because resistance groups, in the case of Belgium, were barely 
organised and individual groups functioned inefficiently and suffered from internal crises.  At the 33
 Bob de Graaff, “Collaboratie en Verzet : Een Vergelijkend Perspectief” in: Joost Jonker and Albert Kersten (eds.), 29
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Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam op 11 en 11 mei 1990 (’s Gravenhage: SDU Uitgeverij, 1990), 96; Dick van Galen Last, 
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 Van Galen Last, “The Netherlands”, 189-190; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 365; Moore, Survivors, 30
234. 
 Van Galen Last, “The Netherlands”, 194-195. 31
 Lagrou, “Belgium”, 33; Gildea, Fighters in the Shadows, 37-38. Lagrou has argued that we can identify three 32
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thereof, see: Lagrou, “Belgium”, 33-48. 
 Griffioen and Zeller, Jodenvervolging in Nederland, Frankrijk en België, 537. 33
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start of the deportation of Jews in the summer of 1942, the Belgian FI was the first major umbrella 
organisation to unite different social and political forces. It was instituted on the initiative of the 
communists in March 1941. The FI connected various groups and included the communist 
Solidarité, which focused on helping the persecuted, including those in hiding.  Among the wide 34
spectrum of social and political forces united in the organisation were representatives of the 
catholics, socialists and liberals as well as the communists.  At first, the FI did not have a 35
department dedicated to helping persecuted Jews.  The organisation’s foremost ambition was to 36
mobilise support in all social circles and to fight against the labour draft.  Jews were considered a 37
marginal group in society and the small number of assimilated Jews who joined general resistance 
groups did not establish Jewish resistance organisations because they were reluctant to be 
associated with immigrants who, as we have seen, had failed to integrate into Belgian society.  38
  
 After the major raids in the summer of 1942, representatives of leftist Jewish circles decided 
to institute a committee that would centre its activities exclusively around the creation of aid 
networks for Jews who were threatened with deportation. Organised Jewish resistance was most 
visible among the communists. The MOI, which worked in affiliation with the FI, was a communist 
foreign workers’ organisation that predated the German occupation under the name Main d’Oeuvre 
Étrangère (MOE).  It was the communist party’s liaison unit, intended to recruit immigrant 39
workers into the party and to unite communist immigrants.  In both Belgium and France, large 40
numbers of immigrant Jews who had experienced persecution in eastern Europe were generally less 
inclined to follow official regulations and were often the first to become involved in clandestine 
movements.  The MOI strongly opposed the law-abiding course taken by the AJB leadership and, 41
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sponsored by the FI, the MOI organised concerted acts of resistance. Among the earliest operations 
were the murder of Robert Holzinger, a German Jew who worked for the AJB, and the destruction 
of copies of AJB files that contained the personal information of Jews who were to be called for 
‘labour’ in the East.  Even though the destruction of the AJB files was ineffective because the 42
original files were saved, both actions underline the resentment felt by organised Jewish resistance 
groups against the AJB. We have already seen that, on the initiative of MOI-member Jospa, the CDJ 
was established, and functioned in close connection with the FI, focussing primarily on social 
welfare work, the production of false identity papers and securing hiding places for Jews.  It went 43
on to become the most important clandestine Jewish aid organisation. As Moore has argued, the 
activities and success of the CDJ rested largely on the assistance of non-Jewish individuals and 
organisations, including the Catholic Church.  The work of Vromen has highlighted that while the 44
story of the rescue of Jews was primarily a story of Jews saving Jews, the Catholic Church was an 
important institution that assisted Jews, and Jewish children in particular, who were in search for 
help.  While help was initially given in the form of providing (false) baptismal certificates, it later 45
‘also encompassed requests for shelter, ration cards, or help to escape the country altogether’.  In 46
order to secure these lines of assistance, many priests acted in cooperation with the CDJ and vice-
versa, mainly in Brussels but also outside the capital.  47
 
 In France, the presence of the Vichy regime initially hampered the emergence of resistance 
activities. A large majority of the population trusted the Vichy government, feeling that it had ended 
a useless war.  The resulting ‘wait-and-see’ policy meant that, apart from small groups of 48
communists and supporters of General Charles de Gaulle (a previously little known army officer 
who had gone to London and denied the legitimacy of the armistice and the Vichy regime), there 
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was no organised resistance in the country in 1940 or during the first half of 1941.  In terms of 49
Jewish engagement in clandestine activities, the presence of the Vichy regime resulted in a 
profound split between French Jews on the one hand and immigrant Jews on the other. During the 
first years of occupation, in particular, responses to the persecution and willingness to engage in 
illegal activities varied widely. Many Jews, in particular those with French nationality, believed at 
first that the French State was submitting to pressure from the German occupier and hardly 
recognised the fact that it was carrying out its own policy. These Jews believed, falsely, that they 
would be protected against German anti-Jewish legislation.   50
 
 A striking example of this attitude can be seen in a proclamation by Jacques Helbronner, 
president of the Central Consistory, from March 1941: ‘The only hope resides in the presence as the 
head of the State of Monsieur le Maréchal Pétain, with whom I have been in contact regularly who 
gives me hope of future reparations for the injustice imposed’.  Raymond-Raoul Lambert referred 51
in his diary to ‘my friend Vallat’, head of the CGQJ, who was always ‘very open and frank’ with 
him.  Lambert trusted Vallat ‘and believed that owing to his animosity towards the Germans and 52
his respect for veteran French Jews, he was willing to ease somewhat the suffering of French 
Jewry’.  As Poznanski has shown, these feelings were fed by the apparently warm and friendly 53
attitude of leading Vichy officials towards the French Jewish leaders.  As a result, many Jews 54
complied with the regulations of the Vichy regime and adapted themselves to the new reality. 
Throughout 1942, the UGIF leaders continued to send telegrams to Pétain and other Vichy officials 
asking for his intervention in various affairs, including the deportation of foreign Jewish children 
and women – ‘whose only crime is that they are non-Aryans’ – to the occupied zone.  In some 55
ways, the situation can be compared to that in the Netherlands, where the relative integration of 
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Dutch Jews into non-Jewish society is often considered to have created a false sense of security 
against German persecution.  Because of this integration, Jews were less susceptible to the fear of 56
being singled out as Jews and many considered themselves to be primarily Dutch rather than 
Jewish.  The presence of large numbers of immigrants in France makes the situation different from 57
that in the Netherlands. Jews who had recently immigrated to France did not share the feeling of 
‘trust’ in the French State. Immigrant Jews, many of whom had already suffered the burden of 
persecution, were at this stage already more inclined not to follow the path of legality. As we shall 
see, this was especially true in the case of the communists and Zionists.  58
 
 Throughout 1941 and the beginning of 1942, various resistance groups operated in the 
French occupied and unoccpied zones individually, without strong, central coordination. As Gildea 
has shown, they were drawn from all parts of the political spectrum.  The help offered by non-59
Jewish organisations to the Jews, who were increasingly suffering under the yoke of the occupation 
was marginal in this period. Racist and xenophobic prejudice, partly inherited from the nineteenth 
century and further encouraged by the economic (and political) crises of the 1930s, fed the notion 
that the Jews were not, and could never become, truly French.  Members of the French resistance 60
were ideologically susceptible to these ideas and also showed caution for strategic reasons, 
suspecting that much of the population would have been influenced by antisemitic propaganda, and 
therefore not wanting to alienate French citizens. They believed that if they supported the Jews, 
they would validate Nazi propaganda that condemned the war as Jewish.  Fear of alienating the 61
Arabic-Islamic world, and the failure to perceive the gravity of the threat to the Jews, contributed to 
the decision not to make a distinction among victims, ‘at a time when France as a whole was under 
the occupier’s yoke’.  As a result, ‘with very rare exceptions [..], the organised resistance did not 62
engage in the battle against antisemitism’ during the first phase of the occupation.  Exceptions 63
were the Communists, who condemned the measures of exclusion, and those Christians who raised 
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their voices to repudiate antisemitic persecution.  However, the Communists, including the FTP-64
MOI units, were still primarily concerned with a national, anti-fascist resurrection rather than the 
provision of aid to Jews.  65
 
 As more anti-Jewish legislation was enacted in 1942 – most importantly, the introduction of 
the yellow star in May in the occupied zone and the mass roundups that began during the summer – 
the responses of the French population to the persecution of the Jews changed. The distressing 
scenes that unfolded in the occupied zone and later in the southern zone moved the population and 
either removed many prejudices or ‘relegated them to the shadows’.  When the categories of the 66
persecution multiplied, including not only Jews but also communists and freemasons as well as 
French workers who were forced to work in Germany after February 1943 (with the introduction of 
the STO), more Frenchmen actively supported, or were engaged with, resistance activities.  This 67
included acts of sabotage, attacks, and the provision of false identity papers and hiding places as 
well as gathering intelligence and distributing it to the Allied powers.  However, there was still 68
very little help for persecuted Jews. The infringement of the sovereignty and honour of France 
remained the central focus of non-Jewish underground groups and newspapers. As Wieviorka 
concluded: ‘the fight against antisemitic persecution had mobilised Jewish and Christian 
organisations, but the internal resistance movements and the Free France organisations [led by 
Charles de Gaulle] remained largely apart from that process’.  Antisemitism had by no means 69
completely disappeared and, with the exception of a few isolated examples, French resistance 
groups remained silent.   70
 
 Lazare saw this history differently, claiming that ‘the Resistance, many members of the 
clergy, part of the administration, and elements of the population all took risks in actively and 
effectively participating in the rescue of Jews’, particularly after the STO and the deportation of 
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Jews from the summer of 1942 onwards.  In his view, the public disapproval by some bishops of 71
the persecution was decisive in bringing many French people to assist in rescuing Jews.  Recently, 72
Sémelin has claimed in a similar vein that individual acts of resistance were more prominent than 
has previously been thought. Sémelin argued that while only a portion of the Jews escaped France 
or were saved by organised rescue networks, the vast majority of Jews were aided by small gestures 
from the French population, including the provision of food and help in finding hiding places and 
ways to escape.  Sémelin has been criticised for his views by leading historians in the field, 73
including Robert Paxton, for failing, among other things, to recognise the power of the antisemitism 
that was inherent in French society.  Sémelin has nonetheless convincingly shown that Jews could 74
survive in France in many ways, often with the aid of French people.  
 
 From the summer of 1942, Jewish resisters of different nationalities began to work together 
with non-Jews of foreign nationalities under the umbrella of the MOI, which relied on the 
leadership of Jewish immigrants and other foreigners who had gained military experience.  Gildea 75
finds that there were important connections between the French communist resistance and 
immigrant Jews in France.  His work underlines that Jews, especially foreign Jews, cooperated 76
with a wide spectrum of other foreigners and that their role in the resistance, contrary to what other 
research has suggested, was substantial.  Jews were both recipients of Gentile help and 77
contributors to the wider strategy of resistance.  We have seen that there were a number of Jewish 78
organisations that (illegally) aided Jews and specifically aimed to shield them from persecution. The 
help of these organisations, including the Amelot Committee and the OSE, materialised 
predominantly on the initiative of Jews who had immigrated to France before the war. Their 
ideological and cultural differences meant that these organisations were initially suspicious of each 
other, but we will see that the interrelations that existed in France between Jewish and non-Jewish 
 Lazare, Rescue as resistance, 30. 71
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groups as well as between French and immigrant Jews began after a time to foster mutual 
clandestine operations under the cloaks of the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud.  
 
 In the Netherlands, ‘the inexperience in matters of war, occupation and illegal activity soon 
became apparent’ when the German troops crossed the border on 10 May 1940.  Initially, acts of 79
resistance were individual in nature. A sequence of anti-Jewish legislation, including raids in the 
Jewish quarter of Amsterdam, when over 400 Jewish men were arrested, resulted in the famous 
February strike on 25 and 26 February 1941. Encouraged by the illegal Dutch Communist Party 
(CPN), this was a coordinated strike during which, among other things, tram drivers and dock 
workers refused to work and factories, officers, stores and restaurants in Amsterdam were closed; at 
its peak, around 300,000 people took part. The next day, surrounding towns such as Zaandam, 
Utrecht, Hilversum and Haarlem followed Amsterdam’s example.  The strike was an isolated 80
incident: accommodation with the occupier remained the primary response in the following period. 
As in France, ‘the greatest impetus to civil disobedience and to wider resistance was the 
introduction of compulsory labour service’ more than one year later in September 1942.  As Moore 81
has argued, the nature of resistance in the Netherlands was changed by the institution of the 
Landelijke Organisatie voor Hulp aan Onderduikers (LO), whose leaders and early members were 
all from Christian backgrounds, and which helped workers go underground.  However, with some 82
exceptions, the provision of aid to Jews was only a minor part of the LO’s work, and was 
sometimes entirely absent.  Overall, because organised resistance took longer to develop than in 83
Belgium and France, it came too late to help the majority of Jews in the Netherlands.  84
 
 There are various aspects that explain these differences between the Netherlands on the one 
hand and Belgium and France on the other hand. The absence of large numbers of Jewish (political) 
immigrants in the Netherlands was a crucial factor. We have seen that the large number of 
immigrant Jews in Belgium and France had experienced persecution in eastern Europe and were 
well aware of the dangers of Nazi occupation. As soon as the Nazis occupied western Europe, these 
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Jews were the first to begin organising clandestine activities, operating as organised groups in 
parallel with the legal organisations via groups such as the Amelot Committee and the FI. The 
nature of migration, as well as the sheer number of immigrants, had been different in the 
Netherlands. As Moore has shown, the Netherlands, despite its proximity to Germany, was never 
considered a place of refuge for political refugees from the Third Reich in the 1930s, even for the 
many Jews who had fled from Poland to Germany earlier on.  Its ‘government by denominational 85
political parties with a relatively right-wing outlook contrasted markedly with the political chaos of 
the last years of the German Weimar Republic’.  While the country did provide refuge to members 86
of German left-wing parties, the Netherlands was relatively unattractive for this group of 
immigrants.  This was especially the case for those who wished to continue their political activities 87
because the Netherlands did not allow political activity by aliens who were considered subversive 
and undesirable elements.  In contrast, France absorbed most of the organised left-wing 88
immigrants during and after 1933 and, as we have already seen, these individuals became important 
in establishing clandestine networks.  89
 
 Their relative integration into non-Jewish society allowed Dutch Jews to develop a false 
sense of security. Like the majority of the Dutch population, they complied with the German 
occupation, responding with a traditional deference to authority and the Dutch sense of ‘civic 
duty’.  In contrast to the situation in Belgium and France, therefore, no Jewish armed resistance 90
groups were formed. Jews in the Netherlands had not experienced anti-Jewish violence on a large 
scale and therefore, they ‘were unused to forming defence groups and few had professional military 
experience’.  The works of Braber have shown that there was Jewish participation in early non-91
Jewish resistance groups, but in small numbers.  There were Jews who set up specific Jewish 92
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welfare and resistance groups, most notably the Nanno and Oosteinde groep and the Palestine 
Pioneers whose activities we have already examined, but again, their impact and representation was 
limited. The delay in the development of resistance activities in the Netherlands, together with the 
fact that the JR was disbanded relatively early (in September 1943), by comparison with its western 
European counterparts (which were disbanded close to the liberation in the summer of 1944), partly 
explains why few resistance groups operated alongside the JR, and why they failed to use the 
organisation as a cloak for their clandestine operations.  
 
3.3 Cloaking: interconnections between illegal groups and the Jewish organisations  
 
During the course of the war, the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud attracted, or had 
connections with, clandestine operators because their leaders and members had information and 
resources valuable to the resistance. In France, the interim president of the Central Consistory, Léon 
Meiss, who was a known critic of the UGIF, opposed the immediate dissolution of the UGIF in the 
summer of 1944 precisely for this reason.  The term ‘cloaking’ has been used to describe this 93
phenomenon of covert actions taking place under the legal cover of the Jewish bodies. It is a term 
best understood as the concealment or camouflage of illegal activities using the legality of the 
Jewish organisations, either with or without knowledge of its members. As we shall see, cloaking 
was a complex phenomenon that was often more central to the organisations than has previously 
been argued.  
 
 The level of cloaking activities undertaken under cover of the Jewish organisations differed. 
The same is true for the central board members’ awareness of, and participation in, these activities. 
Although it is impossible to generalise given the complicated nature of the occupation and changes 
in the compositions of the boards throughout the war, it is possible to identify three different levels 
of cloaking. In Belgium, there were some individuals who took on a crucial dual position within the 
AJB and the CDJ. The top level of leadership seemed to have had knowledge of this, but 
intentionally turned a blind eye so as not to hamper these actions. In the northern zone of France, 
the situation was similar, although here the leadership’s involvement in cloaking activities was more 
active. In the French southern zone, the federative structure of the UGIF-Sud, in which Jewish 
social welfare organisations were operating independently, made it relatively easy to engage in 
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clandestine activities that obstructed Nazi policies, using the legality of the organisation as a 
protective shield. On various levels, and in relatively large numbers, members of the UGIF-Sud 
central board played an active role in accommodating clandestine activities. In the case of the JR in 
the Netherlands, there were some initiatives to use the Council in this way but, compared with the 
other two countries, these were few and far between. There was relatively little knowledge among 
the Jewish leadership of illegal activities that were taking place in parallel with the activities  of the 
Council.  
 
Belgium: the Comité de Défense des Juifs and the AJB  
 
The perspectives of members of the CDJ on the relation between this illegal organisation and the 
AJB vary. It is generally understood that the CDJ’s propaganda activities were mainly directed 
against the AJB, ‘advising Jews to ignore its directives and to resist German measures’.  This 94
notion is confirmed in various postwar statements. For example, according to Alfred Rosenzweig, 
there was a hostile and disapproving outlook towards the AJB’s decisions and its activities.  Some 95
postwar interviews, including those recorded with Hertz Jospa in the late 1940s, indicate that the 
organisation’s central aim was to combat and sabotage the actions of the AJB.  According to people 96
who worked at the top of the FI (of which the CDJ, as we have seen, was part), such as Rudolf 
Roels and Roger Katz, president of the Anciens Combattants et Résistants Armés Juifs (Former 
Combatants and Armed Jewish Resistants), they never authorised contact with the AJB.  The CDJ 97
also actively discouraged people from approaching the AJB for help.  Yet there were important 98
connections between the two organisations. This is illustrated by a letter that prominent FI member 
Jean Terfve sent after the liberation on 17 October 1944, in which he claimed that the presence of 
the AJB was instrumental to the FI’s activities in defence of the Jews.  This notion is reinforced by 99
a letter sent in 1964 to the president of the Central des Oeuvres Juives in which former AJB head 
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Marcel Blum underlined that the AJB had worked in close collaboration with the services of the 
CDJ.  100
 
 Maurice Heiber personified the fluidity between the official AJB and the CDJ. In his 
capacity as head of the children’s service section of the Brussels branch of the AJB, Heiber 
established an orphanage in Wezembeek-Ophem for children whose parents had been deported. 
After the first major roundups in Paris in the summer of 1942, Emile Hambresin, a left-wing 
Catholic working for the FI, approached Heiber and asked him to join the FI, and, specifically, the 
CDJ.  After the war, Heiber claimed to have realised at this point that the AJB was in reality ‘an 101
organism that collaborated with the occupier and ultimately facilitated its control over the Jewish 
population’.  When he was introduced to Hertz Jospa, Abusz Werber and Chaïm Perelman, Heiber 102
agreed to work for the CDJ. Shadowing his legal role within the AJB, he became primarily 
responsible for the children’s section of this illegal organisation.  Heiber worked together with 103
Yvonne Jospa, the wife of Hertz Jospa, and Yvonne Nèvejean, head of the Oeuvre Nationale de 
l’Enfance (ONE), an official governmental agency that was created to promote children’s health and 
remained associated with the FI. A letter written on 7 November 1968 by Jean Terfve indicates that 
Heiber wanted to leave the AJB on several occasions. However, time and again, the FI leadership 
collectively decided it was in the interest of the resistance that he should continue to work for the 
AJB.  104
 
 The use of the AJB’s legal cover by the CDJ was complex. As soon as a parent applied to 
the legal AJB, or any other social service, the child would be sent from one office to another. All 
details about the child’s family background would then be deleted before the child was sent to the 
CDJ. The clandestine workers therefore made it impossible for the authorities or the parents to 
know who had directed the children to them. After that, the ‘childhood’ sections of the CDJ would 
be alerted and would facilitate contact with the parents. Parents had to be persuaded to give up their 
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children to the organisation and the child would then receive a false, non-Jewish identity.  105
Nèvejean, who joined the CDJ as member of the children’s section and sat on its finance committee, 
quickly organised an elaborate illegal network and was able to place between 3,000 and 4,000 
Jewish children, including those from the Wezembeek orphanage, at various locations.  The CDJ 106
benefited from the existence of the AJB children’s homes because of the resources available there 
and because many children were transferred through the organisation’s homes.  Rather than 107
openly disassociating himself from the AJB, Heiber continued to work for the organisation, which 
was considered by the CDJ leadership a useful camouflage for his illegal activities.  108
 
 There was a wider awareness among AJB officials of the dual position that Heiber held. 
David Ferdman, for example, who had fled from Poland to Belgium at the end of the 1930s and 
who himself worked for both the AJB and the CDJ, knew of Heiber’s illegal activities and covered 
for him whenever necessary. In March 1942, Ferdman had been appointed as inspector-general of 
charitable institutions at the AJB Brussels branch. He occupied a position in the AJB’s central board 
and he later became an active member of the CDJ with a direct connection to Chaim Perelman, the 
CDJ’s co-founder.  Hoping to benefit from the AJB’s existence, Heiber and Chaïm Perelman 109
aimed to get access to the deportation lists and other official documents and to exert influence on 
the AJB’s decisions and policies.  In January 1942, Ullman had already asked Perelman to join the 110
AJB Brussels branch but the latter was cautious and, as a technical advisor, he wanted to deal solely 
with matters related to teaching. He only became a fully committed member in November 1942, 
encouraged by the resistance, which saw his infiltration into the AJB as another opportunity to use 
its existence for their own benefit.  Perelman gained a central position in the organisation, 111
especially after the AJB was centralised in response to the Iltis operation in September 1943, an 
extensive operation launched against all Jews of Belgian nationality, and this enabled him to take 
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full advantage of his dual role in the legal AJB and illegal CDJ.  Importantly, the necessary funds 112
for the operations of the FI and CDJ were obtained in part through soustraits frauduleusement, or 
fraudulent subtractions, from the AJB via David Ferdman and Perelman.  In this way, the AJB 113
also served to finance clandestine activities. According to Marcel Blum, member of the central 
board and head of the AJB, many millions of Belgian francs, received from the Ministry of Finance, 
were clandestinely distributed through the AJB via the ONE and the Secours d’Hiver, with the AJB 
serving as a rideau officiel pour la clandestinité– an official cloak for clandestine activity.  114
 
 In addition to Maurice Heiber, David Ferdman and Chaïm Perelman, there were others, 
including Eugène Hellendall, Max Katz and Irène Zmigrod, who were involved in both the CDJ and 
the AJB.  In the introduction to this chapter, we saw that Zmigrod testified about the 115
interconnections between the organisations and how they operated alongside one another to 
safeguard Jewish children. Throughout the occupation, the social services of the AJB increasingly 
became an intermediate station where the boundaries between legality and illegality were unclear 
and permeable.  At times, the AJB offices served as a meeting place for Jews who wanted to go 116
into hiding and for the ‘distributors’ of the CDJ.  At the same time, CDJ members aimed to 117
influence the AJB’s workers by encouraging them not to follow the German directions.  Thus, the 118
AJB served both as a useful cloak and an organisation with whose policies the CDJ continued to 
disagree.  
 
 The first chairman of the AJB, Salomon Ullman, passively supported these illegal activities. 
Yitzak Kubowitzki, one of the leaders of the Brussels Zionist movement who disagreed with the 
actions of the AJB and engaged in clandestine activities instead, testified to this. He claimed there 
were clear signs that Ullman was aware of the undercover activities undertaken by individuals who 
worked for the AJB. During a conversation between the two men, Ullman warned Kubowitzki to 
prepare Jewish refugees for imminent arrests and encouraged him to approach Perelman in the 
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event that anything went wrong.  Clearly, Ullman was aware of the function that the AJB fulfilled 119
for the CDJ. At the same time, Roger van Praag, who had worked for the CDJ and filed a complaint 
against the AJB leaders immediately after the war, indicated that his contact with Ullman was less 
constructive. According to Van Praag, Ullman had not wanted to help him with his clandestine aid 
for Jews and even indicated that he, Van Praag, was putting all Jews in danger by encouraging them 
to go in hiding.  Ullman probably considered it too risky to actively cooperate himself with the 120
organisation. After the war, Ullman was asked whether the CDJ was founded with the support of the 
AJB. Ullman answered that the AJB officially had nothing to do with the CDJ because the Germans 
had appointed the AJB as the exclusive Jewish authority.  At the same time, he claimed that they 121
did meet on a personal level on a daily basis.  As Ullman resigned in October 1942 and the CDJ 122
was officially established in September 1942, it was only in the preparatory phase that Ullman, as 
head of the AJB, and the CDJ were in touch. However, we have seen that that links between the 
illegal CDJ and the AJB were established and maintained during the war. From the evidence 
presented here, we can say that the clandestine actions of clandestine organisations within the AJB, 
most importantly the CDJ, at times with the passive consent of the leadership, were of great 
importance, allowing these organisations to thwart Nazi goals and actions.  Although the AJB 123
cannot be considered a resistance organisation, its existence and the (silent) approval of its 
leadership or membership were important. There was a large grey area inside the AJB in which 
connections between legality and illegality were established.  
 
France: resistance and the UGIF  
 
The last president of the UGIF, Georges Edinger, claimed in a postwar report on the organisation’s 
activities that the UGIF was the most important ‘semi-clandestine, semi-official’ organisation. In an 
attempt to overcome the criticism that, as we have seen, prevailed after the liberation regarding the 
UGIF and, especially, Edinger, he asserted that its legal work primarily served to camouflage 
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clandestine activities.  While the reality was far more complex than Edinger suggested, we shall 124
see that the interconnections between the resistance and the UGIF were substantial. Furthermore, 
and contrary to what existing literature has suggested, there is evidence that there were manifold 
interrelations between French Jews organised in the UGIF and immigrant Jews organised in illegal 
groups throughout the course of the war.  The different organisational structures of the UGIF-125
Nord and the UGIF-Sud played a major role in their varying connections to clandestine activities. In 
the unoccupied zone, the UGIF-Sud had little impact on the still independently functioning Jewish 
(welfare) organisations, like the OSE and the EIF, that were incorporated under its umbrella. The 
UGIF-Sud was in fact the sum of these autonomously functioning relief organisations. Some of 
these organisations decided to establish illegal departments or engage in undercover activities by 
other means.  Since they were already operative under the official UGIF umbrella, the ‘cloaking’ 126
of illegal activities by these organisations should not be understood to have operated in the same 
way as it did in Belgium and the northern zone of France where (some of) the illegal groups that 
used the Jewish organisations as a cloak were not officially incorporated into them.  
 
The UGIF-Nord, the Amelot Committee and other illegal groups  
 
During the war, with increasing demands from Vichy and the Germans, many organisations in 
France moved from legal to clandestine activity. We have seen that the Amelot Committee was 
initially mainly preoccupied with rebuilding Jewish welfare, aiming to unite several preexisting 
legal immigrant Jewish organisations.  Unlike the French Jews, the immigrants had been actively 127
engaged in relief work immediately after May 1940 and Amelot encouraged French Jews to do 
likewise. In September 1940 it organised a special meeting to this effect, at which the ACIP was 
also represented.  The Amelot Committee’s central focus shifted after the mass arrest on 14 May 128
1941, when 6,500 Polish, Czech and Austrian Jews who were encouraged to report themselves to 
the prefectures, ostensibly in order to discuss their status, were placed in the camps at Pithiviers and 
Beaune-la-Rolande. On 20 August, Jews of other nationalities were arrested as well, including some 
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French Jews, and taken to Drancy camp.  By then, the Amelot Committee had been forced to 129
withdraw from the Comité de Coordination and had become a semi-clandestine organisation 
growing closer to the communist MOI and its Solidarité organisation, although their alliance 
backfired after the German attack on the Soviet Union, ‘when the communists attempted to 
dominate the other groups whose objectives were more narrowly based than the outright ideological 
and armed struggle against fascism’.  As Moore had indicated, the path of the Amelot Committee 130
towards illegality ‘was a gradual one, and its relationship with the Jewish communist movement 
MOI and its Solidarité remained fraught, but all were directly involved in ameliorative relief for a 
Jewish population that was economically and socially marginalized from mainstream society’.  131
 
 After the establishment of the UGIF-Nord, the legal activities of the Amelot Committee 
were formally dissolved and transferred into its administration. However, the Committee continued 
to operate separately from the UGIF-Nord leadership, and the latter was aware that it needed the 
support and trust of immigrant Jews to establish a solid basis of support among the Jews in France. 
In order to neutralise immigrant opposition and to gain a position of authority within the Jewish 
communities, the UGIF-Nord organised a meeting with the Amelot Committee on 28 January 
1942.  This meeting shows that there were crucial interrelations between central individuals of the 132
UGIF-Nord central board – Baur, Musnik, Stern, Stora, and Weil-Hallé – and the Amelot 
Committee.  Knowing that the UGIF-Nord leaders could have forced Amelot to be integrated into 133
the organisation, and refusing to dissolve itself, the Amelot Committee was prepared to set aside its 
moral objections to the UGIF as an organisation that cooperated with the Nazi occupier, and it 
promised to refrain from attacking the organisation and focus instead on its relief activities. At the 
same time, the Amelot Committee continued to disavow all responsibility for the UGIF-Nord’s 
activities.  The UGIF-Nord, in turn, promised not to impose control on the Amelot Committee or 134
interfere with its activities.  Amelot was able to use the financial resources of the UGIF-Nord, 135
while it in turn provided the UGIF-Nord with access to its social infrastructure and to the immigrant 
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population. The interrelation between the two organisations was thus based on pragmatism: they 
exchanged information, ‘referred clients to each other’s programs, collaborated in the sending of 
packages to Drancy, and so on’.  With financial assistance from the UGIF-Nord, the Amelot 136
Committee was able to provide by running soup kitchens, two dispensaries and a cloakroom for 
Jews who were in need of clothing and shoes. Until June 1943, the canteens functioned 
autonomously under the surveillance of the UGIF-Nord and were at the centre of the provisions of 
food for Jews. They also served as gathering places where Jews discussed the latest anti-Jewish 
regulations and possible ways to escape or impede them.  137
 
 While availing themselves of the legal structures of the UGIF-Nord when necessary and 
maintaining their organisational autonomy, the Amelot Committee also engaged in various kinds of 
extralegal activity. Amelot helped Jews who wanted to go into hiding, and ‘systematically scattered 
out as many children as they could’.  They also secured hiding places for those Jews who had 138
escaped the raids and found ways to bring them to the southern zone.  In addition, they helped 139
those who came to their offices to obtain false papers.  The Amelot Committee remained separate 140
from the UGIF-Nord leadership as an organisation engaged in illegal activities, while it used the 
organisation’s funds to provide legal social aid. Although André Baur and Marcel Stora had initially 
unsuccessfully tried to engage members of the Amelot Committee inside the legal sphere of the 
UGIF-Nord, the Jewish leadership nonetheless accepted its role as a façade for Amelot’s 
independent activities.   141
 
 In the second half of 1942, Amelot definitively shifted its main emphasis from relief work to 
‘humanitarian resistance’.  Some members of the UGIF-Nord actively aided the Amelot 142
Committee to carry out its activities, for example, by warning them about upcoming raids. In 1942, 
the Amelot Committee was informed that Jews would be taken from their homes during the night of 
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16-17 July as part of the so-called Vél d’Hiv’ roundup, during which over 13,000 Jews in Paris were 
arrested and two-thirds were temporarily confined in the Vélodrome d’Hiver. It spread the news 
among its people.  While the group had considered permanently shutting their legal canteens, the 143
leadership eventually came to believe that deprivation posed a greater threat than police raids and 
decided not to dissolve its activities.  The ways in which the UGIF-Nord functioned as a façade 144
for the Amelot Committee and its closely associated illegal groups, varied. One of the most obvious 
and basic forms of cloaking was the use of the UGIF’s identity cards, which allowed illegal workers 
to operate more freely while carrying out its clandestine activities.  The Amelot leaders had 145
previously objected to the use of UGIF identity cards on moral grounds, but reconsidered their 
decision in the summer of 1942 and this ensured that they were better able to continue their wide 
range of activities.  The importance of access to these cards should not be underestimated. It 146
provided a major benefit to the quasi-legal Amelot Committee compared to other illegal groups 
which had been forced to go underground.  
 
 Cloaking activities occurred at other levels as well. A wartime report of the Amelot 
Committee gives us an insight into the tactics that were used. In October 1942, a member of the 
Committee wrote: ‘We provide the first assistance because the machinery of the UGIF is slower [..] 
If the UGIF rejects a request, we keep the case in our charge [..]. Relations, both within this 
committee and in general between the UGIF and ourselves are cordial’.  The Amelot Committee 147
took up tasks the UGIF-Nord either did not want to, or could not, carry out. For example, around 
900 families in Paris were in such a precarious situation that they did not dare contact the UGIF-
Nord. Instead, they were aided by the Amelot Committee.  A report of 18 May 1943 shows that 148
the CGQJ was aware that the dispensary “La Mère et l’Enfant” on the rue Amelot, where the 
Amelot Committee resided, had a ‘secret bureau’ on the second floor and that it clandestinely 
dispersed children among non-Jewish families.  The UGIF-Nord continued to serve as a cloak for 149
the Amelot Committee until the arrest of its leader David Rapoport on 1 June 1943, less than one 
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month after the CGQJ report. After that, all of the projects of the Amelot Committee were 
incorporated into sections of the UGIF-Nord.  150
 
 There were also other groups that used the legality of the UGIF-Nord to engage in 
undercover  activities. In a postwar interview, Denise Schorr Khaitman noted that while she worked 
in the children’s homes of the organisation, there was a whole network of clandestine organisations 
that attempted to move these children from the occupied to the unoccupied zone, or even to 
Switzerland and Israel.  Khaitman stated that this happened under the legal cover of the UGIF-151
Nord and in cooperation with its members, including Fernand Musnik and Juliette Stern, head of the 
social services division of the UGIF-Nord from January 1942, whose main responsibility was the 
social governance of Jewish children.  Organisations such as the EIF did indeed use the legal 152
cloak of the UGIF-Nord to undertake these activities. We have seen that before the war, the EIF had 
already established a unique organisational foundation throughout the entire country that included 
both immigrant and French Jews.  The organisation was integrated into the fourth direction of the 153
UGIF-Nord as the Service Social des Jeunes (SSJ), where it became the sixth section. The 
clandestine division of this sixth section – the sixième – was from July 1942 active on three levels: 
in the occupied zone, the unoccupied zone and in the armed resistance ‘the maquis’.  In May 154
1943, the illegal sixième was established in Paris. Its administration was in the hands of Musnik, 
who officially worked for the Jeunesse et Reclassement Professionel of the UGIF-Nord’s fourth 
group, and Emmanuel Lefschetz, director of the UGIF-Nord home in rue Claude Bernard.  Before 155
the war, Musnik had been actively involved in Parisian youth movements, including as a member of 
the directory board of the Fédération de la Jeunesse Sioniste et Pro-Palestiene de France. From 
1939, he also played an active role in the EIF. Between 1940 and 1944, he was in charge of the EIF 
and, among other things, participated in the creation of false papers in the northern zone.  After 156
the Vél d’Hiv roundup in the summer of 1942, Lefschetz established a Jewish youth network which 
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served under the auspices of the EIF.  This group, in which his daughter Denise was involved, 157
traced Jewish children in the Paris area whose parents had been deported and provided false identity 
papers and hiding places for them.  The notion that clandestine groups were created in parallel to 158
existing welfare institutions in direct response to the Vél d’Hiv roundup is reinforced by a postwar 
testimony from Denise Gamzon, whose husband Robert Gamzon was the founder of the EIF.  159
 
 Another organisation that used the legal cloak of the UGIF-Nord was the Mouvement de 
Jeunesse Sioniste (MJS). We have seen that during the 1920s and 1930s, Zionist activity increased 
in France and numerous Zionist youth organisations were established, with each reflecting a 
particular political ideological orientation.  At the initiative of Simon Lévitte, a national leader of 160
the Jewish scouts, representatives of various Zionist youth organisations came together in 
Montpellier in May 1942 for a Zionist Unification Congress. An ardent Zionist, Lévitte was born in 
Ukraine and had published a book on modern Zionism in 1936 after which he and his wife 
emigrated to Palestine where he worked in a kibbutz.  On the eve of the war, they returned to 161
France.  During the Unification Congress, Lévitte convinced the individual organisations' leaders 162
to disband their organisations and to form a unified Zionist youth organisation to provide young 
Jews with a ‘Zionist eduction, physical training and vocational skills they would need to create 
successful communities in Palestine’.  The MJS was established with Lévitte as general secretary 163
and Jules ‘Dika’ Jefroykin, founder of the Résistance Juive and later the Armée Juive, as 
president.  Soon after the organisation’s establishment, foreign Jews were arrested and deported 164
and the organisation’s activities shifted to relief work and humanitarian resistance.  Refusing to be 165
integrated in the legal UGIF, the MJS became a clandestine Zionist youth organisation, whose 
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members consisted primarily of foreign-born Jews.  As well as rescuing Jews and promoting 166
Zionist education, the organisation’s leaders wanted to participate in the armed resistance for the 
liberation of France and they sent volunteers to the Allied armies.   167
 
 While not all members were involved in, or knew about, the resistance work in which the 
MJS was engaged, most of its members participated in the rescue of Jewish children and in 
arranging the illegal passage of Jews to Switzerland, in close cooperation with the OSE, the EIF and 
the AJ.  Moreover, the majority of MJS members were directly connected to the armed AJ.  168 169
While the existing literature has primarily underlined the MJS’s operations in the southern zone, the 
organisation was also active in the Paris area.  In a postwar interview, Albert Akerberg, who was 170
responsible for the coordination of the MJS and the sixième in Paris from 1943, emphasised the 
permeable nature of the boundaries between illegality and legality in the UGIF-Nord. He explained 
that he had weekly meetings with Juliette Stern and Benjamin Weill-Hallé to discuss the illegal 
activities that took place under its cloak.  While Akerberg served at the head of the sixième, which 171
aimed to assist all Jews who lived illegally and could not rely on the legal aid of the UGIF-Nord, he 
cooperated with Jacques Pulver, Fredy Menachem and Toni Stern, who worked for the UGIF.  172
Most of the members of the sixième belonged to the EIF, whose organisation in the southern zone 
had been dissolved by Vichy in January 1943. While its functions were transferred to the second 
and third direction of the UGIF-Sud, some of its members were sent to Paris to encourage and 
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participate in illegal activities there.  These examples highlight not only the strong analogies 173
between the clandestine groups, but also show that the boundaries between legality and illegality 
were porous.  
 
 The connections between the legal UGIF-Nord and illegal organisations went beyond the 
passing of information or the use of the organisation as a (passive) cloak to cover clandestine 
activities. In fact, members of the UGIF-Nord actively used illegal organisations for their own 
benefit. This can be seen in the cases of Lucienne Scheid-Haas and Hélène Berr, who combined 
their legal work for the UGIF-Nord with secret operations.  For example, while voluntarily 174
employed as social worker for the UGIF, Berr was also Denise Milhaud’s secretary at the Entraide 
Temporaine (Mutual Assistance), a clandestine organisation that was instituted in 1941 under the 
cloak of the Service Social d’Aide aux Émigrants (Social Service of Assistance to Emigrants, 
SSAE).  Even though Berr did not reflect upon this dual role in her diary, she underlined the 175
ambiguous feeling she had towards working for the UGIF: 
 [A]ll we were doing was trying to relieve other people’s misfortunes. We knew what was happening; 
 every extra regulation, every deportation squeezed greater pain out of us. People called us   
 collaborators, because those who came to see us had just had a relative arrested, and it was natural 
 that they should react that way when they saw us sitting behind desks. Department for the  
 exploitation of other people’s misfortunes. Yes, I can see why other people thought that’s what we 
 were [..]. Why did I accept the job? To be able to do something, to come as close as I could to  
 misfortune. We did all we could to assist the internees. People who knew us well understood and  
 judged us fairly.  176
 
The cases of Eugène Minkowski and Juliette Stern, who were both closely associated with illegality, 
also exemplify this. Minkowski headed the illegal OSE while also working for the ‘socio-medical’ 
department of the UGIF-Nord. While the four OSE children’s homes (two in Montmorency, and the 
others in Soisy and Eaubonne) were closed in 1940 and the Paris office only retained eight 
employees for its four offices, Minkowski intensified the OSE’s work to hide Jews in the summer of 
1942. As a result, the organisation managed to save 600 Jewish children in the Paris region from 
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deportation by cooperating with the EIF.   177
 
 As head of the social services of the UGIF-Nord, Juliette Stern was mainly responsible for 
children, including those whose parents had been arrested and interned in Drancy, and who were in 
need of care after they had been (temporarily) released from the camp. These children were 
‘blocked’ and were not allowed to be transferred to another location because they would eventually 
be interned in Drancy again. While some of them went to UGIF homes, others were placed in foster 
homes through the so-called ‘Service 42’.  After the raids of Vél d’Hiv, Stern decided, against 178
German orders, to transfer the children to non-Jewish families and institutions. Many of the children 
she took care of were maintained in the UGIF-Nord centres that were supervised by the police, but 
children were also smuggled out of these places with Stern’s knowledge.  She created a secret 179
parallel institution to the legal social ‘Service 42’, called Service 42B, through which she was able 
to disperse around a thousand children. A network of organisations involved in the illegal dispersion 
of Jewish children among non-Jewish families, including the Amelot Committee and Minowski’s 
OSE allowed her to do this.  180
 
 A report of the CGQJ’s head Antignac to SS-Obersturmführer Röthke on 22 April 1943 
concerning the ‘clandestine activities of the UGIF’ shows that Vichy and German officials were 
aware of the existence of the illegal Service 42B and the placement of Jewish children in Aryan 
families.  While Antignac encouraged Röthke to start an investigation into these activities, the 181
Gestapo instead arrested the members of the groupe 5, responsible for the children’s homes; all 
were deported and murdered.  At the time of the arrest, Stern was not present in the UGIF 182
facilities and she managed to escape arrest. Thereafter, she cooperated with the illegal groups to 
make sure the children were removed from the homes as soon as possible. The communist 
underground organisation Mouvement National Contre le Racisme (national movement against 
racism, MNCR), for example, ‘kidnapped’ the children from the UGIF-Nord homes with the 
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complicity of Stern and members of the organisation’s local branches.  Stern not only tried to 183
protect these children from deportation. She also wanted their Jewish identity to be preserved, 
which is of crucial importance taking into consideration that the Nazis aimed to deport and murder 
the entirety of the Jewish population in Europe. In the light of the Nazis’ aim to deport and murder 
the entirety of Europe’s Jewish population, this was an extraordinary act of identity politics.  
 
 These examples show that while the Amelot Committee worked in tandem with the UGIF-
Nord to hide its clandestine activities, without disclosing information about the identity of its 
clients, Juliette Stern used undercover organisations to transfer some of the children she was 
responsible for to safer locations. There was an interplay between legality and illegality here, which 
worked for both ‘sides’. As Poznanski has indicated: ‘UGIF dispensaries were often a virtually 
mandatory first stop for children going from a legal to a clandestine existence’.  The interactions 184
between the legality of the UGIF-Nord and an illegal group such as the Amelot Committee were at 
times extremely complex and were considered to be mutually beneficial. Cohen has argued that 
people like Juliette Stern and Fernand Musnik should have opposed the UGIF-Nord leadership 
because it strongly encouraged Jews to abide by antisemitic regulations.  However, the examples 185
here demonstrate that involvement in illegal or quasi-legal activities were mutually beneficial and 
were taking place at more than the purely individual level. We have seen that at an early stage of the 
occupation, the UGIF-Nord leadership had already agreed to function as a cloak for the quasi-legal 
activities of Amelot. The leadership allowed the Amelot Committee to operate independently, and 
did not exercise any control over its activities or accounts.  There was therefore a degree of trust 186
between the two organisations. It should be noted that access to financial resources was 
indispensable for any underground activity. In addition to the financial support of the UGIF-Nord, 
Amelot also relied on the Federation of Jewish Societies in France (FSJF) for the financing of its 
illegal activities and, in turn, supported the illegal Solidarité with its finances when this organisation 
ran short of funds.  The FSJF, which operated in the southern zone, received funds from the Joint 187
Distribution Committee and from July 1943 until the liberation in August 1944, the organisation 
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sent 600,000 francs per month to the Amelot Committee.  Rapoport, the head of the Amelot 188
Committee, also collected funds by borrowing from Jews who wished to shelter their savings. On 
the basis of an agreement with the Joint it was agreed that those who had provided loans would be 
reimbursed no later than three months after the official end of the war.  189
 
 Georges Edinger, who succeeded Raoul Lambert as the president of the UGIF and headed 
the UGIF-Nord after Baur was interned, claimed that the UGIF-Nord continued to be used to 
camouflage resistance from the summer of 1943 onwards.  However, cloaking clandestine 190
activities became increasingly difficult during this period.  After the war, a former UGIF 191
employee who had worked for the social welfare department, Berthe Libers, attacked ‘certain 
dubious elements’ for having tried to save their own skins and having collaborated with people like 
Xavier Vallat.  As the last serving president of the UGIF, Edinger responded in an unpublished 192
work titled La vérité sur l’UGIF. Enfin! in which he emphasised the multiple links between the 
UGIF and resistance networks.  French historian Michel Laffitte refers to Edinger’s defence as 193
‘densely written and sometimes contradictory in details’ and underlined that Edinger failed to 
mention ‘the immense element of uncertainty, the moments of distress, terror and improvisation, 
and the leaders’ lack of action plan with regard to an extermination policy which they had the 
greatest difficulty understanding and anticipating [sic]’.  Since Edinger refused to hand over his 194
personal records to the CDJC, part of his records remain inaccessible to researchers, Laffitte seems 
to doubt the truthfulness of Edinger’s statements.  The preceding sections have shown that while it 195
is sometimes not clear whether UGIF officials were aware of, or actively facilitating, cloaking of 
clandestine activities, there were definitely multiple links between the UGIF-Nord and resistance 
networks in France.  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The UGIF-Sud and its multiple interactions with clandestine organisations  
 
When we compare the UGIF-Sud to the JR, the AJB and the UFIF-Nord, we find that the 
boundaries between legality and illegality were highly permeable in the unoccupied zone (renamed 
the southern zone after the Germans invaded this part of France in November 1942). The welfare 
organisations that operated under the UGIF-Sud’s umbrella were autonomous, and not bound by 
UGIF policy. As a result, it was easy for the leadership of some welfare organisations to provide 
social assistance, both legally and illegally, under the guise of the UGIF-Sud and without fear of its 
intervention.  From the summer of 1942, as we have seen, some of the organisations that had been 196
transformed into sections of the UGIF-Sud set up illegal parallel bodies, including the third (health) 
section (the OSE), the fourth (youth) section (the EIF) and the fifth (assistance to refugees and those 
interned) section (the CAR and the FSJ). Crucially, the very top of the UGIF-Sud leadership was 
aware of, and even encouraged, illegal activities. Existing prewar relations played a major role in 
fostering illegal activities in the Jewish organisation. For example, the OSE’s leader Joseph Millner 
was close to Lambert because they had worked together for the Univers Israélite during the 1930s, 
and Millner benefitted from Lambert’s leading role in the UGIF-Sud while establishing clandestine 
activities.  The Jewish leadership could also capitalise on its  connections with non-Jews that had 197
been established in the decades before the war.  198
 
 We have seen that during the first stages of the war, French Jews were similar to their non-
Jewish compatriots in holding the belief that the French State would protect French Jews against 
persecution. From the end of 1942, prominent members of the UGIF-Sud – Lambert, Schah, 
Spanien, and Gamzon – came to ‘a more realistic appraisal of Vichy’ and realised they would not be 
protected.  After the German invasion of the south of France, which put an end to legal emigration 199
possibilities for Jews, these four men began to support or condone clandestine activities, including 
the illegal migration or hiding of Jewish children.  The connections between the UGIF-Sud and 200
underground workers were many and complex. Although there had traditionally existed a division 
between French and immigrant Jews, these differences were partly overcome in the context of the 
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UGIF-Sud. The organisation has often been considered elitist, but Lambert’s background in Jewish 
relief work and his willingness to serve the interests of the immigrant Jewish community, combined 
with the connections between the UGIF-Sud and clandestine groups which mainly consisted of 
immigrant Jews, shows that the reality was more complex.  
 
 We have seen that the EIF in the southern zone had to be dissolved and incorporated into the 
fourth direction of the UGIF-Sud in spring 1942.  In January 1943, Vichy officials dissolved the 201
entire fourth direction. A letter from Darquier de Pellepoix to the UGIF-Sud, sent on 5 January 
1943, shows that he was dissatisfied with the way the EIF had been reorganised as the SSJ under 
the umbrella of the UGIF. Darquier accused the Jewish leaders of having appeared to integrate the 
EIF into its own services while in fact allowing the organisation to remain intact. He indicated that 
the dissolution of the EIF’s services was supposed to have been total, and should have included the 
full transfer of its resources to the UGIF.  In his diary, Lambert reflected upon the discussions he 202
had had with Antignac about the order to disband the Jewish Scouts, held during his trip to Vichy on 
12 and 13 January. He noted that, in the end, he had managed to save two of the four EIF 
sections.  While some of the organisation’s functions were moved to the second direction, the SSJ 203
was moved to the third direction (health), which incorporated the OSE. Ironically, the Vichy 
measure to dissolve the EIF facilitated cooperation between OSE and the SSJ’s sixième, both of 
which were becoming increasingly clandestine by this point.  The illegal activities of the sixième, 204
such as the manufacture and use of false identity papers and ration tickets and the clandestine 
placement of children, were always conducted under the official cover of the SSJ.   205
 
 Robert Gamzon, founder of the EIF and also member of the UGIF-Sud’s central board, 
explained in his memoirs that in each city’s UGIF office, the sixième was represented. When 
someone turned to the youth service of the UGIF and it was clear that he needed more than ‘official 
aid’, they arranged a meeting outside the organisation’s office and offered clandestine help.  This 206
was done particularly in the cases of foreign Jewish children and adolescents, or those French Jews 
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whose parents had been arrested or sought by the Gestapo or the French police.  Gamzon’s 207
memoirs also show that clandestine organisations like the EIF, the OSE and the MJS cooperated 
closely with members of the UGIF’s Marseille branch.  While using his legal position in the 208
UGIF-Sud to prevent Jews from being arrested and deported, Gamzon also actively looked for 
people who could help with clandestine operations. In a postwar interview, Liliane Klein-Lieber 
described how Gamzon recruited her for clandestine work in Moissac in the Tarn-et-Garonne 
department. She had been a youth member of the EIF in Grenoble and helped with hiding children 
and the production of false identity papers. She claimed this was relatively easy because the local 
police was complicit in these activities. As a result, hardly any of her illegal group members were 
caught. This was very different from the situation in Nice, where almost all Jews responsible for the 
sixième were arrested.  209
 
 Through the official channels provided by the UGIF-Sud, organisations such as the EIF and 
the OSE gained access to internment camps and developed important relations with non-Jewish 
relief societies.  As a result, these organisations could engage in the rescue of Jewish children 210
from round-ups and deportation. As we have seen, this was initially achieved legally, but from the 
summer of 1942, after the massive roundups of foreign Jews throughout the southern zone, these 
practices became increasingly illegal.  While he combined his role as member of the legal UGIF-211
Sud central board with actively participating in the clandestine rescue of Jews, Gamzon also used 
his position to inform illegal workers about forthcoming German actions and regulations.  Despite 212
his successful dual role, by the end of 1943, Gamzon felt that it was morally impossible to continue 
working for the UGIF. During a meeting between the UGIF and the Consistory on 6 October 1943, 
he recommended the dissolution of the UGIF.  After this failed to happen, Gamzon left the 213
organisation. After that, he continued his resistance activities and, among other things, created a 
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Jewish partisan unit within the Maquis de Vabres in 1943.  214
 
 The chairman of the UGIF-Sud, Raymond-Raoul Lambert, was actively engaged in 
facilitating the actions of illegal workers. In the wake of the mass arrests of French and foreign Jews 
in Marseille in January 1943, Lambert had appointed Dika Jefroykin and his cousin Maurice Brener 
as ‘social inspectors’ of the UGIF-Sud. By then, these men were important members of the Jewish 
resistance movement Armée Juive (AJ) and acted as financial intermediaries between resistance 
groups and the Joint.  In this capacity, they were able to finance illegal operations. Gamzon’s 215
diary shows that his clandestine activities were financially supported by the Joint with the help of 
Brener and Jefroykin.  A postwar statement by Albert Akerberg testified to the financial support 216
Brener provided to clandestine operations in order to save Jewish children in the northern zone.  217
The protection of UGIF identification cards allowed the two men to move freely in the southern 
zone and gave them ‘protected access’ to the north.  Their ten-day ‘special mission’ to the north in 218
May 1943, ostensibly to discuss the reorganisation of the UGIF, enabled them to establish further 
contact with resistance groups that were active in both zones.  There is little doubt that Lambert 219
deliberately appointed the men without a well-defined task so that they could continue their 
clandestine activities. Jefroykin, one of the founders of the Jewish resistance movement in 
November 1941, testified to the close contact the UGIF-Sud maintained with the Jewish armed 
resistance group AJ specifically and resistance groups more broadly. In fact, meetings between 
representatives of the UGIF-Sud, the Consistory and resistance organisations seem to have taken 
place fairly regularly.  The relation between the UGIF-Sud and the AJ was not one of distrust or 220
disapproval. Jefroykin specifically noted that he did not consider the UGIF leaders traitors: ‘we 
simply thought they had made a dangerous error’.  221
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 Throughout 1943, Lambert was in contact with Angelo Donati, an Italian Jew who planned a 
mass evacuation of Jews from the Italian-occupied French zone.  In November 1942, more than 222
15,000 Italian soldiers had invaded France following the Allied invasion of North Africa, occupying 
nine departments in southeastern France, a zone that was delimited by the Rhône on its western 
border and the Savoy to the north.  The Italians refused to give in to Nazi pressure and opposed 223
anti-Jewish legislation, allowing Jews to flee from persecution to the Italian zone.  Even though 224
Jews benefitted from this situation, the myth of the brava gente (good fellow), fostered by this 
relatively low-key Italian occupation of the French regions, in contrast to comparatively brutal 
Italian occupation of the Balkans, has recently been reconsidered by some scholars.  To the UGIF-225
Sud, the Italian invasion provided opportunities to foster clandestine operations in this region. Even 
though he does not reflect upon this directly in his diary, it is clear that Lambert met Donati on at 
least one occasion during his visits to Nice in the spring of 1943.  Donati had strong connections 226
with France as he had been a liaison officer during the First World War and was a respected banker 
in Paris in the interwar period. Furthermore, he had helped Jewish refugees who fled to Paris in 
order to escape persecution in Germany in the 1930s and he continued his work in the unoccupied 
zone after 1940. During the war, Donati was associated with Father Pierre-Marie Benoît, who acted 
as an intermediary between the inmates of Les Milles internment camp and the authorities and had 
access to a large network of Catholics and Protestants in and around Marseille. Father Benoît used 
his position to obtain false identity papers and hiding places and he helped individuals to escape the 
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camps.  He also became involved with armed resistance groups who organised escape routes via 227
Spain to North Africa.  The connections between Donati and Father Benoît and, in turn, between 228
Donati and Lambert suggest that clandestine operations in this region may have been carried out 
with the knowledge of the UGIF-Sud’s leadership.  
 
 After his arrest, Lambert showed other clear signs of his (intimate) connections with 
illegality. From Drancy, he sent several coded messages to Maurice Brener that referred to illegal 
activities carried out under the guise of the UGIF-Sud. For example, when the children of the La 
Verdière home had been seized and arrived in Drancy, Lambert indicated that this could have been 
avoided if they had been sent to Lorraine and then over the border to Switzerland.  We have seen 229
that Brener, in addition to his role as ‘social inspector’ of the UGIF-Sud, was active in the AJ and 
was charged with establishing connections with non-Jewish resistance movements who specialised 
in creating false papers.  In the postwar trial against former head of the CGQJ Joseph Antignac, 230
Brener claimed that he busied himself mostly with illegal activities, with the support of Lambert 
and ‘other leaders of the UGIF’; Lambert was an important (silent) source and supporter of their 
illegal actions.  231
 
 The previous paragraphs have shown that the negative and morally weighted image of the 
UGIF provided by those such as Maurice Rajsfus (whose work is revealingly titled ‘Jews in 
collaboration’) should be refuted. At the same time, it would be wrong to argue that the UGIF-Sud 
was in fact an extension of illegal groups, or indeed the other way around. The UGIF was never 
actually led into outright resistance and its structures remained legal. However, Cohen’s assertion 
that Lambert ‘wavered and opted for a middle road’ between legality and illegality does not fully 
recognise his significant role in supporting clandestine activities.  We have seen that Lambert 232
deliberately chose to facilitate activities that obstructed Nazi policies and that he allowed the UGIF-
Sud to be used as a cloak for clandestine activities on various levels. There was an intrinsic 
relationship between the two spheres. In contrast to the Belgium and the Netherlands, the leadership 
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was strongly involved in this process. Taking into consideration the fact that the UGIF’s policies 
were largely defined by Lambert, this is important. As the course of the war changed and both the 
UGIF-Sud members and the illegal workers who had been engaged in these activities were arrested, 
the nature of these relations changed as well. Nevertheless, as Cohen has made clear, since none of 
them advocated the organisation’s dissolution, the ‘twilight activity’ of legality and illegality 
continued to exist.  233
 
 After the summer of 1943, when Lambert had been deported, the UGIF rapidly began to 
lose credibility and hostility towards the organisation grew. Whereas communists and immigrant 
Jews, united in the Fédération, had been fighting against the UGIF from very early on, others too 
now realised that its position was no longer politically viable. Beginning in the spring of 1943, the 
French resistance had set out to unite all its movements, pressuring the UGIF to abolish itself. In the 
meantime, Raymond Geissmann, the last president of the UGIF, continued to underline that all of its 
work had been designed to respond to the needs of the Jewish community.  On 13 August 1944, 234
Léon Meiss, president of the Consistory, supported the position taken by Geissmann.  Meiss 235
argued that the UGIF provided social support and security to many of the Jews living in France and 
that it succeeded in preserving the independence of traditionally important Jewish services. He 
furthermore underlined that some of the UGIF members had paid for these activities with their 
lives.  As president of the CRIF, which officially represented both immigrant and French Jews, 236
Meiss proposed in the end to liquidate the UGIF.  On 23 August 1944, during the battle for the 237
liberation of Paris, Geissmann ordered the dissolution of the UGIF.  Two days later, the French 238
capital city was liberated.  
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The JR: cloaking and illegal activity on an individual level  
 
In the Netherlands, illegal activities under the cloak of the JR were limited compared to the two 
other countries. We have seen that there was comparatively little engagement in (organised) 
clandestine activity during the first phase of the German occupation in this country.  Whereas the 239
presence of large numbers of immigrants was a major catalyst for the emergence of clandestine 
activities alongside the AJB, UGIF-Nord and UGIF-Sud, the nature and scope of immigration 
prevented this from happening in the Netherlands. We will see that this was furthermore hampered 
by the attitude of the JR leadership, who strongly believed in the legal course of the Council and did 
little to encourage illegal activities.  Despite these limitations, there was still a tendency for some JR 
members, who were not part of the central board, to use the Council as a cloak for clandestine 
activities. This idea is reinforced by several witness statements that were taken preparation for the 
trial against Asscher and Cohen.   240
 
 The case of JR member Walter Süskind, born in Germany in 1906, is illustrative of illegal 
activities that were carried out under the Council’s cloak. After the JR’s leadership appointed 
Süskind head of the Hollandsche Schouwburg, where Jews were assembled before being 
transported to Westerbork transit camp, he used his position, his knowledge of German, and close 
relationship with some German officials to smuggle Jews out of the Schouwburg.  Süskind’s work 241
was initially dedicated to liberating Jewish adults from captivity, but he also organised the escape of 
children from January 1943 onwards.  While parents were forced to stay in the Schouwburg 242
during the day, their babies and small children were taken across the road to a crèche, the 
‘Kweekschool’, headed by Henriëtte Pimentel. Süskind and the Jewish women who worked in the 
crèche managed to save many Jewish children from deportation by smuggling them out of the day 
care facility because the crèche was not as closely guarded as the Schouwburg.  The children’s 243
registration documents were removed from the Schouwburg files and the children were then handed 
over to resistance groups, for example during the daily walks the nurses organised for the children 
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in the Schouwburg area. Although the German guards on the opposite side of the road carefully 
scrutinised activities in the surroundings of the Schouwburg, the crèche's employees were able to 
use the trams that passed outside as a cover to hand the children over to the rescuers who would in 
turn use the trams as a way to get quickly away from the scene.   244
 
 Initially, only those children whose parents had given approval were smuggled out of the 
crèche. Children who were caught in hiding and subsequently placed in the crèche were an 
exception because it was generally not known where the parents were. As a result of the hazardous 
position in which these children found themselves – being caught in hiding meant you would be put 
on transport as a ‘punishment case’ – these children received priority.  Süskind and the crèche 245
employees cooperated with at least four organised non-Jewish resistance groups in order to provide 
a safer place for the children: Het Utrechts Kindercomité (the UKC), De Amsterdamse 
Studentengroep (the ASG), De Naamloze Vennootschap (the NV) and De Trouwgroep.  The 246
children were distributed to non-Jewish families and hiding places throughout the country. The 
daughter of JR chairman David Cohen, Virrie Cohen, became the crèche’s leader after Pimentel was 
arrested and she was also involved in these clandestine activities. One of the NV’s members 
reflected upon this after the war and noted that, with the aid of people like Süskind and Virrie 
Cohen, children were removed from the crèche and temporarily housed in places of shelter in 
Amsterdam. There, the children received false identification papers and, usually after one or two 
days, were moved to a location elsewhere outside Amsterdam.  Estimates of the number of 247
children who were smuggled out of the crèche and saved from persecution vary but amount to at 
least a several hundred.   248
 
 Although some JR members who worked in the Schouwburg distanced themselves from the 
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wide range of Süskind’s illegal activities, there was a core group that actively participated.  Some, 249
including Edwin Sluzker, Jacques van de Kar, and Sam de Hond, belonged to the Expositur, the JR 
department that served as the liaison between the Council and the Zentralstelle für Jüdische 
Auswanderung. Van de Kar helped Jews who managed to escape deportation to go into hiding. He 
initially operated in the southern part of Amsterdam (Adama van Scheltemaplein), where the 
Germans first used a former school building as collection centre for Jews. As a JR employee, Van 
de Kar had free access to the building and smuggled Jews out simply by telling the guard that they 
had been exempted from deportation. Since he had access to a large network of non-Jews, he was 
sometimes able to provide these individuals with hiding places.  With the aid of Süskind, Van de 250
Kar received a position in the Schouwburg, which became the central assembly place for Jews from 
August 1942 onwards, and where he continued to help people escape by using a set of duplicated 
keys. In this way, Van de Kar and his group managed to free hundreds of Jews from the 
Schouwburg. Many of them were initially taken to Van de Kar’s house nearby, where they were 
then helped to find hiding places.  Although it is clear that Van de Kar and his group helped many 251
Jews to escape the Schouwburg, there are differing accounts of the precise ways that he managed to 
do so, some saying that he acted with the help of the Germans who guarded the location, some that 
he acted without. Van de Kar is himself in part responsible for these discrepancies because he 
highlighted different methods that he used across a number of interviews between 1961 and 
1991.  252
 
 It is clear that some members of the JR carried out activities that were not in line with the 
policy of legality that its leadership officially propagated, even if these activities were on a more 
limited scale than those of the JR’s Belgian and French counterparts. The same is true in the case of 
German Jews who were involved in the JR department which operated in transit camp Westerbork 
and that had been established after the first deportation began in July 1942. As with most of the 
camp’s bureaucracy, this department was headed by German Jews. The arrangement dated back to 
before the war when Westerbork camp had been built as a central refugee camp to house German 
Jews who had fled to the Netherlands from Germany, especially after the Reichskristallnacht on 9 
November 1938. In the period when Westerbork still served as a refugee camp, these German 
 Schellekens, Walter Süskind, 101-102. 249
 Jacques van de Kar, Joods Verzet: terugblik op de periode rond de Tweede Wereldoorlog (Amsterdam: 250
Stadsdrukkerij van Amsterdam, 1984; first ed. 1981), 50-53. 
 Van de Kar, Joods Verzet, 67-71; Ralph Polak in: Lindwer (ed.), Het fatale dilemma, 96. 251
 For an overview of these statements, see: Report on Alfons Zündler, pp. 56-60, Doc. I  248-2390, Inv. No. 2, NIOD. 252
!252
Jewish immigrants instituted an organisational structure for the camp. They continued to be largely 
responsible for it when the Germans took over and, from 1 July 1942 onwards, changed the function 
of the camp to that of a Polizeiliches Judendurchgangslager, a transit camp where the Jews stayed 
temporarily before being deported to concentration camps and death camps further east. There was 
a lot of animosity between the German Jewish members of the camp organisation and the Dutch 
Jews who were later interned in the camp, not least because the Dutch Jews blamed the German 
Jews for acting primarily to protect their own interests. Philip Mechanicus, for example, describesd 
in his diary how the German Jews were constantly giving orders to Dutch Jews and how they 
misused their power.  The Westerbork branch of the JR was headed by Walther Heynemann, Frits 253
Grünberg, Hans Eckmann, and Hans Heinz Hanauer. It would later become the so-called Contact 
Afdeling (CA), also referred to as the ‘Contact Commissie’. The members of this branch were 
viewed with disapproval, because they often lived in better conditions than inmates of camp 
Westerbork. In the beginning, the Afdeling was responsible for the registration of Jewish capital, 
but during the course of the war the Westerbork branch increasingly became an aid organisation, 
which at times also engaged in clandestine activities.  254
 
 The fact that the Contact Afdeling consisted of German Jews who did not have the same 
deference to authority and were not integrated into non-Jewish society in the way that the Dutch 
Jews were might have made them more inclined not to follow German orders. The fact that they 
spoke the same language as their German overseers undoubtedly helped them in their efforts. For 
example, they often tried to bribe the Germans to arrange deportation exemptions for Jews and they 
continuously negotiated about the number of Jews sent on transport.  In the same way that 255
Süskind tampered with German filing systems, Heynemann attempted to remove the letter ’s’, 
standing for strafgeval (punishment case) from individual files, so that these Jews could be removed 
from the strafbarak (punishment barrack). These punishment cases had to carry out the dirtiest jobs 
inside the camp and were generally the first to be put on a transport to the East.  Official 256
documents such as ‘Palestine certificates’, passports, and afstammingspapieren (birth certificates) 
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were forged and the Contact Afdeling sought connection with illegal workers in Amsterdam. 
Personal documentation including photographs and films was also smuggled out of Westerbork.  257
Heynemann claimed that the CA administered a zwarte kas (hidden budget) by which money was 
provided by the JR to finance their clandestine activities. After the JR was dismantled and its 
leadership interned in Westerbork, individual donations continued to finance the activities of the 
CA.  Although the members of the Contact Afdeling were criticised during the war because of the 258
better conditions they lived in, and were accused of corruption after the war, their involvement in 
these illegal activities and the fact that they had put their own lives at risk ensured that they were 
eventually exonerated.   259
 
 These activities show that the existence of the JR, like that of its Belgian and French 
counterparts, allowed a range of activities that would have been impossible without the protection it 
provided to the members involved. However, the boundaries between legality and illegality were 
not as permeable as they were in Belgium and France. It is likely that the strong focus of the JR’s 
leaders on legal activities discouraged clandestine groups from operating alongside the Council and 
from infiltrating the organisation which, as we have seen, did occur in Belgium and France. It was 
only through people like Van de Kar, Süskind, and the CA members, all of whom operated more on 
the periphery of the Council, that illegal activities were initiated or, as in the case of Pimentel, Virrie 
Cohen and the other crèche employees, that the organisation was used to cloak the hiding of 
children. There are indications that the local JR branch leaders were more directly involved in 
clandestine activities. For example, Hans van Dam, who worked for the Rotterdam branch of the 
JR, indicated in a letter to Jacques Presser in 1965 that this JR branch had cooperated substantially 
with illegal workers, including those who provided hiding places and false identity cards.  260
Considering the concentration of Jews in Amsterdam, and the centralisation of the JR’s policies in 
the capital city, the scale of these activities was smaller than in Belgium and France.  
 
 We have seen that in 1946, an honour trial was instituted by leading members of the Jewish 
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community in order to evaluate ‘every Jew whose attitude or behaviour during the occupation [..] 
had been incompatible with the most basic form of Jewish solidarity’, most notably JR chairmen 
Asscher and Cohen.  During this trial, Cohen indicated that on a number of occasions he knew 261
about cloaking activities and, particularly, the clandestine removal of Jews from the Schouwburg 
and the crèche (through his daughter Virrie).  He also gave a very detailed overview of the illegal 262
actions that took place in and around the Schouwburg, claiming that JR cars were used to smuggle 
Jews out.  Asscher further stated that he and Cohen held secret meetings with Süskind and that 263
they permitted the illegal activities that were undertaken under the official guise of the JR.  Views 264
about the role played by the JR leadership are contradictory, however. Former head of the resistance 
group ASG Piet Meerburg said that Cohen actually obstructed his activities and even started an 
investigation into the whereabouts of children who had disappeared with the help of his group, 
while he – Cohen – knew full well that these children had been ‘safely’ taken care of by the 
resistance.  In his defence, Cohen stated that the wrong child had been taken and that he had had 265
to cope with the angry responses of parents who did not want their children to be taken into 
hiding.  Later in his statement, Meerburg was more neutral, claiming that he was not sure whether 266
the JR leaders were aware of the illegal activities, but he continued to insist that they had definitely 
not been actively involved.  267
 
 The paucity of wartime sources and the existence of different views on the matter make it 
difficult to offer a clear assessment of the extent to which the JR leadership was passively aware, or 
more actively sympathetic to, the use of the structures of the JR as a cloak for clandestine activities. 
The best way to sum it up is perhaps in the terms of Cohen’s own claim, as reiterated by Meerburg, 
that organised resistance groups never attempted to approach him because the position he had taken 
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vis-à-vis the German occupation was simply different.  The JR’s leadership may indeed have been 268
aware of the activities surrounding the Schouwburg, but it seems unlikely that the role of its 
leadership in facilitating clandestine operations went beyond (intentionally) turning a blind eye in 
order not to hamper these actions. As Rafaël (Felix) Halverstadt, who aided Süskind in forging lists, 
stated: ‘Asscher and Cohen neither positively nor negatively influenced the course of events in this 
respect’.  269
 
 We have assessed differences between the four Jewish organisations in terms of their 
connections with illegal activities while analysing the different contextual elements that contributed 
to these differences. Overall, the existence and legality of the Jewish organisations enabled 
clandestine activities that would otherwise have been impossible. This is even true in the case of the 
Netherlands, where organised clandestine activities were undertaken relatively late and where 
Jewish leaders insisted on maintaining the legal principles on which the JR had been established. In 
the case of Belgium and France, we can say that cloaking was more institutional rather than 
individual in nature. On various levels, people within the central boards were aware of these 
activities and, when necessary, communicated this to others. The knowledge that was shared by 
central board leaders and the ways they at times either passively or actively facilitated clandestine 
activities were diverse. The relations between illegal resistance and the legal Jewish organisations 
were more complex than has been accepted hitherto.  
 
3.4 Illegal transactions: the Jewish organisations and the embezzlement of money  
 
We have seen that cloaking activities were undertaken at various levels. In some cases, the members 
of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud were actively involved, while in others, the 
mere fact that the leadership decided to turn a blind eye to these activities was sufficient. Whether 
they were passively or actively involved, the Jewish leaders as well as lower ranking members were 
engaged in a wide range of activities that were generally initiated or fostered by clandestine groups. 
In addition to these findings, we will shortly see that the organisations sometimes played an 
instrumental role in facilitating clandestine activities by secretly embezzling money. Several 
(central board) members of the Belgian and French Associations played a role in distributing the 
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money flows that went through the legal organisations to clandestine workers and groups. Some of 
the existing literature has reflected upon the financing of welfare activities by the Jewish institutions 
and the difficulties their leaders faced in this regard, but little has been written on how money flows 
went from one Jewish organisation to the other.  By making this a central theme, a more general 270
overview will be provided of the manifold connections between the Jewish organisations and 
various (illegal) networks, underlining that the organisations by no means functioned in a social 
vacuum but were instead connected to a larger network of (illegal) organisations. This is important 
because it shows once again that the legal Jewish institutions, rather than operating as antitheses to 
clandestine structures, were interconnected with clandestine organisations.  
 
 We will first provide an overview of the financial resources to which the JR, the AJB, the 
UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud had access in order to support their social welfare activities. As we 
shall see, attempts to find alternative sources of funding often facilitated and enhanced 
communication between a variety of alternative (Jewish) organisations that were willing to 
cooperate. In some cases, this provided the basis for the illicit allocation of money via these bodies 
to other organisations. Looking at illegal transactions shows us that the basic reference point from 
which the Jewish leaders operated, namely apparently collaborating while trying to win time, in this 
case turned out to be effective. The AJB and the UGIF in some way profited from the credit that 
was provided by the Allied powers and governments in exile to clandestine organisations towards 
the end of the German occupation. Unfortunately, as we have seen by then, the Dutch JR had 
already ceased to exist.  
 
Financial resources: a burden on the Jewish communities  
 
In all three countries, the Jewish communities themselves were responsible for financing the 
welfare activities assigned to the Jewish organisations. The cotisations in Belgium and France and 
the verplichte bijdragen in the Netherlands were all forced contributions that Jews had to pay in 
order to facilitate the organisations’ activities. Before January 1943, if Jews in the Netherlands did 
not have access to sufficient funds to pay their contributions, they had to request money from the 
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Lippman, Rosenthal & Co (Liro).  This was a Jewish bank whose established reputation was 271
exploited by the Germans who created a second office with the same name, and then used it to 
obtain access to Jewish assets. On 8 August 1941, all Jewish-owned assets were blocked by the first 
‘Liro’ decree. According to this law, ‘“Jews liable to surrender their assets” were forced to transfer 
all their ready money to an account at the Liro Sarphatistraat that has been specifically opened for 
the purpose’.  Whereas some Jews refused to pay the verplichte bijdrage, others voluntarily 272
proposed to make an additional donation to the JR. However, reports of meetings with Liro show 
that the Nazis were not prepared to release any of the money stored at the bank in those cases where 
Jews wanted to make a voluntary contribution to the JR in addition to the verplichte bijdrage.  273
Whereas objections were raised in France about the use of specific Jewish funds, the JR used the 
Jewish assets that were stored and frozen at Liro.  The ongoing lack of financial resources with 274
which the AJB and the UGIF were confronted did not seem to be as stringent in the case of the 
Netherlands. This probably meant that the JR’s leaders were less motivated to look for alternative 
sources of funding (outside the legal sphere).  
 
 In France, a German law had dictated that the UGIF would be funded through gifts and 
legacies, membership dues, assets from the incorporated organisations, and funds from a Solidarity 
Fund under control of the CGQJ.  The Solidarity Fund consisted of money raised through the sale 275
of plundered Jewish property.  In the period when Lambert and Vallat were negotiating the 276
establishment of the UGIF at the end of 1941, Lambert indicated that he would not accept the use of 
money originating from the Solidarity Fund. He demanded instead that voluntary Jewish donations 
should suffice to support the activities of the UGIF. Adler concluded from this that Lambert was 
intent on finding a formula that would overcome the fears and objections of the other men who 
were appointed as central board members and suggests that ‘such a line of argument on Lambert’s 
part demonstrated that he personally had decided to participate, irrespective of Vallat’s willingness 
to accede to any assurances’.  If we accept that Lambert was truly concerned about the moral 277
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implications of using money from the Solidarity Fund, this claim should be seriously reconsidered. 
Lambert continued to refuse to do so throughout the occupation, making it a matter of principle not 
to use this particular source of money.   278
 
 In contrast to the UGIF-Sud, the UGIF-Nord did use money that originated from the 
Solidarity Fund because they did not have access to alternative funds that were available to the 
UGIF-Sud.  Shortly after its establishment, the UGIF-Nord was immediately held responsible for 279
the payment of a one billion franc fine which the Military Administration had forced upon the 
Jewish leaders on 14 December 1941 in response to recent attacks by the resistance.  The first 280
instalment of 250 million francs had to be paid on 15 January 1942. In the period that followed, the 
UGIF-Nord’s leaders feverishly tried to pay the fine, having neither the legal powers to coerce Jews 
to make a forced contribution, nor access to frozen Jewish bank accounts and other properties.  As 281
Adler has argued, the issue of the fine and the realisation that the Jewish organisation was at the 
mercy of both the Germans and Vichy officials made a long-term financial strategy impossible.  282
 
 As the war progressed it became clear the financial situation for the UGIF-Sud was less 
stringent than that of its northern counterpart. The organisation had managed to avoid using the 
Solidarity Fund thanks to the financial support of the Joint that would be repaid after the war.  On 283
11 May 1943, a levy was imposed on all Jews in order to force mandatory contributions to the 
UGIF and to facilitate the collection of the billion franc fine that the UGIF-Nord was liable to 
pay.  Lambert vigorously protested against the levy and the UGIF did not make any effort to 284
encourage more people to pay the tax.  Despite the threat of internment for those who would not 285
pay, almost half of the Jews in Paris did not do so. In the southern zone, the percentage of Jews who 
complied with this measure was less than 10 percent.  Rather than using Solidarity Fund money, 286
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the UGIF-Sud central board made a call for voluntary contributions.  The notion, therefore, that 287
the organisation was built on mandatory contributions from its unwilling members and by the 
‘proceeds gathered from the systematic despoliation of the Jewish businesses under the 
“Aryanisation” program’ as has been indicated by Nathan Bracher should be refined.  Indeed, 288
both the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud, similar to their counterparts in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, were forced to use money originating from Jewish businesses and individuals, but the 
UGIF-Sud leadership had clearly defined limits about how it was prepared to do so.  
 
 In the case of Belgium, little research has been done on the way the AJB financed its 
activities. The Belgian Jewish leadership depended upon gifts and was soon deprived of financial 
means. In May 1941, all Jews in Belgium were forced to register their property and the sale of 
property became subject to German approval. Furthermore, money earned through these sales had 
to be deposited in special bank accounts.  According to Pierre Broder, affluent Jews were 289
generally unwilling (or unable) to pay the forced contributions to the AJB (cotisations) a tendency 
that can be identified to varying degrees in all three countries.  The AJB’s leadership referred to 290
the financial situation of the organisation as ‘very worrying’ as early as October 1942. The situation 
was partly caused by the fact that there were organisational difficulties obstructing the central board 
from properly overseeing the (financial) activities of local branches.  The dire financial situation 291
of the Belgian Association from the end of 1942 and in early 1943 forced the AJB local branches in 
Brussels and Antwerp to withdraw funds from existing Jewish welfare organisations and this could 
only be done with the approval of the SiPo-SD.   292
 
 Some of the social welfare organisations the AJB turned to were affiliated with the Centraal 
Beheer voor Joodse Weldadigheid en Maatschappelijk Hulpbetoon / Centrale de Bienfaiscance et 
d’Assistance sociale Juives (Jewish Charities and Social Welfare Centre) whose assets were frozen 
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by order of the Germans.  By then, the AJB had taken up the tasks formerly carried out by this 293
social welfare organisation. The same was true of the Fondation Eduard Kischen and Hachosath 
Orchin.  In January 1943, the local board of the AJB Brussels branch attempted to gain access to 294
the frozen assets of two other organisations: the Maatschappij voor Doeltreffende Bijstand (the 
Society for Effective Assistance) and the Israëlitische Moeders en Weesmeisjes (Israelite Mothers 
and Orphans). These organisations had large sums of money in their bank accounts, to which they 
no longer had access. The AJB chairmen came to an agreement with the spokeswomen of these 
organisations about the nature of the activities that the AJB would support with their funds.  By 295
then, the Jewish Association was the only organisation allowed by the Germans to use frozen 
assets.  The same procedure for accessing frozen assets was adopted by the Antwerp AJB branch. 296
By using the money of organisations like the Joods Ziekenhuis (Jewish Hospital), Ezra and the 
Israëlitische Maatschappij voor Liefdadigheid aan Weduwen en Wezen (Israelite Society for Charity 
to Widows and Orphans), the AJB attempted to continue its social welfare activities.  By the end 297
of the summer of 1943, many frozen assets were indeed made available. However, because of the 
enormous financial burden on the organisation, the money was often spent within a few weeks or 
months.   298
 
 The assets of Jews in Belgium were stored (and frozen) in different banks rather than, as in 
the Netherlands, in one financial institution. Throughout 1943, with the approval of the Military 
Befehlshaber in Belgien und Nordfrankreich, the AJB took over the funds of other Jewish 
organisations stored at the Banque Diamantaire Anversoise.  The  AJB also used assets stored at 299
the Amsterdamsche Bank voor België.  In the establishment order of the Association, published in 300
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December 1941, it was stated that in the event that the AJB proved unable to secure its own 
funding, the organisation would rely on the support of the Belgian bureaucracy.  The diary of the 301
Brussels AJB leader, Salomon van den Berg, shows that this option was indeed used. On 29 January 
1944 Van den Berg, Marcel Blum, and Leo Feiertag went to Oscar Plisnier, chairman of the Belgian 
committee of Secretaries-General, to ask for financial resources for the AJB. To his great surprise, 
as Van den Berg wrote, they received an amount of 500,000 Belgian francs per month in addition to 
1,100,000 francs as a starting amount in order to take care of the children’s homes.  This made the 302
Belgian bureaucracy an important financial supporter of the AJB which by this point found itself in 
dire financial circumstances. At this very late stage of the war, the granting of credit through the 
Belgian government (in exile) was not unique. We will see that by 1944, the principal resistance 
groups in Belgium also received money provided by Belgian banks against credit notes from 
Belgian and Allied authorities in London.  However, this was only during the final year of the 303
occupation. Up until then, the AJB continuously faced a dire financial situation.  
 
Alternative financial resources and the secret embezzlement of money  
 
Throughout the occupation, the financial burdens on the Jewish communities intensified. In light of 
the increasing social welfare activities for which the Jewish organisations were held responsible, 
there was a need to find alternative sources of funding.  In both Belgium and France, we shall see 304
that there were attempts to find (illegal) alternative sources of funding, including through the Joint 
Distribution Committee and the native governments (in exile). Despite their difficult financial 
situation, the money secured through these sources was not used only for their own legal social 
welfare activities. Rather, members of the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud also used the 
money to finance clandestine operations. In turn, the Jewish organisations also seem to have 
profited from the money that was transferred to clandestine organisations during the course of the 
occupation. We will shortly investigate the ways in which these financial resources were distributed 
illegally through the Belgian and French Associations, thereby highlighting the many 
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interconnections between these legal Jewish organisations and the illegal sphere. In light of one of 
the central arguments of this chapter, namely that these organisations were at times willingly and 
knowingly involved in stimulating clandestine activities, this is an important aspect to examine. In 
the Netherlands, similar activities do not seem to have taken place.  
 
 In an interview conducted in 1970, the first chairman of the AJB, Salomon Ullman, claimed 
that even though the AJB was officially not allowed to cooperate with other Jewish organisations – 
the Germans did not acknowledge the existence of other bodies except for the AJB and religious 
institutions – there still existed a large number of organisations and individuals that operated 
secretly.  These private social welfare organisations operated alongside the AJB, and included an 305
unnamed organisation in which Ullman’s wife participated. Albert-Edouard Janssen, former 
Minister of Finance (1938-1939) for the Catholic party and president of the Société Belge des 
Banques, anonymously provided Ullman and his wife with monthly financial contributions. In turn, 
Ullman claimed, they distributed these funds among the poorest families.  Against the wishes of 306
the Germans, Ullman engaged in a private communication with Janssen in order to access 
additional funding, using his prominent position as its leader in order to achieve this. Other 
members inside the AJB’s central board were engaged in illegal financial activities of a different 
nature. Among them was Maurice Benedictus, first secretary and later the head of the AJB 
administration, whose activities were highlighted during the postwar court case against the 
organisation. Marcel Louette, national commander of the so-called Witte Brigade, one of the major 
Belgian resistance groups with a strong presence in Antwerp, claimed in a 1946 letter in support of 
Maurice Benedictus that the latter had been an active member of this particular resistance group. He 
said that Benedictus had played a remarkable role in a variety of activities and had provided the 
group with information ‘of Military nature regarding the internal organisation of the SD service of 
the Militärverwaltung as well as the security measures taken by the enemy after the landing at 
Dieppe’, the failed Allied assault on the seaport of Dieppe in northern France on 19 August 1942.  307
Moreover, he had also supplied ‘major financial services’ to the group. It was through these forms 
of financial transactions that some Jewish leaders extended their support from the legal to the illegal 
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sphere.  
 On an institutional level, we have seen that during the final stages of the occupation the AJB 
used money secured from the Belgian government-in-exile through credit notes. Some of this 
money seems to have been used to support activities that were not part of the official legal policy of 
the AJB. For example, Irène Zmigrod, who held a legal position in the Brussels branch of the AJB 
while simultaneously working for the illegal CDJ, indicated that the AJB received ample funds from 
the Belgian government (in exile) which were in the first instance intended to cover the expenses of 
the homes for children and the elderly. In practice, some of these funds were sent to the CDJ. She 
further claimed that the CDJ was supported through the JDC via Switzerland.  Roger van Praag, 308
who worked for the CDJ, declared that Benjamin Nykerk had approached the Joint in Switzerland 
and had received a guarantee that the Joint would repay the loans of Swiss bankers after 
liberation.  The offices of the AJB, Zmigrod claimed, were used to deliver cash to the CDJ and 309
employees of the both organisations never understood why the AJB offices were not subject to more 
careful control by the Gestapo. According to her recollections, an inspection of the AJB’s office 
only happened once: ‘when there was only one poor old social worker and no distributor present’.  310
Similarly, Alfred Blum, the son of Marcel Blum and treasurer of the local Brussels AJB branch, 
claimed in 1956 that both Marcel Blum, Salomon Ullman’s successor at the helm of the AJB, and a 
certain ‘Van den Dijk’ were responsible for embezzling considerable sums of money secured 
through the Ministry of Finance in Belgium. After doing so, they passed the money on to the 
resistance because ils etaient en parfait termes avec les gens de la résistance (they were on good 
terms with the resistance).  311
 
 The situation in France exhibits striking similarities. There were interrelations between the 
UGIF-Nord, the UGIF-Sud and illegal groups in terms of the distribution of financial resources. The 
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JDC financed the UGIF’s legal activities, but also those of clandestine (Jewish) resistance groups.  312
After the German invasion of the north of France in May 1940 the Joint was forced to close its Paris 
office and eventually moved to Marseille.  Whereas Dika Jefroykin initially still served as the 313
Joint’s deputy director, Joseph Schwarz, European Director of the JDC, appointed him as the French 
representative of the organisation in 1942.  In this position, he was asked to collect and distribute 314
Joint funds to Jewish self-help organisations.  In his role as head of the Armée Juive (AJ), 315
Jefroykin had by then already created a network across Switzerland and Spain to finance social 
welfare provision for the Jews. As a result of Jefroykin’s involvement in radical Jewish forces 
through the AJ, the financial support of the JDC increasingly moved into a grey zone, covering 
everything from work in the camps to assisting the Jewish underground. Increasingly, there was a 
preference for supporting illegal and quasi-legal operations. Without explicitly authorising its use 
for clandestine purposes, the JDC appears to have given Jefroykin carte blanche to spend money in 
the hope of saving as many people as possible in the summer of 1942.  316
 
 After the Nazis and Italians invaded the southeastern part of France in November 1942, this 
form of aid entered its illegal phase. Almost all Joint contributions were channelled through the 
American Friends Service Committee (Quakers) and at least part of this money went through 
Switzerland.  According to Jefroykin the Joint did not know that he had decided to allocate the 317
organisation’s money for the benefit of the resistance, but there is no question that the Joint 
financed a wide range of (armed) resistance activities at this point.  The communication network 318
Jefroykin had organised across Switzerland and Spain facilitated the illegal distribution of money 
from these countries to France. Official copies which noted these transactions were carried out by 
groups who left for Spain. In France, a second proof of the transactions was hidden in a villa near 
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Nîmes.  As the war progressed, financial aid to the UGIF-Sud via the Joint became increasingly 319
insecure. Nevertheless, Lambert’s deliberate appointment of Jefroykin and Brener as ‘social 
inspectors’ in January 1943 highlights the ongoing mutual interconnections at this point between the 
UGIF-Sud, the Joint, and clandestine networks. Lambert’s own role in the Joint has been considered 
differently in the existing literature. At the end of November 1942, Lambert wrote in his diary that 
the Joint had asked him to become the organisation’s director for France: 
 The Joint, that brings together all Jewish aid organisations in the United States, has asked me to be 
 their director for France. I accepted in principle, but I refused to resign as general director of the  
 UGIF at this time of greatest danger.  320
According to Hobson Faure, there is no indication that Lambert was indeed asked by the Joint to 
become the organisation’s representative for France.  At the same time, Bauer has claimed that the 321
Joint told Lambert in June 1943 that he could not act as the Joint’s representative as long as he held 
his position in the UGIF, which indicates that this subject was discussed (again) at this late stage of 
the war.  Since we know that Jefroykin acted as the Joint’s director during the war, we can 322
establish that Lambert was not appointed, most likely because he was not ready to step down from 
his position at the UGIF. Above all, we should note that throughout 1943 the Joint no longer 
believed that the UGIF was effective in providing aid and, in response to Lambert’s arrest and the 
narrow escape of his successor Gaston Kahn, the financial support of the JDC to the UGIF 
dwindled.  323
 
 In the occupied zone, the JDC limited itself to supporting the OSE and the FSJ. However, 
when the United States entered the war in December 1941, the entire occupied zone was cut off 
from this financial aid.  Around the spring of 1943, the Joint tried to solve this problem by 324
promising to reimburse loans to local lenders in France after the end of the war. In this way, the 
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UGIF and the Amelot Committee were able to secure funds outside the German purview.  UGIF 325
officials also managed to transfer funds from the southern to the northern zone, despite German and 
Vichy’s knowledge of this illicit action.  This money fostered clandestine operations and rescue 326
activities. In a report on the establishment of the Service Familiare Clandestine de Placement des 
Enfants (Clandestine Child Placement Service, ‘Service 42B’), Stern described how secretive stocks 
were used to finance its activities. She said that when there were insufficient funds for ‘Service 
42B’, which she headed, the UGIF complemented the funds through their caisse noir – a financial 
resource hidden from the Nazis and from Vichy officials.  The UGIF-Nord thus functioned as a 327
financial back-up for its illegal actions, which is remarkable considering the financial difficulties 
the UGIF-Nord faced. Despite financial contributions as a result of external actors, the financial 
situation of the UGIF-Nord remained dire and its resources proved insufficient.  328
 
 As the war progressed and the liberation of France became increasingly likely, resistance 
groups in France received substantial funds and material from the Allied powers.  Up until 1942, 329
the Gaullists in London and the various secret services in the United Kingdom allocated only a 
limited amount of money to domestic French resistance organisations. However, as 1943 
progressed, some French resistance organisations received considerable sums of money (including 
the Libération-sud, Franc Tireur and Combat which received 1,500,000, 600,000 and 2,500,000 
francs respectively).  Although it remains unclear how resistance groups operating in parallel with 330
the UGIF, such as the Amelot Committee, benefited from this funding the increase of aid from 
abroad most likely contributed to an overall expansion of opportunities for the wide range of 
resistance groups that were operative in France as many of these organisations were interconnected. 
For example, the Armée Juive, renamed Organisation Juive de Combat (Jewish Combat 
Organisation, OJC) included about nine autonomous Jewish resistance groups on the eve of the 
liberation, including the EIF, OSE AJ and MJS. Furthermore, the OJC cooperated with non-Jewish 
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resistance groups in the attempt to liberate France following the Allied invasion in June 1944.  331
Since the legal cover of the UGIF still existed, the many interconnections that Jewish organisations 
had with the resistance undoubtedly ensured an enlargement of activity here as well.  
 
 The cases of Jefroykin and Stern in France, and Salomon Ullman and Maurice Benedictus in 
Belgium, have shown that there were attempts by the Jewish leaders to use the organisations’ 
money to finance illegal activities directly or to illegally disperse money among organisations that 
clandestinely aided Jews. Since the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud still existed when 
financial transactions were secured by the Allied powers and the governments-in-exile towards the 
end of the war, the attempt to buy time by (apparently) cooperating with the Germans while 
persisting in their approach was a politics of survival, and in the case of Belgium and France this 
approach worked. The AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud could all profit from the increase in 
money flows to illegal organisations. Even though the circumstances became less favourable and 
faith in the organisations was decreasing, their existence, even at this late stage of the war, was still 
beneficial to the Jewish communities both through their legal welfare activities and through the 
illegal activities that they in part facilitated. We have seen that the illegal operations helped those 
Jews who had gone into hiding and depended upon clandestine contact for their daily needs. This 
frustrated the aims of the Germans. Although the Dutch Council leadership acted with the same 
motivation, they did not manage to buy as much time as their Belgian and French counterparts 
could. In the Netherlands, a similar arrangement was made by the Dutch government to support 
clandestine activities in 1944. Through the Nationaal Steunfonds (national support fund, NSF), an 
organisation that was primarily focussed on arranging financial resources for the resistance in the 
Netherlands, the government-in-exile guaranteed that they would reimburse the loans that were 
arranged with private individuals through the NSF.  However, by then, the JR had ceased to exist; 332
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The JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud were all linked in various ways to clandestine 
activities. These connections are often poorly documented precisely because of their illegal nature. 
Nevertheless, we have seen that interconnections between clandestine groups and the Jewish 
organisations were manifold, particularly in Belgium and France. Even in the Netherlands, where 
the circumstances in which the Council was forced to operate were especially difficult, clandestine 
activities were still developed with aid of JR members. The nature of these activities was complex, 
and the role of the Jewish leaders herein varied from passive acceptance to active support of the 
illegal activities of these groups. In Belgium and France, some of the Associations’ leaders and 
members were actively involved in illegal undertakings themselves. The extent to which this was 
the case varied and fluctuated. Above all, the attempt to provide social welfare to the Jewish 
communities, in a period of time during which conditions worsened, could itself be seen as a series 
of courageous acts intended to maintain these communities as they came under increasing threat.  
 
 The interrelations we have seen between legality and illegality force us to nuance our 
understanding of the behaviour of the Jewish organisations’ leaders and memberships. Their 
responses were those of ordinary people under the threat of an occupying power. Terms such as 
‘collaboration’, ‘cooperation’ or ‘resistance’ are all too narrow to describe the choices of the Jewish 
leaders during the Holocaust. Overall, none of these terms suffices to describe their conduct. On an 
individual level, we have seen varying choices at different points in time. Lambert, for example, 
maintained his policy of legality on the one hand while also allowing clandestine activities to take 
place under the cloak of the UGIF-Sud, and even participated in some of these activities himself. In 
circumstances that continuously changed, the central board members often took on shifting roles, 
oscillating between cooperation and resistance and the many shades of behaviour that exist in 
between. Therefore, even though scholars often continue to use categories that are by definition 
static to describe the behaviour of the Jewish leaderships, there is a need to recognise the dynamic 
and hybrid nature of their conduct.  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Conclusion: Looking back on the ‘Jewish Councils’  
‘I got the impression that [..] not a day and not even an hour passed by in which he (David Cohen) did not 
think about the persecution of the Jews and his own role in it. He (Cohen) said things like:  “[..] every day I 
wonder how I could have done the things I did”.’  1
David Cohen reflected upon his role in the Joodsche Raad on 25 September 1964 during a 
conversation with historian Loe de Jong, who had encouraged Cohen several times to tell his 
wartime story. Even though Cohen often seemed very confident about his decisions as the JR’s 
leader and claimed he could not have done otherwise, he was also tormented by a sense of guilt. 
After he returned from Theresienstadt, where he was deported on 4 September 1944, Cohen 
retained his job as professor at the University of Amsterdam. Asscher was deported to Bergen-
Belsen on 13 September 1944, where he lived in dire circumstances from which he barely recovered 
after the war. After their return to the Netherlands, Asscher and Cohen no longer played a prominent 
role in the Jewish community because they were denounced for their wartime activities. In 1946, 
both chairmen were brought before a so-called court of honour (ereraad), which was instituted by 
the Jewish community to ‘purge the ranks of the Jewish survivors in order to start with a clean slate 
for the reconstruction of the Jewish community’.  While the court dealt with 26 cases, those of 2
Asscher, Cohen and five other members of the Jewish Council were considered the most important 
and attracted the most attention.  3
 
 At the time the honour court was operative, the two men were arrested on 6 November 1947 
on order of the Bijzonder Gerechtshof (Special court of Justice), instigated by the Dutch State in 
September 1945. This court tried those accused of high treason, treason and war crimes, including 
Ferdinand aus der Fünten and Willy Lages.  Even the strongest opponents of the JR were outraged 4
by the arrest of the chairmen, which was motivated by the fear that they might flee abroad, and 
Asscher and Cohen were released again on 5 December after questions were raised in the Dutch 
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parliament.  Shortly thereafter, on 26 December 1947, the verdict of the honour court was 5
publicised in the Jewish weekly Nieuw Israëlietisch Weekblad (the NIW), even though Cohen had 
not had a chance to make his final plea: Asscher and Cohen were no longer allowed to fulfil any 
honourable or representative function in the Jewish community.  The honour court ruled that the 6
former JR chairmen’s decision to comply with the German demand to establish the Council was 
reprehensible; their agreement to draw up lists of names of Jews (7,000 in total) who would no 
longer benefit from the temporary protection of the JR and, consequently, were put on transport in 
May 1943 was considered ‘very reprehensible’.  Cohen objected to this judgement and in the first 7
week of 1950, during a period when the court of honour lost its credibility, the court ruled that those 
who had formally appealed its decision, including Cohen, would be reinstated as respectable 
members of the community.  In the meantime, the Dutch State trial had failed to make any real 8
progress in their investigation of the JR. In May 1950, the trial was dismissed and one year later, 
Cohen was informed that prosecution was suspended on ‘public interest’ grounds.  9
 
 The initial delays and the sudden final verdict of the honour court, combined with the 
dismissal of charges by the Dutch State, suggest that the Joodsche Raad had, after all stopped being 
a central issue. There was now a strong focus on rebuilding the country and the Jewish community, 
which had suffered severe losses: out of around 140,000 Jews who had resided in the Netherlands in 
May 1940, only 30,000 now remained.  Many no longer wanted to be part of the Jewish 10
community and emigrated abroad; the rise of antisemitism and the lack of recognition of the Jews’ 
experiences in eastern Europe contributed to a sense of trauma experienced by many Jews at this 
time.  The nature of the Jewish community had drastically changed as well. Those who had 11
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survived predominantly belonged to the middle and upper classes, because they had possessed the 
connections and financial resources for going into hiding; the Jewish proletariat had been seriously 
affected. While prewar institutions such as the Coördinatie Commissie and the Dutch Israelite 
religious community re-emerged after the war, Cohen and Asscher (the latter died on 2 May 1950), 
no longer received the respect of the Jewish community and were often ignored in public.  12
 
 In Belgium, where around 66,000 Jews had resided on the eve of the occupation, 18,000 
Jews were left in October 1944.  The population increased quickly to 30,000 at the end of 1945, in 13
part because Jews returned from exile and transient refugees settled in the country. Fewer than 
2,000 Jews returned from the places to which they had been deported.  Unlike the Netherlands, 14
there was a generally sympathetic attitude towards the Jews after the war. The physical and mental 
condition of most of the Jewish population was perilous, which meant that aid organisations had to 
be quickly reconstituted. In part, the structures of resistance groups such as the CDJ were used as a 
way to do this.  Some of those who had fulfilled a dual role in the resistance and the AJB, 15
including Yvonne Nèvejean and David Ferdman, were involved in the reorganisation of social 
welfare in Belgium. They were responsible for the institution of the Aides aux Israélites Victimes de 
la Guerre (Aid to Jewish War Victims, AIVG) which played a major role in the postwar 
reconstruction process of the Jewish communities.   16
 
 The Belgian courts were overwhelmed with trial cases in the immediate postwar period. 
Afraid that the AJB’s legal strategy of cooperation would be linked to the wartime attitude of 
Belgian government officials, the military courts were reluctant to carry out an investigation into 
the Jewish organisation.  It was forced to deal with the AJB case in October 1944 after an elaborate 17
complaint by Lazare Liebman who blamed the organisation for active collaboration with the 
Nazis.  However, the trial of the seven members of the organisation’s initial central board 18
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(Salomon Ullman, Maurice Benedictus, Alfred Blum, Salomon van den Berg, David Lazare, Nico 
Workum and Juda Mehlwurm) was not considered a priority. While the Dutch trials were 
predominantly centred around the two chairmen, the Belgian court focused more broadly on the 
entire organisation’s board. This reinforces the notion that Asscher and Cohen had been autocratic 
rulers, and were considered as such, while the authority of the AJB was spread among a wider circle 
of Jewish leaders. In the meantime, several other investigations were opened, including in local 
military courts, that enquired into leading members of the AJB’s local branches.  The courts’ 19
continued reluctance, paired with successful attempts by the defence to gather supporting 
statements, arguing that the AJB’s policy had been similar to that of the Belgian policy of ‘the lesser 
evil’, led the military prosecutor to drop all charges. In January 1947, the cases against the central 
AJB leaders were closed.   20
 
 The absence of moves by the Jewish community to bring the AJB’s leaders to court, as had 
happened in the Netherlands in the form of an honour court, is remarkable here. Van den Daelen 
and Wouters have explained this by pointing to the fragmented nature of the Jewish communities in 
Belgium; the vast majority of Jews without Belgian citizenship did not want to draw attention to 
themselves, fearing they would face expulsion.  Internal division among former Jewish resistance 21
networks, most notably the communists and the various Zionist factions, might also have played a 
role.  Since their actions were never genuinely investigated by a court (of honour), and because the 22
Belgian Jewish communities were relatively decentralised, it was easier for the AJB leaders to 
continue the lives they had lived before the war. The fact that the first AJB chairman Salomon 
Ullman was reinstated as chief Rabbi of Belgium after the liberation of the country and served in 
this position until he emigrated to Israel in 1957 most significantly highlights the different position 
of the AJB leaders in the postwar communities compared to the Netherlands.   23
 
 In France, the Jewish community had lost nearly one-third of its prewar population with 
around 200,000 Jews residing in the country immediately after the liberation.  We have seen that 24
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the first UGIF leaders, most importantly André Baur and Raymond-Raoul Lambert, were arrested, 
interned and deported. In contrast to the leaders of the JR and AJB, they did not survive the war; 
both were killed in the gas chambers at Auschwitz. There were other important Jewish leaders in 
France who also did not survive the war, including 23 (out of the 60) Rabbis who had served as 
members of the Consistory, Jacques Helbronner, and Léonce Bernheim, a socialist activist and 
Zionist spokesman.  Overall, the religious and associative life of the Jews had severely changed 25
postwar society, not least because many synagogues had been either damaged or destroyed.  26
Moreover, while some community leaders fled from Nazism and never returned to France, others – 
including many who had held leading roles in Jewish resistance groups – believed there was little 
future for Jews in France and emigrated elsewhere, including to Palestine.  27
 
 There was a strong focus on the renewal of the French Jewish community. The 
disappointment that many Jews experienced, in relation to the active compliance of the Vichy 
regime, necessitated the reconstruction of Jewish community in such a way that it no longer 
depended on the State.  With a sense of excitement and enthusiasm Jewish organisations, primarily 28
those that sprang from resistance groups such as the CRIF, perceived this moment as an opportunity 
to create a new future for the Jews in France. They aimed to gain the upper hand in the reshaping of 
institutions and policies ‘in order to create a self-sustaining and independent community’.  At the 29
same time, as Daniella Doron has recently argued, this was only an outward appearance.  In the 30
case of child welfare, in particular, communal leaders were worried about the consequences of the 
war on Jewish society and there existed an underlying mood of ‘crisis, anxiety and pessimism’.   31
  
 Because there existed a sense of distrust relating to those Jewish organisations and 
individuals whose wartime conduct were a matter of fierce controversy, a number of Jewish groups, 
often under communist influence, called for an internal purge of the Jewish community after the 
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liberation.  This is indeed what happened, first through the short-lived CUDJF whose 32
representatives, as we have seen, arrested the UGIF’s president Georges Edinger and, second, 
through the CRIF, which instituted an honour court. Both institutions investigated the wartime 
conduct of the UGIF’s employees and the CRIF specifically focused on the culpability of its 
members in the Neuilly case.  While the legitimacy of the CUDJF was violently challenged, the 33
CRIF was criticised both by members of the Consistory and by organisations such as the 
Association of Former Jewish Deportees for failing to make a general evaluation of the UGIF’s 
policies.  In the end, the UGIF leadership was held accountable for its failure to remove children 34
from the homes that were overseen by the Germans, but any further investigations were halted, 
which angered the Jewish press.  The antagonism between the immigrants and French Jews that 35
had dominated prewar society was again reinforced and highlighted in this period.  Above all, we 36
can conclude that few prewar institutional structures or leaders remained that could facilitate the 
rebuilding of the Jewish communities in France. The impact of the traditional Jewish leadership, 
including those who had played leading roles in the UGIF, had largely dwindled and played a 
limited role in the process of reconstruction.  
 
 As Annie Kriegel has pointed out, the long list of employees and directors of the UGIF as 
well as of the Rabbis and Consistorial leaders, who were deported with their families, prevents us 
from discussing the case of the Jewish leaders in terms of resistance or collaboration.  Around six 37
million Jews lost their lives during the Nazi Holocaust. They died in gas chambers in Auschwitz, 
Treblinka, Belzec, Sobibor and Chelmno. Others were brutally shot, including during operations in 
German annexed western Poland (Wartheland), the Soviet Union and other sites in eastern Europe. 
Still others died as a result of the hardships from which they suffered as a result of Nazi policies; 
malnourishment and exhaustion were among the chief causes. In the Netherlands, around 102,000 
Jews perished (ca. 73% of the entire Jewish population). In Belgium and France, the number of 
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victims amounted to around 25,000 (ca. 35%) and 73,000 (ca. 25%) respectively. Even though 
working for the Jewish organisations provided a temporary exemption from deportation – sperre – 
it did not necessarily secure a higher chance of survival. Most of the Jews who worked for either of 
the organisations were deported to concentration and extermination camps in the end. In the case of 
France, the relative number of murdered Jews was in fact (significantly) higher among those who 
worked for the UGIF central board.  The notion that these Jewish leaders only tried to save their 38
own skins is unfounded. 
 
 This thesis has attempted to step away from the moralistic viewpoint from which the actions 
of the Jewish leaders have too often been judged. Rather than assessing the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-
Nord and the UGIF-Sud in the context of the mortality rates of Jews in individual countries, this 
comparative analysis offers new perspectives on the form and function of the Jewish organisations 
in their respective societies. Aspects that have often been overlooked have now been highlighted as 
determinants for the ways in which these organisations functioned. In the first chapter, the 
differences in the socio-historical structures of the Dutch, Belgian and French societies have been 
highlighted. This chapter has demonstrated that these differences explain the divergent position of 
the Jewish leaders during the war. The unique socio-historical foundations of each of the Jewish 
organisations has hitherto not been recognised in historiography because their impact cannot be 
understood when research is exclusively conducted within the borders of the nation-state. Yet, it is 
essential to recognise that the socio-historical foundation of the AJB was markedly different from 
that of the JR, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud, and vice-versa. Only then is it possible to 
understand the position of these leaders in their respective societies, and to contextualise their 
choices. It explains, for example, why the Dutch leadership decided to remain in place until the JR 
was dissolved in September 1943 while their counterparts either stepped down, or were removed 
from their position by the Germans.  
 
 The second chapter highlighted the similarities in the way the Germans planned, or rather 
failed to plan, the institution of these Jewish organisations throughout western Europe. It is 
important to recognise these similarities because they demonstrate that Nazi policies throughout 
Europe were unplanned and irrational. In the context of eastern Europe, the ad-hoc nature of the 
German decision-making process has been emphasised by, among others, Mark Mazower and Dan 
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Michman.  German policies in western Europe, at least with regard to the Jewish organisations, 39
were also defined by local initiatives, ad-hoc decisions and institutional rivalry. This chapter has 
also demonstrated that German views on the organisations’ effectiveness varied from optimism to 
outright frustration. Demonstrating these differences matters because it necessitates an 
understanding of the factors that caused these different views: the nature of the leadership, the 
nature of society and the nature of the occupation. In the last chapter, the use of the AJB, the UGIF-
Nord and the UGIF-Sud as cloaks for clandestine activities, either wittingly or unwittingly, is 
contrasted with the relative absence of such activities under the JR’s cloak. Furthermore, the Dutch 
leadership, in contrast to the French leaders, never actively supported, or engaged in, illegal 
activities. These differences highlight the various structures these Jewish organisations evolved into. 
It also shows that the nature and activities of these organisations were inherently depended upon the 
society in which they functioned, and demonstrate that they should not be considered as isolated 
entities.  
 
 The different social contexts in which the organisations were established proved to have 
been decisive for the appointment and position of the Jewish leaders in their respective societies. 
The various ways in which the Jewish communities were structured, meant that the basic reference 
point from which each of the organisations emerged was crucially different. Many factors that 
played a role in determining the social landscape of these communities, including the presence or 
absence of a central religious body (the Consistory), the impact of refugee streams at the turn of the 
century and in the 1930s, the division of power within the communities and the role of Jewish 
social welfare organisations. These aspects not only affected the position of the organisations’ 
leaders, but also had an impact on their self-perception and, consequently, on the choices they made 
during the war.  
 
 We have seen that the number of immigrants in Belgium and France before the war was 
significantly higher than in the Netherlands. Coming from various social, economic and cultural 
backgrounds and different countries throughout central and eastern Europe, the majority of these 
immigrants struggled to integrate into the Belgian and French Jewish communities. As a result, the 
social, religious and economic landscape in these two countries was highly diverse. The 
communities were decentralised and by no means formed a coherent whole. In the Netherlands, 
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there was also segregation within the Dutch Jewish community in terms of social and economic 
welfare. The nature of this division was mostly based on levels of prosperity and separated the very 
poor Jews from the rich, upper layer of the community that was well-integrated into non-Jewish 
society. However, in contrast to Belgium and France, Jewish immigrants did not radically alter the 
nature of the prewar community in the Netherlands. Even though many were more liberal than the 
Dutch Jews, their number was relatively small and, compared with the neighbouring countries, the 
close geographical connection between the Dutch and German Jews led to better integration for 
these Jews. The more uniform Dutch Jewish community made it easier to establish a body that 
represented the Jews in the Netherlands at least to some extent. Even though the leadership of the 
Joodsche Raad did not represent the large number of poor Jews that resided in the country, we can 
say that its leadership was emblematic of the development of increasing secularisation and 
integration into non-Jewish society that broadly characterised Jewish society at large.  
 
 In Belgium and France, it was impossible to fulfil any representative function vis-à-vis the 
strongly divided Jewish communities that resided in the country. In the changing prewar 
communities, the traditional power of the Consistories in both countries faded, in Belgium even 
more strikingly than in France, because the vast number of immigrants meant that an effective 
central leadership was entirely absent. After the German occupation of western Europe, the Jewish 
communities in Belgium faced a leadership vacuum. In contrast to the Netherlands, where the 
prewar Jewish leadership remained in place, those Jews who had fulfilled representative functions 
in Belgium fled the country after the threat of a Nazi invasion became imminent. To some extent, 
although not with the same level of intensity, Jews who resided in the occupied zone of France 
faced a similar problem. Those who had the social connections and financial means to do so fled 
southwards. Among them were central figures who had fulfilled representative functions in the 
prewar society. In the French unoccupied zone, the situation was different yet again. Lambert was 
part of the prewar Consistorial leadership, but his appointment at the helm of the UGIF-Sud and his 
later function as the organisation’s president can be considered a break with the policies and outlook 
of the traditional leadership; his outlook on the Jewish ‘refugee problem’ in France was markedly 
different from that of the Consistory. Whereas he helped immigrant Jews through the CAR, the 
Consistory generally tried to remain aloof. After the UGIF was established, the Consistorial 
leadership firmly objected to its existence. Because of these differences in prewar social structures 
and in the position of the future Jewish organisations’ leaders, the nature of the leadership was 
different in the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Whereas the leading position of Asscher and 
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Cohen in the Netherlands was a continuation of prewar social structures, Salomon Ulllman’s 
appointment at the helm of the AJB resulted simply from the lack of better alternatives. In a 
somewhat similar vein, the UGIF-Nord’s leadership did not have the same level of prewar 
leadership experience as Lambert in France or Asscher and Cohen in the Netherlands.  
 
 The different social foundations on which the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-
Sud were built affected both how far they were accepted by their communities and the way the 
Jewish leaders perceived their own role. To varying degrees, the positions of the French and Belgian 
leaders was not as solid as that of their Dutch counterparts. This, along with the highly diverse 
nature of the communities they were forced to represent, meant that these leaders could never 
become as determined and self-assured as Asscher and Cohen. Differences in self-perception among 
the central board members can be identified between Belgium and France and within France, 
between the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud. Raymond-Raoul Lambert was much more confident 
about his leadership than Salomon Ullman in Belgium. There also existed different perceptions 
about personal status and responsibilities among members of the same board. Whereas Maurice 
Benedictus (in the AJB) showed uncertainty about his position and eventually resigned, his 
colleague Salomon van den Berg was convinced that he could successfully govern the Jewish 
communities. He strongly believed in his own capacities and felt he deserved the leading position 
he was assigned in the Belgian Jewish community. It was a role he had been wanting for years to 
take on.  
 
 Differences in self-perception and the (lack of) acceptance by the Jewish communities 
affected the way the chairmen governed the Jewish organisations. The choices they made in terms 
of resisting Nazi orders or withdrawing from the boards were also partly informed by these factors. 
In Belgium and both French zones, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud leaders at some 
point either voluntarily decided to withdraw from their position, or were forced to do so because 
they refused to follow Nazi regulations. Their withdrawal resulted in a leadership vacuum which 
was not immediately filled. We have seen that the fluctuation of central board members in Belgium 
and France also resulted from contextual factors such as the presence of institutional criticisms 
about the organisations’ policies and the existence of alternative representative bodies such as the 
Consistory or secular aid groups. This fluctuation in membership turned out to work in the favour of 
the Jewish communities in these two countries since it not only stalled German tactics, but also 
resulted more broadly in the Germans losing their grip on these Jewish communities. In the 
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Netherlands, this did not happen, because of the strong and stable position of Asscher and Cohen 
and the fact that the JR soon became the only major representative organisation the Jews could turn 
to. Also, these two chairmen continued to believe very strongly that cooperation with the Germans, 
and receiving minor concessions in return, served the Jewish community best.  
 
 German views about how the four Jewish organisations functioned should be understood in 
light of the differing contexts we have discussed. The leaders’ perception of their representativeness 
and their acceptance by the Jewish communities were decisive in determining how they responded 
to German demands. Aspects including deference to authority, the overall (lack of) experience in 
clandestine activities and the nature of the German occupation, with important distinctions to be 
made between the Military Administration in Belgium and France and the Civil Administration in 
the Netherlands, all played a role here as well. We have seen that as a result of a combination of 
these aspects, Asscher and Cohen were more prone to follow Nazi directions and to remain in place 
until the JR was dissolved. Both the forced and voluntary resignations of the initial Jewish 
organisations’ leaders in Belgium and France are emblematic of the different stances these leaders 
took in relation to the German occupier. In Belgium, Salomon Ullman and Maurice Benedictus 
voluntarily withdrew from the AJB, in part because they believed they could no longer be of use to 
their communities, a feeling they had nurtured from the outset. In France, André Baur and 
Raymond-Raoul Lambert were arrested because they failed to meet increasing German demands. 
The various ways in which the central board members responded to German demands affected the 
latter’s perceptions about how the Jewish organisations were functioning. Not surprisingly, there 
was a greater level of dissatisfaction with the way the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud 
served, or failed to serve, the German interests.  
 
 Even though the literature has paid a good deal of attention to the decisions of the Jewish 
leaders and their role in the deportation of the Jews from their respective countries, we have seen 
that how the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud functioned was in large part decided 
by their Nazi overseers and was informed by the choices of the Jewish leadership only to a lesser 
extent. In the absence of a central order outlining the structure, role and tasks of the western 
European representative Jewish bodies, their organisation largely depended upon improvisation by 
individual German departments. The nature of the German occupation in each individual country, as 
well as the institutional rivalry which was so central to Nazi rule in Europe more broadly, were 
important factors in this process of improvisation. The lack of premeditation shows once again that 
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the rationale behind the institution of the representative Jewish organisations was not to make these 
bodies instrumental in the solution of the so-called ‘Jewish question’. Instead, they were used by the 
SS or rivalling institutions when they were considered useful, and avoided when they were not. 
Improvisation took a different course in each of the three countries. In the Netherlands, the JR was 
established nine months earlier than its counterparts, in direct response to the disruptions in 
Amsterdam’s Jewish neighbourhood in February 1941. Both the SiPo-SD and the Civil 
Administration attempted to gain the upper hand in overseeing the JR, which only received 
nationwide authority in September 1941. The establishment order of the AJB, which was a direct 
copy of that for the German Reichsvereinigung, was carried out by the Military Administration and 
was the result of numerous negotiations between representatives of the rivalling SiPo-SD and 
Militärverwaltung. In France, Vichy officials played a central role in the UGIF’s foundation 
surpassing SS-Hauptsturmführer Dannecker by forcing a Jewish representative organisation upon 
the communities of both the occupied and the unoccupied zone.  
 
 These differences affected how much room for manoeuvre the Jewish leaders had. The 
rivalry between the Military Administration and the SiPo-SD in Belgium and France continued to 
surface throughout the occupation. In Belgium, the conflicting views of the SiPo-SD and the 
Military Administration not only delayed the decision-making process from the German side, but 
also meant that the AJB leaders were unsure to which department they ought to address themselves. 
Since one of the key actions of the Jewish leaders was to buy time in order to prevent worse, they 
were able to use this ambiguity to their own benefit. In France, the strong presence of SiPo-SD, the 
Military Administration and the Vichy regime created a situation that was more complex than that 
in the Netherlands and Belgium. Particularly in the first phase of the occupation, the Vichy-led 
CGQJ, which directly supervised the UGIF, was a source of frustration for Theodor Dannecker. The 
anti-German outlook of Xavier Vallat problematised the relationship with the Nazis which 
decreased the effectiveness of German rule in France in the earliest part of the occupation. This, in 
turn, was one of the factors that resulted in more room for manoeuvre for the UGIF-Nord and the 
UGIF-Sud. In the Netherlands, the strong presence of the SiPo-SD contrasts with the situation in the 
two other countries. The successful attempts of the SiPo-SD to implement anti-Jewish regulations 
and deport Jews from the country as quickly as possible and the relative lack of powerful rival 
institutions made the context in which the JR was forced to act much more stringent.  
 
 The modus operandi of the organisations was largely decided by the way in which the rival 
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German institutions dealt with the absence of a centrally decided plan, and by the nature of the 
communities from which they emerged. These factors were inherently intertwined and cannot be 
regarded as separate constituents. The comparative method used here has highlighted the 
importance of these factors. This, in turn, forces us to rethink the predominant attention that has 
been paid to the decisions of individual Jewish leaders and their impact on the fate of the Jewish 
communities at large. Rather than assessing their behaviour from a moral viewpoint, we should 
understand their choices in the context of both long-term socio-cultural factors and the particular 
nature of Nazi rule at the time each decision was made. The Jewish leaders were forced to respond 
to German anti-Jewish regulations and orders on the spot and were given little time to reconsider 
their ad hoc decisions. An emphasis on the individual has obscured the larger structures. Only when 
the importance of these structures is recognised, is it possible to come closer to a full understanding 
of the complex situation these Jewish leaders faced.  
 
 The various ways in which the leaders of the JR, the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-
Sud and lower-ranking members perceived their role shows that they cannot be regarded as uniform 
bodies. The heterogeneous responses of the organisations’ members to increasing anti-Jewish 
regulations were not always consistent with the official policies they carried out. Whereas chairmen 
Asscher and Cohen, for example, continued to believe in the legal path they had chosen, other 
central board members questioned their decisions. Yet others outside the central board, such as 
Walter Süskind, interpreted their role differently by engaging in clandestine activities, which stood 
in contrast to the central orders of the JR’s leadership. Similar tendencies can be identified in the 
other two countries, where the autonomy of individuals working for the Jewish organisations was 
larger than in the Netherlands. In Belgium, a clear difference in viewpoint can be identified between 
Salomon van den Berg and Maurice Benedictus. Van den Berg considered the AJB to be an 
extension of the Consistory and strongly believed in the added value of the AJB in terms of 
providing social welfare to Belgian Jews. He was a strong proponent of law-abiding action and he 
resented clandestine activities. After the deportation of Jews in the summer of 1942, Van den Berg 
continued to serve as central board member and local Brussels chair. Benedictus, by contrast, 
believed that there was nothing more that he could do to serve the interests of the Jews, and 
resigned from his post and fled abroad in December 1942.  
 
 Moreover, we should note that the actions of individual members were not consistent 
throughout the occupation. We have seen that the existence of these Jewish organisations created a 
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wide range of activities that were not necessarily consistent with their official policies, but were 
nevertheless impossible without their existence. Even the Jewish leaders at times acted against the 
policies they officially propagated and, to varying degrees, were either actively or passively 
involved in clandestine operations on different levels. The involvement of the central board 
members of the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud in clandestine activities shows that there 
was at times a difference between the outward appearance of so-called ‘cooperation’ with the 
Germans and the actual activities of the organisations. In an inherently complex situation, their 
members could simultaneously cooperate and resist. These aspects prevent us from discussing these 
Jewish organisations as a coherent whole. Their leaders aimed to make sure that Jewish 
communities would suffer as little as possible from the German occupation, despite severe pressure 
on those communities. In doing so, they wavered between various modes of behaviour. More 
attention should be paid in the literature to this liminality of human behaviour since it is inherent to 
the conduct of individuals and, more specifically, to the conduct of individuals who are forced to 
function under severe pressure. As in the case of other individuals and (clandestine) organisations 
operative during the Nazi era, discontinuity, chaos and inconsistency defined the nature of these 
Jewish organisations and the choices of their leaders. In a broader context, this means that research 
on the Jewish organisations ought to focus more on the many nuances and oppositions that can be 
identified within them.  
 
 The complex interrelations that existed between clandestine activity and the JR, the AJB, the 
UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud underline their dynamic nature. They functioned in a context that 
was highly variable. Neither the German anti-Jewish regulations nor the general conditions of war, 
were factors that could be pre-determined. The Jewish organisations functioned in at times chaotic 
situations in which the Germans were trying to create some order. In doing so, these bodies were 
subject to change and underwent a number of severe transformations, including the modification of 
the central boards. Initially, the organisations were established to fulfil a representative role. The 
Jewish leaders aimed to aid the communities as far as possible while protecting them from the direct 
threat of the Nazis. Their intentions were increasingly deformed throughout the war as they were 
forced to deal with and abide by increasing anti-Jewish legislation. As a result, while they had 
started off by attempting to provide social welfare to the Jewish community at large, the 
organisations ended up trying to save as many Jews as possible from deportation. This was a 
gradually evolving process and the responses of the central board members to it wavered. The JR, 
the AJB, the UGIF-Nord and the UGIF-Sud were thus changing entities rather than static models 
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and should be approached as such.  
 
 These conclusions affect our perception of Jewish representation during Nazi rule, both in 
western and in eastern Europe. Broader analyses of the nature and impact of the Nazi regime are 
often focussed on either the West, or the East. In light of the different contexts (of occupation) in 
these two parts of Europe, this is understandable. However, broader themes about the nature of Nazi 
rule can be applied to the whole of Europe. The same goes for notions of Jewish representation and 
Jewish responses. Even though this research has discussed the eastern European Judenräte only on 
the sidelines, the conclusions of this thesis can also be used as a new analytical framework for 
understanding the notion of Jewish representation during the Second World War more broadly. 
There is a need to examine the representative organisations that were forced upon the Jewish 
communities in the broader context of Nazi rule and ideology. The functioning of these bodies was 
inherently dependent upon the nature of the German rule, which was epitomised by contradictions. 
With the absence of a clearly defined plan for how the Greater German Reich would be governed, 
there were competing interests, and different initiatives on a local level. As a result, the Jewish 
representative bodies were used by rival Nazi institutions, often to effect their own intentions. We 
have also seen that there is a need to critically review the terminology used to describe the 
behaviour of the Jewish leadership. Responses to Nazi demands were intrinsically inconsistent and 
dynamic. In changing circumstances, the Jewish leaders oscillated between cooperation and 
resistance and the many nuances of behaviour that exist in between.  
 
 This research has demonstrated that in order to understand and explain the nature of the 
Holocaust, and more specifically the way anti-Jewish legislations were implemented and dealt with 
by the Jewish communities, it is essential to compare and contrast across the boundaries of the 
nation-state. The predominant focus on these Jewish organisations within the context of the nation-
state has obscured aspects that, as this research has shown, proved important in understanding and 
explaining why these bodies functioned the way they did. Only by comparing case studies is it 
possible to determine what factors were distinctive in each locality, and how these factors affected 
the course of events. As a result, comparative studies stimulate multi-perspective approaches 
towards the subject. Even though there is an increase in the number of comparative and 
transnational studies on the Holocaust, language barriers and other practical factors, such as an 
extensive knowledge of the historiographies of each of the case studies involved, still seem to 
discourage scholars from engaging in (macro-level) comparative research. This obstructs a solid 
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contribution to the body of comparative literature on the Holocaust. Only by comparing case studies 
we can have a full understanding of the wide range of (overlooked) factors that were decisive in 





1. Primary Sources 
a. Archival sources and interviews 
France 
Mémorial de la Shoah 
CDJC 
V    German Embassy  
XXIV    État-major allemand en France  
XXV    Gestapo France 
XXVb    Gestapo France 
XXVI    Gestapo France  
XXVIII   CGQJ   
XLIXa    Gestapo France  
LVIII    Fonds de Union Générale des Israélites de France (UGIF)  
LXV    Gestapo France  
LXXIV   Procès des collaborateurs  
LXXVI   État-major allemand en France  
XCVI    Commission rogatoire    
CCXIII-CCXXI   Fédération des Sociétés Juives de France (F.S.J.F.)     
CCCLXXIX   CGQJ - Fonds Braun   
CDX-CDXXX  Fonds de Union Générale des Israélites de France (UGIF)    
CDLXI   Belgique  
DLXI    Fonds Anny Latour   
DLXIV-DLXV  Fonds de Union Générale des Israélites de France (UGIF)  
DCXLVIII-DCXLIX  Fonds de Union Générale des Israélites de France (UGIF)  
DCCCXXX   Fonds de Union Générale des Israélites de France (UGIF)  
CMXX-CMXXI  Fonds Lucien Lublin   
CMXXV   David Diamant  
CMXLIII   Fonds Éclaireuses et éclaireurs israélites de France  
YIVO  
 
MK490   UGIF records from YIVO  
 
MDC    UGIF Zone Sud  
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Archives Nationales de Paris (AN)  
3W 142   Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, depositions  
3W 158   Charles Du Paty de Clam, documentation, interrogations,   
    depositions   
3W 336   Xavier Vallat, documentation, inquiries  
3W 337    Xavier Vallat, interrogations, documentation  
3W 338   Xavier Vallat, Confrontations, depositions  
AJ38 6302   Dossier Charles du Paty de Clam 
AJ39 6278   Dossier Joseph Antignac 
AJ38 1141   Archives of the UGIF  
AJ38 5777   Archives of the UGIF, correspondence with the CGQJ 
American University in Paris (AUP) 
 
University of Southern California (USC) Shoah Foundation Institute for Visual History (accessed) 
-  Noémi Mattis (Perelman), 24 November 1995 
- Liliane Klein-Lieber, 21 June 1996  
Belgium 
Kazerne Dossin  
JMDV-CNHEJ  Archives of the AJB  
JMDV-NMW   Archives of the AJB  
   
Selection of key sources:  
A006685   Journal de guerre Salomon van den Berg  
A006682   La question Juive en Belgique, Maurice Benedictus, Feb. 1943  
A006683   Historique du problème Juif en Belgique, Maurice Benedictus, Feb. 
    1943 
 
Reports of the Foreign Police (Vreemdelingendossiers, N 682.302)  
 - Robert Holzinger (A295861)  
 - Max Katz (A158016)  
 - Noé Nozyce (1522381)  
 - Juda (Jules) Mehlwurm (1160919)  
 - Chaïm Pinchos Perelman (A143129)  
 - Saül Pinkous (876189) 
 - Louis Rosenfeld (A317631)  
 - Idel Steinberg (1313133)  
 - Oscar Teitelbaum (1501782)  
 - Nico David Workum (1550810) 
!287
Documentatie Oorlogsslachtoffers (DOS)  
 
Film XIV (R184.Tr50 077) Marburg Documentation  
R497/Tr206.891   Meeting reports AJB Brussels branch  
R497/248.745   Meeting reports AJB Brussels branch  
R497/Tr146.666  Meeting reports AJB central board  
R696/Tr267.125  Salomon Ullman papers  
R.715/Tr248.00  Archives Marcel Blum  
Krijgsauditoraat  
 
4030 N 1944   Dossier Grégoire Garfinkels  
8036/44   Penal files of the AJB leadership  
54 199/45   Dossier Salomon van den Berg  
NNSE 24 291/46  Dossier David Lazer  
CEGESOMA 
AA 753   Archief R.D. Katz betr. joden in België tijdens de bezetting  
AA 1915   Dossier Esta en Maurice Heiber  
AA 1196   Interviews met Belgische joden betr. joodse organisaties en verzet  
AA MIC/41   Oorlogsarchief Dr. Salomon Ullman  
AB2167    Historique du Comité de Défense des Juifs  
Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA)  
Conseil de Guerre de Liège  
 
No. 4030/44   Report Grigorijs Garfinkels  
No. 19186/45   Report Noé Nozyce  
Fondation de la Mémoire Contemporaine 
Interviews  
- Fela Perelman-Liwer, 1984/1988/1989  
- Irène Rosenzweig-Zmigrod, 1996  
 
The Netherlands 
Nationaal Archief, Den Haag 
Centraal Archief voor de Bijzondere Rechtspleging (CABR)  
 
!288
Abraham Asscher (CABR 107491 I-VIII)  
David Cohen (CABR 107491 I-VIII)  
Ferdinand Hugo aus der Fünten (CABR 66 I-II)  
Wilhelm Harster (CABR 378)  
Willy Paul Franz Lages (CABR 140 I-IX)  
NIOD, Amsterdam  
 
014    Reichskommissar für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete  
020    Generalkommissariat für Verwaltung und Justiz  
077    Generalkommissariat für das Sicherheitswesen (Höhere SS- und  
    Polizeiführer Nord-West.  
181j    Prof. Dr. D. Cohen 
182    Joodsche Raad voor Amsterdam  
250i    Westerbork  
DOC I    Personal Files  
-  Abraham Asscher  
-  Mirjam Bolle  
- David Cohen  
- Wilhelm Harster  
- Isaac Kisch  
- Gertrude van Tijn  
- Wilhelm Zöpf  
DOC II   Documenten  
KBII     Knipselcollectie  
    Fiches Loe de Jong  




M.19    Joodse Raad, Friesland  
O. 29    Belgium Collection    
P.7    Mark Yarblum Archive about the French Underground  
Film Center   






Oral History Interview Collection  
- Denise Gamzon, 2006  
United Kingdom (UK) 
The Wiener Library 
Testimony Collection  
- Maurice Heiber, 1956  
- Irène Zmigrod, 1956  
- Roger van Praag, 1956  
- Esta Fajerstein, 1956 
b. Printed primary sources  
 
Diaries 
Berr, H. Journal: the diary of a young Jewish woman in occupied Paris, transl. from the French by 
 David Bellos. London: Maclehose Press, 2008.  
Bloch, P. Jusqu’au dernier jour. Mémoires. Paris: Albin Michel, 1983.  
Bolle, M. “Ik zal je beschrijven hoe een dag er hier uit ziet”: Dagboekbrieven uit Amsterdam,  
 Westerbork en Bergen-Belsen. Amsterdam/Antwerpen: Uitgeverij Contact, 2005; first ed.  
 2003.  
Cohen, D. in: E. Somers (ed.). Voorzitter van de Joodse Raad: de herinneringen van David Cohen. 
 Zutphen: Wallburg Pers, 2010.  
Gamzon, D. Mémoires. Jerusalem: published by author, 1997.  
Gamzon, R. Les eaux claires, journal 1940-1944. Paris Éclaireurs Israélites de France, 1981.  
Kar, J. van de, Joods Verzet: terugblik op de periode rond de  Tweede Wereldoorlog. Amsterdam: 
 Stadsdrukkerij van Amsterdam, 1981.  
Lambert (ed. R. Cohen) Diary of a Witness 1940-1943, transl. Isabel Best Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,  
 2007; first ed. 1985.  
Mechanicus, In dépôt. Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1989; first ed: 1964.  
Vallat, X. Le Nez de Cléopâtre: souvenirs d’un homme de droite, 1919-1945. Paris: Éditions “Les 
 Quatre Fils Aymon, 1957. 
Other primary sources 
Allgemeine Übersicht für die Zeit vom 1. Dezember 1941 – 15. März 1942, 16 March 1942,  
 Brussels, in: Dokumente. Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Belgien, published by Serge  
 Klarsfeld and Maxime Steinberg. New York: The Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, 1980.  
Het Joodsche Weekblad: uitgave van den Joodschen Raad voor Amsterdam, printed by Omniboek 
 (Den Haag) in 1979. 
Newspaper articles 
 
Ensel, R. and E. Gans, “Over ‘Wij weten iets van hun lot’ in: De Groene Amsterdammer, 6  
 February 2013.  
!290
—., Niet weten van gaskamers verklaart passiviteit niet” in: NRC/Handelsblad, 16 May  
 2013 
—., “Nivellering in de geschiedenis: wij weten iets van hun lot” in: De Groene   
 Amsterdammer, No. 50, 12 December 2012.  
Paxton, R.  “Jews: How Vichy Made it Worse” in: New York Review of Books, No. 6 (2014). 
Polak, H. “Het wetenschappelijk antisemitisme: weerlegging en vertoog” in: Volksdagblad voor  
 Gelderland, 27 December 1938.  
2. Secondary sources 
Aalders, G. Nazi looting: the plunder of Dutch Jewry during the Second World War, transl. by  
 Arnold Pomerans and Erica Pomerans. Oxford / New York: Berg, 2004; first Dutch ed.  
 1999. 
Abicht, L. Geschiedenis van de Joden in de Lage Landen. Antwerpen: Meulenhoff / Manteau, 2006.  
—., De Joden van België. Amsterdam / Antwerpen: Atlas, 1994.  
Abitbol, M. Les deux terres promises: Les Juifs de France et le sionisme 1897-1945. Paris: Perrin, 
 2010; first ed. 1989.  
Adam, U. Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1972.  
Adler, J. “The Jews and Vichy: Reflections on French Historiography” in: The Historical Journal, 
 Vol. 44, No. 4 (2001); 1065-1082.  
—.,  The Jews of Paris and the Final Solution: Communal Response and Internal Conflicts,   
 1940-1944, transl. from the French. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987; first French ed. 
 1985.  
Albert, P. C. The Modernization of French Jewry: Consistory and Community in the Nineteenth  
 Century. Hanover, N.H.: Brandeis Univeristy Press, 1977.  
Anderl, G. and D. Rupnow, Die Zentralstelle für Jüdische Auswanderung als     
 Beraubungsinstitution. Wien: Oldenbourg, 2004. 
Aouate, Y.C. “La place de l’Algérie dans le projet antijuif de Vichy (octobre 1940-novembre 1942)” 
 in: Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer, Vol. 80, No. 301 (1993); 599-613.  
Arendt, H. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the Banality of Evil. New York: The Viking Press, 
 1963.  
Assan, V. “Israël William Oualid, juriste, économiste, professeur des universités” in: Archives   
 Juives, No. 1, Vol. 46 (2013); 130-143.  
Ayoun, R. “Les Juifs d’Algérie dans la Tourmente Antisémite du XXe siècle” in: Revue Européenne 
 des Études Hébraïques, No. 1 (1996); 57-99. 
Bajohr, F. and A. Löw, The Holocaust and European Societies: Social Processes and Social   
 Dynamics. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016.  
Baruch, M. Servir l’État français. L’administration en France de 1940 à 1944. Paris: Fayard, 1997.  
Bauer, Y. “Jewish Resistance in the Ukraine and Belarus during the Holocaust” in: Patrick Henry 
 (ed.), Jewish resistance against the Nazis. Washington: The Catholic University of America 
 Press, 2014; 483-503.  
—., Rethinking the Holocaust. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.  
—., American Jewry and the Holocaust: the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee,  
 1939-1945. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981.  
—., The Jewish emergence from powerlessness. London: MacMillan, 1980.  
—., “The Judenräte: some conclusions” in: Y. Gutman and C. Haft (eds.), Patterns of Jewish  
 Leadership. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1980; 393-405.  
!291
—., They Chose Life: Jewish Resistance in the Holocaust. New York: American Jewish   
 Committee, Institute of Human Relations, 1973.  
Bensimon D., “Socio-Demographic Aspects of French Jewry” in: European Judaism: A Journal for 
 the New Europe, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1978); 12-16.  
—., Socio-démographie des juifs de France et d’Algérie 1867-1907. Paris: Publications   
 Orientalistes de France, 1976.  
Bergh, S. van den. Deportaties: Westerbork, Thersiënstadt, Auschwitz, Gleiwitz. Bussum: Van   
 Dishoeck, 1945.  
Berkley, K.P.L. Overzicht van het ontstaan, de werkzaamheden en het streven van den Joodsche  
 Raad voor Amsterdam. Amsterdam: Plastica, 1945.  
Berkovitz, J. The Shaping of Jewish Identity in Nineteenth-Century France. Detroit: Wayne State 
 University Press, 1989.  
Birnbaum, P. Jewish Destinies: Citizenship, State and Community in Modern France. New York:  
 Hill and Wang, 2000.  
—., The Jews o the Republic: A Political History of State Jews in France from Gambetta to  
 Vichy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.  
Billig, J. Die “Endlösung der Judenfrage”. Studie über ihre Grundsätze im III. Reich in Frankreich 
 während der Besatzung, transl. from the French by Eva Schulz. New York: The Beate  
 Klarsfeld Foundation, 1979.  
—.,  Le Commissariat général aux questions juives,1941-1944 (3 Volumes). Paris: Éditions du 
 Centre, 1955, 1957 and 1960.  
Blom, J.C.H. and J.J. Cahen, “Joodse Nederlanders, Nederlandse Joden en Joden in Nederland  
 1870-1940” in: Ibid. R.G. Fuks-Mansfeld et al., Geschiedenis van de Joden in   
 Nederland. Amsterdam: Balans, 1995; 245-250.  
—., “The Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands: A Comparative Western European  
 Perspective” in: European History Quarterly, Vol. 19 (1989); 333-351.  
—., “De vervolging van de Joden in Nederland in internationaal vergelijkend perspectief” in:  
 Gids, No. 150, Vol. 6/7 (1987); 484-507.  
—., “In de ban van de Joodse Raad” in: Ibid., In de ban van goed en fout? wetenschappelijke  
 geschiedschrijving over de bezettingstijd in Nederland. Bergen: Octavo, 1983; 47-56.  
Blumel, A. Un grand Juif: Léon Meiss. Paris: Éditions Guy-Victor, 1967.  
Boas, H. “The Persecution and Destruction of Dutch Jewry, 1940-1945” in: Yad Vashem Studies  
 Vol. 6 (1967); 359-374.  
Bok, W. “Vie juive et communauté, une esquisse de leur histoire au vingtième siècle” in: La Grande 
 Synagogue de Bruxelles: Contributions à l’histoire des Juifs de Bruxelles, 1878-1978.  
 Bruxelles: Communauté Israélite de Bruxelles, 1978.  
Boom, B. van der, Wij Weten Niets van hun Lot: Gewone Nederlanders en de Holocaust.   
 Amsterdam: Boom, 2012.  
Boterman, F. Duitse daders: de jodenvervolging en de nazificatie van Nederland, 1940-1945.  
 Amsterdam: Uitgeverij de Arbeiderspers, 2015.  
Braber, B. This Cannot Happen Here: Integration and Jewish Resistance in the Netherlands,  
 1940-1945. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013.  
—., Zelfs als wij zullen verliezen: Joden in verzet en illegaliteit, 1940-1945. Amsterdam: Balans, 
 1990. 
Bracher, N “Up in Arms: Jewish Resistance against Nazi Germany in France” in: Patrick Henry  
 (ed.), Jewish resistance against the Nazis. Washington: The Catholic University of America 
 Press, 2014; 73-91.  
Brachfeld, S. Ils ont survécu. Le sauvetage des juifs en belgique occupée. Brussels: Éditions Racine, 
!292
 2001. 
Brasz, C. and Y. Kaplan (eds), Dutch Jews as Perceived by Themselves and by Others: Proceedings 
 of the Eighth International Symposium on the History of the Jews in the Netherlands.  
 Amsterdam: Brill, 2011.  
—.,  “Dutch Jews as Zionists and Israeli Citizens” in: Y. Kaplan et ibid., Dutch Jews as  
 Perceived by themselves and by others: proceedings of the eighth International Symposium 
 on the  History of the Jews in the Netherlands. Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2001; 215-234.  
Brauman, J., G. Loinger and F. Wattenberg (eds.), Organisation juive de combat: résistance /  
 sauvetage, France 1940-1945. Paris: Ed. Autrement, 2002.  
Brinckman, B. “Een schakel tussen arbeid en leiding: het Rijksarbeidsambt (1940-1944)” in:  
 Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, No. 12 (1989); 85-161.  
Bronkhorst, D. Een tijd van komen. De geschiedenis van vluchtelingen in Nederland. Amsterdam: 
 Mets, 1990.  
Bronzwaer, P. Maastricht en Luik bezet: een comparatief onderzoek naar vijf aspecten van de  
 Duitse bezetting van Maastricht en Luik tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Hilversum:  
 Verloren, 2010.  
Caestecker. F. “The Reintegration of Jewish Survivors into Belgian Society, 1943-1947” in: D. 
 Bankier (ed.), The Jews are Coming Back: The Return of the Jews to their Countries of  
 Origin after World War II. New York / Jerusalem: Berghahn / Yad Vashem, 2005; 72-107.  
—., “Onverbiddelijk maar ook clement. Het Belgische immigratiebeleid en de joodse vlucht uit 
 nazi-Duitsland, maart 1938- augustus 1939” in: Bijdragen tot de Eigentijdse Geschiedenis, 
 No. 13 (2004); 99-139.  
—., Alien Policy in Belgium, 1840-1940: The Creation of Guest Workers, Refugees and  
 Illegal Aliens. New York / Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2000.  
—., Ongewenste Gasten: Joodse vluchtelingen en migranten in de dertiger jaren. Brussel:  
 VUB Press, 1993.  
Caron, V. “French Public Opinion and the Jewish Question, 1930-1942: the Role of Middle- 
 Class Professional Organization” in: D. Bankier and I. Gutman (eds), Nazi   
 Europe and the Final Solution. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2003; 374-410.  
—.,  Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis 1933-1942. Stanford: Stanford  
 University Press, 1999.  
—.,  “The UGIF: the failure of the Nazis to establish a Judenrat on the Eastern European Model”. 
 New York: Columbia University Center for Israel and Jewish Studies, Working Papers I, 
 1977.  
Curtis, M. Verdict on Vichy: power and prejudice in the Vichy France regime. London:   
 Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2002.  
Cohen, A. Persécutions et sauvetages: Juifs et Français sous l’occupation et sous Vichy. Paris:  
 Éditios du Cerf, 1993.  
Cohen, D. Zwervend en dolend: de Joodse vluchtelingen in Nederland in de jaren 1933-1940, met 
 een inleiding over de jaren 1900-1933. Haarlem: Bohn, 1955.  
Cohen, R. “Le Consistoire et l’UGIF: La situation trouble des Juifs Français face à Vichy” in: Revue 
 d’histoire de la Shoah: Le Consistoire durant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale No. 169 (2000); 
 28-37.  
—.,  The Burden of Conscience: French Jewish Leadership during the Holocaust.   
 Bloomington/ Indianapolis: University Press, 1987.  
—., “French Jewry’s Dilemma on the Orientation of Its Leadership: From Polemics to  
 Conciliation, 1942-1944” in: Yad Vashem Studies No. 14 (1981); 167-204.  
—.,  and Z. Szajkowski, “A Jewish Leader in Vichy France, 1940-1943” in: Jewish Social  
!293
 Studies, Vol. 43 No. 3 (1981); 291-310.  
Conway, M. The Sorrows of Belgium: Liberation and Political Reconstruction, 1944-1947. Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press. 
Coutois, S., D. Peschanski and A. Rayski, Le sang de l’étranger: Les immigrés de la MOI dans la 
 Résistance. Paris: Fayard, 1989.  
Coutau-Bégarie, H. and C. Huan, Darlan. Paris: Fayard, 1989.  
Daalder, H. Politiek en historie. Opstellen over Nederlandse politiek en vergelijkende politieke  
 wetenschap. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2011; first ed. 1990.  
Daelen, V. van den. and N. Wouters, “The Absence of a Jewish Honor Court in Postwar Belgium” 
 in: L. Jokusch and G.N. Finder, Jewish Honor Courts: Revenge, Retribution and   
 Reconcilation after the Holocaust. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2015; 197-224.  
—., Laten we hun lied verder zingen: de heropbouw van de joodse gemeenschap in Antwerpen 
 na de Tweede Wereldoorlog, 1944-1960. Amsterdam: Aksant, 2008.  
Dickschen, B. “De VJB en het onderwijs” in: R. Van Doorslaer and S. Schreiber, De curatoren van 
 het getto: de Vereniging van Joden in België tijdens de Nazi-bezetting. Tielt: Lannoo, 2004; 
 182-203.  
Donnet, A. “ “Het onderzoek door het militaire gerecht: het geheugen buitenspel gezet” in: Van  
 Doorslaer and Schreiber (eds.), De curatoren van het getto: de vereniging van joden in  
 België tijdens de nazi-bezetting. Tielt: Lannoo, 2004; 291-319.  
Doorslaer R. van (ed), Gewillig België: Overheid en Jodenvervolging tijdens de Tweede   
 Wereldoorlog.Amsterdam/Antwerpen: Meulenhoff / Manteau, 2007  
––., and J. Schreiber (eds.), De curatoren van het getto: de Vereniging van Joden in België  
 tijdens de Nazi-bezetting. Tielt: Lannoo, 2004.  
—., “Salomon van den Berg of de ondraaglijke mislukking van een joodse politiek van het  
 minste kwaad” in: Ibid. and J. Schreiber, (eds.), De curatoren van het getto: de vereniging 
 van joden in België tijdens de nazi-bezetting. Tielt: Lannoo, 2004; 111-146.  
—., “Jewish Immigration and Communism in Belgium, 1925-1939” in: D. Michman (ed.),  
 Belgium and the Holocaust: Jews, Belgians, Germans (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1998),  
 63-82.  
—.,  Kinderen van het getto: Joodse revolutionairen in België, 1925-1940. Antwerpen / Baarn: 
 Hadewijch, 1995.  
Doron, D. Jewish Youth and Identity in Postwar France: Rebuilding Family and Nation.   
 Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2015.  
Drake, D. French Intellectuals and Politics from the Dreyfus Affair to the Occupation. Basingstoke: 
 Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.  
—., Paris at War, 1939-1944. Cambridge/Massachussetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard  
 University Press, 2015.  
Dratwa, D. “The Zionist Kaleidoscope in Belgium” in: D. Michman (ed.), Belgium and the  
 Holocaust: Jews, Belgians, Germans. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem Studies, 1998; 43-62. 
—., “Genocide and its Memories: A Preliminary Study on How Belgian Jewry Coped with the 
 Results of the Holocaust” in: Dan Michman (ed.), Belgium and the Holocaust: Jews,  
 Belgians, Germans. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem Studies, 1998; 523-557.  
Eismann, G. Hôtel Majestic: Ordre et sécurité en France occupée, 1940-1944. Paris: Éditions  
 Tallandier, 2010.  
Fein, H. Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the  
 Holocaust. New York: Free Press, 1979.  
Fenoglio, L. “On the use of the Nazi sources for the study of Fascist Jewish policy in the Italian- 
 occupied territories:  The case of south-eastern France, November 1942 - July 1943” in:  
!294
 Journal of Modern Italian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2019); 63-78.  
—., “Between Protection and Complicity: Guido Lospinoso, Fascist Italy, and the Holocaust in 
 Occupied Southeastern France” in: Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2019);
 90-111. 
Finkel, E. Ordinary Jews: Choice and Survival during the Holocaust. Princeton: University Press, 
 2017.  
Fishman, J. and J.S. Fishman, “On Jewish Survival during the Occupation: The Vision of Jacon van 
 Amerongen” in: Studia Rosenthaliana, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1999); 160-173.  
Fogg, S. Stealing Home: Looting, Restitution, and reconstructing Jewish lives in France,   
 1942-1947. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.  
—.,  The Politics of Everyday Life in Vichy France: Foreigners, Undesirables and Strangers.  
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
Fraser, D. The Fragility of Law: Constitutional Patriotism and the Jews of Belgium, 1940-1945.  
 Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009.  
Fredj, J. “Le Consistoire Central et la création du CRIF” in: Revue d’histoire de la Shoah: Le  
 Consistoire durant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, No. 169 (2000); 164-180.  
Friedman, Ph. Roads to extinction: essays on the Holocaust. New York, Conference on Jewish  
 Social Studies, 1980.  
Fuks, L. “Oost-Joden in Nederland tussen beide Wereldoorlogen” in: Studia Rosenthaliana, Vol. 11 
 No. 2 (1977); 198-215.  
Garfinkels, B. Les Belges face à la persécution raciale, 1940-1944. Brussel: ULB, 1965.  
Gerritse, T. Rauter: Himmlers vuist in Nederland. Amsterdam: Boom, 2018.  
Gildea, R. Fighters in the Shadows: A New History of the French Resistance. London:   
 Faber & Faber, 2015.  
Gotovitch, J. “Resistance Movements and the ‘Jewish Question’” in: D. Michman (ed.), Belgium  
 and the Holocaust: Jews, Belgians, Germans. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1998; 273-285.  
—., Du rouge au tricolore: les communistes belges de 1939 à 1944: un aspect de l’histoire de la 
 Résistance en Belgique. Bruxelles: Éditions Labor, 1992.  
Goudsmit, S. “Fragmenten uit het Dagboek van Sam Goudsmit” in: Studia Rosenthaliana, Vol. 4, 
 No. 2 (1970); 232-242.  
Graaff, B. de. “Collaboratie en Verzet : Een Vergelijkend Perspectief” in: J. Jonker and A. Kersten, 
 Vijftig  jaar na de inval: geschiedschrijving en de Tweede Wereldoorlog, bijdragen aan het 
 congres gehouden aan de Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam op 11 en 11 mei 1990.  
 ’s Gravenhage: SDU Uitgeverij, 1990; 95-108.  
Green, N. The Pletzl of Paris. Jewish Immigrant Workers in the Belle Époque. New York: Holmes 
 and Meier, 1986.  
Griffioen, P. and R. Zeller, Jodenvervolging in Nederland, Frankrijk en België 1940-1945:  
 overeenkomsten, verschillen, oorzaken. Amsterdam: Boom, 2011.  
—., “Jodenvervolging in Nederland en België tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog: Een   
 Vergelijkende  Analyse” in: Oorlogsdocumentatie ’40-’45, Vol. 8 (1997); 10-63.  
Gross, A. and R. Dearin, Chaim Perelman. New York: State University of New York Press, 2003.  
Grynberg, A. “Juger l’UGIF (1944-1950)?” in: Hélène Harter, Antoine Marès et al. (eds.), Terres  
 promises: Mélanges offerts à André Kaspi. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2008;  
 507-526.  
Gutman, Y. and S. Bender (eds.), The encyclopaedia of the righteous among the nations: rescues of 
 Jews during the Holocaust, France. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2003.  
—.,  and C. Haft (eds.), Patterns of Jewish Leadership in Nazi Europe, 1933-1945: Proceedings 
 of the Third Yad Vashem International Historical Conference – April 1977. Jerusalem: Yad 
!295
 Vashem, 1979.  
—.,  and G. Greif (eds), Historiography of the Holocaust Period: Proceedings of the Fifth Yad 
 Vashem International Historical Conference. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1983; 679-696.  
Haan, I. de. “An Unresolved Controversy: The Jewish Honor Court in the Netherlands, 1946-1950” 
 in: L. Jokusch and G.N. Finder (eds.), Jewish Honor Courts: Revenge, Retribution and  
 Reconciliation in Europe and Israel after the Holocaust.Wayne State: University Press,  
 2016.  
Hachmeister, L. Der Gegnerforscher. Die Karriere des SS-Führers Franz Alfred Six. Munich: Beck, 
 1998.  
Haft, C. The Bargain and the Bridle. The General Union of the Israélites of France, 1941-1944.  
 Chicago: Dialog Press, 1985.  
Hajkova, A. “The making of a Zentralstelle: Die Eichmann-Männer in Amsterdam” in: J. Milotová, 
 U. Rathgeber et al. (eds.), Theresienstädter Studien und Dokumente. Institut    
 Theresienstädter Initiative, 2003; 353-381.  
Hand, S. and S.T. Katz (eds.), Post-Holocaust France and the Jews, 1945-1955. New York/London: 
 New York University Press, 2015. 
Happe, K. Veel valse hoop: de jodenvervolging in Nederland, 1940-1945, trans. from the German 
 by Fred Reurs. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Atlas Contact, 2018; first German ed. 2017.  
—., “The Role of the Jewish Council During the Occupation of the Netherlands” in: F.  
 Bajohr and A. Löw (eds.), The Holocaust and European Societies: Social Processes and  
 Social Dynamics. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016; 207-225.  
Harter, H. A. Marès et al. (eds.), Terres promises: Mélanges offerts à André Kaspi. Paris:   
 Publications de la Sorbone, 2008.  
Herbert, U. Best: biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft,  
 1903-1989. Bonn: Dietz, 1996.  
Hersco, T. “Le Mouvement de la jeunesse sioniste (MJS) in: C. Richet (ed.), Organisation juive de 
 combat. Résistance / sauvetage, France 1940-1945. Paris: 2006; 127-131.  
Herzberg, A.J. Kroniek der Jodenvervolging, 1940-1945. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1978; first ed. 
 1950.  
Hilberg, R. The Destruction of the European Jews. London: Allen, 1961.  
Hirschfeld, G. Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration: The Netherlands under German Occupation,  
 1940-1945, transl. from the German by Louise Willmot. Oxford /New York/ Hamburg: Berg, 
 1988; first German ed. 1984.  
Hofmeester, K. “Image and self-image of the Jewish workers in the labour movements in   
 Amsterdam, 1800-1914” in: C. Brasz and Y. Kaplan (eds.), Dutch Jews as Perceived by  
 Themselves and by Others. Leiden: Brill, 2001; 187-202.  
Hondius, D. Return: Holocaust Survivors and Dutch Anti-Semitism, transl. David Colmer. Westport/
 Conneticut/London, 2003; first Dutch ed. 1990.  
Houwink ten Cate, J. “Der Befehlshaber der SiPo-SD in den besetzten niederländischen Gebiete” 
 in: W. Benz, G. Otto and ibid. (eds.), Die Bürokratie der Okkupation. Strukturen der  
 Herrschaft und Verwaltung im besetzten Europa. Berlin: Metropol, 1999; 87-133.  
—.,  “De Joodsche Raad voor Amsterdam 1941-1943” in: Willy Lindwer (ed.), Het fatale  
 dilemma: De Joodsche Raad voor Amsterdam 1941-1943. ’s Gravenhage SDU   
 Uitgeverij Koninginnegracht, 1995.  
—., “Heydrich’s Security Police and the Amsterdam Jewish Council, Feb 1941-  
 October 1942” in: Dutch Jewish History, Vol. 3 (1993); 381-393.  
—., “De justitie en de Joodsche Raad” in: E. Jonker and M. van Rossem (eds.), Geschiedenis en 
 cultuur: achttien opstellen.’s Gravenhage: SDU, 1990; 149-168.  
!296
––.,  “Het jongere deel: Demografische en sociale kenmerken van het jodendom in Nederland  
 tijdens de vervolging”: Jaarboek van het Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Vol. I  
 (1989); 9-66.   
Hyman, P. The Jews of Modern France. California: University Press, 1998.  
—., From Dreyfus to Vichy: The Remaking of French Jewry, 1906-1939. New York:   
 Columbia University Press, 1979.  
Jäckel, E. Frankreich in Hitlers Europa. Die Deutsche Frankreichpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg.  
 Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966.  
Jansen, C. and D. Venema. De Hoge Raad en de Tweede Wereldoorlog: recht en rechtsbeoefening in 
 de jaren 1930-1950. Amsterdam: Boom, 2011.  
Jokusch, L. and G.N. Finder, Jewish Honor Courts: Revenge, Retribution and Reconciliation after 
 the Holocaust. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2015.  
Joly, L. L’État contre les juifs: Vichy, les nazis et la persécution antisémite. Paris: Éditions  
 Grasset, 2018.  
—., Vichy dans la “Solution Finale”: histoire du commissariat général aux questions juives,  
 1941-1944. Paris: Grasset: 2006.  
—., Xavier Vallat (1891-1972): Du nationalisme chrétien à l’antisémitisme d’État. Paris:  
 Grasset, 2001.  
Jong, L. de. Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Den Haag: SDU  
 Uitgeverij Koninginnegracht (1969-1991).  
—.,  De Duitse vijfde kolonne in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1953.  
Jonghe, A. de. “De strijd Himmler-Reeder om de benoeming van een HSSPF te Brussel   
 (1942-1944)” in: Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog (BGTW), No. 
 3 (1974), 9-81.  
—., Hitler en het politieke lot van België (1940-1944). De vestiging van een    
 Zivilverwaltung in België en Noord-Frankrijk: Koningskwestie en bezettingsregime van de 
 kapitulatie tot Berchtesgaden, 28 mei - 19 november 1940, part 1. Antwerpen: De   
 Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1972.  
Kaplan, J. “French Jewry under the Occupation” in: American Jewish Yearbook, No. 47 (1945);  
 71-118.  
Kershaw, I. Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris. London: Allan Lane, 1998.  
—., Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis. London: Allan Lande, 2000.   
Kieval, H.J. “Legality and Resistance in Jewish France: The Rescue of Jewish Children” in:  
 Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 124, No. 5 (1980), 339-366.  
Klarsfeld, S. Vichy-Auschwitz: le rôle de Vichy dans la solution finale de la question juive en  
 France, 2 Volumes. Paris: Fayard, 1983-1985; reissued in 2001 as Vol. 1 of the series La  
 Shoah en France.  
—., and M. Steinberg (eds.), Dokumente. Die Endlösung der Judenfrage in Belgien. New York: 
 The Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, 1980.  
—., Le livre des otages: la politique des otages menée par les autorités allemandes d’occupation 
 en France de 1941 à 1943. Paris: Éditeurs français réunis, 1979.  
—., Le mémorial de la déportations des juifs de France. Paris: Klarsfeld, 1978.  
Klein, B. “The Judenrat” in: Jewish Social Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1960); 27-42.  
Knoop, H. De Joodsche Raad: Het drama van Abraham Asscher en David Cohen. Amsterdam:  
 Elsevier, 1983.  
Kopuit, M. Dat heeft mijn oog gezien: het leven in oorlogstijd in krantenberichten uit de Joodse  
 pers 1940-1945. Kampen: Kok, 1990.  
Kossmann, E. The Low Countries 1780-1940. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.  
!297
Krausnick, H. and M. Broszat, Anatomy of the SS, transl. from the German by Dorothy Long and 
 Marian Jackson. New York: Walker & Co., 1968; first German ed. 1965.  
Kriegel, A. “De la résistance juive” in: Pardès, No. 2 (1985); 191-209.  
Kristel, C. Geschiedschrijving als opdracht: Abel Herzberg, Jacques Presser en Loe de Jong over 
 de jodenvervolging. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1998.  
Kulka, O. “The Reichsvereinigung and the Fate of the German Jews, 1938/9-1943. Continuity or  
 Discontinuity in German-Jewish History in the Third Reich” in: W Benz (ed.), Die Juden im 
 nationalsozialistischen Deutschland. The Jews in Nazi Germany 1933-1945. Jerusalem: Yad 
 Vashem, 1979; 45-58.  
Kwiet, K. Reichskommissariat Niederlande: Versuch und Scheitern nationalsozialistischer  
 Neuordnung. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1968.  
Lafitte, M. “Les Rafles de Janvier 1944 à Bordeaux et les Raisons de l’Aveuglement de l’UGIF” in: 
 Revue d’Histoire de la Shoah, No. 203 (2015); 371-385.   
—., “Was the UGIF an obstacle to the rescue of Jews?” in: J. Sémelin, C. Andrieu et al. (eds),  
 Resisting Genocide: The Multiple Forms of Rescue. New York: Columbia University Press, 
 2011; 395-410.  
—.,  “L’UGIF face aux mesures antisémites de 1942’ in: Les Cahiers de la Shoah, Vol. 9 No. 1 
 (2007); 123-190.  
—.,  “l’Association des Juifs en Belgique (AJB): Des notables postiers de la solution finale” in: 
 Revue d’Histoire de la Shoah (2006); 87-109.  
—., Juif dans la France allemande. Paris: Éditions Tallandier, 2006.  
—., “L’OSE de 1942 à 1944: Une survie périlleuse sous couvert de l’UGIF” in: Revue de la  
 Shoah, Vol. 2, No. 185 (2006); 65-86.  
—.,  “L’UGIF, collaboration ou résistance?” in: Revue d’histoire de la Shoah No. 185 (2006);  
 45-65.  
—.,  Un engrenage fatal: l’UGIF face aux réalités de la Shoah 1941-1944. Paris: Liana  
 Levy, 2003.  
—., “Between Memory and Lapse of Memory: The First UGIF Board of Directors” in: J.K. Roth 
 and E. Maxwell (eds.), Remembering for the Future: The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide. 
 Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001; 674-687.  
Lagrou, P. The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western  
 Europe, 1945-1965. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
—., “Belgium” in: Bob Moore (ed.), Resistance in Western Europe. Oxford: Berg, 2000.  
Laloum, J. “Du culte libéral au travail social: la rue Copernic au tempts des années noires” in:  
 Archives Juives, Vol 41, No. 1 (2009); 118-132.  
—., “L’UGIF et ses maisons d’enfants: l’enlevement d’une enfant” in: Monde Juif, No. 124  
 (1990); 172-176.  
Lambauer, B. Otto Abetz et les Français: ou l’envers de la collaboration. Paris: Fayard, 2001.  
Lazare, L. Rescue as Resistance: How Jewish Organizations Fought the Holocaust in France.  
 Colombia: University Press, 1996.  
Lee, D. Pétain’s Jewish Children: French Jewish Youth and the Vichy Regime. Oxford: Oxford  
 University Press, 2014.  
Lefenfeld, N. “Unarmed Combat: Jewish Humanitarian Resistance in France during the Shoah” in: 
 P. Henry (ed.), Jewish Resistance against the Nazis. Washington: The Catholic University of 
 America Press, 2014; 92-120.  
Leff, L.M, The Archives Thief: The Man Who Salvaged French Jewish History in the Wake of the 
 Holocaust. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.  
Liebman, M. Né juif. Une enfance juive pendant la guerre. Paris / Gembloux: Duculot, 1977.  
!298
Limore, Y, “Rescue of Jews: Between History and Memory” in: Humboldt Journal of Social  
 Relations, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2004); 105-138.  
Lindwer, W. Het fatale dilemma: De Joodsche Raad voor Amsterdam 1941-1943. Den Haag: SDU 
 Uitgeverij Koninginnegracht, 1995.  
Lipschits, I. De kleine sjoa: Joden in naoorlogs Nederland. Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2001.  
Longerich, P. Politik der Vernichtung: Eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistische   
 Judenverfolgug. München: Piper, 1998.  
Lozowick, Y. Hitler’s Bureaucrats. The Nazi Security Police and the Banality of Evil. London/New 
 York: Continuum, 2002.  
Malinovich, N. French and Jewish: Culture and Politics of Identity in Early Twentieth-Century  
 France. Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilisation, 2008.  
Marcot, F. “La Résistance dans ses lieux et milieux: des relation d’interdépendance” in: La  
 Résistance et les Français. Nouvelles approches. Cahiers de l’Institut d’Histoire du Temps 
 Présent, No. 37 (1997); 129-146.  
Marrus, M. “Varieties of Jewish Resistance: Some Categories and Comparisos in Historiographical 
 Perspective” in: Y. Gutman (ed.), Major Changes within the Jewish People in the Wake of 
 the Holocaust. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1996; 269-300.  
—., “Jewish Resistance to the Holocaust” in: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 30, No. 1 
 (1995); 83-110.  
—., The Nazi Holocaust: The Victims of the Holocaust. Toronto: Mecklermedia, 1989.  
—., “Jewish Leaders and the Holocaust” in: French Historical Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2   
 (1987); 316-331.  
—., and R. Paxton, “The Nazis and the Jews in Occupied Western Europe, 1940-1944” in: The 
 Journal of Modern History, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1982); 687-714.  
—., and ibid., Vichy France and the Jews (New York: Basic Books, 1981).  
—., The Politics of Assimilation. A Study of the French Jewish Community at the time of the  
 Dreyfus Affair. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.  
Massenge, C. “De sociale politiek” in: R. Van Doorslaer and J. Schreiber,  De curatoren van het  
 getto: de Vereniging van Joden in België tijdens de Nazi-bezetting. Tielt: Lannoo, 2004;  
 215-244.  
Mazower, M., Hitler Empire: How the Nazis Rules Europe. New York: The Penguin Press, 2008.  
Meinen, I. De Shoah in België, transl. from the German by Iannis Goerlandt Antwerpen: De Bezige 
 Bij, 2011; first German ed. 2009.  
—., “De Duitse bezettingsautoriteiten en de VJB” in: R. van Doorslaer and J. Schreiber (eds.), 
 De curatoren van het getto: de Vereniging van Joden in België tijdens de Nazi-bezetting.  
 Tielt: Lannoo, 2004; 46-70.  
Melkman, J.,“De briefwisseling tussen Mr. L.E. Visser  en Prof. Dr. D. Cohen” in: Studia  
 Rosenthaliana, Vol. 8m No. 1 (1974); 107-130.  
Ménager, C. Le Sauvetage des Juifs à Paris. Histoire et Mémoire. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po,  
 2005.  
Meyer, A. Täter im Verhör: die “Endlösung der Judenfrage” in Frankreich, 1940-1944. Darmstadt: 
 Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005.  
Michel, A. Les Éclaireurs Israélites de France pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, september  
 1939 - septembre 1944: action et évolution. Paris: Éditions des Éclaireurs Israélites de  
 France, 1985.  
Michman, D. The Emergence of Jewish Ghettos during the Holocaust. New York / Cambridge:  
 University Press, 2011.  
—., “Judenräte, Ghettos, Endlösung: Drei Komponenten einer antijüdischen Politik oder  
!299
 Separate Faktoren?” in: J.A. Mlynarczuk and J. Böhler (eds.), Der Judenmord in den  
 eingegliederten polnischen Gebiete, 1939-1945. Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag, 2010;   
 167-176.  
—., “On the Historical Interpretation of the Judenräte Issue: Between Intentionalism,   
 Functionalism and the Integrationist Approach of the 1990s” in: Moshe Zimmerman (ed.), 
 On Germans and Jews under de Nazi Regime: Essays by Three Generations of Historians. 
 Jerusalem: Magness Press, 2006; 385-397.  
—., “Jewish Leadership in Extremis” in: D. Stone (ed), The Historiography of the   
 Holocaust. New York: Palgrave Mac Millan, 2004.  
—.,  The Historiographical Controversy concerning the Character and Function of the Judenrats 
 in: M. Marrus (ed.), The Historiography of the Holocaust. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
 2004. 
—., “De oprichting van de VJB in internationaal perspectief” in: R. van Doorslaer and J.  
 Schreiber, De curatoren van het getto. Tielt: Lannoo, 2004; 25-45.  
—., “Jewish Headships under Nazi Rule: The Evolution and Implementation of an   
 Administrative Concept” in: Ibid. (ed), Holocaust Historiography: A Jewish Perspective.  
 Conceptualization, Terminology, Approaches and Fundamental Issues. Portland/London:  
 Valentine Mitchell, 2003; 159-175.  
—., “Why Did So Many of the Jews in Antwerp Perish in the Holocaust?” in: Yad Vashem  
 Studies XXX. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2002; 465-481.  
—.,  (ed.), Belgium and the Holocaust: Jews, Belgians, Germans. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem  
 Studies, 1998.  
—., “‘Judenräte’ und ‘Judenvereinigungen’ unter nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft: Aufbau und 
 Anwendung eines verwaltungsmassigen Konzepts” in: Zeitschrift für    
 Geschichtswissenschaft Vol. 46, No. 4 (1998); 293-304.   
—., “Preparing for Occupation? A Nazi Sicherheitsdienst document of Spring 1939 on the Jews 
 of Holland” in: Studia Rosenthaliana Vol. 31, No. 2 (1998); 173-189.  
—., “Research on the Holocaust in Belgium and in General: History and Context” in: Ibid, 
 Belgium and the Holocaust: Jews, Belgians, Germans. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem Studies,  
 1998; 3-42.  
—.,  “The Zionist Youth Movements in Holland and Belgium and their Activities during the  
 Shoah” in: A. Cohen, Y. Cochavi, Y. Gelber (eds), Zionist Youth Movements during the  
 Shoah. New York: Lang, 1995; 145-171.  
—.,  “Jewish Religious Life under Nazi Domination: Nazi Attitudes and Jewish Problems” in:  
 Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses No. 22/2 (1993); 147-165.  
––., “The Uniqueness of the Joodse Raad in the Western European Context.” in: Dutch Jewish 
 History, Vol. III. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1993; 371-380.  
—., “De oprichting van de ‘Joodsche Raad voor Amsterdam’ vanuit een vergelijkend   
 perspectief” in: Derde Jaarboek van het Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie. Den  
 Haag: SDU Uitgeverij, 1992; 75-100.  
—., “Belgium” in: I. Gutman (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Holocaust. New York: MacMillan, 1990.  
—.,  Het Liberale Jodendom in Nederland 1929-1943. Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1988.  
—.,  “Planning for the Final Solution Against the Background of Developments in Holland in  
 1941”, Yad Vashem Studies XVII. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1986; 145-180.  
—.,  “Problems of Religious life in the Netherlands during the Holocaust” in: Dutch Jewish  
 History. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1984; 379-399.  
—., “Die jüdische Emigration und die niederländische Reaktion zwischen 1933 und 1940” in: K. 
 Dittrich and M. Würzner (eds.), Die Niederlande und das Deutsche Exil, 1933-1940.  
!300
 Königstein: Athanäum Verlag, 1982; 73-86.  
Michman, J., H. Beem and D. Michman, Pinkas: Geschiedenis van de joodse gemeenschap in  
 Nederland. Amsterdam / Antwerpen: Uitgeverij Contact, 1999; first ed. 1992.  
—., “The controversial stand of the Joodse Raad in the Netherlands: Lodewijk E. Visser’s  
 struggle” in: Yad Vashem Studies, Vol. X (1994); 9-76.  
—., “The Controversy Surrounding the Jewish Council of Amsterdam. From its Inception to  
 Present Day” in: Michael Marrus (ed.), The Nazi Holocaust: Victims of the Holocaust.  
 Westport / London: Greenwood, 1989; 821-843.  
—., “Planning for the Final Solution against the Background of Developments in Holland in  
 1941” in: Yad Vashem Studies, Vol. 17 (1986); 145-180.  
Middleton-Kaplan, R. “The Myth of Jewish Passivity” in: Patrick Henry (ed.), Jewish resistance  
 against the Nazis. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014; 3-26.  
Mildt, D. de. De rechter en de deporteurs. Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2018.   
Mlynarczyk, J.A. and J. Böhler (eds.), Der Judenmord in den eingegliederten polnischen Gebieten, 
 1939-1945. Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag, 2010.  
Molle, P. van. Het Belgisch parlement: 1894-1972. Antwerpen: Standaard, 1972.  
Monneray, H. (ed.), La persécution des Juifs en France et dans les autres pays de l’Ouest presentée 
 par la France à Nuremberg: recueil de documents. Paris: Éditions du Centre, 1947.  
Moore, B. “Integrating Self-Help into the History of Jewish Survival in Western Europe” in: N.J.W. 
 Goda (ed.), Jewish Histories of the Holocaust: New Transnational Approaches. New York / 
 Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2014; 193-208.  
—.,  Resistance in Western Europe. Oxford: Berg, 2000.  
—., Victims and Survivors: The Nazi persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands 1940-1945.  
 Oxford: Berg, 1997.  
—., Refugees from Nazi Germany in the Netherlands, 1933-1940. Dordrecht / Boston /  
 Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff,  1986.  
Nefors, P. Breendonk 1940-1945: de geschiedenis. Antwerpen: Standaard Uitgeverij, 2011; first ed. 
 2004.  
Nicault, C. “Face au Sionisme, 1887-1940” in: A. Kaspi (ed.), Histoire de l’Alliance Israélite  
 Universelle de 1860 à nos jours. Paris: Armand Colin, 2010; 189-226.  
—., L’Acculturation des Israélites Français au Sionisme après la Grande Guerre” in: Archives  
 Juives, No. 1, Vol. 39 (2006); 9-28.  
—., “L’Utopie sioniste du “nouveau Juif” et la jeunesse juive dans la France de l’après guerre: 
 Contribution à l’histoire de l’Alyah française in: Les Cahiers de la Shoah, Vol. 5, No. 1  
 (2001); 105-169.  
Ory, P. Les Collaborateurs, 1940-1945. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1976.  
Ousby, I. Occupation: the ordeal of France, 1940-1944. London: Murray, 1997.  
Paxton, R. Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944. New York: Knopf, 2001; first ed.
 1972.  
Perego, S. “Jurys d’honneur: the stakes and limits of purges among Jews in France after Liberation” 
 in: Laura Jockusch and Gabriel N. Finder (eds.), Jewish Honor Courts: revenge, retribution, 
 and reconciliation in Europe and Israel after the Holocaust. Detroit: Wayne State University 
 Press, 2016; 137-164.  
Piersma, H. De drie van Breda: Duitse oorlogsmisdadigers in Nederlandse gevangenschap,  
 1945-1989. Amsterdam: Balans, 2005.  
Polak, J.A. Leven en werken van mr. L.E. Visser. Amsterdam: Athenaeum-Polak & Van Gennep,  
 1997.  
Poliakov, L. Harvest of Hate. The Nazi Program for the Destruction of the Jews of Europe. New  
!301
 York: Syracuse University Press, 1954.  
—., La condition des Juifs en France sous l’occupation italienne. Paris: CDJC, 1946.  
Poznanski, R. Propagandes et persécutions: La Résistance et le ‘problème juif’, 1940-1944. Paris: 
 Fayard, 2008.  
—., “Union Générale des Israélites de France” in: Walter Laqueur (ed.), The Holocaust  
 Encyclopedia. New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2001; 653-657.  
—., “Le Consistoire central pendant la Guerre: Bilan et perspectives de recherches” in: Revue de 
 la Shoah. Le Monde Juif, No. 169 (2000); 181-194.  
—., Jews in France During World War II, transl. N. Bracher. Brandeis: University Press,  
 2001; first French ed. 1994.  
—., “Reflections on Jewish Resistance and Jewish Resistants in France” in: Jewish Social  
 Studies New Series, Vol. 2 No. 1 (1995); 124-158.  
—., “A methodological approach to the Study of Jewish Resistance in France” in: Yad Vashem 
 Studies, Vol. XVIII (1987); 1-39.  
Presser, J. Ondergang: de vervolging en verdelging van het Nederlandse Jodendom, 1940-1945.  
 Den Haag: Staatsuitgeverij Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.  
Puttemans, J., De bezetter buiten: beknopte historiek van het onafhankelijkheidsfront, nationale  
 verzetsbeweging, 1941-1945. Lier/Almere: NIOBA, 1987.  
Rabinovici, D. Instanzen der Ohnmacht. Wien 1938-1945. Der Weg zum Judenrat. Frankfurt am  
 Main: Jüdischer Verlag, 2000.  
Rajsfus, M. Des Juifs dans la collaboration: l’UGIF 1941-1944. Paris: Études et Documentation  
 Internationales, 1980.  
Rayski, A. The Choice of the Jews under Vichy: Between Submission and Resistance, transl. from 
 the French by William Sayers. Indiana: Notre Dame 2005; first French ed. 1992.  
Reitlinger, G. The Final Solution: The Attempts to Exterminate the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945.  
 New York: Beechurst Press, 1953.  
Rodrigue, A. “Rearticulations of French Jewish Identities after the Dreyfus Affair” in: Jewish Social 
 Studies, No. 2, Vol. 3 (1996); 1-24.  
Rosenblum, T. “Een plaatselijk voorbeeld: het comité van Luik” in: R. van Doorslaer and J.  
 Schreiber (eds.), De curatoren van het getto: de Vereniging an de joden in België tijdens de 
 nazi-bezetting. Tielt: Lannoo, 2004.   
Rosengart, L. “Les maisons de l’OSE: parcours d’une enfance fragmentée” in: M. Lemalet (ed.), Au 
 secours des enfants du siècle. Paris: Nil, 1993.  
Roth, J.K and E. Maxwell, Remembering for the Future: The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide.  
 Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011.  
Rothkirchen, L., The Jews of Bohemia and Moravia facing the Holocaust. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 
 2015.  
Rozett, R. “Jewish Resistance” in: D. Stone (ed.), The historiography of the Holocaust. Palgrave: 
 MacMillan, 2004; 341-363.  
Ryan, D. The Holocaust and the Jews of Marseille: The Enforcement of anti-Semitic policies in  
 Vichy France. Urbana/Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1996.  
Sanders, J. “Opbouw en continuïteit na 1945” in: Michman, Beem et al (eds.), Pinkas:   
 Geschiedenis van de Joodse gemeenschap in Nederland. Amsterdam / Antwerpen:  
 Uitgeverij Contact, 1999; 216-251.  
Sanders, P. Het Nationaal Steun Fonds: bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van de financiering van het  
 verzet, 1941-1945.’ s Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.  
Saerens, L. Vreemdelingen in een wereldstad: een geschiedenis van Antwerpen en zijn Joodse  
 bevolking (1880-1944). Tielt: Lannoo, 2000.  
!302
—,  “De Jodenvervolging in België in cijfers” in: Bijdragen tot de eigentijdse geschiedenis  
 30/60, No. 17 (2006); 199-235.  
—.,  “Die Hilfe für Juden in Belgien” in: Wolfgang Benz and Juliane Wetzel (eds.), Solidarität 
 und Hilfe für Juden während der NS-Zeit, Vol. 2. Berlin: Metropol, 1998; 193-280.  
Sarraute, R. and P. Tager, Les Juifs sous l’Occupation: Recueil des textes officiels français et  
 allemands. Paris: CDJC, 1982.  
Scheffler, W. Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich 1944 bis 1945. Frankfurt am Main: Bücklergilde 
 Gutenberg, 1961.  
Schellekens, M. Walter Süskind: Hoe een zakenman honderden Joodse kinderen uit handen van de 
 nazi’s redde. Amsterdam: Athenaeum, 2011.  
Schenkel, M. De Twentse paradox: de lotgevallen van de joodse bevolking van Hengelo en  
 Enschede tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2003.  
Schleunes, K.A. The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy Toward German Jews. Illinois:  
 University Press, 1970.  
Schoentgen, M. “Luxembourg” in: Wolf Gruner and Jörg Osterloh (eds.), The Greater German  
 Reich and the Jews: Nazi Persecution Policies in the Annexed Territories 1935-1945. New 
 York/ Oxford: Berghahn, 2016; 307-311.  
Schreiber, J., “Tussen traditionele en verplichte gemeenschap” in: R. van Doorslaer and ibid., De 
 Vereniging van Joden in België tijdens de Nazi-bezetting. Tielt: Lanoo, 2004; 71-110.  
—., Dictionnaire Biographique des Juifs de Belgique: Figures du judaïsme belge XIXe-XXe  
 siècles. Bruxelles: Éditions de Boeck Université, 2002.  
—., “Les Juifs en Belgique: une présence continue depuis le XIIIe siècle” in: Cahiers de la  
 Mémoire contemporaine - Bijdragen tot de eigentijdse Herinnering, No. 2 (2000); 13-37.  
—., Politique et Religion: le consistoire central israélite de Belgique au XIXe siècle.   
 Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1995.  
Schrijvers, P. Rome, Athene, Jeruzalem: leven en werk van prof. dr. David Cohen. Groningen:  
 Historische Uitgeverij, 2000.  
Schwarzfuchs, S. Aux prises avec Vichy: Histoire politique des Juifs de France, 1940-1944. Paris: 
 Calmann-Lévy, 1998.  
Seibel, W. Macht und Moral: Die “Endlösung der Judenfrage” in Frankreich, 1940-1944.  
 München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2010.  
Sémelin, J., The Survival of the Jews in France, 1940-1944. London: Hurst & Company, 2018;  
 revised and updated version of Persécutions et entraides dans la France occupée: comment 
 75% des juifs en France ont échappé à la mort. Paris: Éditions les Arènes-le Seuil, 2013.  
—., D. Andrieu et al. (eds.), Resisting Genocide: The Multiple Forms of Rescue. New York:  
 Columbia University Press, 2011.  
—., Unarmed Against Hitler: Civilian Resistance in Europe, 1939-1943. Westport CT:  
 Praeger, 1993.  
Shabbetai, K. As Sheep to the Slaughter? The Myth of Cowardice. Bet Dagan: Keshev Press, 1962.  
Shirman, I. “Een aspekt van de ‘Endlösung’. De ekonomische plundering van de joden in België” 
 in: Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, No. 3 (1974); 163-182. 
Snijders, K. Nederlanders in Buchenwald, 1940-1945: een overzicht over de geschiedenis van  
 Nederlandse gevangenen die tijdens de nationaal-socialistische bezetting van 1940-1945 in 
 het concentratiekamp Buchenwald zaten. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2001.  
Sica, E. Mussolini’s  Army in the French Riviera: Italy’s Occupation of France. Urbana / Chicago / 
 Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2016.  
Somers, E. (ed.) Voorzitter van de Joodse Raad: de herinneringen van David Cohen. Zutphen:  
 Wallburg Pers, 2010.  
!303
Staal, P. Roestvrijstaal: speurtocht naar de erfenis van Joodse oorlogswezen. Delft: Eburon, 2008.  
Steinberg, L. “Jewish Rescue Activities in Belgium and France” in: Rescue Attempts during the  
 Holocaust: Proceedings of the Second Yad Vashem International Historical Conference.  
 Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1977; 603-614.  
—., Le comité de défense des Juifs en Belgique, 1942-1944. Bruxelles: Éditions de   
 l’Université, 1973.  
—., La Révolte des justes: les juifs contre Hitler, 1933-1945. Paris: Fayard, 1970.  
Steinberg, M. and J. Gotovitch, Otages de la terreur Nazi: Le Bulgare Anghelhoff en son groupe de 
 Partisans juifs Bruxelles, 1940-1943. Bruxelles: Uitgeverij VUBPress, 2007.  
—.,  La persécution des Juifs en Belgique (1940-1944). Bruxelles: Éditions Complexe,  
 2004.  
—., Un Pays occupé et ses juifs: Belgique entre France et Pays-Bas. Gerpinnes, Belgium:  
 Editions Quorum, 1998.  
—., “The Jews in the years 1940-1944: Three strategies for coping with a tragedy” in: D.  
 Michman (ed.), Belgium and the Holocaust: Jews, Belgians, Germans. Jerusalem: Yad  
 Vashem Studies, 1998; 347-372.  
—.,  “The Trap of Legality: The Belgium Jewish Association” in: Michael Marrus (ed.), The Nazi 
 Holocaust: The Victims of the Holocaust. Toronto: Mecklermedia, 1989; 797-820.  
—.,  L’étoile et le fusil, 3 volumes: La question juive 1940-1942 (Vol. 1), 1942. Les cent jours de 
 la déportation des Juifs de Belgique (Vol. 2), La traque des Juifs, 1942-1944 (Vol. 3)  
 Bruxelles: Vie ouvrière, 1983-1986.  
Steur, C. Theodor Dannecker: ein Funtionär der “Endlösung”. Essen: Klartext Verlag, 1997. 
Struye, P. and G. Jacquemyns, La Belgique sous l’Occupation Allemande (1940-1944). Bruxelles: 
 Ceges, Éditions Complexe, 2002.  
Suhl, Y. They Fought Back: the story of the Jewish resistance in Nazi Europe. Michigan: Crown  
 Publishers, 1967. 
Szajkowski, Z. Analytical Franco-Jewish Gazetteer, 1939-1945. New York:  Shulsinger Brothers, 
 1966.  
—., “The Organisation of the ‘UGIF’ in Nazi-Occupied France” in: Jewish Social Studies, Vol. 9, 
 No. 3 (1947); 239-256.  
Tammes, P. “Jewish Immigrants in the Netherlands during the Nazi Occupation” in: The Journal of 
 Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2007); 543-562.  
Trunk, I. Jewish responses to Nazi persecution: collective and individual behavior in extremis. New 
 York: Stein and Day, 1979.  
—., Judenrat: The Jewish Councils in Eastern Europe under Nazi Occupation. Lincoln:  
 University of Nebraska Press, 1996; first ed. 1972.  
Tuchel, J. “Heinrich Müller: Prototyp des Schreibtischtäters” in: H. C. Jasch and C. Kreutzmüller 
 (eds.), Die Teilnehmer: die Männer der Wannsee-Konferenz. Berlin: Metropol-Verlag;  
 111-128.  
Umbreit, H. Der Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich. Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1968. 
Valk, H.J., De Rotterdamse Joden tijdens de bezetting. Rotterdam: s.n., 1955.  
Vandepontseele, S. “De verplichte tewerkstelling van joden in België en Noord-Frankrijk” in: R.  
 van Doorslaer and J. Schreiber (eds.), De curatoren van het getto: de Vereniging van Joden 
 in België tijdens de Nazi-bezetting. Tielt: Lannoo, 2004.  
Velaers, J. and H. van Goethem. Leopold III: De koning, het land, de oorlog. Tielt: Lannoo, 1994. 
Veld, N.K.C. in ’t, De Joodse Ereraad. Den Haag: SDU Uitgeverij, 1989.  
Verhoeyen, E. België Bezet, 1940-1944. Brussel: BRTN Educatieve Uitgaven, 1993.  
Vincenot, A., La France résistance. Histoire de héros ordinaires. Paris: Les Syrtes, 2004.  
!304
Vries, H. de. “Sie starben wie Fliegen im Herbst” in: Ibid. (ed.), Mauthausen: 1938-1988.  
 Bredevoort: Achterland, 2000; 7-18.  
Vromen, S. Hidden children of the Holocaust: Belgian Nuns and Their Daring Rescue of Young  
 Jews from the Nazis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.  
Wasserstein, B. Gertrude van Tijn en het lot van de Nederlandse Joden. Amsterdam: Nieuw  
 Amsterdam Uitgevers, 2013; this work was published in English as The ambiguity of  
 virtue:  Gertrude van Tijn and the fate of Dutch Jews. Cambridge/Massachussets: Harvard 
 University Press, 2014.  
Weber, E. “Reflections on the Jews in France” in: F. Malino and B. Wasserstein (eds.), The Jews in 
 Modern France. Hanover / London: University Press of New England, 1985; 8-27.  
Weinberg, D. “The Revival of French Jewry in Post-Holocaust France: Challenges and   
 Opportunities” in: S. Hand and S. T. Katz (eds.), Post-Holocaust France and the Jews. New 
 York/London:  New York University Press, 2015; 26-37.  
—., A Community on Trial: The Jews of Paris in the 1930s. Chicago: University of Chicago  
 Press, 1977.  
Weisberg, R. Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France. Amsterdam: Harwoord Academic   
 Publishers, 1996. 
Weiss, A. “Jewish Leaders in Occupied Poland: Postures and Attitudes” in: Yad Vashem Studies,  
 Vol. 12 (1977); 335-365.  
Wielek, H. De oorlog die Hitler won. Amsterdam: Amsterdamsche Boek- en Courantmij, 1947.  
Wieviorka, A. “Les Juifs en France au lendemain de la guerre: état des lieux” in: Archives Juives. 
 Revue d’histoire des Juifs de France, No. 28, Vol. 1 (1995); 4-22.  
—., Ils étaient juifs, résistants, communistes. Paris: Denoël, 1986.  
—., “l’UGIF n’a jamais été un Judenrat” in: Pardès, No. 2 (1985); 191-209.  
—.,  and M. Laffitte. À l’intérieur du camp de Drancy. Paris: Perrin, 2012.  
Wieviorka, O. The French Resistance, transl. from the French by Jane Marie Todd. Cambridge /  
 London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016; first French ed. 2013.  
Wormser, G. Français israélites: Une doctrine – une tradition – une époque. Paris: Éditions de  
 Minuit, 1963.  
Wouters, N. “De Jodenvervolging voor de Belgische rechters, 1944-1951” in: R. van Doorslaer, E. 
 Debruyne et al., (eds), Gewillig België: overheid en jodenvervolging tijdens de Tweede  
 Wereldoorlog. Amsterdam/Antwerpen: Meulenhoff / Manteau, 2007; 801-1029.  
—., De overheid en collaboratie in België, 1940-1944. Tielt: Lannoo, 2006.  
Yagil, L. Chrétiens et Juifs sous Vichy (1940-1944): sauvetage et désobéissance civile. Paris:  
 Cerf, 2005.  
Yahil, L. “The Jewish Leadership of France” in: Patterns of Jewish Leadership in Nazi-Europe,  
 1933-1945: Proceedings of the Third Yad Vashem International Conference (1977);  
 317-333.  
—., The Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry, 1932-1945, transl. from the Hebrew by I.  
 Friedman and H. Galai. New York: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.  
Zee, N. van der. Om erger te voorkomen: de voorgeschiedenis en uitvoering van de vernietiging van 
 het Nederlandse jodendom tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1997.  
Zeitoun, S. “L’OSE au secours des enfants Juifs” in: Le Sauvetage des Enfants Juifs de France.  
 Actes de Colloque de Guéret - 29 et 30 May 1996. Guéret: Associations pour la recherche et 
 la sauvegarde de la vérité historique sur la Résistance en Creuse, undated; 93-104.  
Zimmerman, M (ed.), On Germans and Jews under the Nazi Regime: Essays by Three Generations 
 of Historians. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 2006.  
!305
Zuccotti, S. The Holocaust, the French and the Jews. Nebraska: University Press, 1999; first ed.  
 1993.  
3. Unpublished secondary sources 
Donnet, A. “Le procès de l’A.J.B. n’aura pas lieu: Analyse du dossier 8036/44 de l’Auditorat  
 Militaire de Bruxelles”, doctoral thesis Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1992-1993.  
Doorslaer, R. van. “De kinderen van het getto: Joodse immigratie en communisme in België   
 1925-1940”, doctoral thesis Rijksuniversiteit Gent, 1990. 
Douarion, B. le, “Le Comité ‘Rue Amelot’, 1940-1944 à Paris. Assistance aux Juifs et Sauvetage  
 des Enfants”, master’s thesis Paris Sorbonne, 1994.  
Hofmeester, K. “De Joodse Raad in de illegale pers: de berichtgeving over de Joodse Raad in zes 
 illegale bladen nader beschouwd”, doctoral thesis Universiteit Amsterdam, 1987.  
Kieval, H. “From Social Work to Resistance: Relief and Rescue of Jewish Children in Vichy   
 France”, BA Harvard University, 1973.  
Romijn, P. “Snel, streng en rechtvaardig: politiek beleid inzake de bestraffing en reclassering van 
 ‘foute’ Nederlanders, 1945-1955”, doctoral thesis Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 1989.  
!306
